EXAMINING STATE DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA,
THROUGH SENEGAL AND NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper studies the relationship between the state and armed conflict in West Africa with an emphasis placed on the value, influence, and role of social institutions on the long-term stability of the West African state. The countries of the Republic of Senegal and Nigeria represent the primary focus of the paper. Comparisons are made of the history of each country/state and experience with socio-political conflict in an effort to explain the penultimate place of social as opposed to legalistic or political influences responsible for the long term survival of the independent state in West Africa. The central question explored in this study is: is the survival of the state in West Africa due to the strength of socio-institutional influence as related to culture or ethnicity, or does primacy of power rest with legalistic influences that are the by-products of the legal establishment such as a state Constitution, the political party system, or established electoral procedures?

Chapter 1 explores this issue in-depth with an examination of literature from a variety of major sources as they relate to the central question posed in this study (see above). Chapters 2 and 3 delve further in the specifics with detailed cases of Senegal and Nigeria. Chapter 4 attempts to compare and contrast the complexities and similarities found in the Senegal and Nigeria cases. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the study. This study demonstrates the importance of social institutions in West African state formation and reaches the conclusion that in the case of the nations of West Africa at least, successful state formation ultimately rests on strong social institutions that function to fortify political cohesion while facilitating long-term stability and cohesion.
PREFACE

This thesis was written to connect ideas from many different social sciences, particularly the specializations within political science. In that sense, it has fallen victim to being very broad in scope. A secondary goal of this paper is to add to the work being done to study African nation-states and societies. There is much to be learned from the emergence of these nation-states and today’s scholar should be aware there are years of progress to come. Not to be clichéd, but the world is changing quickly, and the relationship between the industrialized nations of the world and Africa is also changing. It was not so many years ago that the major players in Africa were the United States and the former United Soviet Socialist Republics. It will not be long before all the world’s leading powers set up economic offices and begin to expand already growing fiscal relationships in West Africa.
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To my family, thank you for reminding me why I am here. Finally, to my husband Nathan, thank you for your reassurance. I only hope that I can return the favor one day.
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States (used in this context as independent nations) experience political development as a process; moving from a position of relative weakness to strength as they construct institutions to carry out one of their primary internal functions, conflict resolution. Political development is a multi-dimensional process during which the state enhances ideological domination, institutionalization, control and utilization of resources and the ability to adapt (Samudavaniya 1991, 19). This process, by which a state matures, depends on the creation and effective use of conflict resolution to ensure the effective suppression of violence and smooth dispersal of state resources from the government to the population and back. During the early stages of both state formation and state development, disagreements over the allocation of resources can lead to the destruction of the state. The purpose of this study is to reveal why this is the case. This study will demonstrate the effect of these conflict resolving institutions in the earliest stages of state development. It is expected that the development of a strong state, one that is thoroughly politically developed, capable of preventing the development of internal armed conflict, will have developed two varieties of conflict resolution institutions: one being democratic institutions, the other being more peace-building in nature. These institutions create a sense of identity connecting the state and its population in such a way as to enhance the legitimacy of the state and unify to a greater extent the population within its borders.
In cases where armed conflict occurs, stability is more difficult to achieve and makes the task of developing and implementing efficient conflict-resolution institutions difficult to establish. Because the local government is constantly in a kind of crisis mode, government leaders are too concerned with maintaining power to deal effectively with this particular type of institution building. This study will also demonstrate the greatest weakness of using democratic institutions as a tool of conflict resolution or peace building, showing that their most effective use requires a specific chain of events, namely, that they be used prior to the rise of armed conflict, as well as when the state is somewhat homogenous. It is expected that there will be variance among states as to how effective democratic institutions can be depending on the history of armed conflict and the extent to which the state has developed a sense of national identity, unity or ‘collectivity’ as described by Sidney Tarrow (2004).

This study will provide a framework for understanding state development by examining the process in West Africa where the modern state is still young and adapting albeit through struggle. State development is a process and no state is ever “finished” developing. It is clear that some are more developed than others. The framework presented here depends on seeing development as a unique path each state takes. The purpose of a state is to seek its own wellbeing, to allocate resources and distribute them, and to increase its ability to exact sovereignty. Where its internal functions are concerned, inability to fulfill its purpose leads to confrontation from challengers. Conflict results in a loss of resources and over time this can increase the likelihood of state failure and collapse from within. The dilemma in many African countries has been that the state and its government fail to govern effectively, particularly when it comes to conflict resolution. Those wishing to challenge the government and its leaders have often found identity issues to be tools with which to build a base of followers. Building a positive
connection amongst the populace may be essential to prevent this cycle of events. Pre-emptive conflict resolution, sometimes referred to as peace building in the form of institutions, whether endemic to the government (democratic institutions) or the society are necessary for state development. Over time, these institutions should generate a strong state.
CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW AND APPROACH

Early academic contributions to the study of state development applicable to this study include modernization theory, Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1959) theory of social cleavage, and structural-functionalism. These theories have set the tone for contemporary understanding of the state, its development, and functions. Though ultimately a critique of modernization theory, Samuel P. Huntington’s *Political Order and Changing Societies* (1968) demonstrates the purpose of modernization theory. Lipset (1968) explains how states become “modern” or developed, the term which today is used to describe a similar notion. Early in the discipline, it was believed that countries were capable of growing out of their traditional conditions, with traditional often meaning primitive in comparison to the modern states found in the West. Huntington (1968) was a bit of a revolutionary in his suggestion that authoritarianism in some form could provide an alternative path to modernization, which at that time meant economic development and ultimately democracy. At the time, others were more strictly in favor of a linear developmental trajectory leading inherently to democracy and economic development and the creation of a strong state, almost directly from a traditional society.

Modernization theory quickly found itself under strenuous critique. The strongest critiques came from dependency and world systems theory that attacked modernization theory primarily on its economic assumptions. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s in political science,
economics and political development were often discussed as though they were one in the same. Almost an equivalent of the Marxist critique of capitalism, dependency theory and its proponents in the 1970s sided with socialist republics in the “third world” and retained a certain disdain for capitalism and its supporters. Indeed, dependency theory itself suggests the only way to development, especially economic development, is by reversing the flow of capital from the peripheral third world to the core (modern or first world). It was thought that this could be the only path to development for the underdeveloped. The very term “underdeveloped” was no doubt intentionally used by Walter Rodney (1982) in the title of his book How Europe Underdeveloped Africa to draw attention not only to the historical roots of underdevelopment, but also to the notion that a certain amount of blame lies beyond African shores, and that underdevelopment was caused in part by the actions of outsiders. This notion of Rodney’s is important and epitomized the emerging paradigm of the international political environment at the time. The critique of development theory, of course, was that many of the woes suffered in Africa—and in the “third world” as a whole—were due to problems within as well as without this territory, and that responsibility also lay at home.

World systems theory, like dependency theory, is also heavily concerned with economics. This theory attempts to explain not only underdevelopment, but offers a vision of how the world may change without relying on Marxist ideology or a critique of capitalism to create change. Like dependency theory, world systems theory is historically conscious, while remaining ideologically less argumentative with capitalism. Immanuel Wallerstein (2000) believed strongly in the impermanence of conditions in the world system, echoing the primary sentiment of modernization theory, that growth and change are possible, and perhaps inevitable. The broad nature of these theories and their overt focus on economics failed to offer a clear route to change
or address underlying political questions. However, the benefit gained however from their pursuits was a means of more clearly explaining the state of conditions in the rising third world, including large parts of Africa. These theories suggest more importantly, that no state operates in isolation from the rest of the world, one of their primary critiques no doubt influenced by the experience of the Cold War. Leaping to the logical conclusion, there is no state whose development politically or economically can be studied in isolation from external influence and or manipulation. An awareness of this condition should permeate our study of the subject of development, something modernization theory has failed to do from the outset.

There were other criticisms of modernization theory. Chai-Anan Samudavanija (1991, 15-16) criticized the movement for being handicapped by its reliance on Western thought, constantly torn between dichotomies of modern versus traditional, thesis and anti-thesis and capitalism opposed to socialist thought. Samudavanija (1991) argued that a three dimensional analysis should be used to explain the process of development for a state, using the measure of security, development and participation (Samudavanija 1991) ultimately producing four types of states. This type of framework addressed some of the most important qualities of the state; the use of force internally and externally (security), while participation addresses the internal relationship between the state and society. Development for Samudavanija (1991) represented a dimension of capacity or strength, one specifically tied to institutions of the government to exercise and plan administrative tasks. His outline of these dimensions captures the essence of what a state is and what it is required to do while providing a system for evaluating that capacity.

Samudavanija’s (1991) framework for understanding the functions of a state is no doubt based on a common understanding of what a state is. Francis Fukuyama (2004, 1) describes the state as “an ancient human institution dating back some 10,000 years to the first agricultural
societies that sprang up in Mesopotamia.” Today it is a permanent and all-encompassing aspect of global politics. A state is more than a government. It is a governing body, wherein rests the final authority over the use of force within its territory and over its citizens. A state is recognized by other states as such. But the state also has a purpose specific to its population. States maintain contracts of agreement with their citizens. They must have control over the use of force, to not only protect the citizenry from outsiders, but to also protect the citizenry from itself. A state uses laws, policies, and the threat or use of force to achieve these ends. These are the most basic and important aspects of a state. But how should the state be assessed in terms of its ability to carry out these duties?

Francis Fukuyama (2004) claims that there are two levels of state strength: scope and capacity. Fukuyama (2004) defines scope as a range or continuum of duties and activities scaled from those duties deemed necessary to those activities viewed as optional, and there is no definite hierarchy along the continuum. Capacity or strength as Fukuyama (2004, 8) refers to the state’s ability to both “formulate and carry out policies” as well as the passage of laws. But the capacity of a state to fulfill those duties lacks any standard measure (Fukuyama 2004, 9). If there is no hierarchy of functions and no appropriate means to measure them, then how can those functions be measured in a test? States use institutions to exercise power that is agreed upon, but there is no agreed upon measure universally describing the strength of individual institutions (Fukuyama 2004, 9). This is due to cultural emphasis, and what each society demands of its state. In academia there are numerous frameworks for categorizing state functions, institutions, and the like. This is a significant aspect of comparative politics. So how can we perform an exam to determine how along a state is in its development, what abilities or failures would point to, or describe fulfillment of this capacity?
Like Samudavanija (1991), Francis Fukuyama (2004) has a system which contains four dimensions to address the internal pillars of the state. Fukuyama’s (2004) frame is based on an economic model of supply and demand, the state being the prime supplier to society’s demands. In this system, the state must have an organizational/administrative capacity, a political system, a base for legitimization, and cultural values which shape the habits of the state (Fukuyama 2004). Each of these pillars, like those of Samudavanija (1991, 22) influence the character and direction of the other recreating and enacting the state as a political force. Francis Fukuyama (2004) emphasizes an additional component to this framework, the role of the society. He describes society as an actor making demands on the state specifically for institutions (Fukuyama 2004, 33). This demand can change, expand, or contract. Fukuyama (2004) is concerned with what causes demand for new institutions and capacities. This is a very important quality in that it hints at a source or potential cause for development or change in the state. That impetus comes from society. It is Fukuyama’s (2004) opinion that society itself is the best vehicle for innovation and improvement in the strength of the state apparatus and where that demand is absent, consequentially, state-building will be unsuccessful. Fukuyama (2004) does not reject a tie between internal conflict and the process of state-building. He claims that there are cases where internal conflict creates demand for new institutions (Fukuyama 2004). But this statement is missing an antecedent.

The missing element between Fukuyama (2004) and Samudavanija (1991) is the emphasis on what causes society to demand change and what causes the state to develop. The answer is found in the wants and needs of the society. Even on the individual level, society articulates its needs to the government in some capacity. If the government lacks the will or capacity to address societal needs, depending on the extent of importance attributed to the need,
the more likely the society will be to mobilize in challenge of the government. This mobilization would tend to challenge the government specifically on the ground of the state’s weakness and offer an alternative system. In this sense, it is possible to trace, through the events of political conflict, to those areas of want specific to a given society. Each state-society relationship is unique. Assessing what needs a state must buttress to increase its strength can only be addressed by the society it belongs to. Actors and analysts must therefore measure the effectiveness of the state by the criteria that society provides. If society’s demands for a specific institution are at the forefront in the lead up to an open conflict, then it can be inferred that this is an area of particular weakness on the part of the state’s capacity. Society has provided its own rubric for ranking the importance of institutions and their capacity.

Because of constant fluctuation in the demands of society, anticipating those demands is difficult. When domestic turbulence is more likely, this tendency toward rapidly changing demands may even be greater in the early stages of development. Thus, predicting what those demands will be in the future is ever more difficult. However, history can be used however to aid in the prediction of the future. Examining what conflicts have brought a state’s development to a halt in the past can illustrate what issues and or problems would be more likely to cause domestic conflict in the future. Therefore, forensic investigation into previous armed conflict should be gathered in order to understand the demands of the society upon its state.

Looking to comparative politics, it is clear that the process of state development is one of demand articulation and slow growth to meet those articulations. When European states began to consolidate around the idea of the nation-state, there was a significant period of turmoil. This period in European history was characterized primarily by war and violence. The situation in West Africa today is comparable. Charles Tilly (1990) examines the history of state development
in Europe, noting that hardly a thousand years ago nearly all the states of Europe exhibited the symptoms of internal weakness similar to that observed today in a variety of African states (1990, 39). Tilly (1990) describes the leadership in Europe during the late tenth century as consisting largely of “emperors, kings and caliphs.” His description hardly evoked the modern image of the king in control of a well formed and durable state, calling them instead “conquerors, tribute-takers, and rentiers” (Tilly 1990, 40). Prior to the late fifteenth century there was nothing resembling a centralized nation state as they are known today in Europe (Tilly 1990, 40).

Beginning in the tenth century, Tilly (1990) notes it took a period of six hundred years before centralization would lead to the creation of the first “modern” kingdom. During this period, economic interest led to the greatest changes in the state model for Europe during this era. War was a key instrument in the accumulation of capital for the centralizing powers (Tarrow 2004). Just like Africa, some states in Europe more quickly developed policies and “tools” to consolidate their state-society.

Tarrow (2004) cites Italy as an example of a state slow to consolidate. Italy became a state only when it developed a political sense of itself, not necessarily by economic or military prowess. Tarrow (2004, 448) notes that specifically absent from Italy was an “internal arrangement” to inspire an idea of collectivity, of the common good, over and above the needs of the elite class. This sense of nationhood or “collectivity” is absent in pre-modern Italy, and largely absent from the cases to be reviewed here for much, if not all, of their modern history. And like Africa, the state in Europe did not develop the nation-state overnight. It emerged via a political process, involving the slow changing of borders, ethnic cleansing, and cultural assimilation. If Tilly (1990) describes the states in Europe as emerging over time, and Tarrow (2004) acknowledges that the state in actuality only comes into existence after coming to this
concept of a collective identity, then how have African states developed? It is clear that for much
of the time until now the process for some of the African states has been different from what
occurred in Europe, the standard bearer of Statehood. The trappings of the state (defined borders,
a type of government, population, external recognition) were present in Africa before the idea of
state actually appeared socially amongst the population. This state of existence is obviously a
product of the colonial period. In Africa, this has meant that the state had to grow and developed
to fit already established borders and a given population rather than naturally over time, through
external wars and other conquests. As a result, conflicts and coups have occurred rapidly in the
initial stages of development. Conflict occurs when there are challenges to the state, and when a
centralized power begins to decay, conflict tends to occur.

Were this process of assimilation to have been skipped, Europe could easily look like
Africa today. According to Tilly (1990, 45), “no plausible definition of political units would
leave us with less than 80” and the total could have tallied over 200 in Europe. With this in mind,
using Nigeria as an example with more than 200 existing ethnic groups reveal that even one state
could conceivably have more countries within it then all of Europe today. The behaviors that best
aided Europe in its transition into statehood revolved around a slow process of disarmament
(Tilly 1990). This is a process that the leadership in Africa has as yet been unable to complete,
but one that is absolutely necessary for moving the state from a low to high level of development
in terms of force. In Europe, the process started with much smaller states and grew until
eventually, the state held more force than smaller domestic bodies (Tilly 1990, 69). By necessity,
the civilian population was slowly disarmed and the power of force became concentrated in the
state base (Tilly 1990, 69). Despite the abundance of technical prowess available to Africa’s
states today, alliance with and reliance on the West has often been necessary. There remain
militias and other groups who have periodically been able to acquire military strength comparable to the state in conjunction with a following amongst the population. The issue of force is critical to state power as several authors have already demonstrated, namely Tilly (1990), Skocpol (1979), and Weber (1947). But it should also follow that force alone does not create a stable state capable of remaining free of internal conflict. By definition, dictatorships use force to hold on to power, but ultimately, their ability to hold the state together becomes defined by the willingness of their subjects to submit. It becomes a question of legitimacy. Therefore, the state must have policies and/or institutions which ensure that non-state actors are weakened in favor of the state along many dimensions, not just with raw military strength. The ability to prevent the want for armed resistance in the first place becomes paramount when taking into account this problem. Perhaps it is that sense of collectivity or “identity” that Tarrow (2004) was referring to.

When analyzing the process of state development it should again be emphasized that it took hundreds of years and cost the lives of millions of people for Europe to first develop states and then move toward more developed states as Tilly (1990) describes. Conversely, the period of colonialism produced the rough outlines of states in Africa over the period of a conference and a century; and since that time, very little has changed. And while the majority of the armed conflict occurring on the continent has been internal, it follows that by curtailing the process something vital which aided development of the European states did not have an opportunity to create development in the African state. Between the eighteenth and nineteenth century estimates show that over ten million people died in some 273 wars largely between the great powers of Europe (Tilly 1990). These wars occurred as the centralization process was coming to a head. If the number of wars is an indication of a high level of centralization occurring, then the situation in Africa in general is hopeful because the worse could have already passed during the period of the
1990s. The end of the twentieth century saw a complete breakdown in the state system for large swaths of the continent including West Africa, and the emergence of fewer new challengers. Why did this occur? Tilly (1990) seems to suggest that the denouement of interstate conflict in Europe signaled a sort of finality to the process of building the ‘outline’ of the state. If this is the case, then to what can be attributed the decrease in violence in Africa?

One reason for a significant uptick and resulting decrease in armed conflict in Africa can be attributed to the Cold War which resulted in a huge shift in resources out of the region. This has been suggest by Christopher Clapham (2003), who observed the patterns of violence in the 1990s throughout Africa as symptomatic of the power vacuum created when the United States and the Soviet Union scaled back their local interventions. This external change had a profound effect on the continent. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. had far less reason to invest time and energy into Africa since the rewards for global prestige were greatly reduced for either side after 1991. Consequently, with the retraction of the U.S. and U.S.S.R influence, African states began to collapse under the pressures of militant groups in their societies. This process of disengagement revealed the underlying weakness in West African states as it did throughout the continent and it revealed how important the pressure of external force was in holding the African states together.

The collapse of Africa’s states both demonstrated their internal weakness and the inability of the leadership to quickly repair the damage. Many leaders failed repeatedly to enact policy changes or build alternative institutions that would uphold the authority of the state. The failure of the leadership to act appropriately impaired the state and had the effect of multiplying the economic, military, and social problems that were already present. Coupled with other factors relevant to the international system as a whole, the result was almost inevitably the virtual collapse of the state. If one were to look to the French Revolution as an example, it was clear that
the collapse of trade was in some ways connected to the revolution itself as well as the wars thereafter (Skocpol 1979). The revolution precipitated great change in the state that had little to do objectively with issues of freedom or democracy. Throughout France, new systems of “law, taxation, and customs replaced the regional variations and local barriers of prerevolutionary times” (Skocpol 1979, 179) were built, creating a new government, but not a new state. As a result services and opportunities were distributed to the population while an increasing number of demands were put on the citizenry as a whole (Skocpol 1979, 179). The populous as a whole had significantly more active involvement in state functions after that period, providing more money, time, and manpower to carry out national objectives, the objectives of the state (Skocpol 1979, 179). It resulted finally, in the full implementation of the French nation-state. Prior to that point, there existed both a state and a nation. The revolution ultimately meant a “bureaucratic, mass-incorporating and state-strengthening” (Skocpol 1979, 179), something far more specific to the state itself then the nation as a social construct. The revolution ultimately merged the state to the social construct of the nation. The difference between France and the states of West Africa, in large part is that by the time of the French Revolution, the French nation was largely present conceptually as an underlying unity. As a result, the revolution was just that, a change in government and a morphing of power within society, but not the abandonment of the state as a concept. Skocpol’s (1979) research into social revolutions demonstrates the difference between the violence that emerges in a revolution like that in France and the violence of separatist wars. One is concerned with a profound change in the essential elements of the state, the membership of a population, the location of borders as well as government. Revolutions are concerned with changing the government or altering the balances of power within the classes. As a whole, revolutions are not about complete remodeling of the state and its most basic attributes.
The Nigerian nation, unlike the nation in revolutionary France, does not as yet exist, certainly not to an extent worthy of calling the country a nation-state. It would be exceedingly difficult for Nigeria to conduct a revolution without that revolution becoming a threat to the state’s existence within the confines of its borders and given population. The French revolution occurred under what were believed by the people to be the leaders; they were emphatically French reforming officials (Skocpol 1979). In Nigeria a distinction must be made that could not be made as easily in France. In Nigeria, not only has the state come under separatist threat (challenging the entity), but the government has also been challenged. Christopher Clapham (1996) explains this more broadly in Africa as at least partially induced by external interference. The governments and leaders of Africa, and by proxy the state (due to a lack of “collectivity”), because of the Washington Consensus, has had the unfortunate appearance of being collaborators with the West, and for some legitimately so. This is acknowledged by Christopher Clapham (1996, 2003) who notes that in the 1980s, the philosophy of structural adjustment, as a form of neo-patrimonialism, failed completely, and occurred not incidentally prior to the waves of state collapse in the 1990s. This point is even more salient when observed against the backdrop of history. Decolonization began in the 1950s and 1960s, and only for a brief period were the states able, with a somewhat free hand, to begin the process of true state building. By the 1970s, there was a resurgence in the Cold War, and simultaneously, a resurgence of external influence in Africa (Clapham 2003, 32). This period prepared the way for the usurpation of the 1980s and the complete degradation of the state in Africa as a whole by the 1990s.

As the states began to lose legitimacy through this degradation, these events provided fertile ground in which insurgencies could grow and expand. In the face of state breakdown, ethnicity became a clear line of allegiance that was used to mobilize the populace. Ethnic militias
were often recruited during this period to assist in protecting the state, but as evidenced again by history, the effect was often the opposite, and became highly erosive to the state’s social foundation. The results were often an increase in violence and a resultant decrease in the state’s domestic strength. Buhaug and Gates (2002, 420) in their study on armed conflict acknowledged these ethnic alliances as non-state alliances, placing them under the rubric of identity politics. They found that 59% of all conflicts are related to identity politics (Buhaug and Gates 2002, 424). In many African countries “the kin and ethnic groups both exert substantial coercive power” on their populations (Azam 2001, 430), further signifying the weakness of the state as originally conceptualized by the West. Again, the state, in this tradition, must have a monopoly over the use of force (Weber 1947), which Jean-Paul Azam (2001) and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (2005) show they do not. These ethno-political groups, as termed by Robert Gurr (2000), not only have coercive ability, but they can be very organized and efficient at mobilization, where the state is less so (Azam 2001, 431; Oberschall 2004). As was also demonstrated by Anthony Oberschall (2004), this kind of mobilization makes use of the ethnic network, but in Azam’s (2001) analysis, the focus was also to show how this mobilization is used in rebellion in Africa, particularly after exclusion from financially and politically beneficial systems. Clearly then, in the development of a state, the sense of a collective identity and—if Skocpol is correct (1979) collective “participation”—is important to counteract the power of ethnicity as a form of collective action, an idea echoed by none other than Seymour Martin Lipset (1959).

Lipset (1959) thought that ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ were important for state stability. He defined these cleavages as an identity based not on ethnicity or religion but a political or associational relationship such as a party. Lipset’s contention is supported by Samuel Huntington (1996, 401) for whom the party system was the preferred method for channeling the
“participation of new groups” in a state. Huntington (1996) believed that political participation could devolve into mass movements were the proper institutions and/or parties not in place to organize the groups effectively. It was Huntington’s (1996) opinion that without these parties it would be difficult for the state to handle rapid changes. Similarly, Lipset (1959) believed that these sorts of ‘political’ relationships were vital in states making the transition into stable democracy. Lipset (1959, 96) referred to the institutions that would perform the function just described as “multiple and politically inconsistent affiliations”; highlighting the possibility that a variety of associational groups could be included under his notion of a “cross-cutting cleavage.” The ultimate purpose of these institutions for Lipset (1959) was ultimately to force the populous to engage in collective bargaining and to inculcate democratic values such as tolerance and cooperation. Inherent to “all democratic systems,” according to Lipset, was a continuous threat that the conflicts among different groups could “crystallize to the point where societal disintegration is threatened.” This eventuality would mean the collapse of the state from within. Therefore, conditions or institutions operating as channels for intra-group politics are absolute necessities for the growth and development of stable democracies (Lipset 1959). These institutions are not only important to democracies as Lipset (1959) described, but to all states making transitions that the states in Africa are undertaking. These transitions are not solely a journey toward democracy, but more importantly a transition into independent statehood. Cross-cutting cleavages may also represent an alternative to Tarrow’s (2004) notion of collectivity or national identity. These cleavages, if they operate the way Lipset (1959) describes could take on many forms, ultimately performing the function of “collectivity,” enabling smooth conflict resolution and peace building.
Samuel Huntington (1996, 402, 408) found that the “modernizing” state’s existence was dependent almost entirely on the strength of its parties, and without them “anomic politics and violence” would ensue. The history of a place plays a pivotal role in determining the likelihood that conflicts arise, and a history of conflict tends to correlate with continued conflict. Africa’s colonial period and the movements for independence resulted in conflict early in the history of many countries. According to Huntington (1996, 418), conflict is expected because “colonial governments tend to suppress nationalist movements for as long as possible, and then when they see independence as inevitable” force that independence as quickly as possible. The result is what he calls an “aborted political development” (Huntington 1968, 418). And it is clear from the history of the African states that after independence, there was a significant period of political stagnation and decay. The product of this stunted political growth, in many circumstances, was conflict between ethnic groups. The result of this ethnic conflict was an intense memory of hatred defined by their identities that contributed to continued conflict in the future (Gurr 2000; Ignatieff 1997). In effect, having a history of conflict contributes to more of the same in the future. Collier and Hoeffler, using their own econometric model, utilized a factor termed “peace duration” to proxy for the history of conflict in a given state (2002). This factor was defined as the number of months “since the end of the previous conflict or since 1945”; of which, Collier and Hoeffler found that countries faced a 50% risk of renewed conflict after having a conflict within five years (2002, 17). As discussed previously, when it comes to rebel mobilization, identity is a convenient mobilizing force. People are susceptible to the power of nationalist ideology and demagogues who would use any marker of identity to encourage violence and dehumanize “the enemy.” This process can feed on itself, and become a response to
a weak state that cannot or will not effectively address the needs and desires of its population (Ignatieff 1997, 45).

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002), who were trying to predict the probable start of armed conflict in a country, used their analytic model to determine whether or not a rebel organization would be established, similar to the work of Jean-Paul Azam (2001). Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 15) also needed to find a manner to determine if rebel groups possessed any “military viability.” Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 15) found that rebellions were most likely in those societies where government forces were weak and geography made it difficult to defend national territory. Three factors were used in their study to proxy for the strength of rebel movements and the weakness of the government: social fractionalization, ethnic dominance, and geographic dispersion (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). As for social fractionalization, Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 17) found that fractionalized or highly diverse societies were safer than those that were homogeneous, attributing this safety to the inability of rebel groups to mobilize across a sufficient number of groups.

This is an interesting finding when compared with the thoughts held by the likes of Tarrow (2004) or even Lipset (1959). Like Lipset (1959), Collier and Hoeffler’s findings seem to indicate a necessity to have a large number of identities to prevent conflict, albeit for different reasons. Lipset (1959) perceived that the effect of a number of identities (associations) would create a necessity to bargain. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) believed that a large number of identities prevent conflict by preventing coalition building along one (ethnic) identity. What then is the purpose of a collective identity, as proposed by Tarrow (2004)? It appears there is significant disagreement about this. European history and the very concept of nation-state would indicate homogeneity, perhaps in the form of a collective identity, is necessary for state
development, and the development of a strong state. On the other hand, the work of Collier and Hoeffler as well as Lipset, seem to support heterogeneity and the institutions of democracy as the preferred conflict resolution techniques. This dichotomy raises the question of which has the greatest ability to encourage state development.

The 1990s were characterized by ethnic civil wars. The wars occurred across the continent, including large parts of West Africa. Those states that had depended the most on external backing, from both the USSR and US, were more prone to collapse than those that were supported indigenously (Clapham 1996, 35). A striking example of this is provided by Clapham (1996) who cites Eritrea (albeit located in the Horn of Africa) where a non-state insurgency attained strong military organization and effectively created a state through the overthrow of an ineffectual one, replacing it with a far stronger body. This demonstrates a pattern akin to evolution or development, where the body with the best adaptation for the environment becomes the successor. Looking back at the work of Skocpol (1979) it is evident that while the revolutions were in part about mass movements, the pairing of state and government that emerged after the fighting had ceased did so because the emergent state-government was better equipped than the previous structure. More importantly, the strength of the state was not solely about military strength, but its political institutions.

In the case of Skocpol’s France (1979) all the changes to the state and its distribution of power were not altered completely. But this example demonstrates a common staple. The elites have often been more concerned with their wealth and fortune and those of their families and kin groups over and above that of the “nation.” Indeed, the remedy to this elitism in France was the revolution, but more importantly, actual structural reforms to amend, to some degree, this elitism. In China, France and Russia, participation and the accomplishments of the peasantry
were vital to state-building and consolidation (Skocpol 1979, 279). The result of the French revolution was the creation of institutions for participation in French government. This dovetails with Huntington’s (1968, 2006) requirement for structured political participation. It would appear that this is what is needed not just in West Africa but in any state that has failed to develop a strong state society relationship. This does not necessarily require adherence to a completely democratic form of government, but any form of government capable of replicating an advanced degree of structured participation. Huntington (1968, 2006) even suggests that a socialist or communist government, because of the focus on the single party, could be useful as a substitute. Democracy is not the sole path to political stability but it does provide a sound alternative to the structures currently in place in some states. Moreover it is found to be more acceptable than many socialist forms of government today.

Democracy is a political structure, and as such its implementation is a political act, requiring a change in many policies and procedures of government. But as Bastian and Luckham (2003) argue quite effectively, democracy is not a universal panacea. It is clear that depending on the environment in which democracy is present and the timing of its implementation particularly in a heterogeneous society, democracy can be manipulated to strengthen majorities at the expense of minorities, protect social inequality, instigate conflict, reduce popular involvement in government and ensure the wealthy remain powerful. Bastian and Luckham’s (2003) belief that democracy can increase the risk of conflict in a heterogeneous society suggests a situation where the assessment of Collier and Hoeffler (2002) could be wrong. Counteracting a tendency toward armed conflict is dependent on the will of the people and its leadership, who can choose to manipulate democracy with negative consequences. In West Africa, it is clear that some of its budding democracies are far stronger than others. It is also clear from the early history of
Nigeria, as will be shown in case study, that democracy can be easily manipulated and become the generator of conflict. The difference between Ghana and most of the other countries in the region is often highlighted as further evidence of this. Ghana has actualized democratic values with far greater success than its neighbors. Actualization of democratic values in all of their variety will always be varied from state to state. However as the question of democracy relates to this study it is democracy’s effect that is most important, and the way in which democratic government came about.

Democracy is one tool among many a state and its leadership can utilize in order to smooth over the problem of a heterogeneous population without resorting to violence or ethnic cleansing. One evident problem presented by using Europe as an example is the difficulty of centralizing a state without what appears to be an almost requisite bloodshed that would remove outsiders and draw those who remain loyal to the prime national identity closer together. Common ethnicity or cultural ties do provide a kind of glue that aid in building loyalty to the state. In mediaeval times this common ethnicity or cultural ties were obviously required in the absence of democracy. In the modern era, particularly since the advent of modern moral consciousness which values human life, even that life which does not belong to the blood tie of the nation (Hannaford 1996), a resort to the kinds of brutal ethnic wars of centuries ago comes with slightly higher costs. In Africa, the cost is, as yet, not high enough for some leaders, as demonstrated by the Rwandan genocide.

The temptation to use ethnic cleansing and violence as opposed to democratic or political solutions has been frequently succumbed to in African history. In West Africa it is clear that ethnicity has been a strong factor in militia mobilization. This is a decision made by leaders; the question is which ethnicity is and under what conditions a certain ethnicity has been the
preferred choice. Clearly, there are goals and ambitions that these leaders sense would be negatively impacted by making decisions which would create free and open societies. There is, as will be demonstrated in case studies to come reward for emphasizing ethnicity for individuals or communities at the expense of state cohesion. In discussing Liberia, Martin Lowenkopf (1995) suggests that democracy as a ‘policy decision’ is absurd in the sense that the conditions have to be right in society itself first and foremost, and cannot therefore, be an institution granted from above but evolving from within and below. This is exceedingly important when examining the choices left to leaders as to how to develop their states and the choices available within society itself. The two, it would appear, go hand in hand. How then, can the state in Africa develop bloodlessly in the absence of a natural nation-state embodiment? It begs the question as to whether or not there is another choice, particularly in those places like many states in West Africa, where there has already been a history of violence. Lowenkopf (1995, 91) was convinced the answer lie in the society itself, where the people themselves desire to bring their country together. The information sought in the case studies to come will undoubtedly shed light on the process. How has one state like Nigeria traversed this dilemma as compared to Ghana, or Senegal, or Liberia? The answers will hopefully improve our understanding of why some states have developed along a more stable trajectory than others.

Approach and Data

This paper will demonstrate the overall supremacy of social institutions as tools for state development. Still, it should be clear that under the right conditions, political and democratic institutions can be used to fill in the gap where a sense of “national identity” is absent. West
Africa was selected because of the absence of significant external influence by the western powers into the affairs of the states during the period of the Cold War. This will allow for a more “isolated” study of the catalysts and resolutions of conflict. Conflicts and spouts of violence carried out for various political reasons will be examined in each state, particularly those reaching the level of armed conflict. Of particular interest in this study are the reasons for the conflict, and the resolution of the conflict, paying particular attention to the kinds of institutions used to resolve the conflict, and the extent of peace duration following the violence. The data will be collected from many sources, including but not limited to the UCPD/PRIO Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset, various journal articles, books, Lexis Nexus news sources, and data from the World Bank, Freedom House, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

If state development is the process during which the state enhances ideological domination, institutionalization, control and utilization of resources and the ability to adapt (Samudavanija 1991, 19), then the approach determining a state’s level of development should include an examination of these factors. On the continuum of developed and developing states, a state that is developed will have experienced an extended period of time without having endured internal armed conflict. The length of the period without conflict represents the effectiveness of that state’s domination and the extent of institutionalization. Armed conflict is defined by Collier Hoeffler (2002) as having 25 or more battle related deaths per year (See Chart 1). Senegal met this criteria during nine years (1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003) while Nigeria met the criteria for six years (1977-1970, 2004) based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002). The period under consideration is from 1960 to 2008, the period during which there is conflict data available (Gleditsch et al 2002). Each case study will focus most intensely on the period immediately impacted by conflict. This will mean
seeking an explanation of the cause of the ensuing peace duration as described by Collier and Hoeffler (2002), and seeking an explanation for its end. This will mean answering four key questions (see TABLE XX and TABLE XXI):

- What did society demand that the state could not provide which led to armed conflict?
- Was a political or social institution a partial cause for the conflict?
- How was the conflict resolved?
- Can the ensuing period of peace be attributed to either a democratic institution or a social (national) one?

Developed states are stable. Therefore, the duration of peace cannot be accompanied by repeated coups and brutal dictatorships which ferment the kind of anomic politics Huntington (1968) describes. Developed states exhibit smooth transitions of power (political stability) and are free from armed conflict for an extended period of time. The concern here is not a specific amount of time, but why that period comes to an end, since it is already understood that the state of development in these states is limited.
Chart 1. Armed Conflict Data for Nigeria and Senegal

Senegal has more years of conflict with a total of 10, while Nigeria totals 5. Still, Senegal managed over the period available (1973-2008) to have a better average freedom ranking than Nigeria, 1.9142 versus the Nigerian 2.0571. Freedom House scores of Free, Partly Free, and Not Free are translated numerically as 1, 2, and 3 respectively (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Freedom House).

Chart 2. Failed States Index 2009 Data and Rank for Nigeria and Senegal

The score is based on information taking into account three categories of issues: economic, political and social. The higher the score and the lower the rank the closer the state to
Senegal has a lower score and higher rank than Nigeria at 74.2 (102). Nigeria comes in at 99.8 (15), making Nigeria by far most likely to collapse (Failed States Index 2009).

The definition of democratic institutions will be broad for the purpose of this study: “Open contestation over the right to win control of the government, competitive elections the results of which determine who governs” (Linz and Stepan 1997, 3; Smith 2000, 25). The definition used here will also include any legal instrument or body which guarantees civil or political liberties. Any violence or conflict emerging prior to or post an election can be attributed to the election if the results of that election were a primary cause for dispute or violence. A lack of trust in the legitimacy or accuracy of the results is a failure of democratic institutions, a failure of their legitimacy. This will help to answer our second question.

The mobilization of citizenry into party or associational groups with heavy ethnic or religious participation from a particular group (for example, Nigeria’s Borno Youth Movement or the Movement of Democratic Forces, made largely of the Jola ethnic group in Senegal) will be treated as related to national political identity. It will be evident as to what role the group plays by whether or not it produces either an increased or decreased sense of collectivity. A decrease in national (state) collectivity can be measured by whether or not the appearance of such a group causes more violence or the emergence other groups mobilized along ethnic or cultural dimensions. An indicator of increased collective identity is a decrease in violence, increase in cooperation across cleavages, and collective action across groups, even ethnic ones. Any institution can serve positively or negatively. It is important to determine whether a group is aiding in the development of a strong national-identity and or stability, or providing a form of
cleavage that induces instability. Groups that are geographically or regionally specific will be classified as national as their effect is similar to that of ethnic identity, as also explained by Lipset (1959). Clearly, groups that are localized can mobilize based on a geographical identity almost as easily as by an ethnic identity, which is demonstrated by the Biafra war in Nigeria. Examples of geographic groups or groups that are originally ethnic but grow to become geographic include the Igala Union in Nigeria and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance in Senegal. This sense of collectivity described by Tarrow (2004) ultimately can only be identified by the absence of significant cleavage from other sources or by the lack of any outstanding or challenging identity. Clearly, none of these states as yet exhibit this entirely. Much of Senegal has a strong sense of national-identity, and yet the separatists in Casamance maintained their insurgency for the greater part of the 1990s.

There will be two case studies: Senegal and Nigeria. Each will follow a format which goes through the history and analyzes the conflicts found in its territory. This will cover for the most part the period immediately after independence and the politics up to the present, with most attention paid to the circumstance which led to conflict and the condition of the state. Conflicts under study will be dissected along the parameters of the four questions previously mentioned. Of primary concern is the role of groups and parties involved and their established reasons for involvement in the armed conflict. Obviously, if it is a separatist movement, the separatist cause could be attributed to both politics and identity. The question following this however is whether the conflict was brought to an end, how the conflict was ended, and what—if anything—has led to a peace agreement. Was a political solution reached, a guarantee of power sharing, or was there a brief cease fire followed by more violence with no resolution reached? If the conflict is resolved through a redistribution of power or influence, then ultimately the reasons for separation
can be addressed by political institutions, and therefore, identity was a merely a source of mobilization, and that source of identity can potentially be subsumed into a larger state (national) identity. The question then remains, as to whether a democratic (or legal) institution was used as a guarantor for this political solution. In other words, was a guarantee of rights desired, or special protections needed?

The ultimate question will be what tool or institution proves to bring about peace most often and effectively (relatively speaking) across the two case studies: Senegal and Nigeria. In the long run does freedom make a difference? A preliminary look at the data shows only a slight difference between Nigeria and Senegal (See Chart 2). Is it the guarantee of political rights and freedoms or the increased use of traditional and/or cultural institutions that make the state more stable in the long run? Which institutions, in other words, are best as peace makers and bringers of stability?

This project will seek political answers to economic questions, because it is this author’s position, one shared by others including Seth Kaplan (2008), that economic development has been over emphasized as a path to state development. Rather, it is political development that ultimately carries the most weight in terms of state development and stability. If society makes an economic demand, a political institution must first be put into place to ensure the demand is met or find an alternative. This alternative could take the form of political representation (or an increase thereof) or mobilization along ethnic or regional identities. The question, again, is whether the demand is answered, how it is answered, and whether the solution to the demand was a formal political structure (democratic or simple) or an informal social one, and for the long term analysis did this solution work. It is also possible no institution was created at all in the image of democracy or society, but instead in the form of force exhibited by the state. In this
circumstance the choice was clearly negative, rather than positive development. This follows the established dictum that military dictatorships are inherently unstable. If this is the case, then the test must move forward to the next incidence of armed conflict.

In the conclusion there will be an attempt to explain the “future” potential of the region and the implications for the rest of the continent using the evidence provided in the case studies. The cases studies provide the basis for a modified control and experimental test of the thesis question. Nigeria is by far the more unstable of the two states in this study, and has a heterogeneous society. The variance in the cases will make it easier to make comparisons with other states. It is expected that this will help identify the way different institutions for conflict resolution play a role in furthering or inhibiting state development in both, heterogeneous and homogenous. Conclusions will be drawn based on the information provided in these studies. Because of the history of both states, the impact of external influence will be largely traceable and small. This will help determine which factor contributes most to state development and conflict resolution in West Africa.
CHAPTER 2

CASE STUDY: SENEGAL

Map 1. Ethnic Map of Senegal and Gambia (Map from University of Texas Online: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/senegal_gambia_pop_1972.jpg)

The region of Senegambia has housed a number of great empires and kingdoms throughout its history. This creates a reality that cannot be ignored. The region as a whole has an established tradition of human government. In the case of Senegambia, these kingdoms and empires remained largely attached to the river systems and trade routes permitted by geography
and have contributed greatly to the outlines and contours of the underlying society today. This was the case whether it was the Empire of Ghana, Mali, Songhai or Wolof (Jolof). The political organizations of the region were tied inextricably for much of their history to trans-Saharan trade and the states to the north and north east, whether Egypt in ancient times, the many Berber kingdoms, and later the Almoravid Empire, a confederation of Berber kingdoms. This meant the slow but eventually permanent implantation of Islam into the culture and politics of the region, the impact of which would be lasting and ultimately decisive. This Muslim would come to shape nearly every state in the greater region of West Africa.

The 15th century would see a dramatic shift in the economic and political structure of the region. This was due in large part to the arrival of Europeans, beginning with the Portuguese, who would completely alter the economic establishment by opening up a new frontier of economic activity and political influence. As Boubacar Barry (1998) refers to it, the Atlantic Trading System would shift trade along the Senegal and Gambia rivers westward, and away from the Sudan, where it had long been the route of connection to and from the old empires: Ghana, Mali and Songhai. And into the 16th century the effects are obvious: the decline of the Mali Empire and the dissolution of the Wolof Empire/Confederacy, all due in some part to the rise of the Atlantic Trading System, and the decline of the Trans-Saharan Trading System (Barry 1998).

The collapse would lead to the spread of Islamic religion into Senegambia and with it the introduction of new traditions and political patterns which were seeded into the regional political system.

The spread of Islam happened very quickly for several reasons. Most important among them was the threat this new system of trade posed to those that benefited so much from the old ways, namely Muslim Arabs and Berbers to the North and East. By purposefully spreading
Islam, they aspired to pull the societies of West Africa back into their orbit using all manner of institutions and social structures. Chief amongst these institutions is the marabout, created from the vestige of the Muslim brotherhood commonly found throughout the Muslim world. Over the history of the region, the marabouts and their various political connections have made up a web of collectives and relationships that have contributed greatly to the organization of political and social life. The importance of this institution would come to be maximized during the seventeenth century primarily through of the slave trade which had a profound impact on the politics, economy, and civil society of the entire continent. The impact of the slave trade, economically and politically, surpassed even the dramatic changes that occurred with the initial introduction of Europeans a century before. As a result the Europeans arrival, the security situation changed, adding new players to the system and altering power balances. But slavery had an equally large political impact on the security of the region, changing forever the alliances and order of things, down to the level of the individual. The slave trade meant increased violence between states in the region and increased militarization of the states, as well as the rise in the fervor and practice of Islam as a religion (Barry 1998). By the end of the 1600s, marabouts were leading a large scale movement to unify the states of the Senegal Valley and to fight slavery (Barry 1998). These would be the first of many marabout ‘jihads’ but certainly not the last. Overall, Islam would be used again and again to attack various entities, whether the local aristocracy or European colonial powers.

The peasantry placed themselves “under the authority of marabouts for protection” against the aristocracies and slave raids leading ultimately to the establishment of Muslim theocracies by providing the security others could not (Barry 1998, 58). Eventually, these theocracies, with marabout led social systems of power inheritance would ensure that power was
acquired and maintained by the descendants of the marabout (Barry 1998, 58). The consequence, of course, was that they became the new aristocracy, and like those before them, they too would participate in the slave trade (Barry 1998, 58). This societal change took place between the late seventeenth into the nineteenth century, during which time the French crept into dominance in the region. The 1860s saw the height of the push and pull between what Charolette Quinn (1972, 157) calls the Islamic “shadow state” with its own emerging aristocracy, and the remainder of the Soninke social system. This decade also saw the beginnings of the quick shift toward Islam that would take place in the latter half of the 19th century. During this period, neither of these groups, Soninke or Muslim was able to build a true power base “among the kaleidoscopic mixture of populations” along the river Gambia (Quinn 1972, 157). The culmination of this great change was the Marabout Wars in the late 19th century, during which time actual fighting broke out between the traditional Mandinka and Soninke society and the emerging Islamic one. These wars, also known as Soninke-Marabout wars, eventually destroyed what was left of government in the Senegambia (Quinn 1972). The structure of the nascent Muslim “empire” ultimately failed to coalesce, however, due to the military supremacy of the French (Quinn 1972). The result of the wars was an open path for the French and the spread of Islam into new territories; territories up to that point which had been closed.

The Muslims continued to operate on a societal level. They would ultimately convert the Wolof, with whom they found shared a desire for war with the French. The wars slowly subsided, but the Muslim “empire” continued to infiltrate society through the Mouride Brotherhood in the late 19th century. The chaos of the previous centuries also impacted the Jola. They too had suffered from attacks carried out by the Mandinka over a long period of time, starting likely with the initial disruptions created by the eruption of the Atlantic Trade Systems.
Economic and population pressures undoubtedly sent them into Jola territory. The result was that by the start of the twentieth century, there had been so many raids that the Jola political structure was reduced to anarchy (Quinn 1972, 26). As a consequence, the Jola became isolated culturally and otherwise. Their resistance to external influence, combined with their history with the Mandinka meant that the Jola remained largely traditional in their religious practices, unaffected by the rise of Islam around them (Quinn 1972, 26), turning instead towards Christianity brought by the colonialists. This reality continues today to impact the social and political life of the Jola, in general, and Casamance specifically.

Colonization

The political shambles left by the Marabout wars allowed the French a far more easy path to colonization then what otherwise could have been. Still, their technical superiority no doubt would have eventually given them the upper hand. The French were eventually able to assert some manner of control over the region, although the underlying society maintained, in some respects, its own hierarchy and institutions. Chief amongst these remained the Muslim Brotherhood, eventually manifesting itself as the Murid Order, which began in the 1880s, but survived into the 20th century. Obviously, the French were incredibly hostile toward the order, their fear being that it represented a “state within a state” as described by James Searing (2002, 232). Charolette Quinn (1972) referred to this as the Islamic “empire” or “shadow state.” The irony is perhaps that this mysterious entity, or ghost state, was in actuality the state that would ultimately emerge, so to speak, from colonization. In any case, the 1880s also saw the decline of the aristocracy as Muslims grew disenchanted with the duplicity of the aristocracy, and by consequence almost embraced conquest (Searing 2002, 270, 272). Like plate tectonics, the Muslim ghost state slide under the colonial power, but continued to seek out new citizens and
challenge the authority of the colonialist. The Murid order had to that point drew in numerous runaway slaves and peasants, growing its power base even larger (Searing 2002). In the moments after independence, this new political entity would reemerge with charismatic and intelligent leadership that would eventually define the state.

Post-Independence

Léopold Sédar Senghor (1959, 1971), the first president of Senegal, described the Senegalese state in an address to Congress saying; “L'Etat, c'est l'expression de la Nation, c'est surtout le moyen de réaliser la Nation”. Senghor saw the state as the only tool for creating a nation, and that idea remains a part of the Senegalese administrative attitude today (Villalón 1995). Senegal has actively tried to use the state to cultivate a sense of Senegalese nationality that is broader than the myriad ethnicities within it. Going back to pre-colonial history for a moment, it should be noted again that even prior to complete French take over, the need to build broad coalitions in the area in order to have and maintain a state was long acknowledged and understood. Like Nkrumah in Ghana, Senegal had a figure in Senghor that reached the international stage and came to represent on many levels, Senegalese identity. This occurred through his poetry and his politics, both of which acted as ambassadors for Senegalese identity abroad. Senghor, like Nkrumah played a pivotal and active role in the formation of the Senegalese political system. But unlike Nkrumah, Senghor stepped down from power voluntarily, albeit after twenty years of service, providing Senegal a far better start in its political and democratic experiment.

Senghor centralized power under one party and dedicated his efforts to creating strength in size and numbers. This was a hallmark of his ideology that had also supported federalism in Africa and had also informed his efforts toward the creation of the Mali Federation. He had no
doubt learned several lessons from the failed experiment of federation with Mali then known as French Sudan, from which Senegal had emerged just prior to his presidency. The attempt was in some ways akin to a similar effort by Gamel Abdel Nasser and the creation of the United Arab Republic, a union between Egypt and Syria. Similar to the Egyptian effort, the experiment of the Mali Federation was extremely short lived but was the cocoon from which Senghor emerged as the first president of a fully independent Senegal.

The years of Senghor’s presidency would be tumultuous. Amongst the larger scandals, he would accuse his Prime Minister, Mamadou Dia, of a coup attempt. Senghor himself would also survive an assassination attempt, remaining president until 1980. By the time he left the presidency, Senghor had left a lasting impact on Senegal. His beliefs and politics would inform high level Senegalese politics for years to come. But he is only one contributing factor to the character of the Senegalese state and its unique strengths. History obviously played a very significant role in shaping the type of political institutions that, in turn, would shape Senegal’s political landscape, including the colonial experience. Still the character, action, and vision of one man cannot be underestimated. Senghor should be credited for much of the good start Senegal had and the security that the state had enjoyed, particularly when compared to other states on the continent. These strengths come from early decisions on both the part of Senghor and other government officials in terms of how they would govern the country. The primary example would be that “Senegal's ruling party Africanized rather than dismantled bureaucratic structures inherited from the colonial regime” (Gellar 2005, 48). This was a pivotal turning point, as evidenced by other states on the continent and other experiences in the world. This Africanization of the government structures is clearly a great advantage. By maintaining the
structures already in place that govern, rather than starting completely over, immeasurable time and energy are saved on behalf of the government.

The leadership decided, rather than attempting to reinvent the wheel, it was best to maintain certain aspects of the colonial regime even through the period of federation with Mali, the effect of which seems to have been positive. Of all Africa’s democracies, Mali and Senegal are perhaps the best examples, other than Ghana and South Africa, in terms of stability and overall success. In Senegal that readymade structure for “governance” and legitimacy was the marabout system. The marabouts carried through the colonial period authority and respect from the community that reinforced the postcolonial political environment which was emerging and transforming under Senghor’s guidance (Villalón 2004). The strength and authority of the marabouts was far reaching, both spatially and temporally, having had the time to reach into society and ferment a strong relationship. The emphasis here is that this was an intentional effort on the part of Senegalese leadership to smooth the process of reform and build support with traditional leaders; the marabouts (Behrman 1970). As the leaders of many rural communities, with established relationships and status, they could influence the rural population, and as a by-product, provide mass support to the government and state growing from Dakar (Behrman 1970). It was a rather pragmatic decision on the part of Senghor and his government.

It was not however, the full extent of the Senegalese program for political development and reform. The government also developed instruments to draw public participation and interaction with the emerging government. These events would provide ample opportunity for those with political goals to interact with the state (Villalón 1995) and establish a relationship with this ‘new’ entity in Dakar. There was also, simultaneously, a process of institutional reform designed to redistribute power and ensure the consolidation of the Parti Socialist (Vengroff and
Magala 2001, 137), which would exercise itself for the next forty years (Gellar 2005). This allowed the state to achieve a unity that initial multi-party politics could have made difficult. The one party system was tempered however, by the political culture endemic to the society. This culture continues to have mistrust for those in power (Gellar 2005), due in part to the country’s history prior to the period of total colonial domination. But through the influence of the Sufi Brotherhoods, the Senegalese have constrained authoritarian tendencies that may have otherwise taken over the country (Gellar 2005), making Senghor’s presidency an outlier of sorts.

Centralization of power specifically combined with the brotherhood and Marabout system generally, allowed Senegal to develop with stability without resorting to outright dictatorship. The key side effect of this tactic was repression of opposition parties early in the post-colonial period. But Huntington (1968) would agree this was probably a necessary step. Certainly, it appears worthwhile because it appears to have been successful.

Repression was exercised through legal instruments. The Parti Socialist altered electoral law in March 1959 (Gellar 2005), even before the state had become fully independent, in order to eliminate opposition parties. The result was that between 1960 and 1966, virtually all political parties were eliminated. This process continued until the 1980s at which point, satisfied with the strength of the state, the call for reversal came. During the 1980s and 1990s, Senegal's budding political parties led the effort to change the law. This movement set the stage for ending one-party rule in the country (Gellar 2005). President Diouf continued this effort into the 1990s using legal instruments to transfer power to local government. In the year 2000, President Wade took the helm thereby ending the domination of the Parti Socialist and bringing to power the Senegalese Democratic Party. Today, there are more than eighty parties in Senegal. And while this transition was not perfect, it is evident by the state of Senegal today that the result of initial
one party rule may have been beneficial as per the expectation of Samuel P. Huntington (1968).
Clearly, the government had the legitimacy to sustain one party rule through the period of repression, and used legal instruments to do so. They also used a social institution to provide legitimacy to a one party democracy. This is not about the instruments used, which will be elaborated upon in a moment, but about leadership realizing it needed to be done and navigating the pitfalls of such a strategy successfully.

The political strength of Senegal is the nature of its religious institutions, particularly that of the Muslim population. Senegal has a very highly organized religious society (Villalón 2004, 63), as detailed in the pre-colonial history of this study. And while this religious society plays a significant role in politics, it also remains largely respectful of the secular nature of the state (Villalón 2004). In fact, Senegal represents a very small list of states that have a largely Muslim population and democratic institutions. The most common example provided of such a state is Indonesia, but Mali, Senegal’s neighbor is also largely Muslim, democratic and secular. This is important to remember when attempting to characterize the nature of the separatist conflict in Casamance. It is not a religious conflict. Islam in Senegal is not ‘Islamist’, as has come to be the term to describe more extremist practices of absolutism and violence since September 11th 2001. Instead, what exists in Senegal is a highly organized Islamic society that exercises political muscle in the shape of influence, not a jihadist movement out to convert the state into a theocracy. And while the pre-colonial history may have used Islam, in some respects to achieve that ‘end’, it is clear that those efforts were symbolic in the sense that theocracy was never the goal fundamentally, but a means to an end, whether those ends were economic or political.

A secular political culture is important to the Senegalese elite, but also to the larger society. It is also likely a contributor to peaceful relations between Muslims and Christians, a
situation not found in Nigeria where the imposition of Sharia has lead to violence. After President Wade arrived, he introduced a draft for a new Senegalese constitution. This in and of itself was not controversial; it was the omission of the term *état laïque* (the secular state) from the document (Villalón 2004, 67). Cries erupted from the press and the secular elite until the phrase was re-inserted (Villalón 2004). This event is entirely demonstrative of what secular means to the people. This controversy over the ‘secular state’ was not nearly as pronounced, however, as another legal action conducted by Wade. He also implemented a law to consent to religious instruction in state schools. The law mandated that all religious groups receive, according to their religion, including the Christians, said instruction (Villalón 2004). It was a political compromise intended to address the wants of the state without going to the extreme of instituting full Sharia, nor denying religious education altogether. Time will reveal the true impact of these decisions. But, Senegal remains, despite the fears of the elite, a secular state. And more importantly, it is a state and society able and willing to make symbolic compromises in order to achieve real gains in terms of power and stability. In other words, it is not crippled by religion or ideology, but powered to a great degree by pragmatic institution building and the desire for stability first.

The strength of Senegal is the ability of its leadership to walk carefully through the political minefield of religion and the state. This effort is aided by the fact that Senegal is almost completely Muslim. At the same time there is a certain amount of ethnic and religious diversity. Still, there has never been a successful military coup in Senegal (Parker 1991), and the country remains one of Africa’s strongest democracies specifically. The society itself, as evidenced by the marabout system, is also, highly organized and connected through the tethers enforced by President Senghor early on, the state. This cannot be emphasized enough. The ghost state or
shadow state as Quinn (1972) called it; has emerged. And yet, it is also home to one of the longest lasting insurgencies in West Africa. How can these two realities coexist within the same state? This can be attributed to several factors, one of which is the fortunate make up of Senegalese society and the unfortunate make up of the state.

Although there are several ethnic groups, two make up more than the sixty percent of the population of Senegal. Ethnicity has played a very critical role in many countries, causing them great difficulty in reaching consensus on state building, but in Senegal things have gone quite differently. Ethnicity in Senegal is not the primary means of political organization, nor have elites found it necessary to use ethnicity to grow adherence to their political messages (Villalón 1995). In fact, there are few incidences in Senegalese history that could be described as ethnic violence. The best example is from 1989 when Moorish Senegalese were attacked after an incident involving land rights on the border with Mauritania (Villalón 1995, Parker 1991). The result was a spree of violence and looting that spread all the way to Dakar. The two governments were forced by their citizenry into much harder stances than they initially took (Parker 1991). Thousands of people were made refugees and eventually had to be returned home. The relevance to Senegal was twofold. The incident caused a great deal of instability. The Senegalese Democratic Party had appealed to the Organization of African Unity and Morocco for security assistance, “implying” that President Diouf was incapable of dealing with the situation (Parker 1991, 163). Despite the ethnic and racial tinge to the conflict, Senegal remained a country with fluid ethnic boundaries (Villalón 1995). The greatest loss suffered by Senegal during the conflict was economic not political. The significance here is that despite the potential for a much larger incident, which could have spiraled out of control on the basis of ethnicity, it did not. Instead it fizzled, and remained in some respects low-level with regard to the intensity of violence.
Ultimately, this ‘non-conflict’ was more about land than ethnicity or regional differences, and more over, it was international not solely internal to Senegal. So how then to reconcile a long lasting insurgency that is seeking independence from a country characterized as largely lacking ethnic or religious discord?

The Casamance conflict, which began in 1982, could be argued to have an ethnic dimension, but also a large geographic, historic and economic one. The Jola are the ethnic group from which most recruits into the MFDC (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance; Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques du le Casamance) are drawn (De Jong and Gasser 2005). Still, to suggest that it is purely an ethnic fight is beyond simplistic. The Jola living in Dakar, for a demonstration of contrast, are known for their ambivalence regarding the state of their home region Casamance (De Jong and Gasser 2005). Analysis of the conflict has deduced that throughout Senegal, the Jola are a well integrated group. What is occurring in Casamance is not, today, a rejection of integration into Senegal, according to some analysts, but instead a revolt against the terms on which they are integrated into that society and the lot they are dealt economically (Marut 2002; Foucher 2002; Gasser 2002; De Jong and Gasser 2005). Although historically, amongst the reasons cited for calls to independence, Casamance, like Kabinda in Angola, was never intended to be a part of Senegal by the colonial powers, but separate and independent. This shapes the conflict as separatist in origin obviously, so why had it continued so long? The answer to this question is of primary concern, not only because it will tell us whether the problem lies in Senegal, in Dakar, or whether the problem is purely an issue of intransigence.

The ethnic dimension of the conflict is acknowledged and manipulated by all parties involved including the government. The ways in which the government has dealt with this
conflict demonstrate the strengths of the organization. Namely, it is the conscious and skillful manipulation of structures endemic to Senegalese society which has sustained it. As a result, the state itself becomes an active participant in its’ own creation. This is achieved through the reinforcement of the state-society relationship through policies and actions that cause interaction between the two on many levels. When it comes to Casamance, the intended effect is to reduce the intensity of conflict and pull it into a relationship with Dakar, all the while the region remains separate on many levels, but especially geographically.

In some ways the diminutive nature of the separatist movement could perhaps be attributed to the success of the government. Violence has had the tendency to coincide with accusations that the government is failing to provide assistance with economic development, but violence is usually limited to clashes and disorder never full on war. The most recent flair in violence was in 2006 when the government of Senegal attacked some of the rebels. The result was the generation of a new surge of people fleeing into the Gambia, the country sandwiched between Casamance and the rest of Senegal. It should further be noted, like the Senegal-Mauritania conflict, that the Casamance issue is also an international issue. The tide of conflict is easily gauged by the politics of Guinea-Bissau, the state from which many of the rebels formerly acquired arms and support or the Gambia for that matter. In recent years, the government of Guinea-Bissau was able to largely circumvent internal support of the Casamance secessionist movement. In light of this information, it seems less value should be placed on examining the Casamance movement as one particular to Senegal. But it should not be overlooked completely. It represents a failure on the part of Senegal to integrate fully part of its territory, regardless of how difficult geography or history makes that integration. Casamance is the most remote region of Senegal making economic development all the more difficult (De Jong and Gasser 2005). But
in order to have stability in the long run, for security to be guaranteed, integration is a necessity. To its credit, the government was probably on the right track in 1981 when it endeavored to establish the Senegambia Confederation. The purpose of this confederation was chiefly security related. It obviously did not endure the test of time, but clearly, both governments realized how intertwined their politics and over all political, military and economic security were.

In any case, the Senegalese government found itself attempting to pacify a movement based on secession but lacking a clear leader with whom to negotiate. It also found that the conflict worsened in times of economic tribulation. The state of the Senegalese economy helped induce another social crisis in 1994 after the sudden devaluation of the CFA franc (Villalón and Kane 1998), which at the time lead to chaos as prices collapsed. The 1970s saw success for Senegal, but in the 1980s it all changed, and under the economic stress, discontent spread in the form of protests “like elsewhere across Africa” (Villalón 2004, 64). The state of the economy today, paired with corruption, is one of the chief complaints Senegalese launch against the government, including under President Wade. “Corruption was not a major political issue and apparently modest in Senegal during the early years of independence”...but by the end of the 1970s, it had become significant for the citizenry (Gellar 2005, 53). Senghor, during his presidency had denounced ministers who took more than their 10% cut of state contract awards but this action proved, over time, largely symbolic (Gellar 2005). The Senghor government did not make a serious effort in dealing with corruption until it began dismantling state offices that were mismanaged and or suffered the embezzlement of funds (Gellar 2005, 53). Under Abdou Diouf, a major campaign was employed to shut down government corruption, but it was a weak effort compared to that of Senghor. Largely, this weakness was due to unwillingness or the part of officials to pursue legal action against well connected elites referred to as 'untouchables'
To be certain, Senegal is not among the most open or transparent countries in the world, even though it is clearly better off than Nigeria.

The economic aspect of the conflict has been dealt with by the utilization of the same tactics employed to integrate and develop Senegal’s state-society overall. One tool of this project has been the use of Senegal’s Islamic reform movement. The Islamic reformer movement is a longstanding entity, having gone through several changes and evolutions, taking on a broad array of responsibilities to the Islamic society of Senegal. By the time the Jama’at Ibad ar-Rahman (JIR) emerged, that responsibility had come to include not only mosques, but schools, nurseries and the coordination of economic and social services generally throughout the country (Loimeier 2000, 185). By taking an active role in participating with and utilizing the JIR, the state was able to reduce its spending on such projects, fight unemployment and simultaneously control, in part, the actions of the Islamic reform movement. The only prohibition in the Casamance conflict to the success enjoyed elsewhere in Senegal could in part be related to the smaller percentage of Muslims in Casamance and moreover, the continued violence that has hampered development efforts conducted by the government.

In Senegal, religion is the most important social factor contributing to the nature of state-society relations (Villalón 1994). As a result, religious discourse and religious institutions have both become intimately involved in the exchange of power and resources that determine and shape Senegalese politics. This system is described uniquely as the Islamo-Wolof system, a term coined by Mamadou Diouf in his book, Histoire du Sénégal (2001). The Islamo-Wolof system has both social and political checks and balances that improve the ability of its leadership to avoid religious tensions. This is done to the point that the question of religious identity is termed as Muslim versus the secular rather than Muslim versus the other (Renders 2002). This essentially
means that alternative religious identities, whether traditional African or Christian prove little challenge to Islam within the state system. And because of the strength of the secular elite, not to mention the constitution, the balance between Islam and secularism is maintained. The constitution of Senegal still forbids Islamic political parties, and yet at the same time, numerous Islamic organizations and associations continue to prosper (Renders 2002). The state uses legal and societal instruments in order to tame what could be a dangerous area of cleavage for the state, religion. Instead of being a polarizing element, religion is used effectively by the state to channel power and influence over the populace. The state has avoided another point of cleavage that could divide society and used it instead to unite. But in the case of Casamance, there seems less benefit to this success.

The very conscious efforts on the part of the government to utilize the Islamic institutions native to the society is highly inspired. The authorities can use them to reach into society, both to control and acquire support, taking advantage of Islamic symbols, as what Marleen Renders calls a form of capital (2002). This type of social ‘usurpation’ for the benefit of the state, as will be discussed shortly, is vital to truly explain the success of the Senegalese state. The success is born not out of luck, but out of continuous bridge building and power exchange through institutions with reach on both sides of the power spectrum. This is even more illustrative in terms of Casamance. Casamance has a much higher percentage of Catholics, making it more separate from greater Senegal religiously (Foucher 2005). Casamance is still sixty percent Muslim, however (Foucher 2005). And while some would say that that may be a cause for conflict in Casamance, Foucher would argue that religion, in such an argument is over emphasized (2005). He would also add that there is in fact no synergy between the traditional Africans and Christians, and that there is no united front against Islam (Foucher 2005). If Islam is not the
‘enemy’, or the external other, then what is it? It would seem that the question does not register as an issue in the Casamance conflict, as in the rest of Senegal. What is clear, is that elites in Dakar often used religion ‘symbolically’ to delegitimize the rebellion of the MFDC, using terminology such as ‘primitive’, peasant, and ethnocentric. So where then does the truth lie in Casamance, when it comes to religion and the resistance?

Obviously, religion plays a significant role in Senegal generally, but with Casamance specifically, the role of religion is again, a kind of misnomer, as Foucher (2005) seemed to suggest. While on the one hand, there is obvious religious division between Casamance and Senegal, it is clear that religion is largely a term in a political tool box of talking points, not a real source of conflict. The state in general, Casamance included, is too secular to really threaten religious minorities. And on the other hand, even the area which could conceivably be rebelling on the basis of religion, Casamance, is also largely Muslim. Therefore the source of the rebellion is elsewhere, and therefore, the remaining ‘weakness’ of the state is elsewhere. What is clear is that the state has found the proper method for dealing with religion, and Casamance, in some manner demonstrates this reality. Moreover, it is clear that if the state is to succeed in bringing Casamance into the fold, an institution other than the marabout system will be necessary to perform this function. Whatever this institution is, it will have to perform a function similar to the marabout’s socially, but not necessarily be religious in origin considering the history of Casamance, and the lack of Islamic penetration into parts of the society there.

Returning to the subject of religious institutions, Leonardo Villalón (1994) was very adamant that Senegal exhibits high levels of integration between the state and its society based upon the successful manipulation of the religious, an opinion seconded by Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff (2004). The government repeatedly and intently used the Islamic reform movement to its
advantage, co-opting it in order to present Senegal externally as an Islamic state (Loimeier 2000), when beneficial, while avoiding having to force the ‘appearance’ of being too Islamic internally, in such a way as to rile the secularists. This aided the government in garnering support from the Muslim population by being symbolically Muslim. This made it easier for the government to enact policies which might otherwise have garnered greater criticism, particularly those that resulted in increased secularism. This combined with the influence of the Marabouts made it easier for the state to control political discourse, rather than the Islamic movement, by co-opting what would otherwise be its leaders. Roman Loimeier (2000) in his discourse on the Islamic reform movement notes several reasons why this was important. Chiefly, it meant legitimacy for a secular government at low cost, by counterbalancing a number of forces that could otherwise prove a challenge to the state. Loimeier (2000) also found it important that both Senghor (1959, 1971) and Diouf (2001) were conscious of the influence of the marabouts and the Sufi network within the state, a conscious strategy of cooptation and simultaneous integration. This cooptation was essential to ensuring the state remained strong, and by that definition, able to intervene into and control aspects of the social sphere in order to obtain its own objectives, and protect its interests (Loimeier 2000).

By tolerating the Islamic reform and opposition groups, as well as the new political parties, President Diouf was able to increase considerably the number of players in the political arena. As a consequence of this policy the room for maneuver with regard to political reforms has become decisively greater and the President’s dependence on specific interest groups has consequently become smaller. During the 1980s and 1990s, the social and political elite of the state was thereby able successfully to resist demands for an Islamization of state and society. By accepting the development of a multitude of
different religious and political groups and by playing them off against each other, the state was able to intervene, should the need arise, into religious affairs and to thus expand into the sphere of social life hitherto regarded as the exclusive domain of the marabouts. As a result of this policy Senghor, and especially Diouf were not only able to defend but to also strengthen the secular character of the state”…as a result “In the 1990s, the Diouf administration was even able to initiate a nationwide campaign against the Quranic schools within the framework of its policy of reforming the country’s educational system (Loimeier 2000, 187).

This repetitive manipulation has produced some blowback from society. In politics there are no costless tactics. As a result, society became fiercely distrusting of politics, and turned increasingly toward traditional institutions because of their comparative symbolic purity (De Jong 2005). These traditional institutions would come to the same fate as their stately counterparts particularly those that were useful in the Casamance conflict. Here is where the state does shine in terms of social institutions and attempts to resolve the conflict in Casamance, in using the ‘traditional institution’ of the Jola-Serer joking relationship. This relationship is based on the mythology of kinship, that the Serer and Jola are cousins. A caveat of this understanding is that the two peoples should live in peace (De Jong 2005). An understanding was reached and the leadership of the state opened up opportunities for addressing this relationship. In keeping with the idea that events should be organized to increase the state society relationship, Governor Saliou Sambou organized the Festival des Origins to celebrate the Jola-Serer relationship and help foster the establishment of the Cultural Association of Aguène-Diambougne or ACAD (Association Culturelle Aguène-Diambogne) (De Jong 2005). ACAD utilizes the relationship to appease the Jola separatists and integrate them into the greater society.
through myriad ways, whether social events such as festivals or to organize peace negotiations (De Jong 2005). For its part the government manipulates the relationship on many levels, including the donation of support to projects such as ACAD.

Whenever a government representative is a member of one of these groups the benefit of the joking relationship itself is that it can demonstrate a measure of credibility, legitimacy and sense of allegiance to the national administration (De Jong 2005, 398). The benefit here is obvious, especially for a ‘break away’ province. In this way the government has in some respect contributed to the sense that the Jola belong to greater Senegal through both symbolic and real political connections (De Jong and Gasser 2005). The extent to which this has actually aided in peace for Senegal is debated. For his part De Jong (2005) acknowledges that the joking relationship has no impact on the peace process which is emphatically measurable since the MFDC recognized that that the government and its allies are using the relationship to their advantage (De Jong and Gasser 2005, 223). What is clear is that the government was not alone in this assumption about the power of the joking relationship. Even in Oussouye, the capital of the Ziguinchor region of Casamance, the notion of ‘sacred kingship’ has been revived in order to aid in controlling members of the MFDC amongst their constituency through traditional leaders such as chiefs (De Jong 2005, 393). It would seem then, that there is some real world benefit to political symbolism and identity politics just as in any other country. The difference in Senegal, it would seem, is the actualization and manipulation that it would appear, from some luck, have allowed the various leaders to do so effectively. But in the case of Casamance, the benefits have been limited.

The checks and balances between the ethnic (joking relationship) and religious (marabouts) institutions that allow the government to play off of different societal dynamics to
its advantage are possibly unique to Senegal in some respects, but not entirely. Every country has games of identity which politicians manipulate in order to garner support and create a sense of national belonging for disembodied minorities. Perhaps it so happens that in Senegal there has been a coalition of favorable circumstances, but that is to simple an explanation. Senegal remains a cohesive unit not only because the leadership is aware of these institutions and manipulates them, but does so in a way that is not heavy handed and that provides some ‘benefit’, if even at times symbolic for the societal counterpart. The conflict in Casamance, while it continues to exist has probably benefited from these institutions even though De Jong might disagree with this. How can this conclusion be drawn? Because the conflict has remained so weak in terms of violence. Even in recent years when it has flared, the violence is hardly comparable even to an insurgency, as much as an outbreak in lawlessness.

Senegal and Casamance Post 2005

The 2005 Casamance peace accord was made possible in the first place by the serendipitous alignment of outside events. Namely, a relative peace being restored in Guinea-Bissau after a disruptive coup brought instability in 2003. This event was significant in that it meant that MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Democratic de Casamance) forces from Guinea-Bissau would largely be expelled, although they would retain some parts of the country (Guinea-Bissau) as a place of operations, particularly the renegade Salif Sadio (Harsch 2005). The loss of Guinea-Bissau as an external operating post would coincide with the loss of support in Casamance itself for a violent independence movement. This would ultimately prove influential in the decision to go for the Senegalese government’s peace deal since public opinion has clearly shifted away from continued struggle (Harsch 2005). By this point, much of the legitimate leadership of the MFDC were more concerned with bringing Casamance back into the economic
fold, and taking advantage of an opportunity for economic and political development resulting from full integration. It is for this reason that with the exception of some violent student protests (“Senegal; Several Hurt in Student Protests”), 2005 lacked any real attacks from the MFDC.

The peace accord was effective only to a point, however. In actuality some more radical factions of the MFDC remained committed to full independence as their mantra and since that time have continued to make attacks against the government and its citizens. This is even after President Wade, in conjunction with aid groups, promised a development package as part of the 2005 peace deal totaling over $160 million US dollars (Harsch 2005). It was the hope at the time, that the funds would be used to smooth the transition into peace by providing, amongst other things, a means to reintegrate the rebels into Senegalese society and to smooth the repatriation and settlement of the refugees (Harsch 2005). Ultimately, the results were less than stellar. The year 2006 would see a new rise in violence, particularly along the border with Guinea Bissau. The increase in violence could largely be attributed to Salif Sadio, the leader of a particularly hard-line splinter group in the MFDC, who emerged as a counter narrative to the movement, attempting to establish his group virtually as the real MFDC, almost akin to a kind of real IRA. Sadio continued to have a close relationship with the army in Guinea-Bissau who, after his support in 1999 against Nino Vieira (“Guinea-Bissau confirms armed incursions into Senegal; 11 killed”), continued to provide him a safe haven for operations. From Guinea-Bissau, Sadio launched attacks against civilians causing them to abandon their villages. By the fall of the same year, the violence had spread, this time to the north, near the border of the Gambia. In 2007 the de facto leader of the rebellion, Augustine Diamacoune Senghor, a Roman Catholic priest, died, spreading fear that the continued efforts at peace could collapse (“Senegal; Rebel Leader is Dead but Peace Process May Stay Alive”). It was suspected by some at the time that his death would
lead to failure of the peace process, whether or not the slow withering could be attributed to him is not clear (“Senegal; Rebel Leader is Dead but Peace Process May Stay Alive”). What is clear is that the politicians even then had little control over the guerrilla movement (“Senegal; African Leader is Dead but Peace Process May Stay Alive”), and as time has worn on, this has become evident. Like the Palestinian movement, the movement in Casamance suffers from severe fractionalization which has inhibited the ability of the Senegalese government to negotiate peace. This has meant chiefly that the rebel leaders have been unable to offer any real promise of peace since ultimately they individually or collectively lack any means to guarantee security absolutely. While some fighters could be disarmed, the lack of organization and structural delineation of power means that any lone wolf could disrupt the process. All the same, the population has continued to suffer under the disorganization. People who had been living in towns and villages in the Casamance and Guinea Bissau, began to gather themselves and their resources to push themselves back toward their villages in early 2007 (“Senegal; While Northern Casamance Still Simmers, the South is Now Calm”). They still had “social networks by which to re-establish livelihoods and build wells, schools and dispensaries,” said Martin Evans at the time reporting on the changes in society resulting from the conflict in Casamance (“Senegal; Rebel Leader is Dead but Peace Process May Stay Alive”).

Salif Sadio remained intransigent on making a deal, making it plain that he could conceive of no peace without full independence. He remained quartered in Guinea-Bissau, and throughout 2007 there were various reports of his theoretical demise (“Salif Sadio est mort”). Clearly, even into late 2007, Sadio maintained a strong social network of his own in Guinea-Bissau which provided him cover during the year. In an unusual parallel, social networks remained relatively strong amongst the common population. The wear of years of instability has
caused many families to lose patience, having to house relatives in times of economic hardship and inflated food prices. (―Senegal; Finding Incentives for Peace in Casamance‖). Throughout 2008 the Guinea-Bissau government was brought in closer to Senegal, helping to reduce cross-border arms trafficking and increasing their level of cooperation under Prime Minister João Bernado Vieira and with the election in Guinea-Bissau in November 2008 and Prime Minister Vieira’s return to power things seemed to look positive in the future. Less than a year later, Vieira was to be assassinated. The turmoil returning to Guinea-Bissau as a result of those political upheavals would slowly manifest in Senegal.

Salif Sadio at large or deceased remains a symbol of the greatest threat to the peace process, ‘the lone wolf’. He has the ability, at little economic cost, to cause great disruption to the process, and weaken the image of the central government while simultaneously achieving his goals. This accounts for much of the failure in the peace process of recent years, over and above the basic problems of negotiation. There remains insecurity in the Casamance region. This is largely in the form of arms attacks such as carjacking, looting and threats. The highest violence seen since 2002 occurred in August of 2009 (―Senegal; 'Heaviest Fighting in Years' Hits Casamance‖), not six months after the assassination of Prime Minister Vieira in Guinea-Bissau. The attacks erupted at the start of Cashew harvesting season. The violence continued into the end of the year, concluding with an appeal from President Jammeh for a ceasefire on the part of all sides, the rebels and the government (―Senegal; President Jammeh Appeals for Ceasefire in Casamance‖). It would appear that whatever benefits might have been gained from using integration strategies internally, the events in neighboring states are intimately intertwined with those in Senegal, and cannot be separated in reality or artificially for research if the situation is to be analyzed accurately.
Summation

Clearly, the problem of Casamance is not symptomatic of great problems in the state and its ability to connect politically and socially with the population within its borders. Senegal has in large part been a stable state and will likely continue to be so in the future. The problem of Casamance is localized. It is a separatist movement, the cause of which is based out of a historical problem. And while it is largely habited by one ethnic group, the mobilization of the society appears for the most part to be based on a geographic-colonial identity. The prime aspiration is for geographic Casamance to be independent, not necessarily Jola people alone. This is a geographic identity created largely by colonization (granting of course that the Jola make up a significant proportion of that region), including the demand for political independence, at least historically. Based on the temporary stay in violence produced by the 2005 peace accord, it would seem that the population was largely satisfied with the political and economic promises made and that in the ensuing breakdown of peace, in the form of looting, carjacking and attacks on civilians and their farmland, the violence is no longer as organized or especially well funded. Separatist movements need large scale support not only in the populace but also massive external financial networks. This usually occurs by default when the society supports the militants. This would tend to suggest that despite the number of years the conflict has been measurable as such, it has only ever reached minor intensity in all of those years (1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997 – 2001, 2003), meaning no more than 999 battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch et al 2002). The brief ceasefire that followed 2005 quickly succumbed to more violence with no real end in sight, although it should be noted that those which continue most of the violence on the part of the separatist are the most hard line in their views. The rest of the
population, weary from more than two decades of conflict, appears to want an end to violence even at the cost of true independence. Regional identification, immediately followed by ethnicity are the two primary sources of mobilization. It has been demonstrated that the Jola identity can be merged successfully into Senegalese identity, and so the prime issue is the geographic regional identity of Casamance and the real politik issue of MFDC rebels who do not wish to ‘give up the fight’.

If the remaining MFDC rebels continue to claim into the future that the only thing to quell their rebellion is independence, then they are in for a rude awakening. The tide of public opinion has already shifted against them. What remains is a question of how long they will endure and what tool or institution will prove to bring about peace. In this case it would appear that the solution will first be socio-economic. By providing jobs and economic opportunity the government will continue to undermine the base from which the remaining MFDC rebels recruit their membership. With no young men to carry out violence it is unlikely that they will be able in the long run to sustain their rebellion. The government, for its part will need to actualize this by using not only political or legal instruments but by finding a new legitimate source of social influence in the region. This will require a certain amount of inventiveness, but historically, inventiveness has been part of the process and there is no reason not to expect it in the future. To fully integrate Casamance, nothing less will be required. This region, in every way that matters remains separate from Senegal and as a result will continue to be difficult to govern in the future. To pull the region closer, connections: social, political and economic will need to be made. The political institutions that connect Casamance to greater Senegal will need to be strengthened with economic support and greater opportunities for representation and expression from the region.
The remaining barriers to peace are largely international. The issue of the Gambia and its place as a separator between Senegal and its southernmost region is foremost. When the Senegambian Confederacy was taken on, it was understood then that the security of Senegal and the Gambia were intertwined. And while that union was dissolved, and it has been expected never to rise again (Hughes and Lewis 1995), the reality is that drawing Casamance closer to Senegal may necessitate connecting it first to the Gambia. Only then can Senegal be connected wholly, both in its relationship to Casamance and itself. The relationship to Guinea-Bissau will be almost equally as pivotal in determining the outcome of peace efforts. Beyond that is simply the leadership question within the MFDC. So long as there is no real centralized authority that wishes to negotiate on the basis of something less than independence, peace will remain elusive.
Nigeria is a state that has yet to really consolidate itself. It is in continuous risk of collapse threatened by the instability induced by its haphazard structure. Despite the hope
conferred through the smooth transfer of power in 2007, the country is still threatened with instability in the Niger Delta, as well as with ethnic and religious tension between Christians and Muslims throughout the country. Christians and Muslims still engage in violence against each other, adding new victims to the thousands killed in violence, well over 10,000, since just 1999 (Elaigwu and Galadima 2003). And while the State of Nigeria remains one of the largest contributors of troops to the African Union, the country itself remains unable to quell the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) insurgency or prevent attacks on its oil infrastructure. Inter-ethnic, economic and religious violence are part of a greater problem in the Nigerian state. It is a problem that has manifests itself in the form of secessionist movements almost from its birth. Secession as a solution or fix to the woes of a given community has long been a part of Nigerian politics since the start (Nixon 1972), because all the parties involved, even then, were aware of the dangers inherent to their union. The chief danger was domination by other regions (Nixon 1972), a fear that proved itself time and again. Though the north had some disadvantages socially and economically from the beginning, the leaders of the Hausa-Fulani have managed to maintain a grip on power and influence in Nigeria since independence. Meanwhile, other groups, some of which inhabit far more lucrative regions maintain a sense of marginalization because they have yet to reap nearly as many benefits as some of their more fortunate political adversaries.

The symptoms of violence and secessionism in Nigeria are due to the failure of every regime to address the needs of the public as a whole, and the problem of social integration and power checking especially. This is whether it is caused by corruption, incompetence, or by design. The state has become, like other troubled states in Africa, a prize to be captured rather than a government there to provide for the needs of the citizenry. There is a trend among
Nigerians to suppose the state is purely a cash cow, not mindful that tax dollars from their pockets continue to feed it (Osaghae 1998a). It creates a kind of competitiveness that has been with the state since its earliest days, and remains a threat particularly at election time, of blowing up. Indeed, in an attempt to assuage this possibility in the future, Nigeria accepted a rotational presidency to ensure that both the North and South each have a chance at the presidency. This extra constitutional agreement was accepted starting in 1999 with President Obasanjo in an effort to ferment agreement to the new constitution. The agreement fails to take into account however, the problems of a miscarried presidency, like the current Yar’Ardua fiasco. It also fails to acknowledge the diversity within each group, especially the south where the Yoruba and Igbo dominate, and together still make up less than half the total population.

The ethnic landscape of Nigeria today can hardly be seen as conducive to the state making experiment. Since every group is numerically a minority, one might be led to believe that Nigerian politics is perfect for building a state government based on compromise and coalition building. This would not however, reflect that reality. Instead, elites control most of the power and use ethnicity as a guarantor to that power. The root cause is the pre-colonial make up of the state. The North and South of Nigeria lacked any significant political connections prior to the first council meeting of 1947, when for the first time the leadership of each region met (Osaghae 1998a; Nafziger and Richter 1976). Until then, they were virtually two different countries, ethnically, religiously and otherwise. And in fact, one could argue there were many more countries within the two mega regions. The south could be divided yet again into two parts, one Yoruba, and the other Igbo, each having its own cultural and political background fueling its regional politics. The year 1914 saw them all brought together for the first time, but only superficially. The process of making two entities, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and the
Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria one country did not really begin until 1947. Up to that point, the North or Hausaland as it was once called had been ruled through an emirate system, under hereditary chiefs, the command of which went to the Sultan (Kirk-Greene 1967). In the eastern region, that would eventually be Biafra, the administration was more of an amalgamation, put together by the colonialists and eventually destroyed when it came time for secession (Kirk-Greene 1967). The southwest, like the North, had a historic tradition of government as well; Yoruba traditional leaders had, during colonial administration, significant influence on the political landscape, an influence that survived Nigerian independence (Adekunle 2006). And scattered amongst them over time had been still more political units and kingdoms. Suddenly together, all sides had a significant degree of mistrust for one another.

In fact, it is doubtful that “anything similar to the present state of Nigeria could have evolved without external intervention” (Osaghae 1998a, 4). The country was cobbled together by the British, an amalgamation of numerous groups, the count of which today is over 250 ethnicities, and at the time of independence was split into three large regional areas. Nigeria remains divided, like other African states touching the Sahel, by a North-South line. This distinguishes populations that are largely Muslim from Christian ones. In the North, the Hausa-Fulani are the majority. And in the South, groups like the Yoruba and Igbo. In between them are a number of minority groups. But these divisions are more than just social in nature. They are also political today, as in the past, and have marked the location and tenor of many secessionist movements. This reality cannot be brushed over, and continues to shape the state of politics in Nigeria today.

No single group has a solid majority in Nigeria. Muslims make up fifty percent of the population and Christians forty percent, the largest ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, are only
twenty-nine percent of the population (CIA 2009). And while the Yoruba are the second largest population at twenty-one percent, unlike the Hausa-Fulani, they are divided between different religious groups (CIA 2009; Elaigwu and Galadima 2003). And while notions of grand coalition building would seem to indicate that Nigeria should be ripe for equally grand cooperation between groups, the reality has been quite the opposite. Instead, Nigeria has experienced what Eghosa Osaghae (1998a) calls a “war like approach to elections” that filters into other realms of the Nigerian state apparatus. The events surrounding the 1961 elections are a good example of this kind of behavior and its implications.

The Southern part of Nigeria had been governed quite differently than the North in colonial times. The British had cultivated legislative experience in the Southerners, particularly the Yoruba. This gave them something of an advantage when it came time for self government at independence, causing the North to be wary of being dominated politically or otherwise by the more favored and educated Southerners. And in fact, to help ease the concerns of the Northerners, the government agreed to provide a kind of affirmative action for the North where education was especially in need. In the federal civil service for example, Northern peoples were given preferential treatment, a kind of affirmative action, for promotions in the administrative and executive positions (Jinadu 1985). But like the United States, which uses a very similar method for repairing historical disadvantage, this came with two significant costs. One, it fueled reports that individuals could be promoted without regard to their qualifications, which was incorrect (Jinadu 1985). Secondly, it created a sense among Southerners that they would be overlooked unfairly for similar positions, or denied jobs for which they were better qualified.

There were those that argued that these kinds of programs violated the 1960 and 1963 constitutions because they in fact privileged one group over another, allowing the government to
discriminate amongst citizens. This is despite the fact that the Northern peoples, while not a minority numerically speaking, were what L. Adele Jinadu (1985) calls a sociological minority because they were so underprivileged socially and financially. This is an example of the way the state, while trying to ease tension and distrust on the part of one group generates mistrust from another group. Nigeria had developed affirmative action as an institutional response to improve the strength of the state as provider. Unfortunately, it also added to the perception of the state as a prize, a kind of money machine, that if controlled, can be bilked. Vying for control of the state apparatus was seen as necessary to ensure the interests of the North would be advanced. But, this kind of ‘necessity’ led to the engorged value placed on winning the ultimate prize, making the political power game all the more intense and increasingly game like, where capturing prizes was all the more important. It no doubt added to the fear of the southern from all strata too, that once in power, the state could not only be used positively for one group, but to intentionally disadvantage another group.

In Nigeria, there is a strong history of dependence on ethnic and religious networks to facilitate political power and legitimacy instead of a ‘secular’ or open nonaligned government, the result of course, is a stronger trend toward secession (Osaghae 1998a; Ikelegbe 2001b). The novelty in the Nigerian situation is that organizations tend in both the past and present, to mobilize through ethnic and or religious relationships, rather than through non-cleavage building institutions. Again, informal networks tend to lend themselves to this kind of institution building. But once a group or organization acquires a foothold in the state apparatus, it has a significant advantage doing so again (Osaghae 1998a). The alternative is of course, what the Hausa-Fulani were trying to avoid in the election of 1964, losing the possibility of having that direct link to the state apparatus. Losing control and influence over the state is a significant threat from that kind
of perspective, particularly one influenced by ever increasing suspicion of the other side (Osaghae 1998a; Nafziger and Richter 1976), but those in a position to control the faucet are in turn free to promote their interests (Ake 1985). It is because of this reasoning however, that groups start to rationalize taking extralegal measures like openly rigging the census (Bah 2005; Adepoju 1981; Ahonsi 1988). At the time, the Nigerian census was used to determine how many seats in the federal assembly each group received (Bah 2005). And since voting patterns were largely attributable to ethnic association, whatever the census in terms of population statistics claimed, ultimately determined the outcome of the election and the allocation of state resources (Bah 2005; Jinadu 1985). It therefore became extremely important to control the census. Clearly, elections are important, but they have historically been a source of tribulation related to the ethnic stakes.

In fact, the only exceptions to this ethnic-voting behavior were observed in the 1993 (Ihonvbere 1996) presidential election and the 1999 presidential election (Bah 2005). In both cases there were of course very specific causes for this observed behavior. Namely, that the entire process had been conducted through a two-party system in which both candidates were Yoruba (Bah 2005). Baring these two circumstances Nigerians have overall, tended to vote largely for members of their own ethnic groups. It should be noted that Nigerian political parties do not proclaim openly their ethnic orientation, but, because they represent a specific constituency, they must intimate that they are with a particular group in a more subtle way in order to gain power (Bah 2005; Elaigwu and Galadima 2003). Keeping these issues in mind, the census crisis is put into better perspective.

The years of the Census Crisis were a prequel to the coming civil war. Desperation and fear propelled both sides to cheat in order to guarantee their return to power. At the same time,
they further entrenched their differences, and as a result, made even more difficult the task of building a nation-state as they strove to protect their respective interests. But as has been the case since pre-colonial days, the social networks of Africa were much more able to perform this function than the state. The same is true today if one examines the history of the Niger Delta movement, which since the 1970s has mobilized itself in the form of many different organizations struggling against the power and influence of multinational oil corporations (Ikelegbe 2001b). In fact, Nigeria is known for the richness and strength of its various civil society movements and organizations making this slightly less surprising. But clearly, these institutions are outside the state apparatus, existing particularly in the South and Western parts of the country. It is primarily Yoruba- and Igbo-speaking populations, for example, that organize groups such as this, primarily to provide in those areas of need which the state cannot, such as education (Barkan 1994). And particularly amongst the Yoruba, this type of “communal self-help” is quite strong having really emerged in the 1930s (Barkan 1994, 130). It was, even then, a kind of response to the failure of the colonial state to meet the needs of the local community (Barkan 1994, 130). These groups were oriented toward the ethnic group, intensifying intra-ethnic links while discouraging inter-ethnic ones. And many groups, throughout both Nigeria and greater Africa, have similar systems of mobilization. This process reinforces the connections between the old pre-colonial state system, not the new one, compounding the likelihood that secession is probable and desirable, even if impossible. For the Yoruba, the manifestation of these organizations was varied. One organization, known as the Committee of Friends or Ikenne Mafia, an offshoot of older Yoruba community groups, functions largely as a economic and organizational firm for the Yoruba elite (Othman 1984). But in terms of its ability to operate in
Nigeria at large, it is limited when compared to the Northerners ability to engage and game the Nigerian political system (Othman 1984).

The Northern peoples have the Kaduna mafia, thought to be made of a wide range of educated professionals and politicians. Kaduna is believed to work through the formal and informal sector to promote the interests of the Northerner which are by and large Muslim Hausa-Fulani (Othman 1984). It is also known widely as the Northern Caucus who existence is known as early as the civil war (Osaghae 1998b; Othman 1984). And like the communal associations used by the Yoruba, the informal connections or base of the ‘Kaduna’ system likely came originally from pre-colonial times as well, perhaps even through the Sokoto Caliphate or other proto-Islamic system. What is evident is that their chief concern is Northern hegemony (Othman 1984) and maintaining access to resources for their constituents, which are largely the educated Northern elites. But like Yoruba groups, the arrival of colonialism likely strengthened this informal system socially even if it lacked ‘sovereignty’ through total external recognition. In pre-colonial times, the emirate system was indigenous to Muslim societies of the North. The colonialist worked to strengthen this system and utilize it for their own purposes, entrenching and continuing to provide it with legitimacy, allowing a blur to form between the religious and political (Elaigwu and Galadima 2003). Today, this is typified in the form of the Sultan of Sokoto, who is both the religious head of Muslim Nigeria, as well as and leader of the Sokoto Empire traditionally (Elaigwu and Galadima 2003). Again, this group intensifies ethnic cleavages, and the pre-colonial state system rather than alleviating them. It does so by working for a specific regional (ethno-regional) group at the exclusion of others. This is not inherently a negative thing, but in a country as fractionalized as Nigeria where ethnicity and religion are used to mobilize individuals, it can become dangerous by undermining the state.
The danger became apparent in the mid 1960s when Nigeria’s federal system seemed to be failing. Like the United States, Nigeria uses a federal system to provide a degree of autonomy to each of its states. But that autonomy has often been held with suspicion by the federal government. There is an excellent example in the First Republic, leading into the Census Crisis right before the civil war which testifies to the federal willingness to intervene. Between 1962 and 1963 there was another crisis which preceded the census crisis in the Western region of the country. What began as an internal problem endemic to the Western region and political struggles therein, quickly turned into a confrontation that undermined, directly, the government’s legitimacy ultimately threatening the peace and security of the state as a whole (Bah 2005, 87). By then, secessionism seemed the best solution with autonomy appearing to be more and more illusory. This had shown the federal government’s willingness to step over the autonomy of the states in a way that was no doubt much more threatening.

But the federal fear of state autonomy was not unfounded. Even as early as 1964, before a declaration was made regarding Biafra, Igbo intentions for fleeing the federation were known (Bah 2005). Is it a complete coincidence that they so quickly began to plan for secession after the crisis in the Western province and the violence in the north? But as mentioned above, secession was a part of Nigerian consciousness as a whole and not unique to the Igbo. Indeed, at some point in Nigerian history, nearly every major ethnic group has threatened secession. To be fair to the federal government, it is usually along national and geographic lines that self determination is forged. And with a tradition of self-help ingrained in their separate societies, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba alike, is it any wonder that Nigeria has contended with coup and counter coup, succession after succession attempt?
Biafra War

The Biafran war came down to the secession of the Eastern region, a recognized political community (Nixon 1972) with established societal institutions and a host of ethnic groups residing therein, from an equally heterogeneous and complex system known as the state of Nigeria. The Biafra war is also a fine example of the spotty way in which the international system has impacted Africa since independence. Most of the major wars of the mid to late 20th century can be understood using analysis that begins with Cold War politics. Biafra is an exception to that pattern. “Unlike so many other insurgencies in the Cold War period after WWII”; Biafra lacked ties to the outside world (Stremalu 1977, 66). Or as M. Rufiq Islam (1985) noted more specifically, Biafran independence was almost entirely opposed by every state holding significant power, including the United States, United Kingdom, and the USSR, a particularly interesting occurrence during the Cold War period. In fact, notes Islam (1985) only Portugal and France supported the move, and even then, perhaps only to sell arms. It was instead a movement by Biafran people largely alone to achieve self-determination. In fact, the Nigerian civil war was the first large-scale armed conflict that could be described as such (Stremalu 1977). Therefore, it is much easier to place the blame for the failure of the state, or the secession itself, entirely on the shoulders of the Nigerian government without have to examine the roles of external powers in motivating or generating the political will to secede. It is the state itself which was weak and structurally failed to develop mechanisms to pull Igbo people generally, and Biafran’s specifically, into the structure nor enabled them to perceive a stake in the survival of the Nigerian state.

Quite interestingly, it was the old global dynamic of religion that was used, ineffectually, as the tool to try to bring in the major powers to one side or another. The Biafran conflict was
portrayed as a religious war by the Biafrans, as a conflict between Christians and Muslims (Stremalu 1977). They accused Nigeria of committing a jihad in order to convince both missionaries inside Biafra and the greater Christian world to come to their aid (Stremalu 1977, 113). It would appear that the only state that joined the Biafran’s because of religion was Haiti, although it should be noted that Portugal and France could be seen as part of the Catholic world. So again, the international system is largely present in appearance rather than actuality. In terms of Nigerian political development, this war was not a step forward but a huge step backward. From the beginning to the aftermath it was fraught with ethnicity and all the implications therein. The 1966 coup which brought Lt. Colonel Gowon to power – a Northerner, began the process of pitting one side against the other. The 1970 conclusion left the region as a whole politically at the mercy of the Nigerian North from whom they had seceded. Although, it was but a short time previously that the Northerners had themselves sought separation from the federation (Nixon 1972). The result of the war, on all sides, was a greater sense of separation.

Both before and after the civil war, the government attempted to alleviate some of the strain of ethnic tension. One example of this is from just at independence, Christians and Muslims residing in the Northern district had to devise a way to live together in a state where Muslims wished to use Sharia. The fruit of their innovation was the Penal Code, which brought together Islamic and English criminal law – religious federalism in the northern region (Elaigwu and Galadima 2003). It essentially reserved Islamic law for Muslims, allowing both groups to live together. Fortunately the first republic, up to the civil war was not caste in religious violence. After the Civil War, however, the second republic did fair much worse on the religious front. This was likely due to the tone which was taken during the war.
A second example, which started in 1963, was an effort to create new states to reduce the political influence of the Hausa-Fulani federally, by spreading their influence and creating states where they were the minority (Jinadu 1985). This process did not actualize itself in time to prevent the conflict, even though it would continue on until eventually there were 12, and ultimately 36 states. But it would prove useful in bringing the war to an end, indeed it was but one part of the political solution to the Biafran war. The irony was that Biafra in many ways, defied the expectations of a secessionist region, particularly one in Nigeria. Namely, Biafra did not have a definitive territory, and although Igbos made up the majority, in actuality the Biafran secession was not driven by ethnic discrimination but by regional discrimination targeting Easterners as a whole by the North, not any specific ethnic group (Islam 1985; Umoren 1996, Nixon 1972). The attacks helped to solidify the identity of the east and aided tremendously in the emergence and articulation of their movement for secession. The causes for secession became enumerated politically and ultimately published in the form of the Biafran declaration of independence, the Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra. This proclamation detailed the history of persecution and violence against the Eastern region, including the pogroms that left some 30,000 dead. But it also hinted at the economic and political reasons for independence that went beyond the issue of physical security (Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra). Charles Nixon (1972) summarized the point of the proclamation to the point of security, which from the ‘Eastern’ perspective, the federal government seemed unwilling or unable to guarantee. What is clear is that the political solution was not fast enough for the Easterners and with perhaps, the “best army in black Africa” (Islam 1985, 213), the Biafrans were more than ready to take the next step in terms of self-determination. Obviously, the leadership had been left with the impression that it was achievable.
The military strength of the Eastern region combined with the historical acceptability of ‘secession’ as an idea in Nigeria and the perception that the movement would be popular in the region (Nixon 1972) sealed the deal. Reality would quickly prove contrary to this opinion. The federal government generally opposed the idea and took to war to bring Biafra back into the federation. And each region in the state had its own reasons for preferring war favorably to ‘mutual secession’. The (South) Westerners feared continued federation with the North, in absentia of the East, would leave them without a counterbalance to northern power (Nixon 1972), a political reality that would be difficult to amend. And for the North, the loss of the south east would prove a huge economic cost that if followed by the West could be doubled for a host of reasons, including sea access and oil (Nixon 1972; Umoran 1996). Joseph Umoran (1996) describes Nigerian ‘tribal struggle’ as essentially resource driven and in his argument included the civil war over Biafra. It would seem obvious to the north even in the 1960s the importance of oil revenue to economic viability in the long run, and no doubt the leadership quickly calculated the ultimate cost of losing a region so valuable. The result would be economic peril for the North leaving them no choice, but to fight the war. The failure of the war to achieve lasting independence for Biafra presents a conundrum if one examines the facts. If so many Nigerians at the time, and in actuality, even in the future, saw secession so favorably, why even fight to keep a region in the federation when everyone can simply surrender to the secession temptation?

It would seem that despite all the secessionist talk, the reality is that few states willingly surrender large portions of territory particularly when the economic and political costs are high enough. And while Islam (1985) argues that there was a fear that secession of one province could lead to that of others, the argument still stands why, if the perception of ‘Nigeria’ as a state was seen as so much of a historical fluke? The political and economic reasons aforementioned
seemed to answer the question with reasonable facts. Once Nigeria was created as a political unit, however arbitrary, the regional economy became interwoven, and the politics as a result became interwoven as well. The twelve state solution was an effort to reshape the state, bringing the East back to the table by first eliminating the idea that secession was a possibility, and second by destroying the perception that it would be a necessity (Nixon 1972, 487-488). With the new balance of states it was now possible for power to be distributed more evenly across regions. It was hoped that “by dividing the North”, the new model of Nigeria “promised to remove the threat of domination of one region by another and thus to remove the source of the abuses which the Easterners had suffered” promoting equal rights among the states (Nixon 1972, 491-492).

Ultimately, the solution was coming through the pipeline all along. One could then conclude that perhaps, based on this finding, Nigerian political leaders of the time had the tools institutional and otherwise to prevent the secession all along. The reason that secession led to war, was then, perhaps, as much a historical fluke as the amalgamation of Nigeria in the first place.

If as Charles Nixon (1972) suggests, and all Nigerians were roused to fight ‘for’ Biafra, it would seem then that the sense of Nigerian state identity was both challenged by the Biafran war, and solidified by it. But if history has been any indication, secession as a political solution to Nigerian state failure would continue on into the future, and that in fact, this ‘political solution’ actually only helped resolve this one particular crisis, not in any way pre-empt those coming in the future. And to be sure, Nigeria would face many more calls and or attempts at secession in the future. What then does the experience of the 1967 war demonstrate? It shows the power struggles inherent in Nigeria as well as the ethnic component to the way that power is distributed and manipulated. It also shows emphatically the impact of pre-colonial history on the politics of Nigeria. True Nigerian history began with the amalgamation of 1914, but the societies
that existed under that structure continue to exist and impact the relationship between the people and the government that is Nigeria.

Formative Years of 1970 to 2004

The political process of creating new Nigerian states ended for the second time in 1976, when Brigadier Murtala Ramat Mohammed was assassinated. The coup resulted in his replacement by Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, a man who would later return to Nigerian politics. Obasanjo led further constitutional reforms, but his efforts actually made Nigeria weaker. Obasanjo was attempting to prepare Nigeria for civilian rule which commenced with elections in 1979, bringing Alhaji Shehu Shagari to power. His reign only lasted until 1983, and when he fell it was due to the obscene corruption under which his governance had occurred. Whatever constitutional reforms were in place, it was the poor political leadership combined with corruption that continued the culture of warring over politics. Political office became too valuable during this era. Like the census crisis election in 1964, the 1983 election was fraught with blatant rigging (Ahonsi 1988). The military came in to quell the disorder and remained until a momentary spell of civilian rule ten years later.

The decline in oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s combined with structural adjustment added to the peril of the Nigerian regime. Nigeria sank into greater instability as the military under various leadership proved unable to right the economy. The situation came to a head as the Ogoni people challenged the government for their share of oil revenue, widening their demand for autonomy. It was clear to them that what little wealth was generated by oil went largely to the Hausa and Yoruba, and as a result they took to forming a new political vision (Welch 1995, 635). Ken Saro-Wiwa, whose execution would ruin the international community’s perception of Nigeria, made the case for Ogoni freedom before the UN in 1992. The very next year, the
government passed the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree, intended specifically for suppression of the Ogoni uprising (Bah 2005, 60). Violence erupted as the Ogoni engaged the government. A neighboring ethnic group, the Andoni, were also drawn into the fight, used as front-men by the government to legitimize further attacks on the Ogoni (Bah 2005). In all, the fighting left a thousand people dead and many more thousand homeless. The government reaction was no doubt informed by the civil war. Trying to destroy the rebellion before it became a full on civil war was a strategic decision. But, the executions of Saro-Wiwa and his high level leaders created even higher levels of fear in the country, straining the legitimacy of the government. This did not, however, end the Ogoni resistance, which continued until 1999 when the military regime ended (Bah 2005). The country was thought to be on the verge of collapse throughout the late 1990s (Bah 2005; Ihonvbere 1996; Afolayan 2006). And while the Ogoni crisis does not rank as an armed conflict, it is very much a prequel to the Niger Delta conflict.

The Ogoni rebellion would ultimately prove largely ethnic, hence the name Ogoni, but it must be emphasized that they reside in the Niger Delta. Their movement began peacefully, articulating a desire for a share in the benefits of oil amongst their greater concerns. But their argument was also a cry of frustration, echoed by other groups, with the failure of the decentralization mechanism that had promised increased power sharing (Welch 1995; Osaghae 1995). The power and authority after all the political wrangling of the previous decades still produced a system where political power still resided largely in the North (Welch 1995). The frustration of the Ogoni was addressed by different actors within Ogoni society. Traditional rulers played an important part in the initial protests although their efforts were ineffectual (Ikelegbe 2001b). Equally ineffectual associations of an ethnic nature would arise over time in an attempt to achieve the same end but would ultimately fail as well. The issuance in the early
1990s of the Ogoni Bill of Rights, spelled out succinctly the fears and desires of the Ogoni in preparation for taking their case to the UN. It is clear from the language that their chief concern was domination by the majority, and a fear that their very survival was at stake (Ogoni Bill of Rights 1992). After a long agitation, the Ogoni turned to violence when it became clear the state would offer them no real solution to the problems they faced, but only promises and excessive return on the violence the Ogoni had used (Welch 1995, Ikelegbe 2001b). This was all brought to a head by the 1993 election crisis.

In a strange twist of fate, the 1993 elections were perhaps Nigeria’s most successful because ethnicity played little or no role in them (Adekunle 2006), both in their making, and in a manner of speaking the sequence of events following their undoing. Mashood Abiola, a Muslim Yoruba won over incumbent President Babangida. The controversy came when Babangida annulled the election, and within a few short months was forced to step down. In the interim, Nigerians all over, regardless of ethnicity or religion rallied around Mashood Abiola, openly challenging the military dictators across all social boundaries; urban or rural, regional, class, gender and so on (Ihonvbere 1996). Julius Ihonvbere (1996, 193) described this crisis as one illustrative of “the nature and extent of the Nigerian political rot” but also as a creative moment. Indeed unlike anything in Nigerian memory, the election debacle actually managed to bring Nigerians together. And in their unity, they managed to bring the country to its knees for the next five years through protests and disruptions of various kinds. Writes Funso Afolayan (2006, 297), “Between 1993 and 1998, more than at any other time since the Biafran Civil War, the fate of Nigeria, the validity of its continuing existence as a corporate entity, was severely threatened”. And yet, for this period, violence did not reach the level demarcated in the armed conflict data set as ‘armed conflict’.
The significance of this may lie in two points. Firstly, that instability is not just traced by violence that is measurable. If analysts like Afolayan (2006) are correct at this was a period of great instability in Nigeria, and it cannot be measured using armed conflict, then that measure has a huge weakness. Secondly, what does this mean for this study and the state of Nigeria leading into the 2004 armed conflict? It could mean that the point of analysis, 2004, and its greater significance, extends far back in time, literally to include even the Ogoni uprising, and a number of other issues that may seemed tangential. And in the process, indicates that analysis of these issues suffers when too limited in scope. The instability of the 1990s should not be ignored or analyzed in such as way as to make too artificial a distinction between them and the events of the following decade. On the other hand, this period also demonstrated not just the almost inherent instability of the state, but also it’s potential for rebirth and regeneration.

This period also could be described as a period of growing pains. States Ihonvbere (1996), the 1993 crisis gave civil society in Nigeria an opportunity to generate strength and its own source of legitimacy though it remained weak. These were the moments that borne Nigerian civil society, not Yoruba, or Hausa, or Ogoni. The country was clearly unstable through this period. Make no mistake, various groups in Nigerian history had long experiences with creating new and various community organizations and societal institutions designed to demand and obtain resources from the state (Ikelegbe 2001a; Ikelegbe 2001b), but they were generally limited in scope by way of ethnicity. Perfect examples of these include Isoko Development Union (IDU), Urhobo Progress Union (UPU), National Council of Nigerian Citizens, Northern People’s Congress, Ibo Union, Edo Union, Ijaw Progressive Union, Calabar Improvement League, Egbe Omo Oduduwa; the list goes on (Ikelegbe 2001a; Ikelegbe 2001b; Umoren 1996). The majority of them were set up for very similar reasons, including but not limited to
development assistance. Essentially, the state had failed to meet the needs of their respective constituency (Ihonvbere 1996). But clearly something new had happened in 1993, and the results were evident into the future. The period witnessed the growth of pan-ethnic organizations the likes of which Nigeria had not seen before, but this was overshadowed by the high level politics of the day.

Abiola was quickly imprisoned on accusations of treason for declaring himself president. And after the seat of power changed hands a few times the people of Nigeria found themselves facing a new dictator. The crackdown on the emerging Nigerian civil society commenced quickly once the Abacha regime finished consolidating its network. From the beginning the use of intimidation, cooptation, misinformation, bribery and divide and rule tactics on civil society commenced (Ihonvbere 1996, 206). When Abacha died in 1998 he was replaced by General Abubakar who slowly began to restore a sense of freedom and democracy to Nigeria, paving the way for elections. This time also demonstrates the survivability of civil society once sprouted. After the death of Abacha, civil society, in the form of groups, associations and institutions flourished again (Ikelegbe 2001b). These groups were various, but more importantly, among them, were several that were pan-ethnic and or concerned with the Niger Delta (Ikelegbe 2001b). This was a new beginning for Nigeria but also a moment when a new security problem would arise. Nevertheless, the significance of these new organizations should not be ignored, especially with the backdrop of purely ethnic organizations behind them.

The Fourth Republic and Armed Conflict in 2004

When the Fourth Republic was established in 1999, it would become the longest lasting civilian government in the country’s history. The Fourth Republic has worked much more smoothly for the citizens of Nigeria. This is evident by the noticeably fewer calls for political
autonomy (Bah 2005). There has been a certain increase in accountability amongst the leadership as well. The rises in oil prices have also brought a mixed blessing. Nigeria was able in 2006 to pay of its debt to the Paris Club. But this has also added more intensity to the insurgency in the Niger Delta. Civil society in the Niger Delta has gotten much stronger particularly since an end to military government as stated previously (Ikelegbe 2001b). Like violence between Christians and Muslims, violence in the Delta has seemed to increase since the end of military government (Ikelegbe 2001b). Obviously, the end of a repressive regime tends to bring about a letting off of steam. But, what has happened in the delta region, particularly through the period of 2004, was something much more violent.

The delta houses the majority of Nigeria’s refinery capacity, and indeed much of the country’s petro-capital, whether with regard to plants, personnel, or other operations (Jike 2004). As such, the area has suffered severely the environmental effects related to the growth of the petro-industry. Still, the region is one of the poorest, with the least amount of development (Ikelegbe 2001b). This being the case, the picture starts to take shape as to why the rebellion arose but the story as to why it became so violent and why the government has been unable to quell that violence requires more detail. The demand for more compensation is clearly justified in terms of revenue share, since the entire region suffers severe economic degradation, and the government’s negligence merely adds salt to the wound. Oil exploration has sacrificed untold acres of productive farmland, displaced farmers, forcing many young people, young men especially, into urban areas to seek employment (Jike 2004). The creation of what are essentially environmental refugees has put added pressure on strained labor markets where there are already high numbers of unemployed, including a host of graduates who no doubt had very high expectations (Jike 2004; Ejobowah 2000). And to add further to the economic distress, oil
companies often employed individuals from outside the locality (Ejobowah 2000), adding further to the economic burden the residents of the region suffered. Over time this compounded the already intense social problems that were developing in the region, and put added pressure on the local leadership to bring about some solution.

As arbiter between the oil companies, the federal government, and the people, the local leadership of the delta region consistently failed and over time to make any significant impact. These failings left a stain on the reputation of the traditional rulers who had up to the recent past, had some influence on managing the resident response. The elders, as they are also known, have become less involved overall as the intergenerational discrepancy has become more manifest (Jike 2004). The youth have instead taken it upon themselves to advocate, organize and challenge the elite, the multinational corporations and the government simultaneously. Is it any wonder then, that as this has been happening, with the older, more people traditional approach losing favor, that violence has taken its place, at the hands of a more youthful leadership? The social instability generated by the economic problems of society, the same economic issues that the government seems so unwilling to really address is the source of Nigeria’s security problems. Indeed the government has used perhaps every institution and tool that it would appear at first glance would fail rather than use any significant financial resources to undercut the movement. What is more interesting is that the costs to Nigeria financially doing so may have been less than the cost of the violence. With so many living at poverty levels of $1 dollar a day, the investment of even $5 billion a year, which is only half of the revenue lost because of the violence in 2004, could make a huge difference (“Nigeria; Following Ibori’s Security Clampdown, Militias Declare Ceasefire in Warri”). And yet, this has not taken place on a significant scale.
While civil society has been in many respects opportunistic, and especially in recent years, quick to violence, clearly, the federal government, with respect to violence, has tended to always fall into the category of excessive. The phrase ‘high-handed’ has been used on more than one occasion to describe its response to the rebellious tendencies of its subjects (Ikelegbe 2001b). These strong arm tactics have proven themselves ineffectual and yet there seems to be no learning curve on the part of the leadership, whose actions only seem to cause an increase in violence not a decrease. The leadership has made attempts at infiltrating many of the militias and associations but has achieved little gain from this endeavor (Ikelegbe 2005). Many groups are no doubt aware of these attempts since the government has a long history of doing so. In any case, the relationship between the community actors and the multinational oil companies is sometimes only rivaled by the relationship between the communities themselves. Violence between the Itsekiri and the Ijaw broke out over the possible claims to oil producing land (‘Nigeria; Self-Styled Rebel Seeks Independence for Oil-Producing Niger Delta’). The violence between these two groups has helped make Warri, one of Nigeria’s largest port cities, and the area surrounding it one of the most violent of the region. Perhaps not coincidentally, it is the area home to one of the country’s few refineries (‘Nigeria; Self-Styled Rebel Seeks Independence for Oil-Producing Niger Delta’). The government had, no doubt because of the economic threat, taken an almost personal interest in attempting to bring peace between the two peoples in 2004, in order to help stem their potential loss in oil revenues should the violence persist.

Early in 2004, militants had blown up the Escravos pipeline, which fed the Warri refinery its oil, leading to the closure of that plant, not long after which, there was a strong clampdown, that by June, had produced a ceasefire between the two groups (‘Nigeria; Self-Styled Rebel Seeks Independence for Oil-Producing Niger Delta’). As part of this clamp down, the
government had initiated another cleaver tactic to quell violence. Like the attempts to make ethnic militias and associations illegal (Ikelegbe 2005), the government in 2004 decided that that it would begin to hold leaders responsible for any attack on law abiding citizens or military personnel (Nigeria introduces new anti-violence strategy in troubled Niger delta). It was a bold move, but went well in conjunction with the greater security strategy which had just gone underway. The result was a June temporary ceasefire between the two groups which hardly survived the month and a quick return to business as usual. Like other conflicts where the combating organizations are numerous but the teams few, the collapse of peace was attributed to the usual complaint. Some Ijaw leaders emerged suggesting that those whom signed the peace deal on their behalf, had no real mandate to represent them, meanwhile the government continued to lose some $10 billion annually in revenue because of their conflict (“Warri Peace Deal Collapses, Ijaw Signatories Back Out”). Meanwhile, the government continued to battle the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force.

The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002) and its subsequent updates only count the year 2004 as reaching the level of armed conflict, thus far in the new millennium. And yet, year after of violence has continued. President Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded in temporarily reducing some of the violence, but the entities that had previously been waging battle passed that role on to a new organization that was gaining popularity. In 2006 the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) came onto the scene and restarted the militant effort again. Their tactics meant using the kidnapping of oil workers and looting of oil through the practice of bunkering to make a mark in the international media. The success of MEND is that is has brought needed attention to the cause of the Niger Delta region. On the
other hand, it has been condemned by many, including those native to the region, for its use of violence, which is often reprised by the government.

Their anger is based in concerns for their own safety, since the government has often been, perhaps deliberately non-discriminating in its use of violence. Reports as recent as the summer of 2009 have shown large numbers of civilian deaths, numbers over and above the number of militants involved. If it is deliberate it is in keeping with the previous policy of holding the leadership responsible, spreading the consequences to the public. That is collective punishment, a type which works on the logic that by making the citizens wholly responsible for the actions of the militants, they will perhaps take part in the policing of these organizations in order to protect themselves from the collective consequences. This is illegal however, based on the Fourth Geneva Convention, and if that is what is occurring then the international community must keep an eye on events in the Delta. Obviously, Nigeria’s government has much to lose due to violence. But ultimately, the government should find the cost of prevention is worth much more than the long term price of the tactics currently used.

Christians and Muslims

Nigeria must deal with ongoing violence not just in the states of the Delta, but in other areas as well. In the case of violence between Christians and Muslims, the violence has blossomed as the government has struggled to address the role of Sharia in what is supposed to be a secular state (Elaigwu and Galadima 2003). This violence has failed to reach the level of armed conflict, but it is nonetheless significant with regard to the Nigerian political landscape. Christians have feared the implementation of Sharia would mean their permanent subjugation to Muslims and have reacted accordingly. Church leaders and secularist have taken many opportunities to speak out against the implementation of Sharia in all its forms at various
occasions and on many levels of government. This struggle at times led to some violence on all sides including between Muslims, a significant occurrence that reveals how divisive the issue is. Writes Joseph Kenny (1996):

> There is little popular desire among Muslims to live under the restrictions of strict Sharia. Yet they are inclined to support a politician who waves the flag of Sharia, because it is a symbol of Islam, and a politician who promotes Islam will be expected to give a generous share of the national cake to the Muslims.

This manipulation is little different from other political tactics of an ethnic nature. The only significance here is the long history of Islam in Nigeria and the role of that religion with regard to Christianity and the present of violence.

Islamic history goes back to the 14th century when Islamic leadership took hold in Borno, where at the time, the kings had begun to profess the religion and in only a short making it the religion of the elite (Kenny 1996), far earlier than Christianity. Christianity spread much later under colonial influence when missions sought out to convert the population and the people sought the political benefits thereof. The spread of the Islamic faith, after gaining entry along trans-Saharan trade routes, actually led to the establishment of the Sokoto Empire under ‘Uthman dan Fodiye’s jihad where it was virtually the state religion of Hausaland for some time (Ibrahim 1991). In short, the society became entrenched with Islam and Sufi institutions like other parts of greater West Africa. There was a flourishing of organizations and associations as seen in other parts of the Muslim world. Today these groups include the Qaddiriyya and Tijaniyya orders, a host of Muslim brotherhoods as well as the extremist Izâla which is militantly anti-Christian (Kenny 1996). All of these associations and institutions play a significant role in organizing and
serving the needs of Muslim Nigerians, and galvanizing them at different times to political causes.

What should be noted is that Christians and Muslims in Nigeria do share a continued predilection for creolization of their faith systems, mixing the indigenous with the Abrahamic. The results are practices that fundamentalists have at times attempted to eradicate with little success, the traditional African religion remains embedded in the society in many forms. The responsive fundamentalism takes various forms to counter this trend. In Islam the jihad has been used to reform pagan practices to various degrees of success. And like their Muslim neighbors, Christians have become organized to some extent, and have experimented with revivals in fundamentalism and evangelism in the form of the ‘Born Again’ movement (Ibrahim 1991).

What is somewhat unique to Nigerian politics, is the ability of various groups and their leadership to drag the government into both their inter and intra-religious squabbles (Ibrahim 1991). Jibrin Ibrahim (1991) research suggests that this relationship of manipulation and teaming has a long history in the state. Religion continues to be manipulated like ethnicity for the purposes of power and the acquisition of a base for political power.

The curse of inter-religious violence has been the convenience of organizing against the other. The violence has at times been explosive coming in waves, sometimes sparked by political disputes, other times escalating an attempt at king making. Hundreds have been killed and thousands displaced. It is but one of many sources for instability in the country. Over all, since 1999, it has been estimated that tens of thousands have been killed in Nigeria in ethnic or religious violence (“48 Killed in Religious Violence in Plateau State”). These numbers are staggering. Ultimately, the resolution will be continued dialogue between groups. The 1990s saw the height of Muslim-Christian violence. Even though the violence between these two groups
continues to flair even in the present, the real animosity between them was largely superseded by fear of the dictatorship since the 1993 election debacle (Kenny 1996). This is truer at the societal level where the population regardless of faith often suffers. This seems to suggest that violence in Nigeria between Muslim and Christian is less and less a symptom of state failure, than in actuality, the failing attempts of would be leaders to obtain power. In the end, as in dictatorship, those who mobilize the people to fight for their cause, are usually only interested in supporting those closest to them and achieving personal material gain.

**Summation**

Corruption still plagues Nigeria. The wind fall oil profits that fueled its growth in the beginning of the new millennium quickly dropped as the world economy slowed in 2008. Federalism and democracy have not proved yet that they can keep a country like Nigeria together, much less prevent violence between its diverse peoples. The connection between violence, corruption and state development in Nigeria is clear. The state will be unstable so long and the needs of the people are not addressed, so long as any one group feels under cut or unable to access influence. Mobilization will continue to occur first along ethnic and then regional lines because those are the easiest ways to mobilize people. The state will become more stable when the state apparatus is no longer a prize, and zero-sum political conflict no longer shapes the political forum (Jinadu 1985). It would appear that in Nigeria, that day is still to come. Society has as much a role to play in this as the government does. Laws must be strengthened as well as institutions to enforce those laws. Individuals must also become accountable to themselves and each other. But these sorts of changes albeit important are among the least concerns of a country so dependent on one resource. Oil preoccupies the regime, because it must. And so long as this is the case, much of its energy and resources will go to tackling threats to that resource.
In the case of Nigeria, threats to oil income have come not from external powers as of late, but from the very people who live atop the oil. They have demanded compensation for the losses they have suffered in the name of oil exploration, and have demanded that the government and oil companies, aid them in developing their region, one which is the poorest in the whole country. It is obvious to the people that live in the Delta that the elites of the country abscond with most the wealth generated. As so long as this perception persists, particularly in combination with their current conditions; a lack of work and an incredibly degraded environment, there will continue to be a source of rebels for the efforts of groups like MEND. The violence in this new century is not a new phenomenon but part of a long series of rebellions in the southern tier of Nigeria almost since the civil war. Oil was discovered in Oloibiri in 1958, two years before the country was independent (Jike 2004). Oil played a royal in the Biafra war, the Ogoni uprising, and virtually every aspect of violence related to the Delta Region. Much of the blame could be placed on the resource itself. But this author would like instead to suggest that to blame is the structure first and foremost of the federal system in Nigeria and those who continue to be complicit in the corruption that allows the fleecing of the population.

The territory today called Nigeria once consisted of numerous kingdoms, and at different times throughout history empires. The north experienced Hausa kingdoms, the Kanem-Bornu Empire, and the Sokoto Sultanate. The south, both in the east and west, was governed by various kingdoms, city-states and empires such as Oyo, Benin, and Nri. The diversity of the past is reflected in the diversity of the present. Many of these kingdoms have social structures still in place on the ground at the grassroots level, helping to shape the political layout of Nigeria today. This continues to be a source for division in the state-society relationship. How can Nigeria build
a stable state system, when the underlying society is so fragmented and trust between groups so tenuous? The short answer is by a matter of time.

It is clear in the developments over the last two decades that the development of a Nigerian civil society is well underway. This society is made of various organizations civilian in nature working toward the good of Nigeria as a whole, not just any particular group. That is a very positive sign. Granted the state continues to suffer significant bouts of instability. In 2009 and early 2010 the political drama over the health of President Umaru Yar’Adua and his absence from Nigeria became a point of contention. It is yet unclear how this will impact stability for the state. These events have raised questions about secession and the Constitution, which were relatively unclear. It has also highlighted the growing Nigerian identity while also demonstrating the continued weakness and fragmentation of the state all the way up to the level of the president.

In light of Mr. Yar’Adua’s absence, there has been a scramble for power the prize still being access to oil wealth, with Yar’Adua’s wife Turai at the center of much of the politicking (Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan ‘is acting president’). And while those in power have made valiant efforts, and the people have supported such efforts to stick to the constitution even in its vagueness, the reality is that the elites are still governed by a particular law, as personified by Mrs. Yar’Adua. Whether this will ultimately be termed a coup of sorts is a matter for history to decide. But what it demonstrates is the continuing saga of the Nigerian state as a prize, even as Nigerian society grows up to meet it.
CHAPTER 4

COMPARISON, CONTRAST AND FINDINGS

Map 3. Ethnic Map of West Africa. Areas of Color note separate but non-specific distinctions amongst ethnic groups.

The Basics

Nigeria and Senegal are both very fractious states, with highly divided societies existing within their borders. But their case studies demonstrate that the underlying societies in each country are very disparate in their histories. And it is their historical structure which has had the most impact on their current level of state development. This chapter will use the comparison of
the two states to demonstrate the long term effects of that history and show the superior influence of social institutions in the creation of a stable state.

Pre-Colonial State System Reincarnate

The impact of pre-colonial history cannot be underestimated when assessing the current state of development in a given country, particularly in Africa. This is clear if one examines the case of Senegal or Nigeria, and no doubt, a number of other countries. In both of these examples, it is clear that the colonial period, although destructive, did not completely destroy the indigenous state system at all, but in a bid of establishing indirect rule often reinforced it or co-opted it in some manner (see Adekunle 2006; Ibrahim 1991). The map provided above (See Map 3) shows visually the high level of ethnic fractionalization throughout West Africa. We also see in Chart 3 below, the fractionalization, in each state along religious lines. Clearly the most fractious society is in Nigeria. Is it any wonder then that it suffers not from the most numerical conflicts in terms of years, but along many different social and political lines? The result of the clash between historical communities and the new government has already been discussed. It was the creation of what Charolette Quinn (1972) referred to as a shadow state in the case of Senegal. It is evident that in Nigeria as well, there was in the past and today, a kind of secondary state system that exists, and it is largely reflective of pre-colonial political and social conditions. And what is more important, is that in both Senegal and Nigeria, this old state system has a habit of resurfacing during times the newly independent modern state fails to live up to its obligations as a sovereign over the population. The old state system is the political persona of the social facts on the ground in both states, in terms of religious and ethnic cleavages.
In the case of Senegal and Nigeria, the differences in the degree of influence and power that secondary state exhibits (as well as how many of them there are) also reflect the significant differences in the record of stability within each state. While Senegal has a secondary state, that state largely coincides with the modern state of Senegal proper such that if one were to count a ‘true’ second state within the confines of the Senegalese territory, it would be the Jola who lived, historically, outside of the Islamic system that existed to their North. This would explain why Senegal has dealt only with the secession of Casamance, whereas Nigeria has dealt with the secession of many ‘sub-states’, not just the Delta area where the oil is located, but the North as early as 1914 and again in the early 1950’s; in 1965 the Tiv in who reside in the Middle-Belt threatened the state with secession, not to mention the two Biafra threats as well as the Ogoni uprising as well (See Tamuno 1970 for more details, See Map 4). Clearly, these threats of secession do not all relate simply to the issue of resource battles if the roots of secession extend into the earliest moments of inception, even prior to independence. Instead a deeper issue which has existed since the 1914 amalgamation emerges foremost in concern. Like Senegal, the
colonialists left much of the traditional system in place in order to use it for a system of indirect rule. And like Senegal, Nigeria was the unification of a number of disparate kingdoms, but to a far greater number. Where Senegal has one secondary state, Nigeria has at least four major state systems underlying it; the Yoruba system, the Hausa-Fulani (Islamic) system, the Igbo system, and a number of other small but significant traditional systems some of which lay in the Delta region. Some of these ‘sub-states’ are better organized than others and one need only examine the pre-colonial history to understand why.

The significance of all this is that for both states, building a more stable union will mean more integration of the pre-colonial and post-colonial systems. Senegal has largely accomplished this by default as the Casamance regions society has slowly lost its organizational cohesiveness with regard to rebellion. Similarly, some regions in Nigeria are more integrated than others. The problem in the Niger Delta, however, is that the traditional rulers have lost much legitimacy. This will mean in the long run that Nigeria has started to lose a system with which to negotiate and as the traditional system falls apart, the leadership and organizations that arise in its place may, like Casamance, be less prone to cohesiveness or satisfiable demands. The result, like Casamance, will be a drawn out period of violence with no simple solution because no leadership will have the ability to guarantee it, quite unlike the Biafra conflict. In the case of Biafra, there was an established authority, one with the organizational ability to surrender. All of this depends on society respecting a leadership, and that respect is usually based on a historical legitimacy. This is also the reason why the secondary-state system has remained so active and at times outshines the federal authority.

Mamadou Diouf (1994) described perfectly the Senegalese political model when he used the term Islamo-Wolof. It contains within it a perfect description of the sub-state system that has
Map 4. Sites of Conflict and Secession. Areas of Color note separate but non-specific distinctions amongst ethnic groups. (The areas with red stars are those with major ongoing violence as described in this paper. The black star represents the Biafra war which was resolved in 1970. The blue and white stars represent areas of where secession was threatened and documented for the purposes of this paper but for which there is not armed conflict data to be found.)

been slowly integrated into the modern Senegalese state such that now, the two are inseparable. This inseparability and the strength of their connection are based on the degree of interrelationship between the state governing system and the society below. This system is reinforced by the plurality and strength of a number of traditional institutions including the marabout system and a host of Islamic organizations geared toward working as stand in for government with society. Even with the Casamance conflict, the state of Senegal has a traditional institution in the form of the Jola-Serer joking relationship to make a link between the government in Dakar and the people of the ‘break-away province’. Despite the ongoing conflict that has only just begun to lose some of its intensity, Senegal is one of the strongest states in
West Africa. The reason for this is the number of traditional institutions that remain in force but connected and utilized by the government to connect with the people even into the modern era.

The difference between Senegal and Nigeria is what the state government and its leadership chooses to do with these organizations, associations and institutions. In Nigeria, these sub-state systems are underutilized; it would seem, for all but the Hausa-Fulani group in modern history. The reasons for this seem self-evident but it is worth examining nonetheless. The case study of Nigeria established that there were numerous Yoruba institutions in place to provide “communal self-help” which extended into the period prior to independence (Barkan 1994, 130), including the Ikenne Mafia. Yoruba traditional rulers were at the center of colonial politics because the British recognized their importance in terms of controlling the indigenous population (Adekunle 2006). In the modern era, the Yoruba engage their own population in this manner. There is however, a difference between the Christian and Muslim Yoruba as with other groups that have similar religious divisions. The churches of Christian Nigeria are important tools for organizing and addressing the political concerns of many communities, but they are generally more limited in the range of their influence. Muslims in general tend to utilize Muslim institutions and compared with Christians, and Southerners in general, are far more effective, in part, because Muslims have greater access to the state. It is no doubt also helpful, that Islam has had a few more centuries to build a base in society in terms of the depth of its connections to the people that Christianity has not yet accomplished. Add to this the political power that the North has due to the weight of its population and the picture becomes clearer. The Hausa-Fulani have the Kaduna system which has entrenched connections with the Muslim population and is centered on Northern power and influence to the exclusion of other groups.
As a result of continued Hausa-Fulani exclusion of other groups since independence, from the centers of power, on many levels, it has reinforced other groups looking inward for satisfaction of their demands and thus reinforced the sub-state system. The numerous ethnic organizations that exist in Nigeria and are too numerous to name again, are the products of this. They are evidence of the fractionalization endemic to the society itself which is clearly distinct from Senegal by virtue of numbers alone. The question then, is how all of this relates to the central questions of this paper and the notion of state development. Remember that for our purposes state development is the process during which the state enhances ideological domination, institutionalization, control and utilization of resources through its ability to adapt (Samudavanija 1991, 19), and as a result of this, should go an extended period of time without having experienced internal armed conflict. Clearly, neither Senegal nor Nigeria can make this claim.

Furthermore, armed conflict is a misleading measure. If it is defined as having 25 or more battle related deaths per year, then to only examine the years of conflict would make Senegal look far worse in terms of stability than Nigeria. In Senegal nine years (1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003) meet this criteria, and in Nigeria five years (1967-1970, 2004) based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002). It is clear however from our case studies that Nigeria was especially unstable during the 1990s even when there was no actual armed conflict according to our standards. This period includes the widespread conflict between Muslims and Christians that killed thousands as well as the years leading into the civil war where many thousands of Easterners, especially Igbo died. These years are not counted as armed conflict, but clearly represent the opposite of state development particularly when paired with numerous threats of secession. The facts reveal to us not only the instability of Nigeria and
the stability of Senegal, but address why. It is not a question of oil or cashews, but of political influence and ties.

The Foreign Policy Failed State Index 2009, too, takes a full spectrum analysis of the condition of the state, where Nigeria, not Senegal, is ranked as in danger of failure, not only because of the number of years in conflict, but a host of other factors which contribute to the undermining of the Nigerian state as a concept. With this in mind it is more difficult to assess using any statistical means offered by PRIO/UPPSALA for explaining peace duration as described by Collier and Hoeffler (2002), or analyzing the significance of said duration if it is not particularly an accurate description.

Political and Social Institutions?

It would appear that social institutions have the largest impact on the development of these states, their stability, and the conflicts that occur internal to them. Based on the data of our case studies, the secession of Casamance was based on a historical belief in its independence and a desire for self-determination of its economic future. Both Biafra and the Delta movement attribute their secession claims to specific failures of the government to provide security and or economic wellbeing specifically. And to reiterate previously established facts, other secessionist movements in Nigeria have all centered on questions of access to political authority which is often determined by social factors first and foremost. In the case of Senegal, the government in Dakar could not provide sufficient self-determination or economic wellbeing so in response, the Casamançais took to a violent rebellion in order to secure for themselves these wants. So, perhaps, the Casamançais would blame a lack of democratic institutions for their taking up arms, but it seems clear from case analysis that it was the lack of a connecting social institution between the people of the Casamance region and the government in Dakar historically. This is
because the system of government in Senegal ‘major’ used social institutions to provide for its citizenry, and where those institutions were absent, i.e.) in the Casamance region, this failed. Moreover, the population was literally cut off from the rest of Senegal geographically, which tends to impact the ability of social institutions at all levels of society to engage the government. This geographic separation was in addition to the ethnic and religious distributions which were also different in Casamance from the rest of Senegal proper. This would lend to the notion that social institutions were to blame, particularly since the rebels are largely associated with one group even though they claim to be fighting for the whole region which in the beginning of the conflict was emphasized.

In Nigeria, the Biafra war began because the government was unable, and from the perspective of the Eastern people, unwilling to provide their security. It is unclear whether or not more representation in government or other institutions of a political nature would save them from the violence of individuals whom saw them socially as ‘the other’. As to whether a political or specifically democratic institution caused the conflict, it seems that the tipping point came with violence from the population not the mishandling of elections or the census. The secessionist in their manifesto attributed much of the reasoning to the security question even though other reasons were mentioned. The Ogoni uprising was largely a failure of democratic address of their issues as with the Niger Delta movement. Their traditional leadership or representatives failed, as did the federal government and as a result lost legitimacy for failing to address their issues. In the case of the Ogoni, the blame for mobilization and violence came due to social institutions. They mobilized purely around ethnicity, even though they blamed a lack of civil and political protections. In the Niger Delta, the picture is less clear because of the number of minor conflicts adding up to the general conflict. The Niger Delta conflict at its heart is a
resource war, and a development war based on a lack of civil and political rights and protections. Sometimes mobilization has occurred along ethnic lines, and other times pan-ethnically, but always specific to the region. But like other secessionist movements in Nigeria, the resolution to the conflict will no doubt lie with redress of the social aspect in addition to the political questions.

The 1993 crisis was the first major crisis in Nigeria that demonstrated the growing salience of the society and the government. It is very illustrative that it did not produce armed conflict. The collective Nigerian identity grew during this period and as a result made it easier to abstain from high levels of violence mobilized by ethnicity or geographic region. The distaste for the dictatorial tendencies of the central government caused cooperation across all groups in Nigeria, breaking down the cleavages referred to by Seymour Lipset (1959). So while the state was characterized as unstable during this time, the instability was that of the government not necessarily the state identity, much like the French revolution.

Regardless of the exact cause, neither the Niger Delta conflict nor the one in Casamance have ended in real terms. There is still sporadic violence in each region. But in terms of armed conflict, neither region has experienced armed conflict since 2004, when the violence in the Delta surged. So on what basis can this ‘peace’ be attributed? It appears that peace can be attributed to a changing relationship of a social nature. In both regions, the leadership of the rebel movements have gone through significant changes in terms of their leadership, and in the case of the Niger Delta changed altogether. In Casamance, Salif Sadio and his inheritors lead the breakaway movement for a while following the 2005 peace deal but the rebel movement and its leaders have lost a great deal of legitimacy with the population at large. As a result, the relationship between Casamance citizenry and rebel leadership is degrading which results in the
relationship to the Dakar government growing in comparison. In this respect, a social institution can be attributed with increasing peace in Casamance. In the Niger Delta, MEND has become the leading force for the Niger Delta rebellion, but its strategic approach to challenging the government suggests that it is unable to be a secessionist movement, geared instead toward reprisal.

In Casamance stability has slowly increased and barring radical changes, the rebels should continue to lose more and more legitimacy, and as a result the Dakar government gains that which the rebels have lost. The events following the 2005 peace process demonstrated this. Not only was it completely unclear who was emphatically in charge, but the peace was broken by a leader who lacks the support of much of the population. In the Delta on the other hand, there the rebel movement has in many ways started to replace the traditional leadership as it moves beyond ethnicity. It will no doubt continue to agitate long into the future so long as it is ignored by the government in Abuja. The Delta movement is too disorganized to be a threat to the state as a whole, in the sense of actually achieving secession, particularly when compared with the Biafra movement. In fact, the government is under greater threat now, perhaps, then the state itself. The year 1993 saw a growth in the relationship between Nigerian societies at large, which will over time, will add to the stability of the state as a whole, reducing the likelihood of full on secession. This is due to the reduced cleavage between groups now that they see a ‘common enemy’ in dictatorship.

Instead of secession, revolution is more likely. The problem of President Yar’Ardua demonstrates this. The tone of society is one of concern for the constitution of the country. And while many Nigerians are no doubt frustrated with Northern hegemony, the fact that the country has maintained the presidential sharing system means that (the South) will remain satisfied with
having a guaranteed rotation at presidency every other election. This would be sufficient to avoid secessionist politics in exchange for the politics of reform. The Delta, as well as other parts of Nigeria, will continue to have difficulty even in a more democratic state, because of the population issues inherent to representative government that give the North an inherent advantage. When these changes are made, the situation in the Delta region and elsewhere will improve.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Senegal: Casamance</th>
<th>Nigeria: Biafra</th>
<th>Nigeria: Delta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What did society demand that the state could not provide that led to armed conflict?</td>
<td>Territorial independence which was allegedly promised prior to independence. Economic development.</td>
<td>Physical security and economic self determination free from Northern control.</td>
<td>Economic self determination through increased benefit of oil revenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was a political or social institution a cause for the conflict?</td>
<td>Failure of the central government. No social alternative.</td>
<td>Failure of the central government. No social alternative.</td>
<td>Failure of the central government. No social alternative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did the conflict end?</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can the ensuing period of peace be attributed to either a democratic institution or a social (national) one?</td>
<td>Although violence continues, an increase in peace can be attributed to social and political institutions.</td>
<td>The resolution was a political/democratic use of power balancing tactics through the creation of more states.</td>
<td>An increase of peace can be attributed to the creation of the a new political institution (Delta Ministry)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Summation of Questions

Findings

The primary question addressed by this paper is what institution endemic to a state system will prove in the long run most successful at maintaining a peaceful, and ultimately, stable state across all states. This study focused on political rights versus cultural institutions.
Clearly, economic self-determination and concerns of development motivated many of the secessionist movements. But underlying these rebellions tended to be problems of ethnic or geographic self-determination indicating that group was in one way or another left out of the social and economic pie. It would appear that underlying political problems is often a social problem. Political problems are rarely addressed when there is not a social connection between groups. This is regardless of whether it is an issue of political representation for an ethnic or regional identity.

Casamance, Biafra, and the Niger Delta rebellion demonstrate that demands, especially those economic in nature, will not be addressed if those who hold the power belong to another social group provided they can sustain the state. In all three cases where there was armed conflict, the rebellious region was economically important to the capital. In all three cases, the rebellious region represented a separate regional and or ethnic identity (see Map). The capital or power base in the state could sustain long term rebellions because holding on to the secessionist region was in the long run worthwhile economically. Just the same, the benefits of not sharing in the wealth of said region outweighed possible benefits of stability because the capital does not require the region or ethnic group to maintain power.

In Casamance, the demand for economic development was answered only after a long conflict primarily, and secondarily, after many changes had already begun to take shape slowly. First, the state made attempts at manipulating various social institutions to attempt to build a social connection with the Casamance citizenry. Secondly, the traditional rulers went into partnership with the state in a peace deal and demonstrated that the state could produce some answer to the demands of the people. Thirdly, after the traditional rulers were co-opted, the new leadership lacked legitimacy so that the strong social and political connection between
Casamance over time was with Dakar. And while this connection is in its early stages, clearly the formal rebellion is over. The violence that remains is from leaders who lack the legitimacy to perform a real rebellion that could actually threaten the state and its present territorial integrity. This doesn’t mean that the situation is stable per se; any large scale localized violence can lead to instability particularly the kind found in Casamance. If the federal government cannot eventually control and suppress the violence and allow the population to thrive again economically, that could prove troubling in the long run.

In the case of Biafra, the war was ended with a political peace deal that was in many ways related to democracy by attempting to guarantee greater distribution of voting power with the creation of new states. In effect the solution did provide stability for a long time. However, there was a call again in 2000 for secession of Biafra again. On the other hand, it could be argued that the ‘solution’ relied too heavily on the subsequent military dictatorships to suppress dissent and eliminate those who would mobilize against the government. The problem of Biafra’s secession seems to be related however to the greater problem of the Niger Delta and a failure of the central government to share the wealth. The government continues to ignore this problem as stated previously, because it continues to exist without any real threat to its integrity in the meantime, much less a threat to Northern hegemony. Power sharing of the presidency with the South at least in the beginning was more than acceptable because President Obasanjo was a Muslim and well-connected in the North. The fallout from Goodluck Jonathan ascending to the presidency since February 2010 has altered the rotation and will no doubt lead to difficulties into the future.

The Niger Delta conflict now persists like that in Casamance with high levels of criminal activity, kidnappings, looting and the like which could boil over again. The ceasefire declared in
2009 has helped to quell some of the violence, and the offer of amnesty suggested the government was serious about moving on toward serious negotiations. MEND agreed to an indefinite ceasefire, and as per the amnesty agreement handed over the arms of some 15,000 militants (“Nigeria; MEND Declares Indefinite Ceasefire”). But ending violence only addresses the symptoms not the source of the problem, and without real redress, it will be easy for the militants to acquire new weapons, and easier still to mobilize new fighters if the political situation deteriorates. In this case so far, the boldest move yet involved the creation of the Niger Delta Ministry under President Yar’Adua, specifically geared toward addressing development in the long term, particularly employment and infrastructure (Walker 2008). The new organization came with the promise of billions of Naira in funding, subject to approval of course from the national assembly but that was back in 2008 (“Nigeria; Niger Delta Leaders Query Yar’Adua Over 2009 Budget”). Obviously, as per this paper’s earliest argument, only time will tell as to whether these efforts will grow into something more than lip service. President Yar’Adua took the lead on the Niger Delta issue. But given the political fallout since his replacement by Goodluck Jonathan, it may be difficult for the new President to take his place politically.

What seems evident from the research presented here is that social institutions that connect at the grassroots level the citizen to the state are more effective at creating a stable state. These social institutions can take many forms, whether religious, ethnic or even pan-ethnic, especially if one examines the long run picture. How else can the long-term stability of Senegal be accounted for outside of Casamance even with its ethnic diversity? Just the same, political institutions, and for our purposes democratic ones, can help build some stability, but clearly, they are far less effective when there is a lack of social institutions already in place, much less so when violence has already begun.
Martin Lowenkopf (1995) knew that for democracy to work, society itself had to be developed first, and only then could democracy, and its institutions, grow properly for the state. In the case of Nigeria it is clear that this notion is correct. Serious adjustments need to be made first in the institutions and relationships between and amongst Nigeria’s secondary states. The same is also true for Senegal, but to a lesser degree. Nigeria suffers from a lack of Nigerian society, having a number of societies and institutions that are divided along religious and ethnic lines, which inhibit the ability of the Nigerian society budding underneath to grow. Just the same, Senegal has many years required before the region of Casamance and its society is fully integrated into the greater Senegalese state-society relationship. This study demonstrates the inherent ability of social institutions to prevent armed conflict, and induce state stability. But in those circumstances where the state needs time to integrate and create a society, political and yes, democratic institutions can ease the transition period, but cannot guarantee peace if they are enacted halfheartedly.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

West Africa is an excellent place to study the process of state development. The region is rich with history and provides numerous states with variations on their makeup. Still, they share striking similarities with other states of the continent in terms of their colonial legacy and their experience since independence with civil war and armed conflict. This similarity is especially resonant with those states that are ensconced in violence with ethnic and religious connotations. The cases of Nigeria and Senegal seem to lend themselves as evidence that a certain amount of homogeneity within society goes a long way in determining the ease with which state development occurs because it is easier to rely on social institutions to smooth over difficult times in state development. In both cases, the impact of external influence was limited in the sense that the governments and their actions were not under constant interference from other powers, and Cold War politics had little impact on the region. In this way, these West African states have been able to escape the tragedies found elsewhere in Africa where local conflicts were exploited in the name of global politics. As such the conclusions drawn here should have more general applicability to the world.

Political development in both states depended on the use of both democratic and social institutions. The democratic institutions were occasionally more ambiguous in the sense that they
were more or less generic political institutions, particularly in Nigeria where they were extra constitutional. Still, social institutions proved the most dynamic in the process of state building, even if at times they proved to be constructing/have constructed a secondary state. The implications of this deserve a closer look. While this sub-state may operate as the social elite in one state structure, it can operate as a virtual secondary state in another. Future research into state development should examine more closely the problem of development and sub-states that can mobilize populations, whether ethnic, regional, or otherwise. This appears to be strongly correlated with in the state of Nigeria and its difficulties in both political and economic development.

The state of Nigeria is facing a crisis of uneven economic development, large scale human migration, religious violence (for economic causes), and a political system that relies on ‘regional’ power sharing of the presidency. This is a recipe for huge complications in the future. Unlike Senegal, the state of Nigeria is largely unsettled and incredibly unstable. The Failed States Index (2009) lists Nigeria at number 15, with number one being Somalia, an utterly failed state that has been unable to rebuild itself since 1991 when its collapse began almost twenty years ago. Senegal, on the other hand, is ranked at 102, ahead of China, Russia, and Mexico, but still several ticks away from South Africa at 122 or Ghana at 124 (Failed States Index 2009), countries one could describe as sharing the same peer group. Indeed, the continent of Africa on the Failed States Index (2009), sports no green at all, green indicating states which are estimated as stable. There remain numerous zones of conflict throughout the continent that put their neighbors at risk through the threat of spill over, chiefly Chad, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Somalia. In each of these cases it is clear that much of the
conflict could be reduced to the social institution question presented here to some degree and should be considered for further research.

Armed conflict and state instability are systems of social and political problems endemic to a failed state system. In Africa, states have had to develop to the contours of a territorial design which did not match the social and political reality of the pre-colonial condition. This created secondary state systems and many series of cleavages that left the states, post-independence extremely fragile. Charles Tilly (1990) and Sydney Tarrow (2004) both recognized the importance of a slow process of state development, having studied European state development. A state requires a collective identity to be strong internally, and to function with stability in the long run. This collective identity is clearly a broader social concept, as demonstrated in this paper, relying largely on social institutions for its actualization. Many African states are only now beginning to develop national identities reflective of their ‘new’ territorial reality. These states have grown into, albeit slowly, their given borders and population but at the cost of internal violence and war. Some have had, like Senegal, the fortune of having institutions in place to ease the transition, but these processes have seldom been entirely smooth. For Africa the process may not need hundreds of years, modernity has a way of speeding the world up, perhaps even the process of state building.
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