Persistent Revolutions in Colombia and Peru: A Comparative Analysis

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Abstract

This thesis performs a comparative analysis of rural-based revolutionary movements in Latin America. The movements that are compared are the FARC, originating in Colombia, and the Shining Path, which emerged from the highlands of Peru. The comparison is meant to serve as a test for what variables are predictive of revolutionary success. Since these movements differ in their success in establishing permanent political, social and military movements in their countries over time, their dichotomous outcome can be used to point toward variables that warrant further consideration. Comparison of revolutionary movement makes sense in this case due to the similarities between the FARC and Shining Path, including geography, income distribution, historical political development and international context. However, the politics of these two countries contribute greatly to how these states adapt to their international environment and historical political development, providing a compelling point for analysis and explanation for the different scale of revolutionary success achieved.
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Peasant-Revolutionary Relations in Colombia and Peru

Introduction

Revolutions have affected nations worldwide, creating havoc for governments in states where control over a population and territory and possession over the exclusive use of force is not held in the state’s hands. Revolutions have created new forms of government in places like Russia, France and China (Moore 1966; Skopcol 1979). In these successful revolutions, peasant uprisings played a role in destabilizing the country by ripening the environment for political change. In Latin America, since the Cuban revolution took hold of power in 1959, revolutionaries in the peasantry have largely been unable to form the necessary alliances with other society sectors to force regime change. Peasant struggles to exact justice from the political systems which govern over them have long fallen short of the lofty aspirations and success of the Cuban Revolution.

This thesis deals with two cases of peasant revolution in Latin America. In Colombia and Peru, revolutionary groups still engage in a war to overthrow their governments. Though their chances for success are limited by weakness relative to other social classes that more directly and effectively influence and empower the state, rebel operations persist. The factors which explain revolutionary activity in these two countries are rooted in the experience of the peasant societies from which these revolutionary groups emerged, and which make up the populations in areas controlled by revolutionaries.
Today, the FARC and the Shining Path are politically active in Colombia and Peru respectively. However, their capacity to challenge state power differs; so while each movement has emerged from similar political and geographical contexts, the success of each group to develop into a viable resistance to state power has been variable. The FARC maintains a much more active insurgency and still controls territory inside Colombia and a membership total in the thousands. In contrast, the Shining Path is much more geographically isolated to the drug trafficking alleys in Peru’s highlands.

Explaining the difference in revolutionary movements is the focus of this thesis. In terms of revolution, the divergent path of these two movements provides the basis for an exploration of revolution literature and theory to test the viability of variables for predicting revolution. By searching for variables that differ in these two movements, a search is performed for the variables that predict revolutionary outcomes. The key questions for research are: first, do the revolutionary movements in Peru and Colombia represent similar social phenomena in terms of relations between peasants, revolutionaries, and the state; second, to what extent do the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Shining Path offer a challenge to state power; and lastly, what variables can best explain the persistence and scope of these movements?

Literature Review

Many scholars have studied revolutions, some analyzing total social revolutions which completely upended traditional sources of power and governance. While others have analyzed peasant rebellions in attempts to understand the circumstances which transform rural disaffection with a central government into revolutionary activity.

In analyzing social revolution as a phenomenon, scholars have always been challenged to identify explanatory variables. Research has often guided them to examine government
institutions, society’s class structures and the nature of government-society relations. Earlier scholarship developed explanations of revolution by probing for causes within a functional analysis of state institutions. The primary analyst who utilized this method was Chalmers Johnson. In *Revolutionary Change*, Johnson (1982) performs a macro-analysis of revolution. He begins by establishing that the natural order of social-political systems comes from equilibrium between the “values, division of labor and environment” (58). For instance, a person’s values reflect personal feelings of self-worth within the society, and the division of labor among members of a society characterized by equilibrium, must reflect citizens’ values. Because a social system with synchronized values and division of labor is in a state of equilibrium, “unintended evolutionary” changes are able to provide the subtle adjustments to society’s structure that prevent major cleavages from emerging as a consequence of time-induced changes inherent within a social-political system (Johnson 1982, 59). For revolution to occur in an equilibrated society three events must take place: the deployment of force necessary to maintain stability rises due to increasing change, the deployment of this force loses its legitimacy, and the state’s coercive capacity to enforce social behavior and norms erodes (Johnson 1982, 93-4). For Johnson, the state’s role in a society characterized by equilibrium is to maintain social cohesion between the society’s members, keeping the system intact and allowing for the evolutionary change mentioned above to naturally occur. When the state fails to fulfill this function, disequilibrium can penetrate the society, leading to the above-mentioned prerequisites for revolution. As Johnson focuses on the state’s centrality to maintaining societal cohesiveness, other scholars, departing from functionalist theory, assign more weight to the changes modernization has thrust upon state institutions.

Modernization theory, largely agrees with the functionalist school that changes to a state
environment can bring revolutionary change to a society and its political system. However, modernization theory characterizes the impact of changes on society as more severe. Changes, fast and dramatic, are the norm in modernization theory, challenging the notion of equilibrium that Johnson argues characterize all political systems. Samuel Huntington (1968) in *Political Order in Changing Societies* asserts that the forces of modernization create disruptions in traditional societies. The disruptions of modernization include the penetration by markets into traditional parts of society and the resultant expansion of demands on state capability. The demands of modernization are the inherently stressful conditions state institutions must cope with to avoid revolutionary upheaval. To successfully cope with modernization requires states to aggregate the interests of newly wealthy sectors of society and newly disrupted traditional groups who find their place in society weakened by the dynamic changes modernization brings. For modernization theorists like Huntington (1968), revolution becomes likely when new classes emerge and make economic and political demands on state institutions that outpace the ability of states to aggregate interests. While Huntington argues that emerging classes can create state instability if state institutions cannot aggregate competing interests, he does not emphasize the relationship between classes as a potential source of instability. Thus, leaving revolutionary causation with state-weakness and above the dynamics of class relations.

While Huntington left out class interactions as important for revolution, other scholars base their studies on the causes of revolution on the different forms class interactions and relationships can take. Barrington Moore (1966), in *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, argues that revolution is the product of class interactions and interest disputes. He emphasizes, similarly to Huntington, the important role modernization and the market economy plays in changing the interests of societies’ sectors. However, unlike Huntington, he sees the state as the direct
outcome of class interactions in the face of modernization, not a distinct actor existing above social-class disputes (Moore 1966). For Moore, revolution occurs when traditional classes-most importantly the peasantry-come into conflict with newly wealthy sectors of society. Moore (1966) argues the power of different competing classes is determinative in shaping the form of state-institutions.

Skopcol (1979) agrees with Moore on his emphasis of class interactions. However, she disagrees with Moore on the place of the state’s role in the revolutionary equation. She emphasizes the role of the state as an autonomous actor. For Skopcol (1979), in her analysis of revolution in France, Russia, and China, these circumstances had to do with changes in the resource allocation within society colliding with traditional state privileges and security needs. In her view, modernization creates imbalances between the new groups less willing to hand over their resources to the state and state institutions with an increasing appetite to extract more taxes from the emerging merchant-business classes to maintain security against neighboring governments. This pressure can be intense, as in the French case, where the neighboring countries were also increasing their wealth and power through the same forces of economic modernization.

Both Moore and Skopcol found peasant rebellions to be vital in the challenge to state power. Barrington Moore states that the peasants role in revolution “provided the dynamite to bring down the old building” (Moore 1966, 468). Moore’s analysis of revolution and the peasant’s role emphasizes the social relations between lords and peasantry. In today’s societies, this analysis would be used to study the relationship between peasant producers and the established agrarian systems. Moore’s analysis agrees with Skopcol (1979) when she writes, “without peasant revolts, urban radicalism in predominantly agrarian countries has not in the end been able to accomplish social revolutionary transformations” (112-3). These perspectives point
to the importance of social conditions that create revolutionary thrusts within society as a critical
variable in explaining revolution. Failed revolutions in Germany and England in 1848, under
conditions of modernization, are related to the conservative social relationships tying peasant and
lord; thereby, creating conditions for peasant stability that prevented revolutionary change
originating in the city, from completely transforming society (Skopcol 1979, 112-3).

Huntington (1968), on the point of modernization’s importance, agrees that often peasants
have played a conservative role in revolutions, remaining skeptical of urban elites and the agents
of modernization as agents of revolution (293). These authors point clearly to the importance of
peasant revolution as an important area of study and as a potential instigator of broader political
upheaval. The aforementioned scholars have all explained revolution and the peasant’s role in
revolution using macro-level and systemic analysis. Other scholarship, instead of seeing peasants
as part of a revolutionary formula, explores the forces behind peasant rebellions from a
micro-perspective.

Scholars who use the micro-analysis of peasant revolutions explain revolution from the
perspective of the peasantry itself, focusing on the tendency of modernization to deprive the
peasantry of economic security. Ted Gurr’s (1970) classical study, Why Men Rebel, explains
revolutionary activity through the concept of relative deprivation. Gurr (1970) defines relative
depprivation as the difference between a person’s "perceived discrepancy between value
expectations and value capabilities" (37). Gurr blames the gap between rising expectations and a
flattening or declining ability to achieve those expectations as responsible for the psychological
impulse to rebel. Gurr further explains the different forms relative deprivation can take,
illustrating three patterns of relative deprivation that create individual’s dissonance between value
expectations and value capabilities. The first pattern is “decremental” deprivation, which occurs
when people experience anger over the loss of something they once had. The loss in this case can be of social status, access to employment, social group belonging, or political influence (Gurr 1970, 46-7). The second pattern is “aspirational” deprivation which occurs when people become angry at a perceived inability of the state to meet newly rising value expectations. In this case the new and rising expectations can be for more political influence from a growing bourgeoisie class or welfare demands in a modernizing state newly capable of offering expanded services (Gurr 1970, 50-1). The third and final pattern is “progressive” deprivation, based on Davies “J-Curve theory,” which Gurr (1970) argues is a special case of “aspirational” deprivation (52). This pattern occurs when people experience a long-run improvement in their values position that creates expectations for continuous improvement (Gurr 1970, 52). For example, “progressive deprivation” can occur when institutions hamper the advancement of modernization or when an economic depression hits a country that was experiencing significant growth (Gurr 1970, 53). Gurr’s extensive research into the forms that relative deprivation can take in creating an impulse toward violence serves as a baseline to transition to scholars who see peasant anger and turn to revolution as a consequence of the peasant community’s expectations conflicting with the realities of a modernizing society.

An important book that uses Moore’s analysis of revolutions from the perspective of the peasantry’s concept of justice and reciprocity is The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence in Southeast Asia. In this book, James C. Scott (1976) explores the challenges for peasants in Southeast Asia, illustrating their exposure to the market economy and uncertain labor markets that worsen their potential to subsist and security. Facing a bleak outlook in regards to subsistence, the forces of modernization also force on the peasant social changes which transform and fracture old relations of reciprocity and mutual aid. Scott (1976) considers these relations to comprise the core of peasant socialization, and argues their destruction constitutes a loss in vital protection
against economic crises and insecurity.

According to Scott (1976), these developments cause a loss of support from peasants who feel the broader society is disregarding their methods of survival, creating a moral distaste for modern society within the peasantry that, in places where circumstances are right, justify revolution. Both Gurr, analyzing individual psychological deprivation, and Scott, analyzing peasant feelings of moral injustice towards the market-based economy, deal with the peasantry’s confrontation with uncertainty over their ability to meet their traditional social and subsistence expectations. Gurr and Scott, though similar in their emphasis on peasant deprivation, differ markedly in the source of this deprivation. While Gurr emphasizes the peasant’s individual wants rising short of expectations, Scott is analyzing the effect processes of modernization have on the peasantry’s social relationships and their subsistence prospects in an attempt to explain how subsistence insecurity violates the peasant sense of justice. These authors analyze a feeling of loss within peasant revolutionaries, with Gurr (1970) emphasizing the loss of the ability to meet expectations of achievement, and Scott (1976) the expectation that the peasant would no longer have access to the subsistence security that was at one time available through social relations with landed classes. To further examine peasant society’s reaction to the social, cultural and economic changes of modernization Eric Hobsbawm’s Bandits provides some additional insights.

Hobsbawm (2000), like Scott, focuses on peasant moral constructs to explain their tolerance for violence against the state. Unlike Scott, Hobsbawm does not detail the changes in social and economic relations that have created the peasantry’s distaste for society, instead he focuses on the source of peasant tolerance for anti-state violence. Hobsbawm (2000) points out that peasants are often supportive of bandits who they see as robbing from the rich, who are unjust, and giving to the poor. He makes the case that often when a bandit makes off with a portion of the
peasant’s crop or profits the peasant tolerates it because he sees bandits as separate from, and opposed to, those who bring on the injustices and inequities of modernity (Hobsbawm 2000). The peasant tendency to idolize and ensconce in legend famous bandits from their region (who may or may not have selflessly served the peasant interests against elites) points to a reason why revolutionary movements may garner sympathy with the peasantry even when peasants are often the victims of revolutionary violence. Hobsbawm’s work points to a need to understand the dynamics of peasant interactions and relationships with revolutionary movements. Revolutionaries are often drawn from the peasantry, and there is little doubt that if the peasantry was to unite against them, it would be easier for states to locate and destroy networks that fund, support, and aid in hiding revolutionary groups and their leaders. While Hobsbawm studies the peasant’s reaction to modernity from a psychological perspective, penetrating the peasant psyche to explain anger at the modern state, Eric Wolf focuses on modernization’s tendency to pressure landed classes to break away from traditional relationships of reciprocity that cause the anger displayed in Hobsbawm and Scott’s work.

Eric Wolf also views peasant rebellions as reactions against the state and the changing social and production patterns modernization creates. However, he does not feel peasant revolutions originate from within peasant society’s concepts of reciprocity and justice as Hobsbawm and Scott argue. Instead, Wolf (1969) analyzes revolutions as the product of the peasants’ historical experiences and interest-calculations in the face of modernity’s advancement, particularly the penetration of market systems into peasant societies. Unlike Scott who argues peasant rebellions occur when peasant-lord (society) relations are disoriented by modernization, Wolf emphasizes the new choices modernization gives to those who held power over the peasants. Wolf agrees with Moore in emphasizing modernization-forced change in the relationship between
landed classes and the peasantry. However, he differs with Moore in assigning to the state a mostly pro-modernization role (while Moore argues the structure and power of classes produce the level of state sympathy towards the peasantry). Modernization’s main effect, for Wolf, is its impact on the landed classes who, as part of tradition, had protected the peasantry from outside forces and subsistence crisis. Wolf (1969) argues that the traditional landed classes, in their attempts to hold on to power, make alliances with new emerging classes that undermine their credibility to uphold long-standing obligations to the peasantry. This results in excessive rent-taking, and ruining of traditional practices (282-3). Essentially, the pressures on the landed classes to shift from a traditional to capitalist form of production create a peasantry newly isolated from its traditional social context and production relationships. For Wolf, it is the rupture of alliances with the landed classes which causes the peasants disillusionment with their modernizing society, and pushes them towards revolution (Wolf 1969, 295).

A final approach to revolution is by scholars who view the peasants as able actors in the modern state of the twenty-first century who are not inevitably angry losers in the modernization process. Instead, these scholars choose to see them as interest pursuing actors, typical of a pluralistic political system, who like all other actors in such a system are attempting to maximize their political power and incomes simultaneously. While attempting to maximize economic and political power within the broader society, the peasant’s interest-calculation is influenced greatly by the organizational and resource realities of his economic and social position.

Charles Tilly (1978), one such scholar, understood peasant rebellions through the pluralistic school of political actors, seeing their propensity to be mobilized as the product of a cost-benefit analysis of interaction with other groups in society, including revolutionary thinkers and fighters. For Tilly, factors such as the organization, social composition, and resource
acquisition process of revolutionary groups shapes peasants decisions on whether their interests would be best served by supporting, being part of, or aligning with certain revolutionary groups (Tilly 1978).

Similarly, Jeffrey Paige assumes the peasant to be a competent political actor. In his analysis of landholding patterns and disposition for revolutionary activity, Paige concludes that peasants without ties to the land are the most likely to revolt. To reach his conclusion, he analyzes the peasants place in the rural landholding system to determine the space within that structure from which peasant revolution is most likely to emerge. Paige (1975) concludes peasants that are unattached to the land (sharecroppers and wage laborers) and work for commercial landowners exposed to market forces and who garner no special privileges from the state are the most likely to revolt. Paige argues the peasants with no ties to the land feel less invested in the agrarian system of which they are a part. These unattached peasants can be without a quality place of residence, and in periods of unemployment, migrate unable to meet their basic needs. This can give unattached peasants a greater propensity for violence than the landed-peasant who, even when the market is down, has land to work and provide subsistence.

Paige’s analysis reflects his understanding that structural production features color the peasants’ choices when the discontent of modernity confronts them. His emphasis on the place occupied by peasants in land-owning and labor structures causes him to assign to the peasant an ability to perform the interest-calculation that Tilly uses for importance in revolutionary activity. Both of these authors understand the peasant to be an interest-seeking political actor who, based on his position both within the peasantry and within the society, will be likely or unlikely to find his interests served by revolutionary activity. Paige’s focus on landholding clearly indicates his belief that agrarian-production structures are more important and determinative than Tilly, who
views the relationship of peasant groups to revolutionary actors and the broader society (social structure) as critical in shaping peasant decisions on whether to engage in revolutionary activity.

Midlarsky uses Paige’s emphasis on agrarian production structures to assess the conditions conducive to peasant revolution. Midlarsky compares the peasantry’s experience with land inequality to a country’s GINI coefficients to determine which is statistically related to political violence. In his findings, Midlarsky (1988) declares land inequality is the better predictor of revolutionary violence. By demonstrating the emergence of land inequality over time as peasant populations expand and the land supply remains stagnant, he was able to determine that the unavailability of land is more destabilizing than basic inequality measures like the GINI coefficient. Land inequality, he argues, represents the absence of a shared “commiseration,” which promotes the potential for “large-scale political violence” (Midlarsky 1988, 493).

Midlarsky chooses to emphasize the importance of the unequal, differing, and unfamiliar relationship between the rural peasants and the wealthier affluent owner classes. He sees rebellion as more likely the wider the gap in wealth, living standards and cultural familiarity between peasant and landowner grows. Though his emphasis on land deprivation and material frustrations provide the key variable in his analysis, he characterizes the peasant as reacting to modernity.

In sum, in Midlarsky’s analysis, modernity not only causes a decline in the land available to the peasant, but also creates a distinct contrast between the peasant’s past, where land was more available, and his present experience, where land is in shorter supply. This contrast between the past and a present where the peasant’s, land-dependent, traditional way of life is in jeopardy points to a new peasant that must seek out his material and social interests in the modern world without the social structures of community, reciprocity, and land that once defined his reality. Paige,
Tilly and Midlarsky have all offered arguments on the instigators of peasant revolutions while making clear that modern society’s interaction with the peasantry, however it is defined, is changing how the peasant must conceive of his place in the broader society.

If, as Paige and Tilly argue, peasant interest-calculation is central to understanding revolutionary potential, the question must be asked: can interest-calculation override revolutionary aims? And if so, what other motivations could the peasantry have to participate in or tacitly support anti-state violence? Some scholars, who represent a sub-type of revolution scholarship, explain longstanding revolution by pointing out the similarities between revolutionary groups and criminal enterprises that provide economic incentives to low-ranking members to maintain participation. Collier (2000), in an analysis of the economic costs of starting a rebellion and the theoretical similarities between rebel leaders and common criminals, concludes “to get started, rebellions need grievance, to be sustained, it needs greed” (852). Collier examines revolution from the viewpoint of the rebel group. However, his conclusion on groups that join or are complicit in revolution is that they will not sustain anti-state activity without a rebel organization that distributes resources to supporters and members.

Collier’s conclusions on the profit motive of revolution are supported by Regan and Norton. While Regan and Norton agree with Collier on the need for revolutionaries to be compensated for sustained participation in rebellions, their analysis examines inter-group dynamics between revolutionary leaders and their followers. For Regan and Norton, compensation is, similarly to Collier’s analysis, meant to keep revolutionaries participating in anti-state violence. Regan and Norton (2005) take the analysis further by explaining what function the compensation performs for the revolutionary group when he argues that compensation bridges the interest-divide between revolutionaries and their leaders (319-20).
divide between revolutionary soldiers and leaders comes from the different benefits each expects to gain if revolutionary change is successful (Regan and Norton 2005, 323). For peasants, a revolutionary victory means an improvement in the peasants’ life. Regan and Norton (2005) argue that only slight improvements await revolutionary fighters because their motives to fight are unrelated to broad political issues and based on specific and local grievances (323). This is quite different from revolutionary leaders whose aims are more ambitious because the leaders stand to gain a significant share of political power if their movement is successful. For Regan and Norton (2005) larger rewards in the event of victory cause rebel leaders to be more willing to accept more risks than peasant rebels. This means economic incentives from revolutionary leaders to peasant revolutionaries are critical in convincing peasants to follow their leaders even when they have less to gain (Regan and Norton 2005, 323). Whether the resource acquisition and distribution is for criminal profit or to sustain political revolution, the conclusion from Collier and Regan and Norton is that peasants’ interests and resource acquisition potential are a large part of the decision to perform revolutionary operations.

If resource acquisition and distribution is important to maintaining recruits and compensating them, a key part of this is to cultivate good relations with the peasantry, making membership in revolution a respected endeavor for individuals in the peasant community. The obstacle to achieving respect from the peasants is the propensity of revolutionary movements to commit violent acts that kill or injure peasants or their crops. For one author, the propensity for violence against the peasantry is described as an issue confronting the FARC and Sendero that could delegitimize their revolutionary aims of overthrowing those who dominate and exploit the peasantry. Billie Jean Isbell (1992) writes about the struggles for Sendero in cultivating support from the peasantry, using an instance in 1986 where peasants in Chuschi Province, a Sendero
stronghold, petitioned their representatives to the central government for potable water, education and hospitals after becoming victims of revolutionary violence on multiple occasions in the early 80s. Isbell (1992) argues peasant willingness to participate in the political system in defiance of Sendero Luminoso indicates the peasants were not wholly supportive of revolutionary aims (74).

Sewig and McCarthy, in an analysis of the FARC’s role in Colombian civil unrest, argue that the political aims of the FARC are “dubious” and centered on their interest in maintaining a “state within a state,” asserting that group survival was all that motivated the FARC (Sewig and McCarthy 2005, 17-8). They use an instance where the FARC massacred coca farmers who they claimed were supporting and aiding the right-wing paramilitaries (Sewig and McCarthy 2005, 17-8). What these authors demonstrate is that in these case studies of rural revolution, there is ground for skepticism of Hobsbawm’s conclusions on the peasantry’s willingness to tolerate violence if the ends of the violence are perceived to be just by an excluded peasantry.

Most scholars of peasant revolution deal with circumstances, structures, and societal relationships that created a heightened potential for revolutionary activity. However, once revolutionary movements have been established and survived over the course of decades, as in the cases of Colombia and Peru, explaining the existence of rebellion may seem tired and overdone. Given their lengthy tenures as movements that consider their state illegitimate and seek to topple the central governments, they must have some amount of support within the peasantry, both in the form of active recruits and tacit, logistical assistance in the form of food, clothing, and tips on government troop movements. So, the additional challenge in this thesis is that of distinguishing which differences in the national conditions surrounding the FARC and Shining Path are determinative in explaining their scope of activity and persistence of these social movements.

To identify the determinative aspects of these revolutions a comparative analysis will be
employed. The goal here is, by comparing the relationships between peasant societies and the revolutionary movements in Colombia and Peru, to make a further contribution toward understanding why peasants accept revolutionary movements in their midst. Hobsbawm (2000) has made clear why bandits are accepted because they are perceived to be robbing from the political establishment which they find to be disrespecting and disrupting the peasants’ way of life. Scott (1976) made clear the moral indignation peasants can feel when confronted with economic changes that disrupt their social order of reciprocity arrangements and thrust them into uncertain labor markets. However, for Hobsbawm, bandits are not revolutionaries. For Scott (1976), most peasants who are exploited do not take revolutionary action (3-4). So, given banditry’s non-political aims and the tendency of the peasantry on a world scale to not revolt even when facing exploitation, it would seem that revolutionary action would need to provide ideological criticisms of and solutions to the worsening condition of the peasantry to form a movement that can seek an alternative claim to the legitimacy held by the state. In fact, when examining the Shining Path and the FARC’s origins their aims were indeed, at their inception ideological-Maoist and Marxist respectively (Gott 1970, 267; McCormick 1987; Palmer 1992, 2). However, while few peasants worldwide actually spawn revolutionary movements the question is what has been the form and nature of peasant-guerrilla relations that have contributed to the persistence of revolutionary operations in Colombia and Peru? And finally, what form do exogenous forces, state and revolutionary’s alliances with international actors, play in influencing revolutionary scope and persistence of revolutionary activity?

Methodology

The method applies concepts from theories posited by scholars of revolution in an attempt to come to a conclusion on how best to analyze revolutionary groups. The authors above guided
the thinking on this topic toward the importance of the peasantry. The questions chosen below represent key points of comparison which can inform the reader on how similar or dissimilar the revolutionary movements in Colombia and Peru are. The variables emphasize some of Skopcol and Wolf’s analysis by seeing where these groups fit in the broader state and society in which they exist, how they relate to these actors, and what significance their international context has in understanding their survival. By comparing the revolutionary movements in Colombia and Peru in terms of how they relate to the peasant society that lives near their bases of operations, and the broader state and society, the elements of the phenomena that each group represents can be brought to the fore. By highlighting these relationships and comparing them, the revolutionary groups will provide a good test on Hobshawm and Scott’s perspectives on peasant justice, and the tendency of this sense of justice to lead to both tacit and active support of revolutionaries. Paige’s analysis of agrarian structures can be used to identify the significance peasant agrarian structures have for predicting the propensity to support the FARC and Shining Path. In addition, this methodology will offer insight into whether these groups represent the same strand of activism and resistance against the government or if they are the product of distinctive historical experiences of groups within both Colombia and Peru.

The comparative analysis will be appropriate because the FARC and Sendero share similar characteristics of context. Both groups operate in Andean nations, with geographic regions that have been historically isolated from the central governments in the capitals. Also, both groups were formed and draw most of their support from the countryside and areas that present logistical challenges to state agents. Both countries have populations which are largely indigenous in the countryside, and of European descent in the major cities, where power is concentrated. The inequities between the urban areas and the bulk of the peasants has been a defining characteristic in
each country’s historical and present condition. In essence, both of these movements emerged out of a similar context and relationship to the state.

The research will be performed to identify which variables are necessary for sustained revolution. The presence of similar variables in the two countries variables leads to a positive conclusion can be reached that this variable is needed for sustained revolution. In the case of a variable that is different between the two countries, this variable will be considered unessential for predicting the presence of sustained revolution. The research done will all be categorized into answering the questions for analysis below. Each variable will be analyzed with its relation to each revolutionary group being written consecutively. This will give the reader the opportunity to compare important differences and similarities that may become prominent in the analytical section.

The main dependent variable is the scope of revolutionary activity, and will be identified by the size of the revolutionary movement in terms of its membership numbers. This number, though it is often an approximation of estimates, can display the viability of the group as an independent political force, and provide a useful point of comparison to assess which group poses a greater threat to the state. Because the measurements of revolutionary movement’s size are fraught with inconsistencies over time, the state responsiveness to the threat is employed as a supplement to quantitative estimates of group size to strengthen the scope measure.

Persistence refers to the extent to which the revolutionary group remains a viable threat to state power over time. The problem that is being investigated is the persistence, which provides evidence that the comparison is viable because neither the state nor revolutionary movement has been decisive in their struggle with one another. Next, it is important to explain how the independent variables selected for analysis will relate to explaining the scope and persistence of
revolutionary activity.

The research should indicate that a rising number of landless peasants will expand the scope of insurgent activity. This idea is derived primarily from Paige’s argument that peasants without ties to the land are most susceptible to revolutionary mobilization (Paige 1975). If the number of landless peasants in one country rises, the scope of revolutionary activity should also increase. Also, since Sendero and the FARC are still operational and have taken human losses in their battles with the state, there should still be a landless peasantry from which they can draw support and new members to replenish their ranks. So, it would be expected that as more people become landless, either (both) the incidence of attacks against the state or the amount of territory under revolutionary control should increase.

The research expects to find a relationship between the closeness of revolutionary groups’ ideological and political ties with the peasantry and the level of fighting and territory controlled by revolutionaries. Peasants will not simply fight for a monetary reward, although it may entice some revolutionary members into their initial membership. However, to sustain conflict as the FARC and Sendero have, it is assumed that ideological agreement is vital to a successful anti-state campaign. This hypothesis is based on Hobsbawm and Scott’s concept of peasant justice (Hobsbawm 2000; Scott 1977). The utilization of this variable in the thesis goes further than Scott, and is more in line with Hobsbawm’s (2000) concept of a moral peasantry arguing that the peasantry would not be supportive of a violent group that may sometimes harm the peasantry were it not for friendly social relations between guerrilla and peasant, supportive of an agreement on the fairness of anti-state activity. Next, it will be made clear what kind of targets for revolutionary attack peasants would find morally acceptable and commendable.

To see how the revolutionaries serve as dispensers of justice for the peasantry, an
examination of the targets of peasant anger and grief will have to be undertaken. It is expected that revolutionary activity will be higher when the peasants are angered or disillusioned with the intrusion of entities and people perceived to be “outside” the peasant community and ignorant to its customs and traditions. Examples of groups that could intrude into the peasantry’s lives and provoke a heated rebuke would be multinational corporations, state security forces, and paramilitary forces fighting as proxies for the state against the revolutionaries. Amid these outsiders, peasants may be more likely to join or tacitly support revolutionary groups. So, as the number of outside entities infiltrating the peasants’ territorial base rises, the revolutionaries will find it easier to garner support from the peasantry thus increasing the amount of land controlled by revolutionaries or their attacks on the state apparatus.

The last independent variable to be operationalized will be the international context. The hypothesis is derived from Skopcol’s argument that state power competitions often dilute the state’s ability to deal with domestic movements seeking to destroy the state (Skopcol 1979). Here, not only will power-politics between states be analyzed, but also state support for revolution inside other states will have to be included. Revolutionary groups’ power relationships to the states they oppose are often influenced heavily by military assistance from an outside group either to revolutionaries or the state. When aid is given to a revolutionary group by an outside state, then there should be a corollary increase in revolutionary capacity. However, this may be mitigated if the revolutionary group’s state also has a patron to assist in destroying the revolutionary movement. In this case, the power and resource competition between the two patrons may be determinative of the expansion or contraction of revolutionary activity. In addition, if a state is distracted by other security concerns from other states, this distraction could result in an increase in revolutionary scope.
Since the hypotheses illustrating the nature of the relationship between the variables for analysis and the persistence and scope of the FARC and Sendero’s revolutionary activities have been stated, it now seems necessary to offer a chapter outline that will permit exploration of the concepts and relationships spelled out above.

To deal with and provide some form of explanation for the dependent variable (the persistence of rural revolutionary movements in Colombia and Peru), independent variables that may correlate to the scope and persistence of revolutionary movements need to be identified. The second chapter will be dedicated to introducing the historical origins and progress of the Sendero and FARC movements, providing a narrative and context from which later analysis can be built.

In the third chapter, I will attempt to answer the following questions: what is the social basis of these revolutionary movements? Are they from similar peasant-sectors? In the fourth chapter, the international context will be explored to see how revolutionaries and state power-relations are affected by international actors, answering the questions: How do international actors empower and influence repressive state policies and forces? Do revolutionaries protect the peasantry from outside groups (paramilitary forces)? Do they protect illicit peasant crops (coca) from eradication? What effect does contact with revolutionary actors abroad have on revolutionary power? And, does the role of the international environment legitimize revolutionary groups or state-policies? The fifth chapter will highlight key differences and similarities between the two revolutionary groups upon answering the questions posed. This chapter will also contain a conclusion where a summation of the research with insight on how similar and dissimilar the two movements are, and how useful the variables used were for measuring the scope and persistence of revolutionary activity.

In conclusion, the topic proposed here is intended to delve deeply into the peasant-guerrilla
relationship in two Andean countries, Colombia and Peru. By using a comparative analysis, the goal is to provide insight into what variables are necessary for persistent revolutionary activity. The research hopes to provide a springboard for future study by both determining the validity of these revolutionary movements as phenomena that require social scientific explanation and adding theoretical insight into what variables are crucial for persistent revolution.
Historical Context

To begin the comparison of these two movements, it first must be established that the political context from which they emerged are similar. This will strengthen the argument for the viability of certain variables, by disproving any notion that there are fundamental differences between the two states that would account for the differing scope of activity of the FARC and Shining Path. To do this, in accordance with Moore (1966), the process of modernization will be examined for its impact on peasant-state, peasant-lord and intra-peasant relations. From Huntington’s (1968) perspective, the state will be examined for its attempts to aggregate newly emerging interest-groups that are the key destabilizing element in the modernization process. In essence, this chapter will validate the use of Colombia and Peru as a sample cases for comparison of revolutionary zeal by establishing the political and social commonalities each country experienced in the modernization process. These commonalities will be directly linked to revolutionary emergence, and will begin to be tied to their persistence.

Before the narrative of the political context can begin, it is important to note some key terms that will be in usage in this chapter and throughout the paper. The first term is the hacienda. In Latin America the hacienda has always been the primary form of land tenureship. Furtado (1970) states the hacienda has never existed on its own. Hacienda land structures always exist within a larger rural economy that also contained minifundistas, who are either subsistence farmers or part-time hacienda workers (216-7). As Furtado makes clear haciendas and
minifundista relationships exist on a continuum. On the one end, a hacienda is largely isolated from any minifundistas and in a given area is the primary source of employment. On the other end, is a hacienda located within close proximity to minifundistas and where the hacienda serves as a source of employment for the smaller minifundistas where it often ends up conflicting with landed minifundistas over property (Furtado 1970, 216-7).

The analysis will begin in the post-Cold War period. It is this period that externally focused economic policies would take root, which would begin to force state and elite economic interests to interfere in traditional peasant-lord relations.

Modernization-The Case of Peru

Beginning in 1948, Peruvian General Manuel Odria, who had staged a military coup, adopted an export led growth model-where economic growth would come from profits from an export of natural resources. The export profits would go into private hands and government coffers and be used to bring cheaper imports into the country than could be made domestically (Skidmore 2005, 205-6). Export oriented growth favored specific domestic industries where economic planners felt Peru had a competitive advantage. The state promoted these exports through tax incentives, protective tariffs, and other various enticements that promoted competitive advantage against others (Balaam 2008, 316-7). In the Peruvian case, the outward orientation of its economy meant the oligarchy’s share of economic activity would decline and created new pressures on the agricultural sector to produce for increased urban consumption.

The oligarchy witnessed the emergence of new employment and investment outside of its control, dating back to the 1920s, particularly in the Cerro de Pasco mines, the fishing and fishmeal industry. Philip (1978) writes that 13% of all economic output was industry in 1950 and by 1960 the number was 20% (24-5). Industry was concentrated in Lima, which was
experiencing an influx of urban migrants. Lima’s population in 1940 was 1.5 million, while by 1972 it had almost doubled at 2.9 million (Philip 1978, 26). In addition to these changes, the oligarchy also came to lose control of Peru’s banking sector to foreign competition. In 1960, foreign financial institutions controlled 38% of banking, while in 1968 foreign bankers controlled 62% of Peru’s banking sector (Philip 1978, 26). The increase in urbanization and industrialization meant new demands on the peasantry as well as a shift in some regions of the sierra to wage labor for mining companies.

Since the 1920s, Pasco and Junin, departments of the central sierra, had been penetrated by mining corporations (Handelmann 1975, 50). The influx of wage labor ameliorated land pressures by offering peasants work as a stop-gap measure to allow for their sustenance in a time of scarcity or provide savings to a family-plot operating near the subsistence level. In the early years, from around 1920 until the late 1950s, the influx of wage labor did not significantly restructure peasant society because peasants disliked wage labor and would only temporarily be employed as wage laborers, preferring to return to their communities (Handelmann 1975, 50). However, politically, the social contact with peasants from other communities the work in the mines provided was invaluable for later political agitation. In Pasco and Junin, during the years of 1920-1960 all of the communities had had members work for the corporations, make social connections with other peasants, and return (Handelmann 1975, 50).

Modernization-The Case of Colombia

In Colombia, coffee exports had made the economy dependent on international trade and provided the necessary financing for industrialization beginning in the 1920s. The fluctuations in the market and the Great Depression forced Colombia to turn inward and seek to manufacture industrial products that had been imported from abroad pre-depression (Skidmore 2005, 238; Dix
Coffee’s importance in financing a push toward import-substitution industrialization (ISI) meant fewer threats to Colombia’s landed elite than in Peru. This is because coffee in Colombia has always been best produced on small hillside plots by the small holders, either on minifundias or family sized plots (Dix 1967, 24-5). Also, because Colombia’s key export did not have foreign investors involved, the Colombians were able to finance industrialization, while U.S. capital pre-1960s did not play a significant role in any one sector of the Colombian economy outside of oil (Dix 1967, 35-6).

Urbanization was also an important factor in Colombia’s development into a modern country. Dix (1967) asserts that population growth has cancelled out the persistent economic growth that Colombia experienced throughout the 1930s and into the 1960s, with economic growth failing to provide the new urban arrivals in the cities jobs (39-40). According to Dix (1967), from 1918-1953, the proportion of Colombians living in communities of 1,500 people or more doubled from 21 to 42.8% (39).

For Colombia, the worrying aspect of modernization in the late 1950s was the volatility of the global coffee markets. While certain elites were transferring themselves to commercial agriculture in areas where the land was conducive to machinery farming, the peasants involved in minifundia and family-sized coffee farms had nowhere to go when the price of coffee would no longer support them. So, as Zamosc (1986) argues, capitalism in the 1960s made the question between capitalist farming and peasant farming one of national significance as land availability shrunk and economic growth could not provide sufficient labor opportunities in cities (27).

In both Colombia and Peru, modernization changed the dynamics of peasant society and the landed elites, presenting a dilemma for the state. For Colombia, the dilemma was over how to deal with the pressures of landless peasants and the need for persistent productivity in the coffee
sector. Capitalist farming techniques, landed elites seizure of colonist plots, and the persistence of hacienda farms even as modernization advanced meant less land for the peasantry. In Peru, the landed elites played less of a role in the modernization process and were largely seeing their position in society eroded by the industry’s growth and increasing share of capital. The peasants of the central sierra did witness the influx of capitalist techniques in the form of livestock haciendas that did not employ many peasants. This created, at the same time as urbanization and industrialization expanded Peru’s consumer base, a diminution of productive land and peasant employment opportunities. These pressures on the peasantry and the state, in both countries, would lead to activism from both the peasantry and the state to, in the latter case, attempt to manage both supply shortages from the peasantry’s output, and in the former redress grievances over land shortages and political domination. The next section will deal with the evidence of a need for land reform and each country’s political experience attempting to address the land question.

Origins of Peasant Mobilization and State-Sponsored Land Reform: The Case of Peru

First, this chapter will discuss the signals the governments heeded in attempting land reform projects, followed by a synopsis of the political sources of land reform’s impact.

Manuel Prado, Peru’s president from 1956-62, was a member of a prominent banking family and a member of Peru’s oligarchy at the onset of Peru’s industrialization and decline of the landed oligarchy (discussed above). He initiated political liberalization allowing unions to be organized by a reformist party previously banned from the country-legalizing APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) (Handelmann 1975, 79-80). He did this in an attempt to ameliorate peasant land invasions while making an ally that could generate popular support and preserve the oligarchy’s power, particularly in the departments of Pasco, Junin, and the Valley of
La Convencion, in the department of Cuzco (Handelmann 1975, 63-4,70-4).

From 1959 to 1963, peasant communities in the departments of Pasco and Junin mobilized to invade and occupy lands that they felt were rightly theirs from mostly the corporate owned livestock farms (Handelmann 1975, 65-7). The land invasions were a response by the peasantry to tensions over the expansion of pastoral use of land on livestock ranches owned by Cerro de Pasco Corporation. The invasions were indicative of an expanding need for land. They also represented the profit-motivation of modernization and capitalism as agribusinesses expanded livestock grazing in Pasco and Junin, which was not labor-intensive (Handelmann 1975, 65-7). As pastoral use of land was expanding the mines which as stated earlier had for decades provided a stop-gap source of employment for poorer peasants, began hiring at a rate unable to meet the demands for labor created by population growth and employment needs (Handelmann 1975, 79-80).

In La Convencion in the Southern sierra of Cuzco, the antagonisms which led to land invasions were from coffee growers who had moved into a hacienda between the mountains and the sierra. Transportation difficulties and the region’s historical isolation from the Incan empire meant loosely affiliated communities occupied the region (Handelmann 1975, 70-1). In the 1940s, the land was divided into haciendas and began to be available for peasant settlement. Since the land was newly converted for coffee production, the plot sizes were larger than most peasants held within their communities providing sufficient land to motivate influx of peasants. From 1940 to 1960 the number of peasants went from 28,000 to 62,000 (Handelmann 1975, 72). As peasant numbers increased and the coffee growing production increased, the hacendados began to place a greater squeeze on the traditional peasants many of whom had hired workers of their own. One of these workers was Hugo Blanco who helped to organize a peasant federation in La
Convencion, made up of leaders of eight peasant groups to mobilize land invasions against increased hacendado extractions (Handelmann 1975, 76-7).

President Prado commissioned a report in an attempt to deal with the land invasions. The report acknowledged the role land inequality played in Peru, but called only for measures that would enhance productivity, neglecting the redistribution peasant land invasions were attempting to force (Handelmann 1975, 80-1). Prado left office without ever confronting the land question.

The 1962 election featured the newly legal APRA party and their leader Haya de la Torre and Accion Popular’s Fernando Belaunde Terry. De la Torre was the victor yet without a plurality needed Congress to decide the election. The military, unwilling to allow APRA into power, took power and violently put down the peasant insurrections in La Convencion, while at the same time redistributing a hacienda of 1500 hectares pacifying Cuzco (Handelmann 1975, 82-3).

The return to elections in 1963 produced a victory for Fernando Belaunde Terry. The military during their one year reign had abandoned their posture as a supporter of the oligarchy. They had been angered over the APRA-oligarchy alliance that had attempted to bring Haya de la Torre to office and found few trustworthy allies within Peru’s political system. Belaunde was allowed into office by the military because of his acknowledgement of the need for land reform and his opposition to APRA. Balance-of-payments deficits caused by a surge of imports in the late 1950s (to combat famine in Arequipa, Ayacucho, and Puno) combined with ongoing peasant land invasions to highlight the need for land reform and motivated Belaunde’s push for land reform (Handelmann 1975, 80).

Belaunde and Accion Popular comprised a broad-based party finding support among urban managers and workers, as well as indigenous communities in the south (Skidmore 2005, 207). Upon his election, Belaunde sought to stabilize the country and build a political consensus on the
land issue. From August to November of 1963, Belaunde attempted to negotiate with invading peasant communities (Handelmann 1975, 116-8). Invaded land was kept in the hands of peasants in Junin (north of Cuzco) in an agreement between peasant community leaders and the government for the building of a road and other technical assistance (Handelmann 1975, 116-8).

By late 1963 and early 1964, Belaunde ordered crackdowns in the south. As part of these crackdowns 15-30 peasants in Cuzco were murdered in October of 1963 (Handelmann 1975, 118-9). Peasants in the southern highland departments like Cuzco and Ayacucho were not allowed to keep the land they had occupied (Handelmann 1975, 120-1). Handelmann (1975) offers two explanations for the differing state treatment of the two peasant sectors. These explanations are central to the necessity of land reform and the political difficulties of such a reform.

The first explanation is the differences between peasant-government relations in the two regions. Handelmann (1975) asserts that because the northern sierra departments of Junin and Pasco had peasants who were integrated into the national economy through wage labor and participation in contract sheep farming (representing ties to the emerging bourgeoisie and modern corporations) they were consequently tied to politically active patrons that were able to shield them from violent suppression (123). To support his conception of social and political connections between the peasantry in the central highlands and the broader society, Handelmann (1975) highlights the much higher rates of education, electricity, and fluency in Spanish that he found in communities of the central sierra compared with the southern mountain regions like Cuzco and Ayacucho (163-4).

Handelmann (1975) also argues that Belaunde had an unclear understanding of the demands of the southern-sierra peasants compared with the central peasants (122-3).
grievances of the southern peasants were less specific than that of the central peasants. Southern highland peasants were invading lands because of long-standing grievances with the hacendados and patrons that extracted surplus crops from them. On the other hand, the southern-sierra peasantry had clear grievances with mining and livestock corporations, and when combined with the central sierra peasantry’s better political ties were able to find negotiable solutions and avoid violent suppression (Handelmann 1975,122-3).

The second explanation is the political timing and eventual acknowledgment by Belaunde that his land reform would never happen. Belaunde faced opposition within Congress to his land reform demonstrating that the key political actors might be unable to develop a plan for land reform. APRA was one key opponent of land reform and of Belaunde. APRA had long been a reformist party committed to peasant mobilizations. However, APRA had come to dominate the federation of sugar workers and the peasant unions representing workers in Junin and Pasco (Handelmann 1995, 64; Philip 1978, 33-4). These workers were, relative to other non-union peasants, a privileged class. The APRA support of the Prado administration demonstrated the shift in the reformist party to favor export-led growth which benefitted the sugar industry and its workers (Philip 1978, 34).

APRA’s opposition was important because of their dominance in the Congress. This dominance allowed them to control the purse strings needed for reform and to push out pro-reform ministers within the Belaunde administration (Philip 1978, 36-7). The Congress increased wages for teachers (strong APRA supporters), while short-changing Belaunde development projects, weakening any push for land reform or redistribution (Philip 1978, 36-7). Late in his administration, Belaunde formed an alliance with APRA to attempt to win the next election. The political deadlock caused the populist faction of Accion Popular to become frustrated with
Belaunde. Due to APRA control of Congress and spending, the only way to have passed a land reform would have been to raise taxes. However, his own popular base was located in the urban managers and workers, as well as the fishmeal industry, the exact sectors with the wealth to pay for the reform with higher taxes (Philip 1978, 48-9, 46). The power of APRA to strain Belaunde’s finances and compel him into an alliance to secure power in the 1968 elections by creating an alliance between the urban managers, workers, and privileged peasant unions, ruined any attempts at serious economic reform. At the end of the Belaunde administration, an economic crisis ensued. In 1967 the government devalued the currency and placed export taxes on goods and limited imports, restraining export-led growth (Skidmore 2005, 208). In the end, Belaunde’s attempts to negotiate with the peasantry would have little political significance in relation to the alliances Belaunde made in the struggle for electoral power.

After successfully putting down the peasant rebellions, Belaunde was ousted from office by a military coup (Skidmore 2005, 208). In October of 1968, the military reintroduced itself into politics when General Juan Velasco Alvarado seized power. As Philip suggests, the takeover was the result of the military’s recognition of the stalemated land reform due to the influence of classes supporting the APRA-Accion Popular alliance, the inability of any party or group to break the APRA-Accion Popular hold on politics, and the potential for instability due to a failure to tackle agrarian reform (Philip 1978, 50-1). Stepan (1978) cites journal articles written by military generals which articulated their belief that the peasant revolutions in the early to mid 60s were the result of structural flaws in Peru’s economy that would have to be dealt with to prevent future uprisings (130-4). The military’s awareness of the potential for peasant mobilization was sensible. The new intelligence services that had tracked the previous peasant uprisings had made them aware of the potential for radicalism within the peasantry and the danger for the Peruvian
military to be eliminated (as in Cuba) were peasant revolutionaries ever to seize power (Stepan 134-6).

While the Generals involved in the coup to place Velasco in power were not of one mind when it came to policy matters, there were some key areas of agreement. Agreement within the military came from the fact that the military was largely cut off from many sectors of society with very few officers being involved in private enterprises because of the hostility to for-profit motives emphasized in Peru’s military officers’ college, CAEM (Stepan 101-2). The education at CAEM and the perception of Peruvian capitalism as corrupting combined to cement an agreement on perhaps the one issue that permitted Velasco’s coup. The issue was of the military’s role to defend the society from itself, including its civilian political leaders (Stepan 140-1).

To succeed in remaking Peruvian society into an entity that could participate in the modernizing economy, the generals institutionalized a military government to permit them to carry out long-term significant change. Within this political framework, two factions emerged. The first, the developmentalists, wanted to use the state to promote and lead industrialization with participation of foreign investment. The other faction found largely in the Committee for Advising the President (COAP), and aligned with Velasco, was known as the Radicals. Their prescription for development and societal stability was to redistribute wealth and develop the society with state investment (Philip 1978, 115-7). The mission, stated by Velasco, was to create a “fully participatory democracy” that would end oligarchic monopoly of control (McClinsect 1981, 3).

The land reform passed by Velasco intended to break up the hacienda system and mobilize peasants into participation in newly formed cooperatives. To do this, two types of cooperative were established, the Agrarian Production Cooperatives (CAP) and Agrarian Social
Interest Societies (SAIS). CAPs were made up of one hacienda unit that was geographically contiguous. In CAPs, individual ex-hacienda workers were the members of the cooperative. SAIS cooperatives contained multiple communities in a more dispersed manner and often incorporated both ex-haciendas and peasant communities (McClintock 1981, 36). In SAIS, individual communities formed membership in the larger cooperative instead of individuals. The cooperative would be made up of a general assembly that would be the ultimate decision-making authority (McClintock 1981, 34). The general assembly would elect members of the Administrative Council and the Vigilance Council. The Administrative Council would select three candidates for the gerente (technically trained professional), from which the Ministry of Agriculture would hire one. The Vigilance Council’s role was to ensure that the Administrative Council, subject to the technical advice of the gerente, was serving the cooperatives’ best interests (McClintock 1981, 34).

The cooperatives would have, in addition to power over production strategies with the help of advice from a technical expert, considerable power to control salary levels for cooperative members until a 1976 law placed this power in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture (McClintock 1981, 35). Cooperatives also had to spend a certain percentage of their earnings on reserve funds, investment in production increases, and compensation toward old hacienda owners (McClintock 1981, 35). In addition to these government controls on the cooperatives’ autonomy from the state, the cooperatives were also exclusionary toward some groups in rural society.

These new cooperatives excluded from membership those who did not work in the communities or profit economically from activities within the community. The government, McClintock argues, was attempting to prevent peasant middlemen, who acted as merchants between communities from wielding power in the new cooperatives (McClintock 1981, 38). Also,
landless peasants and temporary workers, the poorest peasants, were also excluded and developed into a new dependent class that relied on ties to cooperative members for work. McClintock assesses the overall impact of agrarian reform on the poorest peasants as negligible due to the fact that most expropriations were on the north coast and fewer were in the central highlands, in addition to the exclusion of the poorest peasants from cooperative membership (McClintock 1981, 63). From 1968-1974, the land reform had expropriated over 8.3 million hectares of agricultural land, amounting to about 35% of all agricultural land in Peru (McClintock 1981, 61).

According to McClintock, cooperatives of ex-hacienda members reported improvement in their lives during the five critical years of Velasco’s agrarian reform (1969-1975). In two communities, one an ex-hacienda on the north-coast and another a former livestock farming the highlands. In Monte, the highland cooperative, only 11% of respondents said they were better off than they were five years ago, while five years earlier 18% of respondents felt their lives had improved in the previous five years, while in the SAIS cooperatives in the highlands 56% said they were better off now than 5 years ago (McClintock 1981, 295). The effects of land reform were not uniformly favored by the peasantry in all regions, indicating that many peasants who pre-reform were the least politically connected saw little benefit from land reform.

The first example of this is the failure of the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) which was an institution designed to aggregate peasant demands. Its policies were only passed when supported by other powerful reform groups like SINAMOS (Velasco’s political mobilization bureaucracy), the Ministry of Agriculture and the cooperatives (McClintock 1981, 265). CNA was actually critical of cooperatives treatment towards landless laborers, passing a decree that all CAPS should have one permanent worker for every five hectares. The law passed after Velasco’s failed health led to his replacement by General Bermudez, who moved policies
rightward (McClintock 1981, 266). In addition, the CNA also called for ways to hold public officials accountable through the granting of the power to review their performance and fire them if necessary, and to hire peasants to hold official positions. The government responded by awarding scholarships to peasants who earned positions in universities, but did not institutionalize any accountability measures to compel peasant office-holding (McClintock 1981, 267)

Another area where peasants were concerned with the government’s performance was in the marketing of their goods. The Velasco government was incoherent on what this relationship should look like. The radicals wanted central cooperatives to play the large role in marketing, processing, and agro-industrialization to create a centralized place for sale and collection of profits to be redistributed to cooperatives based on need. The developmentalist officials wanted this in private hands (McClintock 1981, 270). Government officials felt this way because of strong opposition from the more prosperous cooperatives who would have had profits from their crops redistributed. The opposition to state-control of the marketing cooperatives was easily justifiable after cases of state corruption in the marketing of rice. Consequently, most cooperatives sold their produce through private middlemen, which allowed for a new avenue for extraction of peasant profit (McClintock 1981, 271-2).

While the impact of Velasco’s land reform on the landless peasants and temporary workers was not uplifting, McClintock argues that for peasants participating in cooperative politics a new political and social unity emerged (McClintock 1981, 324-7). The break-up of the hacienda system and the removal of the patron-client relationship inhibited competition between peasants. McClintock’s research identifies an increase in peasant trust for one another and relaxed social interactions between 1969-pre-cooperative establishment when surveys were first done- and in 1974-when McClintock’s field work was completed (McClintock 1981, 326-7). However,
because of disputes between ex-hacienda members and peasant communities, peasants remained skeptical of outsiders, most prominently the government (McClintock 1981, 329). According to McClintock, their sense that the Velasco government had competing internal visions over the role of the state and the importance of participatory democracy created anxiety that a power-shift within the government could alter the structure and importance of peasant participatory opportunities (McClintock 1981, 329).

Cooperatives created from Velasco reform were “islands” that brought power to members, but not outsiders (McClintock 1981, 261-2). There still remained competition among cooperatives for access to middlemen who could market, store, transport, and process cooperative produce. In addition, sometimes struggling cooperatives might be charged high rents to use machinery in the event of an unfortunate equipment failure, placing cooperatives in the place of patrons in relation to one another at times (McClintock 1981, 262-3). In terms of changing the relationship between the Peruvian peasantry and outsiders (state, lords, or middlemen) that was so often considered exploitative, the Velasco reform fell short in its transformational character. As was just mentioned above, the conflict within the military on how to best market the peasantry’s produce exacerbated inter-peasant inequality, leaving unchanged the peasantry’s conditions in the areas where there existence was most detached from the state in the Southern highlands.

Peasant Mobilization and State-Sponsored Land Reform: The Case of Colombia

From 1940 to 1970, Colombia adhered to the economic principles of import-substitution industrialization (ISI), seeking to boost domestic industry and create financial strength to import consumer goods (Skidmore 2005, 238). After La Violencia, a proxy conflict between Liberal and Conservative elites where the combatants and victims were rural Colombians, the country’s urban classes wanted to assert control over the uprisings before they transformed into inter-class warfare
and through ISI, facilitate and benefit from the modernization process. Consequently, in 1953 General Rojas Pinilla took power to cheering crowds and broad support among key Colombian political actors, the Church, Liberal press, most Conservatives, and some Socialists (Dix 1967, 117). The central feature of Rojas’s government was to alleviate violence through an offer of amnesty for guerrilla bands to give up their weapons and claim loyalty to the state (Gott 1970, 237). Although many rebels did, those affiliated with the Communist party in Andean regions like Marquetalia, Tolima, and Cundinimarca refused and established Independent Republics where the Colombian government exerted no authority. With the rebel problem at least partially dealt with and mass class-conflict averted, Colombia’s elites began to worry less about stability and more about the economy.

In the late 50s and early 60s agrarian society, coffee in particular, was needed to pay for the manufacturing supplies that were gaining in importance to the country’s economy. Between 1951 and 1964, the value of manufactured goods increased by 130.9% and industry employment grew by 69.7%. Colombia had to import wheat and barley for consumption as peasant production was not rising to meet new demand from the expanding urban working-class (Zamosc 1986, 20). Consequently, Colombian elites would seek to reassert their control over the country and resume their hold on the reins of modernization.

In 1957, at the end of the Rojas dictatorship, the military announced their support for his reelection, prompting the traditional parties, Liberal and Conservative, to agree to Constitutional changes that would allow for “equity in the representation of the parties” (Dix 1967, 133). After an agreement was reached that Liberals and Conservatives would unite to govern in the National Front, and a plebiscite was passed by Colombians approving amendments to the Constitution. In these amendments, the Conservatives and Liberals agreed to share power in all public institutions
including both houses of the legislature, departmental legislatures, and municipal councils. The agreement also extended to cabinet officials and public administrators, only excluding career officials and military officers (Dix 1967, 133-4). To reach a final accord, the two parties had to agree to alternate the Presidency every four years. Dix asserts that the National Front represented an attempt by the elite to inculcate into society the political culture necessary for democracy and modernization by demonstrating the two powers toleration for each other’s views (Dix 1967, 156).

The National Front period, according to Dix (1967), was a situation where elites attempted to impose a modern democratic political order onto a society emerging from a recent history of violence and dictatorship. Society was meant to benefit from reforms that would aid in the processes of modernization, democratization and liberalization: beginning with women’s suffrage, agrarian reform, and development initiatives that run through both international development financing and the strengthening of local development councils like the Cauca Valley Corporations (Dix 1967, 149, 155, 133). Since the agrarian reform is most pertinent to the development of the FARC, this is the most important aspect of the National Front’s governance to be analyzed.

First, key political realities of the National Front’s rule over Colombia must be made. The Colombian peasants themselves had two distinct sets of demands: stable colonists and coffee-growers wanted better market access and state services, and unstable peasants from all sectors wanted land. Rebels emerged in areas where landlessness was high and the inequalities were stark. Agrarian reform was meant to settle the question between traditional land structures and the emergence of capitalist techniques. On the one side were the traditional hacendia owners and peasants who wanted more land, favoring stagnation in capitalist farming to allow for new land to be developed through traditional peasant-landowner tenancy arrangements. On the other side were the members of the Colombian elite who had begun to invest in capitalist techniques and
wished to see a large body of landless peasants that could be proletarianized, providing a low-wage workforce (Zamosc 1986, 21). The group most tied to the government was the capitalist farmers. The National Front, given the recent importation of wheat and barley, was well aware of the need to expand production. In addition, many of Colombia’s new industry were investing in the new industries and required imported inputs, meaning an uptick in exports was needed to provide the necessary foreign currency for industrial inputs (Dix 1967, 53).

The story of Colombia’s agrarian reform is traced back to the political forces that made it necessary. Thus, the reform is divided into two separate categories. The first came under the Presidencies of Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) and Conservative Guillermo Leon Valencia (1962-6). Land reform during the time of these Presidencies was concerned with quelling instability in the countryside. Agrarian reform came in the form of the Agrarian Social Reform Law (Law 135 of 1961). It emerged with a broad political consensus. This was likely because it only improved upon programs which were already in existence without having any significant redistributive power. Landowners were given healthy compensation for any expropriations, while landowning interests were also able to limit the requirements for redistribution. The reform that helped the peasantry was the technical assistance and market access programs included for colonists (Zamosc 1986, 35).

After the Agrarian Reform Law, particularly the years of 1963-8, numerous land invasions took place throughout the country in varying sectors of peasant structures. These occurred across a broad spectrum of geographic areas, from Andean regions like Cundinamarca and Antioquia, to areas where wage labor was predominant in newly capitalist farming centers like Tolima and the sugar estates in southwestern Colombia (Zamosc 1986, 45). The broad nature of these mobilizations and the political expressions of the peasantry with grievances against both
traditional and newly formed agrarian structures highlighted the propensity for peasant mobilization. As will be discussed in a later section, the FARC consolidated themselves as the army of the Communist Party during this time. For now, it is best to discuss the broader political context in which Colombia’s land reform attempts took place. New President Carlos Lleras Restrepo took office in 1966, three years into the broad scale land invasions, determined to usher in a new phase of land reform that would alter the social and political realities of the peasantry, providing a basis to establish stability within the peasantry by integrating them into the state (Zamosc 1986, 50).

Restrepo, in response to economic stagnation and popular pressures, promoted industrial exports to increase foreign reserves, ending ISI (Zamosc 1986, 48). Restrepo was aware that the expansion of industrial exports would likely not be large enough to provide the needed jobs for the increasing population and landless peasant-class had created, meaning a new policy was needed which could tie the peasants to the land and improve its availability (Zamosc 1986, 48). To respond to the agrarian situation, Law 1 of 1968 was narrowly passed through the Congress. The major redistributive power of the law was diluted by Liberal and Conservative landowning elites (Zamosc 1986, 49). Any redistributions to tenants and sharecroppers involved high amounts of bureaucratic maneuvering and restrictive costs to the state compensating landowners for expropriated land (Zamosc 1986, 50). Restrepo, being discouraged with the law’s impact and its failure to alleviate peasant concerns or provide him with a political base, responded with an initiative to politically mobilize the peasantry on a national scale to convince the landowning-supported Liberal and Conservative politicians that land reform was necessary (Zamosc 1986, 50-2).

Restrepo established the Asociacion Nacional de Campesinos (ANUC) as a way of
incorporating the *usuarios* (users) of agrarian reform, the peasants, into an association that could allow them to participate in official institutions and participate in the implementation of agrarian reform (Zamosc 1986, 50-1). Restrepo had to establish a state-led mobilizing force to increase peasant pressure for land reform and convince elites to end obstruction. The effort to mobilize the peasantry had to be through the state and easily controllable so as not to threaten the elites that might balk at any radical reform. While Restrepo sought to mobilize the peasantry, he did not do so with the intention of halting the expansion of capitalist farming, instead the focus was on expanding services in areas where the peasant production was economically viable, minifundias (coffee) and colonies (Zamosc 1986, 53-4).

In 1969-70, in reaction to the radical mobilization of the peasantry, landowners evicted peasant colonists on haciendas (Zamosc 1986, 67-8). In other areas, peasants performed land invasions. In areas where they were not taking on the traditional elites through violence and physical protest, they organized politically through the circulation of petitions (Zamosc 1986, 67-8). The landowners’ response to peasant mobilization and the peasant reaction created a political controversy with land as its central question (Zamosc 1986, 67-8). This was precisely what Restrepo had sought to avoid. However, the peasants’ ability to unite on a national scale through ANUC created a politically aware peasantry that was beginning to not see its issues as local and particular, but national and part of a systemic need for reform.

After his disputed 1970 election, President Misael Pastrana was confronted with a mobilized peasantry making new demands on the state for resolution to the land issue. Pastrana, a Conservative with strong ties to landlords, was less enthusiastic toward peasant mobilization than Restrepo (Zamosc 1986, 69). The recent success of Restrepo’s export-promoting economic reforms, along with the rise in the global price of coffee improved Colombia’s
balance-of-payments, made available capital for any necessary imports of foodstuffs, and caused Colombian elites (bourgeoisie) to be less convinced of the importance of land reform (Zamosc 1986, 69-70). Pastrana’s administration had members who soon after his inauguration were making clear their desire to curtail the more radical ANUC aspirations (Zamosc 1986, 69).

In 1970 peasant uprisings occurred, taking the form of land invasions and protesting on the streets of department capitals in places like Magdalena (banana zone), Atlantico, Cundinamarca, Tolima, Huila, and Sucre (Zamosc 1986, 69-70). Key state supporters in the land-owning federations, in response to these measures, sought to defang the agrarian reform to serve the landowners interests. Pastrana’s counterreform was intended to demobilize ANUC and transform land reform to serve the interests of landowners and capitalist agriculture (Zamosc 1986, 97). In response to Conservative fears that “agrarian communism” would pose a threat to capitalist farming, Pastrana initiated counterreform measures (Zamosc 1986, 98-9). The agreement to reverse land reform was reached at a meeting between high-level representatives of the two political parties and elements of the bourgeoisie in 1972. The Pact of Chicoral as it was called, named after the place of the meeting, provided financial incentives for the expansion of capitalist agriculture, loosened requirements on expropriation, and reduced the budget for INCORA (Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform), the state bureaucracy responsible for implementing agrarian reform (Zamosc 1986, 98). The state intervened in ANUC by ousting radical leadership and replacing it with ‘anti-Communist’ leaders, who lamented the radicalism of their predecessors, splintering the group, effectively ending the peasantry’s national mobilization (Zamosc 1986, 100-1). The state also stepped up their repression of peasant activism, throwing entire groups of peasant families into jail, often for days, passively failing to address violence against peasants by thugs hired by landowners, and blacklisting peasants who had participated in
land invasions as ineligible for land reform (Zamosc 1986, 102-3).

By late 1972 and into 1973 land invasions were on the decline and, to a degree, it seems the peasant land question had been ameliorated (Zamosc 1986, 105-6). The conflicts that did persist even into 1974 were over lands that had already been occupied but had not yet been repressed (Zamosc 1986, 111). In 1974, Lopez Michelsen took over the Presidency and sought to consolidate the export-promotion policies of Restrepo. He repressed the interests of labor and offered concessions to the peasantry to increase their access to food, increase production on capitalist farms, and reduce migration to the cities (Zamosc 1986, 126). The Sharecropping Law, passed in 1975, forced large landowners to offer subsistence plots to peasants who they could only employ part-time. This would keep more peasant families in the countryside and provide the seasonal labor for the capitalist farms (Zamosc 1986, 126). It also pointed toward the emergence of capitalist farming as the preferred technique of the state, regulating the landowners to ensure labor availability for the capitalists.

In summary, this section shows that both Colombia and Peru, when faced with the process of modernization, had elites who felt the need for land reform was critical to maintaining the viability of an industrializing, increasingly urban state. The need for land reform in each country emerged from rising peasant political mobilization and shortfalls in food production that in Peru caused famines in the countryside and in Colombia necessitated the importation of wheat and barley. In Peru, land reform was attempted by civilian politicians who, in making alliances to politically control the country, could not push through a significant land reform that might remove oligarchic, union, and bourgeois privilege gained in the inchoate process of modernization. An alliance between the sugar workers (APRA) and urban managers (professionals) and workers (Accion Popular), while it could win elections had no appetite to pay
for agrarian reform that might have cost them their privileged status. In Peru, the military then stepped in, fearing the potential for insurrection in the countryside and their own survival in a case of a radical group’s ascension to power. The military was able to mobilize the peasantry into cooperatives, in a top-down manner, assuring that they would not lose control of the peasantry’s aspirations as they became more politically aware.

In Colombia, Restrepo understood the need for significant land reform and attempted to establish a bourgeoisie-peasant alliance. The intention was to keep the pressure off of urban expansion, while promoting peasant land holding to keep a vibrant peasantry on the land producing food for the urban markets. With ISI being strained and destabilizing elements operating in the Colombian countryside, Restrepo was able to convince some members of Colombia’s elite that it was necessary to have land reform. To push the elites who were lagging on meaningful implementation of the reform to allow redistributive reforms, Restrepo mobilized the peasantry through ANUC. Like the developmentalist Peruvian generals, the Colombian state controlled ANUC and was able to dilute its participatory significance in implementing agrarian reform. When Restrepo’s economic reforms, coupled with a resurgent world economy, took away the impulse toward reform, agricultural modernization took hold and the promotion of capitalist techniques and the transfer of the peasantry to wage laborers was underway.

Colombia’s traditional elite’s emergence as a bourgeoisie gave it enough strength to politically control the modernization process both economically and politically, causing reform to fail when the elite consensus died. Peru, on the other hand, had a traditional elite that was historically dependent on the military to maintain their privilege and found it difficult to keep their place in Peruvian society as modernization took hold. This forced the oligarchy to seek new
alliances with APRA’s sugar unions, alienating the military. In the last attempt to assert control over civil society, the governing Accion Popular, whose leader Belaunde had electorally defeated the oligarchy-APRA alliance, aligned with Congressionally powerful APRA to cement its electoral and political hold on Peru. This prompted the military, which was experienced in dealing with peasant insurrection, to intervene in response to the anti-reformist alliance between APRA and Accion Popular. This occurred because the military no longer had a powerful oligarchy as an ally and feared the prospects of Peru not having a land reform.

The Origins, Scope and Persistence of Guerrilla War-The Case of Peru

Peasants, business leaders, and urban workers all were somewhat displeased with the Velasco regime’s reform efforts. By 1975, the stagnation in the world sugar and copper markets caused stagnation in the Peruvian economy and a balance of payments deficit (Skidmore 2005, 212). The number of strikes in 1975 was nearly double the number in 1969, and the Peruvian military sensed new leadership was needed to curb these troubling signs. General Francisco Morales Bermudez was put in as President by the Joint Chiefs in August 1975. His immediate actions led to the dismantling of institutions whose mission were to mobilize the population, like SINAMOS, while also cutting the government’s spending in an attempt to attract foreign investment.

The radicals’ policies had required significant foreign investment and had strengthened the Peruvian economies dependence on foreign capital (Philip 1978, 152). Austerity measures were needed to counteract the balance of payment deficit the collapse of the fishmeal industry caused (Philip 1978, 150). Austerity measures in 1975, coinciding with a world recession, led to riots in Lima in February of that year (Philip 1978, 156). The military was forced to align with Aprista forces to pass through austerity measures. The Generals responded to their loss of support from
multiple sectors of Peruvian society opportunity to begin the transfer back to civilian government by calling for a constituent assembly election in 1978 and general elections in 1980 (Skidmore 2005, 212).

For the peasantry, the time between land reform and the Shining Path’s emergence was one of increased participation and decreasing power. As Seligmann’s (1995) analysis of Huanoquite, a district in Cuzco bordering Ayacucho, shows peasants were put into leadership positions in peasant organizations and district councils (201-2). However, due to austerity measures passed in the 1970s, the funding from the state for peasant projects to increase production was never realized. In addition, the urban sector’s decline meant migration to the cities was no longer possible and the land compression that had been endemic to the southern highlands was only exacerbated (Seligmann 1995, 202). The younger and more often educated peasant generation that had become invested in Velasco’s land reform interpreted economic strains, the insertion of peasants into roles of dominance over other peasants, and intermediaries’ persistent parasitic relationships to the peasantry as signs that violence was the only way for peasants to escape their subservient relationship to the state (Seligmann 1995, 202). As Velasco’s reform collapsed, the political space for mobilization on the left expanded with peasants poorly integrated into the economy, highlighting the potential instability for the southern highlands. Ayacucho, in particular would be a dangerous place for the state to maintain control due to its isolation and the presence of a local university, a potentially radicalizing influence (McClintock 1984, 49).

In 1970, Abimael Guzman, philosophy professor at the University of Huamanga founded the Shining Path, a Maoist political group that denounced pro-capitalist policies that deepened foreign control of the economy. The group’s ideology stated the military regime had never been interested in uplifting the Peruvian peasantry, only pacifying it to make the way for exploitation by
the agents of modernity, including financial institutions that were increasingly foreign subsidiaries (McCormick 1987, 2). Guzman was a Maoist, and believed revolution in Peru would be achieved through a popular war that would engulf the countryside and surround the cities (McCormick 1984, 51).

Guzman was frustrated with the legal left, as were peasants, because of their atomized and localistic support and the lack of a broad-based popular movement with a leftist ideology (McCormick 1984, 80). The United Left was structured as a loose affiliation of leftist parties to expand the national significance of the left-leaning parties. However, each party’s influence was based on local parties, meaning a national leftist institution was not forthcoming (Burt 1998, 278). Burt (1998) quotes an urban activist on the dynamics of the United Left and other parties who states “relations between the different parties and in Villa were cordial and fraternal, but they were also very complicated. It was difficult to figure out who was working for the united front (IU) and who was working for his or her political party” (278).

The Shining Path became the primary party of resistance and remained isolated from the “legal left,” yet because leftist parties did not want to condemn their anti-state, pro-peasantry and worker ethos, the Shining Path found much passive support for their arguments among other leftist parties (Hinjosa 1998, 77). The Shining Path largely flew under the radar of the Peruvian state because of a lack of information sharing between security agencies and a focus on the administrative transfer of the police function into civilian hands (Gorriti 1999, 37-54). This was in spite of reports written by security officials in the late 70s that the Shining Path had proclaimed its intentions of waging a revolutionary war against the state. The seizure of ballot boxes on election-day in 1980 at an Ayacucho polling station was the first major operation against the Peruvian state by the Shining Path (McCormick 1987, 4, Gorriti 1999, 53-4).
In the political realm, the 1978 elections saw the Peruvian Left win 33% of the vote, while APRA took 35%. In 1980, Fernando Belaunde Terry again became the elected President of Peru as the Shining Path began its violent campaign against the government. His first initiatives were policies in line with an IMF stabilization strategy, including divestment of the state from the economy, and a renegotiation of Peru’s foreign debt (Skidmore 2005, 213). Belaunde was adhering to the principles prescribed in the Washington consensus formula for less-developed countries that calls for low social expenditures for governments, freedom of capital to move into and out of a developing country, and state divestment of industry (Balaam 2008, 321). To rejuvenate the Peruvian economy, Belaunde was skeptical of the state-led approach that the Generals had tried with excessive foreign borrowing. He favored the integration of Peru into the world economy through the opening of its borders to investment, eventual growth when restrictions on investments are removed, and the reduction of state expenditures that could allow for repayment of balance of payments deficit. The impact of these measures resulted in an uptick of foreign investment in Peru that led to optimism from Belaunde and his supporters on the state of the economy. However, the world recession of 1981-3, the Mexican debt crisis, and the high cost of servicing foreign debt all led to inflation of 110% in 1983 and 1984 (Skidmore 2005, 213-4).

The next President, Alan Garcia pursued a nationalist economic policy, intent on creating domestic demand for goods through currency devaluation, price freezes for goods and increasing wages and tax cuts for both payroll and sales taxes. The boom in consumption was unable to be met by Peruvian producers and only increased the foreign debt and caused foreign exchange reserves to disappear (Skidmore 2005, 215-6). Fearing a default on debt, investors withdrew (Skidmore 2005, 216). With runaway inflation already making food and other essentials too expensive for many Peruvians, an economic shock program intended to rectify inflationary and
debt problems caused massive unemployment throughout the cities. Gordon McCormick (1992) argues that the Shining Path throughout the 1980s, maintained efforts to incorporate an increasingly urbanized population into assisting the rural war by exploiting the failing economy and under-performing state to incite anti-government behavior in the city. McCormick (1987) reports that there were seventeen times as many Sendero attacks near Lima in 1990 (634) than in 1980 (36) (22).

The Shining Path in 1987 gained control of the Upper Huallaga Valley, a coca growing region, and began to oversee coca paste sales to Colombian cartels, increasing their resources to challenge the state (Kay 1999). An agricultural crisis caused by Garcia’s economic policies had sent more agricultural workers into an illegal sector of the economy that accounted for around 3% of Peru’s employment in the late 80s (Kay 1999, 101-2). Both Belaunde and Terry had tacitly allowed coca growing to continue unmolested. In 1987, the Shining Path would seize control of the Upper Huallaga Valley in the Northern highlands and control a major thoroughfare of drugs into Colombia (Kay 1999, 101-2). Kay argues that the infiltration of resources from the taxation and management of the drug trade in the Upper Huallaga Valley gave the Shining Path the opportunity to maintain a high level of activity and destruction into the early 90s (Kay 1999; McCormick chart 1987, 22).

Alberto Fujimori was elected President in 1990 with support from Cambio 90, an organization formed in the run-up to the election and not a major political party (Skidmore 2005, 217). Fujimori’s election indicated the discontent with the government and represented the people’s clamoring for an outsider to come in and change the plight of the Peruvian masses. In 1992, Fujimori staged an autogulpe (auto-coup), whereby he reconfigured the government to centralize his control over the military and legislature (Skidmore 2005, 217). Not long after the
autogulpe, Guzman was arrested, and called for the Shining Path militants to lay down their arms. Many Shining Path members were arrested and the threat they posed to the state subsided significantly, yet would not disappear (Skidmore 2005, 218). Fujimori’s power-grab and success combating the Shining Path endeared him to many Peruvians appreciative of his decisive leadership. Aviles (2009) argues that Fujimori’s ability to put the military under his civilian leadership, made easier by adherence to neoliberal tenets in economics, brought Peru toward democratic consolidation by 2000. Although Fujimori did place the military and intelligence services under his control, he did so by establishing an illiberal democracy in Peru. For the peasantry, neoliberalism meant no significant land reform, only projects resembling political patronage and designed to cultivate Fujimori’s popular base (Skidmore 2005, 218-9).

In 2006, Alan Garcia once again took office. Aguilar argues that the Garcia administration’s adherence to neoliberal tenets led to the maintenance of Peru’s unequal socioeconomic makeup (Aguilar 2009). Aguilar points out that certain regions, particularly the river valley between the Apurimac and Ene, remain a potential haven for elements that seek to overthrow the government. In 2006, the Shining Path staged multiple attacks on government installations in the region, prompting Garcia to launch a development initiative (Aguilar 2009). The citizens living there have little access to education, healthcare, and potable water. In addition to the continuing social inequities of Peru—the worst conditions being found in Ayacucho where the Shining Path was formed—Garcia has had problems with state repression against indigenous protests. As Schaffer reports, protests in Bagua province, over grants to corporations for public land, resulted in 40 Indian casualties and 22 police fatalities (Schaffer 2009). In addition to the actual violence, the incident was caught on tape, showing 600 members of the police force firing into a crowd of Indians (Schaffer 2009). Today, the conditions of peasant-Indian poverty in the
the Huallaga Valley, the Ene River, and the Apurimac Valley remain conducive to support for Shining Path recruitment and support (U.S. State Dept.: Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism [OCOC] 2009, Ch. 6). The State Dept estimates that today the Shining Path is made up of 300-500 members (State Dept.: OCOC 2009, Ch. 6). A few incidents from 2009 offer a glimpse into current Shining Path activities. In April, Shining Path militants fired rocket propelled grenades at a helicopter carrying the chief of the Peruvian armed forces and other high ranking officers while it was on its way to Sanabamba (State Dept.: OCOC 2009, Ch. 6). The town of Sanabamba was the sight of earlier Shining Path strikes in April in which 14 members of the Peruvian armed forces were killed. The last incident occurred in September of 2009 when Shining Path militants shot down a MI-17 helicopter performing anti-narcotics operations in a key coca growing region for the Peruvian Air Force, killing three members of the military (State Dept.: OCOC 2009, Ch. 6).

The Peruvian political system, since the time of Velasco, has not seen a significant push to counteract the social inequities of Peruvian society. Garcia hopes to heal social problems through open-door economic policies, evidenced by his hosting of two international economic conferences, one with Latin American countries and European countries and the other with Asian nations, illuminating his internationalist, neoliberal approach. It seems, at this point, impossible to state that any alleviation of inequality has been achieved in the newest Peruvian administration. In April of 2010, the Andean Air Mail and Peruvian Times reported that the UNDP report for 2009 on Peru demonstrated that despite economic growth numbers, regional inequality was still present. The report highlighted the lack of doctors in Huancavelica, in the central-southern highlands (5 for every 10,000) as compared with Lima (26 for every 10,000 residents), to highlight the persistent inequality in the country. Also, the access to water and sewage is absent for 80% of
Huancavelica’s residents, while only 7% of Lima’s residents go without (Peruvian Times and Andean Mail, April 23, 2010). While Garcia’s government continues with policies forwarding integration into the international economy as a development strategy for Peru, underdeveloped regions remain fertile grounds for recruitment into the illicit drug trade and Shining Path support.

The Origins, Scope and Persistence of Guerrilla War: The Case of Colombia

The National Front’s immediate desire to control modernization through rebel suppression made the Communist-affiliated group become more active against the central state. The government crackdowns on the Independent Republics represented the National Front’s attempt to establish government control and provide the rule of law necessary for the success of the Agrarian Reform. Early in 1964, Liberal President Lleras Camargo, the first President of the National Front period, sent the army into Marquetalia to end Communist control. The operation was a Counterinsurgency operation, with steps to establish relations with the peasantry through gift-giving, psychological warfare, and attempts to isolate and divide rebels based on personal conflicts over legal participation in politics. Marquetalia was overtaken easily as the guerrillas retreated into the mountains, while the local population faced a brutal bombing campaign, including the use of napalm (Gott 1970, 250). By 1965, operations such as “Operation Marquetalia” had been continued in Rio Chiquito, Guyabero, and El Pato, causing the Communist Party to perceive their relationship with the Colombian government as war (Gott 256).

Those who retreated from the Independent Republics disbanded in Operation Marquetalia slipped into the neighboring Communist enclave, Rio Chiquito and formed the Southern Bloc (Bloque Sur) (Rempe 1995). In 1964, the Bloque Sur would draw up a land reform that included the confiscation of large estates and the free distribution of land to peasants (Gott 1970, 253). In 1966, the Bloque Sur would rename their movement the FARC. At the time of the FARC’s
formation other groups had formed attempting to overthrow the Colombian government the National Liberation Army and the MOEC (Movimiento de Obreros Estudiantes y Campesinos) being two prominent groups. The Communist Party and these groups had little trust for one another. The Communist Party felt these groups jeopardized their electoral struggle, and the rebel groups saw the Communist party as collaborators with an oppressive regime, with the only major point of agreement being that both the rebels and official Communist Party believed in the peasantry’s importance for revolutionary change (Gott 1970, 242). The FARC, however, saw itself as the violent revolutionary wing of the Communist party and would retain its Communist affiliation until the late 80s. In 1966, a Communist Party leader said of the FARC’s revolutionary strategy, “The united military political leadership of FARC follows the line of the Communist party as set forth in the revolutionary process in our country, the tenth congress of our party centralized the leadership of armed action in the rural localities” (Gott 1970, 256). Some in the Communist Party were skeptical of the revolutionary moment in Colombia, and did not feel the FARC could effectively create the situation simply through the perseverance of armed resistance to the government (Gott 1970, 256).

The FARC emerged in Andean areas like Tolima, Narino, Cauca, Antioquia, and Santander, where peasant inequality was obvious and the peasant mobilization had excluded them in favor of the stable peasantry. Areas like Tolima, where plains were adjacent to mountain ranges, experienced an increase in agricultural capitalism. Colombia, in 1977, faced a spate of labor-strikes over the elite-dominated political orientation of Turbay and low wages the Colombian bourgeoisie used to enhance their competitive position in world markets (Dudley 2004, 50-1). In 1978, President Julio Cesar Turbay, granted the military expanded power to infiltrate houses, torture, imprison, jail dissidents for protesting, use military tribunals, following the edict
of guilty until proven innocent (Dudley 2004, 32-3).

In the early 1980s Colombia joined the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and began to liberalize its trade and financial sectors to be more integrated into the world economy. Colombia’s integration into world markets hit a near immediate snag with the Iranian revolution, the oil crisis in 1979, the world recession and the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. These conditions reduced Colombia’s export-growth, bringing Colombia into the debt crisis of the 1980s. Although Colombia’s circumstances were not as dire as other Latin American countries like Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, austerity measures were required. These included the devaluation of the peso and a large decrease in public sector expenses, measures that, as typically happens, hurt the country’s poor. These cuts likely pushed many more Colombians into areas like the informal economy, where drug trafficking was becoming more prominent.

In 1979, the FARC was relatively weak with fronts in eight departments Huila, Cauca, Tolima, Putumayo, Caqueta, and Antioquia (Rochlin 2003, 99). The last three departments listed were important because of the FARC’s ability in the 80s to tax the drug traffickers (Rochlin 2003, 99). The FARC’s break with the Communist Party in the early 80s allowed it the freedom to align itself with the drug traffickers and increase their resource base by removing the Communist Party’s attempts to be a legal party and restrict some of the FARC’s illegal and militant behavior (Dudley 2004, 50-1).

Belisario Betancur’s election to the Presidency in 1982 reflected a shift in Colombia’s political orientation toward the guerrillas. The evidence of this was in the strength of Betancur’s victory and his offer to begin negotiation with all groups fighting the Colombian government (Dudley 2004, 17). The Colombian military was largely opposed to this idea, as were many FARC hardliners. However, in 1985, the negotiations between Jacobo Arenas and the
government resulted in an agreement that called for an eventual drawdown of the FARC’s weaponry and the legal emergence of the FARC’s political wing, the *Union Patriótica* (UP) (Dudley 2004, 54-5).

Some in the military reacted angrily at the amnesty agreement and saw the FARC’s negotiations as part of a nefarious plot to take over the state. One of these was General Landzabal, a prominent general during the negotiations between Betancur’s government and the FARC. He attempted during the negotiations between the government and the FARC to capture and kill the FARC leaders. When the FARC leaders found out and complained to the government, Landzabal was ordered by the Betancur administration to stand down (Dudley 2004, 40-1). Landzabal’s position was to follow to the letter a 1965 government decree that stated, “all Colombians, men and women, will be used by the government in activities and work that contribute to the reestablishment of order” (Dudley 2004, 42). Landzabal attempted to mobilize this edict in the Middle Magdalena Valley, an important economic center with a thriving coca trade and oil, nickel and gold deposits. The large number of resources in the region provided an opportunity for the FARC to either kidnap bourgeois residents or tax the business people and illicit crops (Dudley 2004, 41-3). Under Landzabal’s mobilization, local business leaders, the middle peasants, shop-owners, and representatives of Texas Petroleum all came together to form a paramilitary organization that would combat the FARC to end the extortion of business, both legitimate and illegitimate. To carry this out, a campaign of killing was undertaken, with writing on bodies that indicated the purpose of the killing was to avenge ties or sympathy to guerrilla groups (Dudley 2004, 43-4).

As time would prove, military leaders like Landzabal were correct in the implications of an expanding FARC and the allowance of a political wing of the group into the legal sphere. The
FARC grew during the UP’s mobilization from 1984-8, opening 14 new fronts, more than doubling in size. The electoral success of the UP’s tendency to coincide with the FARC’s presence in an area or community proved particularly alarming, appearing to the military as an appendage to allow the FARC to legally seize political control of the state (Dudley 2004,94-5).

Meanwhile paramilitaries had formed in conjunction with the Colombian military and had been engaged in violence against peasant communities where the FARC had support. The paramilitaries were beginning to be used to fight what the anti-guerrilla leaders in Colombia saw as a subversive political entity, the UP. To respond to UP mobilization of the peasantry, the paramilitaries assassinated UP leaders, activists, militants and supporters (Dudley 2004). The funding for these groups was often provided by drug traffickers who needed to control territory for their operations and sometimes found common interests with paramilitaries (Dudley 2004, 99-101). This signified the creation of an alliance between a growing portion of the landowning class and the narco-traffickers, who each had a mutual interest to combat the FARC’s taxation in certain regions. The political violence and legal impunity with which many of these crimes would be committed would disturb many Colombians. The assassination of Liberal Presidential candidate Jose Galan created the need for a new Constitution in 1991.

While the new Constitution did seek to award citizens civil rights, a relationship to the state, and make state institutions less corruptible, little changed in regards to the society. During the 1990s, Colombia remained a very violent place with the continuation of drug trafficking and the FARC’s persistent war with the state. The mass killing of UP militants convinced FARC leadership that violence was the only way to wrestle power away from the state, primarily the landowners, military, and business people who were all united in support of the paramilitary campaign (Murillo 2004, 66-7).
In 1998, the Colombian government, under the leadership of Andres Pastrana created a demilitarized zone to facilitate negotiations with the FARC (Skidmore 2005, 250-1). Violence between the FARC, government, and the paramilitaries—the umbrella organization for the different paramilitaries is known as the Colombian United Self-Defense Forces (AUC)—would prompt Pastrana to enact, in conjunction with President Bill Clinton, Plan Colombia (State Dept; Colombia 2010). The intent of this program was to use U.S. aid to combat drug trafficking in Colombia, decreasing the flow of drugs into the U.S., while helping to diminish the resource base of drug cartels, the FARC and the paramilitaries, in order to clear the way for a civil society to emerge and democratic norms to predominate in Colombian society.

The negotiations ended in 2001 due to continued FARC attacks on government infrastructure and the government’s war on the group’s resource base, meaning the war would continue between Colombia and the FARC. In 2001, the Colombian Attorney General’s wife was assassinated by the FARC, proving how active the war truly was (Skidmore 2005, 252). This assassination corresponded with an intensified mobilization of the FARC through expansion of taxation on drug smuggling.

FARC membership in the late 90s and early 2000s reached its highest levels. In the late 80s the FARC numbered around 3,000 members. By 1995, Pablo Escobar’s Medellin cartel’s destruction allowed for the rise of the weaker Cali cartel that eagerly paid FARC taxes to avoid total war against both the guerrillas and the Colombian state’s anti-narcotics forces, leading the FARC’s numbers to rise to approximately 7,000 by 1995 (Durnan 2006, 104). The FARC’s expansion would continue as the Clinton administration went after and weakened the Cali cartel, decentralizing drug profits and making them easier to tax, prompting the FARC’s membership to rise to about 15-20,000 by 2000 (Perceney 2006, 107; Skidmore 2005, 250).
In response to the strength of the FARC and pervasive violence, Colombians elected Alvaro Uribe to the Presidency in 2002. In the fall of that year Uribe introduced a range of initiatives that were intended to quell the violence in Colombia. The key here was a call by Uribe to guerrilla groups, including the M-19, FARC, and the AUC to participate in unilateral talks with the government (State Dept: Colombia 2010). Uribe, attempting to be tough on violence, stated that as a precondition for negotiations the groups would have to denounce violence and end their involvement in the drug trade and kidnapping (State Dept: Colombia 2010). By 2003, only the AUC had taken up Uribe’s offer and demobilized 31,000 of its members. Another 20,000 fighters from the FARC, ELN and AUC had laid down their arms in exchange for lighter sentences (State Dept: Colombia 2010).

Uribe’s election was significant because of his personal commitment to ending the FARC, in part to bring Colombia peace and also because his father was killed by a FARC attack when he was young. Since Uribe has been in office, he has stated his commitment to ending the violence in Colombia through defeat of the guerrillas and the ending of political ties with the paramilitaries that allow them to remain mobilized (Patel 2009). However, Uribe’s position as a legitimate force pushing to end Colombia’s violence is hotly disputed and will be dealt with extensively in a later chapter. To briefly mention the general controversy, the 2006 questioning of six Uribe supporters by the Attorney General for ties to paramilitaries, including former and acting Congress members and the Foreign Minister’s brother, deserves attention. In addition, the prominent Senator from Sucre was charged for planning the massacre of 14 villagers and the mayor of a small town (Brodzinski 2006). Patel (2009), argues that due to the ineffectiveness of Uribe’s demobilization of the paramilitaries and the severing of their political ties, Uribe’s credentials as a democratic leader were hurt due to the human rights controversy the paramilitaries create. In
addition to an incomplete demobilization of paramilitary forces, Uribe’s counterinsurgency strategy has also recently come under criticism for its perverse incentives and the labeling of civilian casualties as guerrillas to earn military personnel and officers rewards (Restrepo 2010).

However, Uribe has represented a strong leader in the face of the FARC and other groups. In 2004, the Colombian government was able to establish authority in all municipalities for the first time in Colombian history (State Dept: Colombia 2010). Today, the FARC is still active, yet is not currently operating a large-scale multi-front war. Due to Uribe’s success in mobilizing the army to carry out counter insurgency operations against the FARC and amnesty efforts, the FARC’s membership numbers are down, though by how much remains contested. According to the U.S. State Department, the FARC’s numbers were down to 8,500 from the 15-20,000 in 2000 (State Dept: Colombia 2009). Yet Brittain (2010), citing a plethora of sources, produces a table that puts the 2008 FARC membership total at around 36,000 (Brittain 2010, 20). Brittain (2010) offers some insight into the wide discrepancy between official and academic estimates of the FARC’s size. He quotes Cesar Caballero, former head of Colombia’s National Administrative Department of Statistics, on former President Uribe’s penchant for statistical manipulation, “to make Colombia appear safer than it is, casting doubts on achievements that have made him popular both at home and with the U.S. government.” He further states that Uribe’s policy was to “maintain the perception that security has improved no matter what the case” (Brittain 2010, 22). Though the State Department estimates the FARC’s size lower than independent analysts, it denotes the FARC’s strength in late 2009 by mentioning both a deadly assault on the Colombian military where nine soldiers were killed and the guerrillas escaped and the assassination of the department governor of Caqueta (U.S. State Dept OCOC 2009.: Ch. 6). An earlier chapter of the same State Department’s Counterterrorism report demonstrates decreasing demobilization of
In both Colombia and Peru, the influx of narco-trafficking has solved the resource problem that often confronts anti-state groups. However, this is not the total explanation for their continued existence. Both countries have a class within the peasantry that has been left out of the modernization process and land reform attempts. Colombia’s disaffected peasantry has faced a persistent pro-capitalist alliance between the military, bourgeois elements sometimes tied to the state, and narco-traffickers who all have incentives to eliminate the guerrillas. The bourgeoisie and narco-traffickers seek the FARC’s destruction to alleviate themselves from any taxes, while the military seeks to preserve its institutional importance by ensuring FARC success does not mobilize popular support. These groups’ support for the paramilitaries and the recent political ties of the Uribe administration to these groups indicate the persistence of these forces combative nature with the marginal peasantry, from where the FARC emerges and finds support. In Peru, a segment of marginal peasants has been left out of modernization and agrarian reform. As in Colombia, the military’s alliance with and creation of peasant rondas curtailed the insurrection. However, in Peru’s case there was less of a bourgeois backing in the rondas. The areas where the Shining Path had emerged were economically marginal and less connected to the national economy, meaning the primary opposition to the Senderistas was the government in its quest for legitimacy. State-Shining Path violence emanated from the less economically significant regions, in contrast with Colombian-FARC violence, that occurred where capitalist farming and resource extraction was the force limiting peasant land availability.

Both revolutionary movements found themselves in similar situations in relation to their broader political sphere. This was due to the similar nature of politics in each country that
favored the financial interests of urban elites, agrarian capitalists, and the persistent nature of peasant-society relations that left others in a position to exploit the peasantry’s position. The violent reactions of the state in each case confirmed the hostile histories of state-peasant relations in the areas most geographically significant for the peasantry. This chapter has demonstrated that the emergence of these movements was from a largely similar context, containing common features as political marginalization, land pressures, and a modernizing economy increasingly oriented to global markets and corporations.
Peasant Society and Revolutionary Opportunity

After reviewing generally the broad context and place of the Shining Path and the FARC within their countries of origin, it now makes sense to explain the social basis of revolutionary upheaval. To do this, modernization’s effect on community structures and social relations between peasant and landlord patrons will be compared. The comparison between these two peasant community structures seems analogous to the Japanese and Chinese comparison in Moore (Moore 1966). Moore asserts that in China the Communist Party entered into and successfully ignited a revolutionary situation consisting of a peasantry that had been exploited by Chinese lords, victimized by warlordism, and lastly, forced to pay members of the Japanese gentry (Moore 1966, 223-4). The Japanese invasion removed the hold of warlords and traditional elites and allowed the Communist party to be welcomed into peasant communities when they redistributed lands and created a new social order that would be committed to defeating the Kuomintang. Moore states that the atomized and individualistic peasant communities allowed for the Communist armies to have a steady stream of recruits as peasants individually reacted to the violent extractions of peasant rents (Moore 1966, 222). This contrasts with the Japanese experience that saw a peasant community unified in its relations with the lord and able to alter labor productivity to satisfy the push towards modernity. The differing outcomes in Japan and China highlight the validity of testing the peasantry’s social structure and the degree of contact with capitalism in order to see how these variables effect state and insurgent attempts at cooptation of the peasantry, and contribute to revolutionary zeal.
In contrast to China, in neither the case of FARC nor the Shining Path was peasant revolution successful. However, each movement’s persistence points to a degree of revolutionary potential to be assessed. Through a comparison of community structures and their affect on constant variables like capitalist incursion, landlessness, and patron-client relationships post-modernization; a test on the validity of community structures importance in explaining peasant revolutionary movements’ scope and persistence can be performed.

This analysis will coincide with not only Moore’s Japan and China juxtaposition, but also with the importance of land tenure patterns that Paige established, highlighting the propensity of peasants without land to revolt against well-connected capitalist farmers (Paige 1975). To perform such an analysis by comparing the Shining Path and FARC, first the peasant community and production structures will be compared, followed by an examination of how modernization impacted peasant social relationships, both between the peasants and outside actors and intra-peasant relations, with a conclusion comparing the Shining Path and FARC’s role in the social landscape of the peasantry.

The focus of this chapter, then, is on the significance of peasant communities and their structures. In Peru, peasants live in communities that house all people who are involved in any way with the farming process. Surrounding the peasant community is the land where village members each farm their plots. Peru’s south-central peasantry, was predominantly made up of these types of communities with few haciendas (Handelmann 1975, 29). In charge of village governance were village elders, the heads of the largest and most productive families, who would usually hold the most land (Handelmann 1975, 30). These elders were responsible for negotiating arrangements with the community’s patrons and settling disputes among villagers over issues of salience for the community such as land boundaries and water usage.
In Colombia, the farm laborers do not live in any communal center, but rather live in the countryside on their plot of land. Colombian peasants are typically largely isolated from one another. Colombian peasant groupings are referred to as *veredas*, usually a handful of houses comprising a tiny community even in relation to the small rural community that serves as the center (Restrepo 1970, 506). Veredas are, in addition to diminutive in size, made up of houses that are separated by large distances that reduce consistent and spontaneous social contact between peasants. Smith refers to this interaction as largely mechanistic and not organic (Smith 1970, 180). The owners of the larger plots of land who hire the labor are residents of a communal center, along with the professional classes and market middlemen (Smith 1970, 172-4).

Both the Colombian and Peruvian peasantries share an attachment to patrons living in distant rural towns or region capitals with ties to the national economy that allow peasants some access to state or market services like healthcare, credit, seeds, and technical assistance or equipment. For Peruvian peasants, their village elders negotiate their ties to the outside patrons who live in district capitals and large rural towns usually far from the peasant community. Colombian peasants individually have ties to their patron who lives in the communal center. Social cooperation for the Peruvian peasantry is more organic and occurs based on persistent needs, reciprocity and interaction than the Colombian peasantry that lives in relative isolation and markets their goods to the center. These are the basic structures of peasant and rural communities that are found largely even still today in both Peru and Colombia. Next, it will be necessary to illustrate the structure of agricultural production and land tenure patterns in the regions that gave rise to revolutionary movements.

Changes to Peasant Society and Support for Peasant Revolution in Peru and Colombia

The highland communities of the southern sierra in Peru are the areas least penetrated by
modernization. Peasant communities in these regions, unlike northern and central sierra highland communities, do not have livestock farming and mining corporations vying for their lands because the terrain is too rugged and transportation is restricted. However, the peasantry in the south was not unaffected by the Peruvian state’s modernization. The natural need to expand landholdings to satisfy community growth ran up against a handful of haciendas seeking to adopt capitalist techniques and the corporations in the central sierra that also need expansion to satisfy their profit-motive.

Peru’s traditional land tenure structure originated from the Spanish colonial practice of awarding elite settlers tracts of land while the indigenous populations were forced to work the land as peasants. In the North coast region, where sugar plantations eventually emerged, the hacienda system would eventually predominate. In this system, the Spanish landlord, or hacendado, would rent 40-75% of his land to the peasants, or peons, who would live on a small personal plot of land adjacent to the hacendado’s land (Handelmann 1975, 27). Peon’s would, through traditional obligations, have to work 150-200 days on the hacendado’s land. This would place a strain on the peasantry because the times of year when the hacendado would demand labor from the peasantry was the same time that peasant plots needed to be worked (Handelmann 1975, 27).

In the Central and Southern highlands (sierra), peasant communities were much more common. The higher number of peasant communities in the highlands was attributable to the land being more hilly and rugged, less productive, and more isolated from market centers (coastal cities) than the North coast, with no incentive for the establishment of large haciendas. However, in areas of sierra where land was amenable to large hacendada farming, it did emerge, though still in much smaller numbers and proportions to the North coast. Mining in Junin and Pasco established wage-labor and management styles that were emulated by sheep farms owned by both
corporations and members of the oligarchy (Handelmann 1975, 52). In the cases where haciendas emerged in the central sierra, conflicts sprung up between the communities and the hacienda owners who expanded their holdings at the expense of communal lands (Handelmann 1975, 28-9). Financial resources and a competitive disadvantage in ties and understandings of state machinery compared to hacendados made land disputes difficult for peasant communities.

In addition to land disputes, comuneros in the sierra also faced a level of dependency on Spanish descended middle classes from urban centers. These men were located in the department capitals, or the nearest cities to the peasant communities, often called cholos (Handelmann 1975, 38-9). Cholos often dressed and spoke in indigenous languages and acted as intermediaries between the peasants and the Spanish-descended capitalists (owners of mines, ranches, and haciendas) (Handelmann 1975, 38-9). Peasant communities relied on these men for seed, fertilizers, credit, medical services for a family member and essentially any service or good that had to be obtained from outside of the peasant community (Handelmann 1975, 38-9, 41, 44). Though there was a degree of dependence on intermediaries with the outside world, in peasant communities the relationships with the intermediaries were not between individuals and intermediaries but between the comunero representatives and cholo intermediaries (Handelmann 1975, 30).

In Colombia four types of peasant groups or communities had emerged at the onset of economic modernization and the ISI of the 1940s. The first was the Andean peasants, located in the departments of Narino, Cauca, Antioquia and Santander where coffee farming for both export and domestic consumption predominated (Zamosc 1986, 28; Skidmore 2005, 252). In these regions, a minifundista, or smallholder economy existed. Peasants in the Andean departments were either secure or insecure. The secure peasants held a sufficient amount of land to earn a
living through the coffee markets. For insecure peasants, their land-size was either too small of a plot to subsist off of the crop harvest or they held no land at all and could only work for secure peasants (Zamosc 1986, 28). The secure peasants' main grievances or demands toward the central state included better access to markets, credit and social services that could boost their profits (Zamosc 1986, 28). The insecure peasants had a desire for land to be reconstituted as a free-holding peasantry, yet because they were landless and unattached to markets nation or world-wide, their demands were muted by those of the secure peasantry.

In reaction to these land shortages and other forces that prompted a land-squeezed peasantry, many peasants turned to colonization in frontier areas to establish peasant communities. This took place in undeveloped frontier areas that were heavily forested and without legal property rights. The colonizations were most prevalent in Caqueta, Putumayo, Ariari, Arauca, Antioquia and Middle Magdalena (Zamosc 1986, 28). Due to the illegal status of these settlements, few peasants were able to become stable through colonization, many instead opting to sell lands to hacienda owners attempting to establish cattle ranches and expand their holdings (Zamosc 1986, 28). Again, like in the case of the coffee-growing peasants of the Andean departments, it was the stable elements of the peasantry that received from the state access to credit, markets, and services to become linked to the society at-large.

The next kind of peasant economy was the haciendas. These were located in the llanos of the North near the Atlantic coast in the departments of Cordoba, Sucre, Bolivar, Atlantico, Cesar and Magdalena. Peasants in these regions often cleared forests, subsisted off of the land for a few years, in exchange for their labor for the landlord in clearing the land, and then returned the land to powerful agribusiness (Zamosc 1986, 29). Where land was already cleared, the peasants would pay rent in kind or in money. Peasants would often find themselves landless after years of labor
clearing lands for the hacendado, further contributing to land shortage and a desire for peasant reconstitution and land availability in Colombia’s countryside.

The fourth and final kind of land tenureship in Colombia at the time of modernizations’ onset in the late 1950s and early 60s was the encroachment of agrarian capitalism in the central plains of Valle, Tolima, and Huila and a few fragmented sections of the Atlantic coast (Zamosc 1986, 29). This kind of production took land away from the hacienda systems and colonists. Farms owned by large agribusinesses wanted to have a labor force available to perform the seasonal labor, and did not want the labor force to be too scarce and result in high-wages (Zamosc 1986, 29).

In Colombia’s land tenure system, by the late 50s and early 60s both capitalist farming and haciendas had been expanding into colonies and the plains, exacerbating landlessness in these two sectors of peasant economy. Fluctuations in the coffee markets and population pressures increased landlessness in the Andean departments (Skidmore 2005, 232-3). Essentially all sectors of the peasant economy were faced with land pressures, though for two, the colonists and stable Andean peasants, state services and higher profits were bigger concerns slated for state-intervention than the need for land. In Peru, the patron ties which facilitated peasant-rents that supported the oligarchy and intermediaries (cholos) lifestyle meant a persistent extraction from the peasantry that would come to present an obstacle to modernity and its’ consequences such as urbanization, industrialization, and market-based financial systems.

The early emergence of capitalist farming in Colombia-due, at least in part to a more expansive plains conducive to heavy machinery farming- as opposed to Peru’s rugged sierra (particularly Southern sierra) that mitigated against heavy machinery farming, helps offer a picture into the differing problems of land tenure patterns. Colombia was faced with a higher degree of
landlessness emanating from multiple sectors of its more diverse peasant economy that, in what amounts to a ripple effect, was a product of capitalist farming. At the same time, Peru was faced with heavier extraction from a growing oligarchy that was beginning to compete with an emerging bourgeoisie for power. In both countries, modernization created a decline in peasant subsistence security unlocking social tensions that took on different forms depending on a confluence of the community structure and degree of agro-capitalist penetration.

The Influence of State-Sponsored Land Reform on Peasant Uprisings: The Case of Peru

Modernization’s reach into Peruvian peasant society is a long-story, with origins dating back into the early 20th century, and with peasant land invasions occurring by the late 50s and early 60s. These tensions came into existence during the time of land invasions during the late 50s and early 60s. Peasant leaders had attempted to find more land for their communities and ran into conflict with the state. It was this tension that instructed the military on the need for a land reform and alarmed them enough to take over when it became clear that the civilian political leadership’s societal support would not allow them to significantly restructure the Peruvian peasantry.

The Velasco land reform attempted to bring the Peruvian peasantry into the political system through official recognition of communities and haciendas by forming them into cooperatives and creating institutions that could aggregate the interests of peasant society at the national level (McClintock 1981, 40-1). The land reform did little to change the peasantry’s dependence on outside patrons, and instead only forced dependence on alternative patrons. The land reform also created peasant rivalries between those communities formed into cooperatives and those that remained isolated peasant communities. In fact, most of the land expropriated was in the north and had been part of the major sugar haciendas, and not in the southern sierra (McClintock 1981, 63).
Cooperatives were created and made to solidify those who were part of the community and limit expansion that would dilute the returns on crop productivity. Cooperatives, because they were made up of multiple communities, had more power in negotiating prices with buyers. In addition, membership in the cooperative was limited to peasants actively involved in cultivation and not those who labored part-time elsewhere and in the community, meaning wage labor was needed to perform efficiently the farming operations of the cooperative. The profit motive drove the peasants within the cooperative to exploit the land and neglect traditional preservation strategies followed by the communities (Seligmann 137).

What is most important for this analysis is the Velasco regime’s corporate modernization and the fallout from it that by 1980 had failed in its ultimate mission to prevent a full-blown revolution from the countryside. The 1970s were a time of low world demand for exports and significantly hurt the Peruvian peasantry as a whole. However, the story is more nuanced. As land pressure continued into the 1970s for some peasant communities, particularly those left out of cooperatives, peasant frustration with the government was high, based on failure to attain achievements that had been hoped for under Velasco’s “revolution from above”.

An important consequence of this pressure for the southern sierra peasantry was the need of some peasants to labor, either in distant areas for corporations or for wealthier peasants (McClintock 1981, 74). For peasants that could not find work with wealthier peasants in the southern sierra, few options existed. This meant a peasant class began to emerge that had a shrinking role in the peasant community. As was made clear, other communities, cooperatives, and a few corporations had competing claims to some land, thus making significant expansion that could provide for a community and reduce the land shortage was impossible. Facing the pressures of being a part of an emerging marginalized peasant class, the communities of the
southern sierra peasantry had to struggle to survive within themselves and attempt to alleviate members leaving the community.

The main division was between the younger and the older peasants. Seligmann points out how the younger peasants wanted to expand production using newer techniques that would allow for a larger surplus to be sold, generating more money for the community and increasing the likelihood of land expansion (Seligmann 1995, 135,138-9). The older peasants and the traditional leadership were more concerned with longer range concerns about land usage, tending to favor old methods that would provide most of the sustenance for the village. This was because land distribution among community members gave older men, with larger families used for labor power, the glut of private land, creating a patron within the peasant community on whom many landless or miniscule holders would need to depend for labor (Seligmann 1995, 135).

Essentially, in the cooperatives the younger members of the community’s impetus toward capitalist farming were followed, yet often at the expense of the younger members who had fewer ties to the land. While many peasants were left out of the privileged position of cooperative membership that included better access to credit, less need to migrate for labor, and better crop diversification, the Peruvian peasantry was never divided deeply enough to create inter-peasant violence (McClintock 1981, 37). To illustrate the unity of peasant communities in responding to outside pressures, it seems important to demonstrate the communal frustration with the educated elites that accompanied Velasco’s reform.

The agrarian reform under Velasco attempted to provide the peasantry with a reliable, fair patron, the national state that would have the power to deliver subsistence security to the peasantry and stave off a revolutionary impulse. Velasco’s reform created new offices within the cooperatives and the peasant councils to allow for peasant decision-making on issues related to
cooperative production strategies (Seligmann 1995, 149). These new methods eroded the utility of previous fiestas, rituals, and practices that demonstrated patron support of peasant social enjoyment and gratitude for peasant servitude (Seligmann 1995, 149). What began to ascend to importance was the ability to cut deals within the councils and between the various peasant cooperative organizations and the state ministry officials (Seligmann 1995, 149). To interact with the state required understanding paperwork and legal aptitude. The need for this intellectual skill created new status for the teachers who were the children of recently landless parents, whose positions had been created by the universalization of education advanced by Velasco (McClintock 1981, 270; Seligmann 1995, 184-6). Seligmann, in her visits to Huanoquite Township in Cuzco, witnessed a man who was able to write official documents and who possessed many documents needed by the peasantry. She witnessed him provide clerical assistance for peasants all day, each time in exchange for a fee, indicating the dependence for a patron to interact with the state apparatus the peasants experienced (Seligmann 1995, 182-3).

Teachers very often filled this role, representing the younger generation and possessing greater ties to the urban values of the state. The educators would often buy peasant produce, help them with paperwork and circulate information from the state downward into the peasantry. Thus, teachers provided the link between peasant communities and Peruvian society, passing on important information necessary for a peasantry that had become more greatly entangled with the state via the Velasco land-reform (Seligmann 1995, 182). An incident in 1981 in Huanoquite demonstrates the village attitude towards the new social position of the teachers. Teachers in Huanoquite harshly admonished students for absences during labor-intensive periods of the agricultural cycle, prohibited the use of Quecha, the local language, in class, were often unexpectedly absent, and used racial slurs to discipline children for behavior (Seligmann 1995,
In response to this treatment, peasant villagers threw the teachers out of the villages. By 1982, the teachers were back and little had changed. The peasants in 1984 took their complaints to a general assembly attended by educational supervisors from the Department of Cuzco. In 1986, the peasants in Huanoquite demanded “a transfer of all educational personnel,” yet were unable to influence education bureaucrats of the need for a change in the teachers’ behavior toward the students (Seligmann 1995, 184).

Seligmann (1995) is quick to point out that the experiences with the teachers are emblematic of their relations with the outside and demonstrate the force behind peasant skepticism of the seriousness of new patrons’ willingness and desire to solidify and enhance the peasantry’s position in national society post-land-reform (187). The reaction of the peasantry to the outside influence of the teachers demonstrates the communal solidarity that characterized Peruvian peasant communities in the southern highlands. Though the teachers represented agents of modernity (and members of the community with high-status likely benefited from interactions with them, mistreatment of the community’s children) disregard for peasant practices, and the inability of peasant circumstances to improve in relation to national society warranted a communal reaction against the teachers. As will be seen later, the Shining Path, largely through teachers who better related to peasant communities than the teachers in Huanoquite, was able to unify villages toward their cause and compel them to support the Shining Path in a war against the state.

Clearly, communal dynamics were changed with the injection of the state bureaucracy into traditionally patron functions. In essence, what emerged was new patrons tied more directly to the state and a need for the peasantry to rely on state-educated members of their communities, like teachers, to help them navigate state services. The cooperatives were intended to be the aggregator of peasant interests and the contact with the state for the peasantry. While the
cooperatives did not reach deeply into the southern sierra the poor world and national economy of the 1970s and the persistent shortfalls of peasant production hurt the peasant’s faith in their new state-based patrons, creating an opening for new patrons to emerge that could better serve the Peruvian highland peasantry.

The Influence of State-Sponsored Land Reform on Peasant Uprisings: The Case of Colombia

As Colombia moved into the modern world in the first half of the 20th century, its peasantry came into new pressures. Social mobility for the peasantry was most often downward because of the dividing up of minifundio (smallholder) lands among multiple children and the inability of productivity to increase the profitability of land (Restrepo 1970, 514). For Colombia’s minifundio peasants, mechanization of the farming process was not possible, while coffee growing was not feasible for farming in the rugged highlands. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Colombian peasantry was comprised of multiple production structures, minifundio, colonizing peasants, traditional haciendas, and the emerging capitalist farmers (livestock and grain). Capitalist farming expanded greatly by the 1950s and was involved in relations with all peasant sectors, usually in asymmetrical relationships that increased the capitalist farm’s landholdings.

In essence, the minifundio coffee economy was under pressure due to the land’s inability to provide a living for the children of peasant smallholders, while the hacendado owners were prevented from expanding their holdings and, in some cases, lost land to capitalist farms. These two sectors’ collision with modernization characterized the Colombian land struggle. In this sense, the Colombian peasantry was divided even within its own sectors. Strong peasants possessed enough land to provide an income to support themselves and faced no migration pressures or need to engage in a significant amount of wage-labor on capitalist farms (Zamosc 1986, 27). Haciendas that could not expand or were shrunk due to capitalist incursion also left
peasants without either a significant subsistence plot, or without a place on the hacienda due to excessive rent taken by the landowner who served as the patron and provided for the peasants (Zamosc 1986, 27). Within these sectors, there were the peasants who were landless or land-starved who railed for land redistribution and peasants who had enough land and simply wanted better state services and access to credit in order to hedge against future losses to capitalist expansion or endemic landlessness within the minifundio economy (Zamosc 1986, 28).

These two classes within the peasantry were present within a Colombian social system characterized by ties of patron-client relationships (Martz 1997). Martz (1997) argues that Colombian society pre-modernization was comprised of dyadic patron-client relationships. For the peasantry (client), the patron served the client by providing him protection from outside actors in exchange for obligatory compensation with an arranged percentage of the peasant’s crop. As Colombia modernized, regional patrons, in order to survive needed to possess a national patron with contacts or ties to the state to preserve their capacity to “protect” peasant communities and individuals (Martz 1997, 67). Those hacienda owners with sufficient ties to the national political scene were usually better prepared to defend their lands against capitalist incursions, while those without access to these new networks likely became unable to prevent capitalist producers from infringing on their land and ability to protect their clients.

La Violencia in Colombia, the violent period from 1948 until the late 50s, represented a mobilization of peasants by political elites and did not take on a class struggle (Dix 1967, 372). Liberal guerrilla groups were formed, with a few having ties to the Communist party in the 1930s and 40s. The local nature of these groups, reflecting Martz’s notion of regional patrons, demonstrates the top-down mobilization that peasants were under and their dependence on this leadership for navigating the newly modernizing Colombian state. The Independent Republics
of the Communist party represent the origins of the FARC, while the early difficulty for the FARC to spread throughout any specific peasant sector indicated that ties to certain patrons were key in the decision to mobilize. The emergence of many groups, Liberal, Conservative and Communist, and the failure of those with similar enemies like the Liberals and Communists to form into any alliance even though there were common interests indicates what Dix (1967) calls the ‘individualist’ nature of the Colombian peasant (373).

For Colombia, the individual peasant had to make choices about violent resistance, urban migration, colonization, or capitalist wage labor. The infiltration of capitalist farming and the land pressure endemic to the minifundio economy put peasants, even within the same community or locality, in sometimes dramatically different economic situations. The advocacy for better access to state services by stable peasants, and redistribution from lower echelons of the peasantry is an indication of a divide. The Colombian government faced a choice in attempting to coopt its divergent peasant sectors. The 1975 Sharecropping Law passed by President Michelsen demonstrated the support for agrarian capitalists by compelling them to supply tiny subsistence plots to workers in exchange for excluding the large landowners from any land reform or redistribution (Zamosc 1986, 126). This law also helped the stable peasantry by offering them credit, state health services, electricity, and improved marketing services and access (Zamosc 1986, 126). The drug trade’s expansion in the 1980s and 90s also created a land squeeze as drug barons bought up large amounts of land for cattle ranches, and enjoyed impunity because of their ability to enrich many sectors of society like construction, politicians, bankers, and police. At this time, the FARC would begin to rise as an actor that could challenge the state (Simons 2004, 64). Essentially, the Colombian government has consistently favored well-capitalized actors who could serve as powerful patrons to politicians. The Michelsen reform’s lack of land redistribution
despite calls for it from groups representing lower peasant sectors and the seizure of the state’s economy by narcotraffickers demonstrated the state’s support of its capitalist patrons. In the next section, the FARC’s role in rural society will be explained to demonstrate how it related itself to a peasantry that was increasingly dealing with landlessness and a life of wage labor or urban migration.

In both Colombia and Peru, population pressures and the influx of modern economic entities into the countryside, to different degrees, created a deepening of extraction of peasant obligations that led to resistance. Each state attempted to deal with these pressures and pacify the peasantry in different ways. Peru attempted a reordering of rural society by merging peasant communities into cooperatives to create more direct market access and greater prices throughout. Colombia weakly attempted redistributions, but largely used land reform as a way to boost the stable peasantry and ensure capitalist farms had a rural workforce. In both states, land reform, the state’s attempt at cooptation of the peasantry, failed to prevent land shortages and landlessness from creating subsistence and impoverishment within the lowest peasant sector.

In Colombia, the fragmentation occurred based on individual land status. Individuals, based on their circumstances, had to decide whether to make a living off of their plot if possible, labor for a middle peasant or agro-capitalist, migrate to the cities, or join a resistance movement (by the 60s). Unlike Colombia, Peru’s main cleavage within the peasantry was between communities and newly formed cooperatives. The unproductive land of the southern highlands meant that fewer cooperatives were set up in these areas. The communities of the southern sierra, as Peru modernized, were unable to be given subsistence security by the state’s facilitation of market-access, input supplies, and credit availability.

In essence the Colombian and Peruvian lower peasant sectors confronted two different
problems that related directly to land availability. The Peruvian peasantry was land-short, needing more land to maintain community subsistence security and survival as an integrated entity. The communities were legally recognized as owning land. Population pressures within the peasantry meant they needed more land, and since the land was not of great quality in the southern sierra and all communities faced similar population pressures, little could be done, short of state-subsidization of subsistence, to protect these peasants from Peru’s emerging capitalist ethos. In Colombia, the land was much more productive in the plains, and agribusiness was determined to exploit the available land. Being politically connected, from the land reforms of 1975, the Colombian government pushed peasants off of land in favor of capitalist interests. The Colombian peasants were individuals and had any legal rights to land usurped or were forced to flee land amid violent confrontations between guerrillas, traffickers, state security forces, and paramilitaries. These circumstances created a landless problem, whereby wage labor was promoted, yet due to mechanization, was not abundant enough to provide work for anywhere near all of the displaced peasantry.

In sum, it was these two realities that the FARC and Shining Path encountered and made their revolutionary push. The Shining Path would have to mobilize communities of impoverished and frustrated peasants, while the FARC would provide a social place and function to landless peasants displaced by capitalist businesses and their armed defenders. The next section will explore the significance of these differences in social construction for anti-state groups like the FARC and the Shining Path that attempt to mobilize peasant support toward a peasant revolution.

In the Colombian case, the conditions found within the peasantry conform to Paige’s formulation of peasant revolution where landlessness and limited availability of wage-employment are harbingers of peasant revolutionary potential (Paige 1975). The Peruvian
conditions for revolution seem to be best represented by Scott’s formulation of peasants that are neglected by traditional patrons who find new clients, leading to subsistence crises within the peasantry (Scott 1976). In each of these constructions of likely conditions for peasant revolution, the state is failing to alleviate a key pressure of modernization, land shortages, and sets itself up as the focus of peasant blame on their land and resource loss. The peasantry, amid the forces of modernization described above, finds itself seeking a patron that will serve it, and turns to the national government. When over time, the peasantry finds the state has other clients it is more interested in serving, peasant revolution may be possible if a group can convince peasants that their interests might be best served by participation in and tacit support of the group’s revolutionary aspirations (Tilly 1975). In the next section, based on the peasant communal and individual realities described above, the different guerrilla composition will be evaluated for its relationship to the persistence and success of the FARC and the Shining Path in earning peasant support.

**The Influence of Insurgent/Guerrilla Strategies on Peasant Societies: The Case of Peru**

This section will analyze the interactions of insurgent groups and communities to highlight insurgent efforts to become a peasant patron, filling a void left by the state. A key point here will be made to identify who the insurgent recruits were and what they could expect from insurgency membership.

During the 1960s, Shining Path founder Abimael Guzman held hundreds of political meetings in his home. At these meetings, Guzman organized and sent Senderistas into peasant communities to live, work, and learn Quecha among other Indian languages if they were not already fluent, instructing them to sometimes actually become married into the community (McCormick 1984, 51). Guzman, through his influence on hiring at San Cristóbal of Huamanga
University to include ideologically friendly staff, began recruiting Indians throughout Ayacucho.

By the mid 1970s, Shining Path cells had been established in Cuzco, Apurimac, Huancavelica, and Junin. Most recruits were non-Spanish speaking Indians from the highlands and slum dwellers from Lima and other major cities (McCormick 1987, 3). By the 1978 elections, Guzman was preparing the Shining Path to wage a war against the government.

Billie Jean Isbell, who analyzed the reasons behind Guzman’s decision to begin operations in Chuschi, a town in Ayacucho, concluded that the presence of few hacienda peasants, isolation from markets, and lack of peasant control over their resources all contributed to Guzman’s decision (Isbell 1998, 60). Isbell describes the community’s initial support for the Shining Path as being centered on the group’s willingness to bring perpetrators who stole cattle from Chuschi residents to justice by assassinating them (Isbell 1998, 61). In addition, the Shining Path also intimidated members of the community who were tied to the outside world, forcing them to leave, often gaining approval of peasants who came to feel powerless negotiating the state apparatus (Isbell 1998, 25). Many peasants also identified the state apparatus with the cooperatives (Isbell 1998, 23). This prompted the Shining Path to attack nearby cooperatives that were usually rivals to the communities. Seligmann points out an example of Shining Path operatives blowing up a tractor in the cooperative near Tihuicte, a town in Cuzco, that limited the capacity of the cooperative to harvest 800 hectares of crops (Seligmann 1996). De Gregori denotes how the Shining Path’s teachings simplified intellectual and scientific discourse to sharply conform to the stark view of peasant realities, characterized by oppressed and oppressor, while espousing the adherence to these “scientific” and Maoist interpretations of reality as the key to achieving peasant justice through the violent overthrow of the state (DeGregori 1998, 42-3).

This stark view espoused by the Shining Path, at the beginning of peasant mobilizations
allowed for peasants to feel hopeful of their chances to play a meaningful role in a new state led by Shining Path cadre. Those who were most receptive to the message and willing to participate in operations for the Shining Path were the children of middling peasants who sought to climb the social ladder and felt more economically vulnerable than elders, yet had divided loyalties between their own wealth desires and deference toward the wishes of the elders (Mallon 1998, 134-5). Shining Path cadre came to occupy elite positions within the community, taking the place of provincial or departmental officials they expelled. In fact, the Shining Path’s inability to uplift and respect interests of marginal peasants would be instrumental in dampening their support from the peasantry. The Shining Path hierarchy was based on the racial characterizations of the peasant society, with darker skinned militants being relegated to lower ranks, essentially preserving the social order (Starn 1995, 551). The more privileged elements of rural society, the educated children of higher peasants and professionals from rural society comprised much of the Shining Path cadre (Starn 1995, 551-2). When, the peasantry, particularly those who joined the insurgency, did not see their community being served by the Shining Path, toleration of the Shining Path’s brutality would lessen.

The first source of peasant communal opposition to Sendero was violence. After the Peruvian military began anti-Sendero operations in 1981, the Shining Path began public executions of suspected informants that were many times erroneous (Mallon 1998, 136-9). Also, many peasants were not in favor of killings because of the tenuous nature of economic subsistence. An assassination forced the assassinated peasant’s obligations onto others, creating issues where someone would have to decide how and who should fill the labor void. Peasants instead usually prefer some kind of punishment that denotes the severity of the crime and balances the needs of the peasant community to discourage any punishment that will affect labor and obligation.
contributions (Mallon 1998, 136-9).

While military incursions often caused the Shining Path to turn violent against members of peasant communities, this was not the only reason peasant support for the groups waned. A peasant Walter, interviewed by Mallon, commented on the Shining Path practice of retreating from the armed forces to protect the cadre and keep group casualties low, a tenet borrowed from Mao. The sentiment of the peasantry toward the Shining Path’s tactical emphasis on cadre preservation was likely reflected in his comment. Walter said of the Shining Path, “they turned us over; they practically sold us out. Well this is not manly” (Mallon 1998, 141). Walter was unimpressed with the Shining Path’s tactics and likelihood for serving his community. Though he is one peasant, his sentiment reflects, when combined with a contextual analysis of the social disruption the Shining Path caused in communities, the social conflicts which would have provided the thrust for the rondas that emerged in the late 80s as part of Garcia’s attempt to improve military-peasant relations (Degregori 1995, 146-7).

Seconding Walter’s sentiments, Starn points out that after years of conflict, the Shining Path was not seen as a protector of the peasantry, but rather as the source of the conflict’s brutality (Starn 1995, 552-3). In fact, an incident where a Shining Path militant was hung in the middle of the village square provides an example of what could happen to those who joined the revolution (Starn 1995, 553). Peruvian military officers’ social relations with the peasants also helped, as Starn documented the same officer who hung up the Shining path commander in the square as a regular attendee of birthday parties and festivals (Starn 1995, 552). The 1990 construction of a village under the guise of military assistance illustrates communal rejection of the Shining Path for the military, who they saw as capable of protecting them and better able to serve peasant interests (Starn 1995, 553). After three mortar attacks against the village, the comuneros remained
resolute and became unified against Shining Path violence, constructing a church, school, and a health post (Starn 1995, 553). Later, a shrine would be created for a comunero whose life was lost when his ronda patrol was attacked by Shining Path militants (Starn 1995, 153).

The villagers’ decision to align with the military and form a ronda signified their shift away from the patronage and protection afforded them by the Shining Path. As peasant justice came to be violated through various violent and inconsiderate Shining Path actions, the peasants began to resent the continuity of social exclusion and domination by more privileged sectors of rural society. Given excessive violence and social immobility during the Shining Path’s period of domination, some peasants became receptive to cooptation efforts by the state, creating fissures in the broad base of rural support the Shining Path cadre wanted to use to bring down the Peruvian state.

The Influence of Insurgent/Guerrilla Strategies on Peasant Societies: The Case of Colombia

In the early 1960s, many areas of the Colombian countryside were governed as Independent Republics by guerrilla groups supported by Liberal elites. The Colombian Communist party maintained some ties with a few of these, and after guerrilla amnesty was offered in the late 50s, the Communist-affiliated guerrilla groups refused to disband or disarm. Operation Marquetalia’s chasing of the guerrillas from Marquetalia into Rio Chiquito prompted a guerrilla conference where the FARC was formed. The FARC’s official formation initiated the armed struggle to defend its peasant supporters from the Colombian government and seize power from a state that would violently suppress peasant political dissent (Rempe 1995). Restrepo argues that the violence of the state against the peasantry, the reduced services, and the traditional patron’s inability to protect his client caused traditional patrons to lose their leadership, prompting the search for new patrons (Restrepo 1970, 511). With peasants searching for new patrons serving
as a precursor and stimulant for peasant mobilization, Jacobo Arenas was sent to organize the countryside’s resistance by the Communist Party in an attempt to delegitimize the state by demonstrating the incomplete nature of state control and sovereignty.

Independent Republics had been formed through an alliance between peasants seeking protection and Liberal and Communist elites that were willing to offer it to them. As has been demonstrated earlier, peasants that had protection and had a sufficient amount of land were targeted in Colombia’s land reform with state patronage (loans, market access, health clinics) at the exclusion of the emerging landless peasantry (Zamosc 1986). Guerrilla groups and leaders filled this role. The FARC was an alignment of Communist Party ideologues with economically struggling and often landless peasants that provided new social roles for these peasants centered around defending themselves from the Colombian state that was scared by the recent events of the Cuban Revolution into attacking the Independent Republics and FARC strongholds.

For much of the FARC’s earlier existence defense was the key, with peasants committing themselves into new social orders and norms of cooperation that integrated them both with one another and the Communist party’s revolutionary aims (Restrepo 1970, 509). This was a clear break from the earlier position of many of Colombia’s peasants who were used to limited contact with other peasants, not occupying positions in contiguous and adjacent dwellings. Peasants, through the FARC, discovered solidarity and class-consciousness to the extent they were incorporated into the FARC’s zones of control. As the FARC would grow in the 1980s, it became a more offensive group that could attract and pay larger numbers of peasants struggling to make decent wages or acquire land.

In the late 1970s, Arenas, the FARC’s political leader, was motivated by the ascension of the urban based M-19 guerrilla movement’s high profile attacks in Bogota to raise the profile of
FARC. Arenas began his break with the Communist Party by defying their directive to not kidnap people for political reasons (Dudley 2004, 50-1). The FARC began to increase their revenues and expand their operations from their original bases of control. By the early 1980s, taxes on the drug trade, representing a further break with the Communist Party, began to facilitate the FARC’s power to expand their operations, allowing their ranks and geographical breadth to grow, and become a force in national politics (Dudley 2004, 53). In these early days of FARC expansion, the FARC punished drunks, adulterers, murders, settled disputes in state absentia, protected the peasants from aggressively bartering drug traffickers (Dudley 2004, 52; Rochlin 2003, 136). At this time, the FARC began to emerge as a powerful player in Colombian politics, one that could legally begin to seize local government offices. This made the FARC an emerging outlet for popular desires within the peasantry.

The 1980s saw the FARC emerge as the defender of the peasantry and provider of a social-context to a broad segment of the Colombian peasant population. Modernization had brought into the Colombian countryside many capitalist elements. After the FARC’s emergence forced the government into the 1985 negotiations that resulted in the UP’s formation, the Colombian military, business groups and middle peasants all united behind new paramilitary groups that could execute peasants suspected of being guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers (Dudley 2004, 40-4). This alliance indicates the besiegement of the guerrillas and lower peasants by both the broader pro-capitalist society and the upper sectors of the peasantry. The government’s powerful capitalist allies and the drug traffickers, by far the country’s wealthiest segments, united against the UP and repressed the popular expression of the Colombian peasantry. Clearly, the peasants were searching for a patron that could protect them from these encroachments; the work of the UP highlights the FARC’s legal attempt to fill this role.
The FARC’s political wing, the UP, provides an important example of some of the attempts to educate the peasantry on their position in Colombian society, and unify them towards joint achievement and cooperation. Dudley points out the role of a FARC political operative, named Sebastian. Sebastian’s job was to travel with the guerrillas on their long marches and, at every stop, begin educating the peasants in basic core concepts involving math, science, civics, and the peasantry’s place in Colombia’s political framework (Dudley 2004, 62). After the creation of the UP, and the emerging need to campaign legitimately to the public, Sebastian began forcing peasant-guerrillas to speak for minutes at a time on the political ideology of the FARC (Dudley 2004, 63). Once the group would show up in a village they would spread word that the UP was to be holding a meeting later in the evening and that the entire village should attend. Sebastian told Dudley that usually the meetings were well attended, and that the only problem with the operations was the propensity for the guerrillas to drink and socialize with the peasants (Dudley 2004, 63-4).

The need for men like Sebastian to serve as educators to the peasants indicates a clear system of indoctrination that the FARC had to perform itself. The Colombian peasants that found their way into the ranks of the FARC did not come into the organization as a class unified and coherent. Rather, they were largely atomized and were likely driven more by material benefit when confronted with the dearth of opportunities for social mobility the Colombian agrarian structure and market-oriented economy left them. Restrepo argues this lack of social mobility and the state’s favoritism toward the middle-stable peasantry was key in forcing the lower-peasants to resent large landowners property rights and seek new patrons that were willing to provide protection (Restrepo 1970, 511,514-6). Restrepo also provides as his main argument that guerrilla violence represents the unifying function that creates an organic form of cooperation
between Colombian peasants, uniting them against enemies that had previously been patrons to the newly uniting peasant fighters (Restrepo 1970, 509). It seems apparent that as the FARC developed it confronted this need to educate and elucidate its broader aims to the Colombian peasantry, signifying continuance of Restrepo’s concept of a peasantry socially merged through anti-state violence.

As Murillo (2004) points out, the FARC provides jobs for its members as well as opportunities for advancement within the group. Status and promotions within the FARC are determined by revolutionary zeal and loyalty. For the peasantry, the FARC serves as a useful patron. It can provide the peasantry with a force to fight against the state’s capitalist patrons who displace many peasants, help them to negotiate a living by facilitating bartering arrangements with drug traffickers, and provide peasants with employment and the potential for upward mobility.

Both the FARC and the Shining Path each confronted different peasant societies as they attempted to achieve similar goals in turning rural insurrection into a toppling of the state. The FARC confronted an atomized peasantry that needed a group to articulate their interests, provide them with the means to satisfy these interests, and coordinate the political efforts to expand support across rural society. Unlike the FARC, the Shining Path encountered communities that, while divided by the new forces of modernization, were still living side by side with one another and embedded in persistent social cooperation for survival. The Velasco reforms had reached into peasant societies, even in the south-central highlands, creating divides within peasant society (cooperative vs. community), and fomenting a distaste within many communities toward the state bureaucrats and their newly emerging patrons. As a product of the different peasant communities and society structures, each group confronted different challenges to mobilization. The FARC confronted the excessive violence of the paramilitaries and the social alliance that supported them.
The Shining Path confronted the difficulties of ingratiating themselves into peasant communities, adhering to their norms, all the while attempting to articulate a stark and dramatic revolutionary doctrine that espoused resolute support for guerrilla violence. Ultimately, the Shining Path’s propensity for angering peasants would create the space for government-backed rondas (government-peasant alliance) to emerge, resulting in a diminution of guerrilla violence and scope. The FARC, always confronting this peasant upper crust opposition, was able to use the position of these peasants as a driver of support among the lower peasants. This acted as a stimulant, further strengthening their rhetoric that all of Colombian society, from the business elites with ties to the U.S., the military, down to the secure peasantry, were all against them, providing a stronger social and contextual basis for the success of the FARC’s doctrine of class warfare.
The International Context and State Legitimacy

After exploring the internal dynamics of each revolutionary attempt, including the process of modernization’s affect on peasant communities, land relationships, and state-peasant relations, what is left is to investigate the international arena and the ways it has affected state and revolutionary legitimacy. Because the international environment influences state policies, it is important to see the impact that the international environment has had on state policies that have, in the most recent times, contributed to the divergent scopes of these two movements. Legitimacy is the best concept to use to explain the divergence because the state policies that in this comparison have been most related to guerrilla persistence and scope were ones of state violence against peasants, carried out by the military and paramilitaries, in support of corporate or U.S. interests, delegitimizing the state.

Skocpol (1979) underscores the importance of considering the international environment as a variable that influences state behavior that is often a portent for revolution. Indeed, both the FARC and the Shining Path have existed and been impacted by a broader context that has shaped their ability to effectively combat state power. Huntington’s (1991) Third Wave of Democratization provides a path for political groups within authoritarian regimes to follow that can foment democratization. The key for political groups in the democratization process, both within pro-establishment (authoritarian supporters) and pro-democracy groups, is to be led by moderates within their respective camps (Huntington 1991). This chapter will seek to point out the ways in which the international environment has influenced the state and insurgents away from a moderate stance toward one another, and how the absence of any conciliation between the
insurgents and state has affected their persistent struggle for power and legitimacy.

Into the twentieth century, especially following World War II, deep economic ties to the U.S. were the norm for Latin American nations. The U.S. served as both a destination for raw commodity exports and a source of investment capital for extractive industries like mining and oil. Colombia and Peru were no exception to this regional trend. U.S. corporate interests in the region would proliferate in both Colombia and Peru. Though the economic ties with the U.S.-based multi-national corporations’ depth, breadth and scope are likely important in analyzing how the international environment contributed to objective conditions amenable to insurgency, what is most important is how the power struggle between two actors (state and guerrillas) is affected by international geopolitical realities. By comparing the impact of external actors on guerrilla-state power and legitimacy conflicts, this chapter elucidates an argument concerning the international context’s importance for explaining the guerrilla movement’s success. The main focus is on the actors and how they were treated, and the chapter does not explain general changes in Latin America-U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War relations.

Basic Elements of U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Insurgents in Peru and Colombia

During the Cold War (1948-1989), the U.S. was very concerned with Soviet backed Latin American political and social movements. The reasons are at least twofold: the extensive U.S. investments in Latin America that have faced expropriation when leftist movements were successful and also the larger geopolitical strategy of not ceding world influence to the anti-capitalist Soviets. This context led to the Alliance for Progress, championed by President John F. Kennedy in 1962. The Alliance’s goal was to defeat revolutionary Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movements to maintain the U.S. advantage in its strategic rivalry with the Soviet Union. This goal would be accomplished through a two-pronged approach: provide economic aid to spur
economic growth in Latin America and through the implementation of counterinsurgency measures to help protect Latin American states from radical elements within their societies (Skidmore 2005, 418).

What is most important for this period is the military ties with Latin American countries that the Alliance fostered. Both Colombia and Peru, like other Latin American countries, were encouraged to seek ties to the U.S. military to strengthen their capabilities to fend off radical elements.

In 1959, internal security documents analyzing Colombia’s potential for radical uprisings stated that the violence occurring in Colombia at the time posed little threat of a Communist takeover, but that, if the present violence and economically unequal social conditions persisted, “the establishment of a pro-U.S. , free-enterprise society” would be very difficult (Stokes 2005, 69). By 1961, the U.S. was helping the Colombians in both establishing an intelligence agency and building military capacity through equipment sales. In 1961, the U.S. government sent the first Military Training Team to Colombia to begin to establish intelligence networks and capability throughout Colombia (Rempe 1995). In addition, Colombian officers were offered spots in military courses at Fort Bragg, NC and the Canal Zone, Panama (Rempe 1995). Military equipment sales from the U.S. to Colombia totaled $1.5 million. With this money, Colombia was able to purchase three medium sized helicopters, motor-vehicles, communication equipment and other small-arms to supply a special-forces unit that was to carry out “Public Order” missions (Rempe 1995). These Public Order missions were to deal with the areas where Independent Republics of Liberal and Communist rebels were still in control after the Violencia. The U.S. support of these units provided the Colombian state, for the first time, with assistance to protect itself from internal threats (Rempe 1995).
Marquetalia was a locality that emerged as the center of the FARC insurgency where an Independent Republic had been established by Communist and Liberal party leaders. Using U.S. military and equipment counterinsurgency strategies recommended by instructors at the Special Warfare College—that included the creation of ‘civil defense’ forces of Colombian civilians predisposed to guerrilla opposition—the U.S. facilitated a Colombian government launched assault on the Communist community there as part of Plan Lazo. The assault was backed by the U.S. and carried out by 16,000 Colombian soldiers with U.S. air support (Stokes 2005, 70-4). Most of the guerrillas in the community were able to escape into the mountains. Soon after, they sought to formalize their resistance to the Colombian state by establishing a guerrilla organization able to compete with the state for support in the countryside (Rempe).

The FARC experience in Marquetalia is telling and demonstrates an example of the U.S., an international actor, playing a direct role in the creation of a group that emerged as a competitor with the Colombian government for control and legitimacy. Before the attack on Marquetalia, the community was largely carrying out passive resistance to the state by denying it control of administration in the community. However, the FARC’s primary function was a defensive response to attacks from other peasants that characterized the Violencia and was not involved in spreading revolution. In fact, the FARC was affiliated politically with the established Communist party and was known among revolutionary leftists for its tendency to wait for “appropriate” revolutionary conditions to incite rebellion. Eventually, the FARC would break with the Communist party, with the underlying cause being a result of this tactical divide. Given the Communist party’s tepid revolutionary impulse, it seems that the Independent Republic was, at least initially, not comprised of an imminently revolutionary ilk. It was only after the violent disbursement of the community that its leaders transferred their
efforts from protection of civilians from localized threats, like opposing landlord armies, to a broader anti-state political movement focused on violent resistance to state authority. In the FARC’s founding documents, the members of the community cited the fact they were “victims of the policy of fire and sword proclaimed and carried out by the oligarchic usurpers of power” (Marulanda 1964). Considering this statement and the timing of the FARC’s formation following the assault on Marquetalia, it seems plain that the U.S. relationship played a role both in legitimizing guerrilla struggle and enhancing the strength of the state to combat rebellious activity. Due to the FARC’s longevity, the international environment seems to have contributed more to revolutionary zeal than to its stated intent of reforming the social order and avoiding leftist revolutionary incitements.

Peru’s ties to the U.S. in the 1960s and into the 70s were not as extensive as Colombian ties during the same period. However, cooperation between the two countries was not completely absent due to the large amount of U.S. investment located in Peru. Yet, likely due to Peru’s further distance from the U.S. traditional sphere of influence in the Caribbean and Central America, it would not be a place where U.S. counterinsurgency doctrines would be applied as vigorously during the Cold War.

Between 1952 and 1968, five thousand Peruvian Air Force Officers were trained or took courses on U.S. bases. The Peruvian army would also have officers instructed in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrines in the 1960s (Clayton 1999, 178-9). Needing to keep order, due to peasant land seizures, the Peruvian state turned to the region’s hegemon, the U.S., which would provide assistance for states threatened by political resistance from egalitarian political forces. In 1967, Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry sought to buy fighter jets from the U.S. Lyndon Johnson, choosing to emphasize the Alliance for Progress’s social reform policy track to
ameliorate societal upheaval, instructed him to use the money on social spending (Clayton 1999, 182).

The Johnson administration’s conclusion that Belaunde’s military needs did not correspond to U.S. strategic interests, in addition to the subsequent military regime’s expropriation of U.S. companies meant, Peru would look elsewhere for its armament in the 1970s (Clayton 1999, 261). Needing a patron with technological sophistication, the Peruvian military regime turned to the Soviet Union for fighter jets, tanks, and other small arms equipment. This shift worried Washington because of the Peruvian military’s newly acquired offensive capability and the appearance that these arms were not for defensive purposes (Clayton 255). In addition to the military ties with the Soviet Union, economic ties were also created by the Velasco regime to compensate for the needed funds for expropriation and social development aspirations of the regime (Clayton 1999, 258-9). In February of 1969, Peru signed a free trade agreement with the Soviet Union and later increased its trade with China. By 1973, the Soviet Union was purchasing 15% of Peruvian sugar and China was purchasing 15% of its copper (Clayton 1999, 258-9).

The Peruvian military’s ideological makeup during Velasco’s rule was decidedly anti-imperialist and derived much of its legitimacy from its stance against the U.S. over the concessions made to International Petroleum Company (a Standard Oil subsidiary). Its position vis-à-vis the United States is not surprising given this reality. The U.S. clearly did not view internal security in Peru as vital to its national interest, as was the case for Colombia. When the Velasco regime came to power, it offered itself as a corporatist-nationalist regime that would subjugate the interests of the MNCs to the interests of Peruvian state and society. The Velasco regime’s nationalism legitimized it with much of the Peruvian population early on. By the time
of Velasco’s death and the beginning of the transfer to civilian rule, many promises had not been carried out and problems persisted. The areas of the southern highlands had been largely excluded from trade with the Soviet Union and encountered much graft in their attempts to market their goods, along with stagnant supplies of land for growing populations. In this sense, the international environment actually helped the Peruvian state, in some areas, perform for its citizenry and gain legitimacy, while failing to reach others (southern highlands). The inability of southern highlands to benefit from trade with the Soviet Union left open the necessary gap for a fertile base from which the Shining Path revolution would sprout.

The Influence of U.S. Drug Interdiction Policies: The Case of Colombia

The late 60s and early 70s saw the Colombian-U.S. military alliance provided the Colombian state the necessary force to prevent the spread of the FARC and its political ambitions (Stokes 2005, 9). Arguably, this was either because of the strength of the Colombian state or the lack of resources available to the FARC to fight an offensive war against the state. It is likely that these are not mutually exclusive explanations, as a well-financed and technologically-advanced military would require a well-financed and technologically-advanced insurgency to threaten its hold over territory. The emergence of the FARC’s offensive capability in the 1980s seems attributable to new resources from the rise in drug trafficking in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In 1978, President Julio Cesar Turbay requested assistance from the U.S. regarding the drug trafficking problem that was beginning to enrich insurgents and creating new wealth in society that the government was unable to control. By 1979, extradition to the U.S. was failing to curtail or threaten drug trafficking, while experts were assessing coca’s revenues as being higher than that of Colombia’s traditional export, coffee (Randall 1992, 247). Indeed, it was in
the 1980s when the FARC began expanding fronts across Colombia, with membership going from around 1,000 members in the early 80s to about 1,300 by 1986 (Perceney 2006, 103-4). However, the FARC was limited by the emergence of resistance from paramilitaries that derived from common interests between drug traffickers, corporate interests, middle peasants, and the Colombian military. Its greater expansion would not be seen until the 1990s.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. shifted away from the Cold War strategy of containment of the Soviet Union and Communism. The American government began to justify its intervention in Colombia by claiming it was to halt the drug trade that brought a surge in the sale and use of cocaine in the U.S. during the mid to late 1980s. Peceney notes that the very reason the illegal coca trade is so profitable in Colombia is the result of the U.S. policy of prohibition of the drug, and prevention of any state from openly aligning with coca producers to tax profits from the drug’s sale (Perceney 2006, 99). High consumption of cocaine in the U.S. highlights the potential validity of U.S. concern of drug trafficking from Andean nations, yet also highlights U.S. inaction to curtail domestic consumption through anti-drug policy, most heavily carried out in Colombia. The most important question is how U.S. support for the Colombian military (both before and after the Cold War’s end) and its drug-control strategy impacted the legitimacy and strength of the FARC and government.

U.S. policy toward Colombia’s drug trafficking problem shifted resources away from certain members of the major drug cartel, ran by notorious drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, and created an opportunity for the FARC to expand its resource, territorial, and popular bases (Peceney 2006). This does not tell the entire story, however. The FARC’s political

1 Perceney does not even mention one important feature of the drug trade that won’t be dealt with extensively here, and that is the U.S. position as the number one consumer of coca in the world (CIA Factbook 2008).
movement, the Union Patriotica, suffered 3,000 extrajudicial killings of its cadre, many of whom sat as officials on many local governments, at the hands of paramilitaries. This is instructive to the half-explanation that Peceney provides for the FARC’s rise and durability in the early 90s (Dudley 2004; Murillo 2004, 63). But U.S. policy may have hurt the major drug cartels and opened a space for the FARC to seize more profit from the illicit drug trade. However, U.S. support of the Colombian military, as well as U.S. -based MNC’s direct support of the paramilitaries to combat FARC extortion, delegitimized the Colombian government’s impulse toward inclusiveness that had been attempted following the negotiations that brought the FARC (UP) legally into Colombian politics.

U.S. actors, both military and economic, were contributing in two ways to Colombian elite’s intolerance of popular political expression. In the early 1990s the Presidency of Cesar Gavira brought with it promise of an inclusionary Colombian political regime. A new Constitution stipulated individual rights and the allowance of indigenous political groups to be represented in the Constituent Assembly. It seemed to prove that actors outside of the traditional party and military establishment could become a part of the political system independent of these traditional power-brokers (Murillo 2004, 65-6). However, negotiations between Gavira and the FARC broke down amid suspicions by both parties that neither was negotiating in good faith and each was trying to usurp the power of the other.

The FARC leadership was unconvinced of the government’s intentions following the failure of the government to redress the killing of 3,000 UP operatives. The government used the FARC’s unwillingness to disarm as evidence of their disingenuous intentions for negotiating. In 1991, the Colombian government restored its total war against the FARC and all popular opponents. The FARC became ever more convinced of this after the massacre of twenty Paez
Indians in Cauca by men who were tied to local police forces (Murillo 66-7).

In addition to suppression of popular movements, the Colombian state also began to engage in coca crop eradication at the behest of the American government. It had the effect of galvanizing the peasantry against the state and U.S. influence, and created a perfect chance for the FARC to enter, gain support, and oppose the American proposed and Colombian executed crop-eradications (Murrillo 2004, 68; Rochlin 2003, 137). While opposing crop fumigation the FARC was also able to enter the drug trade not just as agents of taxation on coca growers wealth, but also as supporters of the trade through the protection of trade routes. The FARC often negotiated on behalf of peasants with traffickers, who often intimidated poor peasants to lower the coca’s sale price, for optimal pricing for their product. In addition, the profitability of coca compelled the FARC to have direct control over export-trafficking of the drug itself (Murillo 2004, 67).

The drug trade and the strategies to eradicate it offered the FARC opportunities to protect peasant livelihoods from threats posed by outsiders both within the Colombian and U.S. governments. In this context, Hobsbawm’s Bandits (2000) sheds light as the FARC plays the role of a protector of illegal economic actors who struggle to survive economically, through legitimate means, in a modernizing society and agricultural system that displaces them at alarming rates. The FARC protects the peasants from the traffickers, government officials and the U.S. (patron to the Colombian government) who, according to FARC sympathizers within the peasantry, are the perpetrators of the unjust modern system. It is because of this protection the FARC provided for peasant livelihoods that do not experience a backlash for participation in the transport of illicit drugs. Indeed, the U.S. government perpetuated the Colombian government’s hostility toward coca growers and popular mobilization (UP). Whether it was
simply by supporting the Colombian military or actively encouraging Colombian anti-drug policy, the U.S. was at the forefront of the state’s legitimacy loss and the FARC’s legitimacy opportunity.

**The Influence of U.S. Drug Interdiction Policies: The Case of Peru**

The international environment has not played nearly as important role in the struggle for legitimacy and power between the Shining Path and the Peruvian state. The 1980s in Peru saw Presidents Garcia and Belaunde commit to policies that limited the closeness of U.S.-Peruvian relations. Garcia’s refusal to pay debt service payments in 1985, the purchase of weapons from the Soviet Union, the participation with the non-Aligned Movement and meager cooperation against drug trafficking all reduced U.S. contact with the Peruvian state (McClintock 2000, 2, 23). The weakness of the Soviet Union at this time meant that it did not play the same role in Peru that the U.S. would for Colombia. In addition, the Shining Path leadership actually condemned Communist politics in both China and the Soviet Union for their lack of socialistic purity and received no support from either of these countries (McClintock 2000, 23).

For Peru and the Shining Path, the drug trade and U.S. anti-drug policy did not have the same impact as in Colombia. As Kay’s research on the political economy of the Shining Path indicates, the seizure of the Upper Huallaga Valley corresponded to a vital surge in the export of the coca leaf to processing countries (the largest being Colombia) (Kay 1999, 101-2). As in Colombia this surge did correspond to an expanding social base from which the Senderistas could draw their support. However, social forces were also pushing against the Shining Path by the end of the 80s and early 90s, as peasant rondas (self-defense groups) were being organized to fight back Shining Path’s violently brutal control over peasant communities. These groups, representing a peasant-military reproachment, would form the vital component to Fujimori’s
repression of the Shining Path and would serve as an obstacle to Shining Path expansion and success (Degregori 1998, 146-7).

The U.S. became concerned about drug trafficking in the 1990s. The U.S. and Peru’s cooperation on flight interception was a key form of U.S. assistance throughout the 1990s. Presidents Garcia and Fujimori each rejected an offer of military aid from the U.S., in part reflecting concerns among the Peruvian military establishment that was concerned that repressive actions might deepen peasants’ desire to align with insurgents (McClintock 2000, 24, 41-2). Eventually, Fujimori would take the aid but would disagree with the U.S. on anti-drug performance, since he believed some Peruvian officers had been successful fighting insurgents by leaving alone coca growers (McClintock 2000, 41-3). Ties between the CIA and Peruvian intelligence agencies, however, would become more frequent, with the head of Peru’s National Intelligence Service (SIN), Vladimir Montesinos playing an important role in repressing Fujimori’s opponents while benefitting from CIA support (McClintock 2000, 26-8).

The 1990s saw an aggressive war, both physical and psychological, fought against Shining Path strongholds by both the Peruvian armed forces, intelligence agencies and the previously mentioned rondas under the leadership of Fujimori. One part of the intelligence sharing agreement was a program consisted of U.S. air traffic facilities monitoring potential illegal flights and contained within it, an agreement between Presidents Bush and Fujimori to shoot down planes carrying coca paste into Colombia (Faiola 2001). U.S. officials touted the Peruvians’ success in using the detection to thwart drug trafficking attempts, prompting President Bush to continue the plan into his administration (Faiola 2001). Additionally, the CIA’s ties with Peruvian intelligence agencies were also important. The CIA’s ties with SIN leader Montesinos and statements by insiders to McClintock led her to conclude that under CIA
guidance, Montesinos and SIN’s psychological war against the Shining Path was able to play an important role in demoralizing Shining Path combatants following Guzman’s capture (McClintock 2000, 27). Who caught Guzman, however, is telling of the separation between Fujimori and the U.S. The intelligence agency that caught Fujimori was Grupo Especial de Inteligencia and was in fact established with significant CIA support during the Garcia administration, with the sole mission of capturing Guzman (McClintock 2000, 25). When it did capture Guzman in 1992, it was without the knowledge of Montesinos, SIN, or Fujimori who were unable to bask in the public relations victory (McClintock 2000, 25-6). While the U.S. did play a role in the intelligence apparatus, and in supporting Montesinos’ power in Peru, the U.S. had no connection to the peasant rondas, the other force widely viewed as significantly weakening the Shining Path (McClintock 2000, 27).

So, as drug trafficking netted the Shining Path more resources its social base began to erode as peasant discontent with violence and cruelty was exploited by the Peruvian military. The Peruvian government did not engage extensively in crop eradication as in the Colombian case. This could possibly explain why the peasant rondas could be formed, and, in confluence with psychological war and traditional counterinsurgency measures, imported from the U.S., had such an impact on eventually demobilizing the Shining Path’s very real threat to the Peruvian state’s existence.

The efforts of Peru to manage the spread of the Shining Path worked well in the eyes of Washington. The involvement into the Peruvian situation was less invasive than in the Colombian case yet seemed to have more impact. Though the U.S. assistance to stem the drug trade does not seem to have been the sole reason for the Shining Path’s failure to spread its influence as the rondas show, the correspondence of the U.S. adopting these measures with Peru
on the decline of Sendero cannot be overlooked.

When examining the impact of U.S. drug policies in the late 80s and early 90s, the most important aspect of the international context for the experiences of Colombia and Peru show a differing impact for the trajectory of state-guerrilla power relations. In Colombia, U.S. business interests played an active role in forming the paramilitaries that successfully repressed the FARC’s legal political establishment (UP). U.S. efforts such as large scale fumigation and the rounding up of Escobar’s drug cartel significantly altered the FARC’s opportunities to expand its social base within the peasantry.

For Peru, the U.S. never engaged in large-scale eradication measures and instead focused on interdiction and insurgent fighting per the preferences of Fujimori and some military leaders. The lack of a significant drug cartel meant the U.S. had no major enemy to pursue in Peru, while the lack of business interests for the U.S. meant there was little role for the U.S. or Peruvian business interests to play. In essence, the U.S. involvement with drug eradication and paramilitary operations led to greater support for the FARC’s operations even as it tried to bolster state capability (Peceney and Durnan 2006, 95-6). For Peru, the U.S. injected itself only lightly into eradicating the drug trade that was supplying the Shining Path, and during the years of this intervention the movement shrank to its smallest, least impactful state.

The Influence of FARC Negotiations with the State and the Role of Paramilitaries in State Legitimacy

Drug trafficking, guerrilla, and paramilitary violence plagued Colombia into the mid 90s. Colombian President Ernesto Samper was unable or unwilling to combat any of the violence and continued the total war plan against the FARC. Under Samper’s guidance (1994-8), the war against the FARC (in spite of Samper’s claims that the FARC was delegitimized and weakened)
led intelligence officials within the U.S. government to begin asserting that Colombia without U.S. military assistance would collapse and become a narco-state (Simons 2004, 184). Andres Pastrana was elected president in 1998 and immediately announced that he had previously held direct negotiations with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda (Simons 2004, 188). In early 1999, negotiations between Pastrana and the FARC leadership began and were characterized by starts and stops. Pastrana granted FARC autonomy over an area the size of Switzerland in east-central Colombia and agreed to a $3 billion dollar rural development program to help wean peasant poppy and coca farmers off of the illicit crops (Simons 2004, 192-3).

However, paramilitary violence would disrupt the peace talks. Between January 7 and 12, 1999, Colombian paramilitaries were responsible for 160 civilian deaths, prompting the FARC to propose a pause in negotiations to give the government time to curtail paramilitary activity (Simons 2004, 193). Then paramilitary leader Carlos Castano called for negotiations with the government. Pastrana obliged his request and agreed to a negotiation track. This infuriated the FARC because they believed they were a legitimate political movement and the paramilitaries were thugs hired by business and corporate interests. The FARC was appalled with the government’s willingness to negotiate with them (Simons 2004, 193). Attempts to restart negotiations failed due to FARC concerns about paramilitary-government ties (Simons 2004, 200-1; The Sixth Division 2001). At this time, the U.S. was gearing up to begin more aid to the Colombian government, weakening Pastrana’s position that negotiation was necessary and prudent. U.S. politics influenced the Democratic President Clinton away from support of peace talks and further advanced the notion that the U.S. should be involved in propping up the Colombian state with more military assistance (Simons 2004, 203).

In the first half of the 1990s, the U.S. had already given Colombia $322 million in
military aid, provided Colombian officers training in counterinsurgency at the School of Americas, and even employed some Colombian officers as instructors at the school. In 1996, President Clinton announced to Congress he would send $169 million in military equipment to the Colombian government (12 Black Hawk helicopters, machine guns and ammunition) (Simons 2004, 223). In 1994, calls from Congressional Democrats and Amnesty International to end aid to Colombia based on human rights abuses were largely ignored, while the Republican argument that human rights concerns hampered efforts to end drug trafficking and stop FARC’s violence carried weight with Clinton. By the time the FARC-Pastrana negotiations failed, the U.S. was already committed to boosting armament of the Colombian state and army, and, indirectly, the paramilitaries. Even before Plan Colombia, the U.S. had appropriated an addition $280 million to Colombia for anti-drug activity in October 1998. In addition to this money, a 1,000 man anti-drug battalion was formed, trained, and equipped by the United States (Simons 2004, 223-5). These additional steps pre-Plan Colombia were cited by FARC as the reason for the refusal to disarm.

By 2002, Plan Colombia had convinced the guerrillas that the Colombian state, with the U.S. as a key strategic partner, was not committed to good-faith negotiations. Plan Colombia was passed as a multi-faceted arrangement to bolster Colombian efforts to end the drug trade and violence emanating from group struggles for control of drug routes and other resources. Clinton and Pastrana each submitted their preferences for what the agreement was to achieve. Clinton’s most resembled future policy. It had the stated goals of supplying the Colombian police with logistical equipment (helicopters, jeeps), increasing the amount of planes available for eradication efforts, promoting crop substitution, and improving the justice system to punish human rights violations (Simons 2004, 233).
Opposition to Plan Colombia was present throughout Colombian society. Sixty organizations—including civil society, non-governmental, human rights, and Peace for Colombia—issued a joint communiqué, which rejected Plan Colombia because it “uses an authoritarian concept of national security exclusively based on a strategy against narcotics,” was likely to “lead to an escalation of the social and armed conflict,” and “will worsen the humanitarian and human rights crisis, increase forced displacement and aggravate the social and political crisis.” In fact, even before Plan Colombia was enacted in 2000, paramilitaries were responsible for a series of massacres in Catatumbo that resulted in the killing of 70 civilians (Simons 2004, 234-5). Not only was the human rights situation itself being questioned, but also the rights of citizens to not have their environment damaged by toxic chemicals used in aerial fumigations. Liz Atherton of the Colombian Peace Association was quoted by Simons, stating that “adults and children are being made sick with diarrhea, vomiting, skin rashes, eye and respiratory illnesses… livestock and fish in contaminated waters are dying… food crops are being destroyed,” clearly articulating another reason for vehement opposition from rural sectors of the population that were exposed to these measures (Simons 2004, 240).

Some have argued that in retrospect, Plan Colombia seems unrelated to drug trafficking altogether. Fransisco Cuellar (2005) notes the location of three anti-narcotics bases, a key component of Plan Colombia, had proximity to key natural resource deposits that U.S. corporations were interested in extracting. The first base was located in the South of Bolivar region. This region has large gold deposits, is a transit for an oil pipeline operated by Occidental Petroleum, and has some oil deposits being explored by the Harken Energy Company (who boasts the Bush family as one of its largest shareholders). The second base is located in Catatumbo in the province of Norte de Santander (site of the above-mentioned paramilitary
massacre pre-Plan Colombia), which has the same Occidental Petroleum pipeline running through it and large coal deposits, 90% of which are mined by U.S. companies (Cuellar 2005, 65). The third base is in Altaco, located in the Department of Tolima. It has large deposits of gold and precious metals. In the time leading up to and immediately following Plan Colombia’s passage and implementation the region became a hotbed of paramilitary activity, leading Tolima to have the highest displacement rate of all of Colombia’s provinces (Cuellar 2005, 66). Human rights violations in areas valued by American corporations and militarized through Plan Colombia did not escape the U.S. Congressional record. After the U.S. House approved $700 million extra to support the Colombian military, Massachusetts Democrat John F. Tierney pointed out the repression of the labor movement that was taking place in some of Plan Colombia’s strongholds, stating “In Colombia, U.S. energy, military and trade policy are becoming intertwined with devastating consequences for the country’s labor movement” (Simons 2004, 240). With all of the antagonisms to Plan Colombia which delegitimized the government’s position, the FARC also engaged in cooperation with international actors at this time to legitimize their political struggle. The Colombian government would not hesitate to use these ties to paint the rebels as unworthy and dishonest negotiating partners.

The Colombian government and the U.S. accused the FARC of ties to Irish Republican Army (Irish separatists opposed to England’s control over Northern Ireland) to discredit the FARC as an actor in Colombia’s political process. In August of 2001, three Irishmen (Colombian 3) tied to the IRA were arrested while attempting to leave Colombia with tests showing that the men had come into contact with explosives and drugs (cocaine and amphetamines) (Morris 2001). In late August, ten days after the news of the Colombian 3’s arrest the Belfast Telegraph reported that an Interpol conference in Lyon, France had painted the
picture of a triangular terrorist relationship between the FARC, the IRA and the Basque militia in Spain (ETA) (Thornton 2001). Jan McGirk (2001) of The Independent (London) quoted a Colombian army officer who told her “The FARC is like a sponge absorbing international terrorism.” The officer continued “it has sufficient money and drugs to pay for most of the sophisticated armaments, training, and most hi-tech communications.” A September 10 story in the Irish Times found the FARC using similar heavy mortar technology as used by the IRA (Irish Times 2001). The report claimed the FARC used heavy mortar technology, firing 10,000 heavy mortars, killing 84 civilians in over 100 locations across Colombia (Irish Times 2001). Perhaps what is most significant is the story in the Washington Post the day following the breaking of the Colombian 3 arrest that interviewed sources who called into question the demilitarized zone in Colombia claiming that the links to terrorist groups made the FARC terrorists. The conclusion being implicitly drawn was that the FARC were terrorists and appeasement of them was essentially acquiescing to evil (Wilson 2001). Colombian leaders used this narrative to align their rhetoric with the United States in the post 9/11 world.

The Colombian 3 were put on trial for supporting the FARC and the lesser charge of traveling without proper documentation. They were originally acquitted, but, on appeal by the prosecutor, were eventually convicted. However, they disappeared before sentencing and returned to Ireland. The story of the Colombian 3 and the implications it has for the FARC’s coordination with international insurgencies did not disappear with the Colombian 3. In 2003, then Colombian Vice President (newly elected President in July 2010) Fransisco Santos stated that there was “strong evidence” of FARC ties to the ETA, citing remote-bombing capabilities and the usage of mobile phones as indicators of the FARC’s European ties, while admitting that the Colombian government did not yet have the “key” evidence to substantiate the claim (BBC
Summary of Broadcasts 2003). In 2008, a video purporting to show ETA training of FARC combatants drew disapproval from then President Alvaro Uribe, who said the video’s contents were “very serious” (BBC Monitoring Latin America 2008). A 2003 bombing of a trendy Bogota nightclub that killed seemed to indicate that the FARC might have learned some valuable lessons from overseas actors on the importance and tactics of urban insurgency (Murrillo 2004, 26, 73). After 9/11 the American government felt more emboldened to flex its muscle against groups violently opposed to its interests. Washington’s commitment to combating terrorism would have implications for their support of President Uribe, whose human rights violations, economic policies, and all around corrupt ties make him a pariah to many who advocated for civil society in both Latin America and the United States. His success in earning popularity among the residents of the major cities (who are affluent and crave stability) has earned him legitimacy as an anti-guerrilla leader, while his policies displaced impoverished populations from the war-torn countryside and hurt the state’s legitimacy, doing little to stem support for the FARC.

U.S. Efforts to Discredit FARC

The FARC is often characterized as an illegitimate actor because most Colombians truly wish for the guerrillas to lay down their arms and support state repression of guerrilla forces (Brittain 2010, 30-1). Polls throughout Uribe’s administration demonstrated his popularity to be around the 70th percentile, while halfway through his second term his popularity peaked at 80% (Brittain 2010, 40). The picture this portrays is of a popular president fighting an unpopular insurgency. However, the story is not so clear cut. In fact, polls in Colombia are inherently distorting of true voter opinion. First, the polls are conducted on landlines, which many Colombians do not have access to, and particularly poorer, more-isolated peasants.
Second, the state conducts the polls and is capable of tracing the calls to specific addresses, meaning the polls are not truly anonymous and devoid of intimidation. And lastly, most polls are conducted by making calls in the four most heavily populated cities (Brittain 2010, 43; Murillo 2004, 203).

Two protests in 2008, one against the FARC (February 4) and the other against the human rights violations, past and present, highlight the nature of popular sympathies in Colombia (March 6). The anti-FARC protest was organized via Facebook and promoted by state media, shut down the Colombian stock exchange, halted public services, and saw employees pressured to attend by bosses (Brittain 2010, 38-9). Though this was touted as popular solidarity against the violence of the FARC, 96% of Colombians have no access to the internet, meaning young, wealthy, internet users from the cities were the principle organizers. The state media covered this protest extensively. However, on March 6 a protest took place against state-sponsored violence that was organized via communications between 270 Colombian localities and spanned 140 cities in 23 countries from all over the world (many protests were held outside of Colombian embassies). The state media, in the days leading up to the March 6 protest, splashed pictures of dead FARC leader Raul Reyes’s dead body, neglecting the broad-based protesters anti-violence ethos (Brittain 2010, 38-40).

The 2002 election was largely considered a law and order election where the half of Colombians who typically vote favored Uribe’s tough stance on the guerrillas following the failure of the Pastrana administration to reduce violence through negotiation. Uribe’s vision of the guerrillas corresponded well with Washington’s vision. In 2003, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft claimed that the FARC was “the most dangerous international terrorist organization in the Western hemisphere” (DeYoung 2002). Uribe’s policy toward the guerrillas
demonstrated his agreement, passing a law that created “rehabilitation and consolidation” zones in lieu of Pastrana’s de-militarized zone, which granted the military expanded powers to patrol domestically, detain suspects without cause, and conduct surveillance (Murillo 2004, 23, 84). Some of these zones are located around the Catatumbo oil pipeline, further enforcing the paramilitaries and the military’s ability to protect the pipeline’s infrastructure and employees (Cuellar 2005, 65). Uribe’s policy aligned with the U.S. shift to anti-terror activity as a preeminent foreign policy mission, reflecting his cooperation with U.S. foreign policy’s shift from anti-drug to anti-terror aid (terminating a Plan Colombia edict which had restricted intelligence gathering assistance from the U.S. for anti-drug activity) (Murillo 2004, 24).

Influence of Domestic and Other International Actors on Legitimacy

Apart from Uribe’s domestic policy, his loyalty to Washington was demonstrated in his commitment to serve U.S. strategic interests in Latin America. Maybe the most important interest is Uribe’s cooperation in Washington’s efforts to oppose and marginalize the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Links have been attempted to be made between what the U.S.-Colombia axis calls terrorist actors, the FARC and Chavez, a harsh critic of U.S. foreign policy. These links are meant to delegitimize both Chavez and the FARC as an evil axis. What will be examined is the role Uribe played in attempts to assist the U.S. in delegitimizing and containing Chavez, the official record on the links between Chavez and the FARC and the impact Uribe’s policies had for the legitimacy of the Colombian government. Uribe’s supporters within the Colombian government have long believed the FARC operated from the Venezuelan side of the border after Chavez came to power due to the ideological affinity between them. The U.S. shared this suspicion, although the 2009 State Department Country Report on Venezuela acknowledged the extent of Venezuelan ties to the FARC was “unclear”. The report also noted Chavez’s
loathing for Washington’s war on terror, citing his statement that the U.S. was “the first state sponsor of terrorism” (State Dept. Country Report; Venezuela 2009).

Ray Walser, in a careful examination of Venezuela as an actor on the international scene—both rhetoric and reality—depicts a Chavez regime unabashedly opposed to U.S. interests. Citing Chavez’s ties to Iran, Russia, Cuba, the FARC, anti-imperialist rhetoric, permissiveness of drug trafficking, and statist (socialist) economic thinking, Walser provides a plethora of widely understood and accepted reasons within the U.S. political establishment for the U.S. to obstruct Venezuela’s interests (Walser 2009). Given U.S. opposition to Venezuela, the hawkishness of the Bush administration, and the close nature of Colombian-U.S. ties, Chavista cadre and sympathizers within Latin America feel angst over the implications of this alliance for the political balance of power. Given Washington’s opposition to Venezuela on the grounds of strategic interests and ideological opposition, it is interesting to see how the Colombian government under Uribe picks up on the aspects of this rhetoric that affect his country, namely the support and toleration of FARC militants in Venezuela.

Uribe used findings from a cross-border raid into Ecuador to make his case that the FARC was an arm of Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution. In late February 2008, the Colombian military bombed a FARC camp inside Ecuador, killing FARC leader Raul Reyes. In the process, the Colombians seized laptops from the camp and immediately announced they contained evidence of links between the FARC and Chavez with findings that suggested money going from the FARC to Chavez in the 1990s and more recent support of the rebels by Chavez (Carroll 2008). The bombing escalated regional tensions with both Ecuador and Venezuela, deploying armed forces near their borders with Colombia to deter further aggression, while Chavez claimed that Colombian aggression was a product of American imperialism. The raid
demonstrated the willingness of the Colombian state to violate norms of regional cooperation in order to serve its own internal security interests while receiving substantial U.S. support.

A few months later in mid-May 2008, Interpol confirmed that the laptop findings by the Colombian military were not doctored (Brodzinsky 2008). The most damning evidence released by Interpol was an email message from one of the FARC’s top military leaders proposing to the rebels governing secretariat that they ask Chavez for a loan of $250 million (Brodzinsky 2008). There was also email correspondence with Venezuelan officials serving as middlemen between the FARC and Australian arms dealers. However, a report in the Christian Science Monitor acknowledged that there was no confirmation that any of these operations had actually taken place (Brodzinsky 2008).

In the fall of 2009, Latin American countries ideologically divergent from Chavez became very concerned with the U.S.-Colombian relationship. In the fall of 2009, Colombia ceded control of seven military bases to the United States (Forero 2009). Chavez opposed this measure and interpreted it as an aggressive action against his country. Rafael Correa, left-leaning President of Ecuador warned Uribe directly “you are not going to be able to control the Americans,” emphasizing his long-term fears when he told Uribe “this constitutes a grave danger for peace in Latin America” (Forero 2009). Correa and Chavez’s opposition might be expected from those predicting policy preferences strictly on ideological dispositions. Yet what gave weight to the tensions in Latin America about further U.S. penetration into Colombia and the region was the opposition voiced by Chile, a newly minted member of the OECD (Forero 2009).

The U.S. and Colombian governments have never empirically established the nature and scope of Venezuelan support for the FARC; this has meant failure to successfully portray the
FARC as an insurgent army in Chavez’s crusade against America. Events like the Colombian grant of control over seven additional bases to the U.S. signified a strengthening of U.S. penetration that Latin American countries find objectionable. In 2009 skepticism of the U.S. and its supporters in Latin America arose following the coup that ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya (Van Hook 2009). The U.S. initially rejected the coup, but, after several months encouraged the recognition of the newly elected President Porfirio Lobo, though Zelaya was prohibited from serving out his term by the Honduran legal authorities and military (Van Hook 2009). The U.S. announcement that they would recognize the administration of a newly elected president raised eyebrows to the willingness of the U.S. to throw out what was an extra-constitutional regime change and unwillingness to back up the OAS and the Inter-American Democratic Charter to protect a President, like Zelaya, whose philosophy was left of center and who had been criticized for Chavista sympathies (Van Hook 2009). Colombia’s agreement with the U.S. on this issue further constituted a break with the region as a whole, instead opting to curry favor with the hegemon to the North (Sierna 2010; Van Hook 2009).

The Colombian bases and U.S. failure to uphold OAS rejection of the Honduran coup created skepticism among Latin American countries over U.S. intentions. Why would the U.S. not want to uphold a democratically elected government unless it really was worried about that government’s allies, and involved in trying to contain the influence of states critical of the U.S. . Skepticism of U.S. intentions in the region seemed to be further stoked by an April 2010 defense cooperation agreement signed between the U.S. and Brazil, one of the opponents of the Colombian base agreement (Pitarque 2010). Given the apparent nature of the U.S. desire to militarily penetrate Latin America and the ideological hegemony of the U.S. and their allies in
the region, like the Colombian government, the U.S. and Colombia have not been successful in ushering in a condemnation of anti-U.S. actors like Venezuela and the FARC.

What has prevented this is not only the historical skepticism of U.S. involvement and support for repressive Latin American regimes that was the norm during the Cold War, but also concern for the human rights records of states like Colombia. Uribe forcefully sought to combat Washington’s enemies and Colombia’s domestic enemies, like the FARC, preferring confrontational methods that proved that neither he, nor his American patrons, had a legitimate concern for maintaining human rights. Instead, a policy of defeating enemies of the state at any cost has been pursued, using an ends-justify-the-means logic even though the means have resulted in a loss of legitimacy for the Colombian government and created an environment where the FARC has little trouble operating.

The repression of the post-Zelaya Micheletti government demonstrated a neglect of moderation and accommodation toward popular forces by the U.S. -Colombian-anti-Zelaya axis. The personnel used by the Honduran government to repress Zelaya supporters, as Greg Grandin reported in the Huffington Post, had among their members 40 Colombian paramilitary personnel, recruited by Honduran plantation owners, to protect their interests (Grandin 2010). In addition to the calls from plantation owners in Honduras to Colombian paramilitaries, prominent human rights activists in Honduras alleged that a Micheletti security adviser travelled to Bogota to arrange the deal (Grandin 2010). These allegations, as Grandin points out, were reported by both Colombian and American press and serve to discredit the U.S. -Colombian political argument that theirs is an alliance for order, peace, and democracy. The infiltration of Honduras to suppress forces that were supporting a legitimately elected and illegitimately
deposed president creates the image that democracy and peace is only a rhetorical tool used by the U.S. and Colombia.

The Uribe administration pursued policies whose implications and impacts have discredited them in the eyes of popular forces throughout Colombia, especially when seen in light of the exportation of paramilitary forces into Honduras. This meant discrediting the U.S.-Colombian relationship as one that can serve the interests of a plurality of Colombians. In conjunction with rehabilitation zones and the seven new U.S. bases inside Colombia, there have been scandals that have linked top Uribe officials with the paramilitaries which (amid the recent amnesty granted to them in exchange for confessing their crimes) indicates that it is their ties to serving the Uribe administration that has provided them the opportunity to avoid severe punishment for what are often devastating crimes. Amnesty International points out that the Justice and Peace Law, passed in 2005, to demobilize paramilitary forces has not discernibly curtailed human rights violations and that it granted total amnesty to members of certain forces that were not, at the time of demobilization, under investigation for human rights abuses (Amnesty International; Colombia). AI also critiques the law for its encouragement of demobilized paramilitary members to join informer networks and civic order organizations that simply administer control over regions that have been wrested from FARC control (Amnesty International; Colombia). In addition, AI points out that the demobilization only targets individuals, while doing nothing about the larger phenomena of paramilitarism that encapsulates paramilitary patrons, including landowners, corporations, and government officials (Amnesty International; Colombia; The Sixth Division 2001).

While Uribe’s symbolic support for paramilitary demobilization has been disconcerting, the conduct of the military and security forces during his administration has been troubling for
civil society advocates. The scandal of “false positives” has demonstrated the brutality of the Colombian regime’s total war against the FARC. In this scandal, unemployed young men were offered jobs by security personnel and told to follow the security forces. After arriving at some destination, the security forces murdered the young men, then turned the bodies over to government officials in exchange for praise and rewards (Sierna 2010). Over the course of a six year investigation, 1,603 individuals within the Colombian military have come under scrutiny as responsibility for over 800 victims has been identified (Sierna 2010).

A 2010 study produced by the U.S. Office on Colombia, and presented by the U.S.-based Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) in Bogota, indicated a strong “correlation between U.S. Aid and Army Killings” (Martinez 2010). The report concluded that after the implementation of Plan Colombia, military units within Colombia began reporting more extrajudicial killings, with more than 3,000 being reported since the year 2000. Inter-Press Service quoted the director of FOR, Lindsey Poland, who, in discussing the report’s conclusions, stated “we found that for many military units reports of extrajudicial executions increased during and after the highest levels of U.S. assistance” (Martinez 2010).

Systematic human rights abuses correlating to levels of U.S. aid, as well as Uribe’s ties to paramilitaries and tepid attempts at demobilizing them (while they perform most of Colombia’s human rights abuses), are evident in spite of efforts by actors both within Colombia and the U.S. to uphold human rights standards (Murrillo 2004, 152). The Leahy Law, a stipulation in federal assistance spending that prohibits the use of American money to support human rights abuses, is the most prominent resistance from the U.S. to Colombian human rights abuses. However, in 2001, a Human Rights Watch report highlighted the limited capacity of the U.S. to monitor what its equipment was used for or to monitor which Colombian military units had members who had
in the past been linked to paramilitaries (The Sixth Division 2001). The report highlighted the deficiency of a monitoring practice of certifying Colombian military personnel based on whether they had official charges filed against them, in spite of cases where there was credible evidence of past human rights violations (The Sixth Division 2001).

In addition, the State Department continues to certify Colombia’s human rights record. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs soundly rejects the legitimacy of these certifications (Sierna 2010). What seems clear is that American policy toward Colombia prioritizes fighting the FARC and drug trafficking over consideration of whether or not the groups receiving U.S. aid are actors who respect international norms on human rights. Combating drug trafficking fails to be a legitimate reason for U.S. intervention in Colombia given that the paramilitaries themselves are funded by the drug trade. Carlos Castano, head of the large umbrella paramilitary organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), brazenly told reporters in 2000 that drug trafficking provided around 70% of paramilitary funding (The New York Times 2000). Additionally, a 2001 Human Rights Watch report makes clear the depth of ties between the paramilitaries and the Colombian military:

Colombian army brigades and police detachments continue to promote, work with, support, profit from, and tolerate paramilitary groups, treating them as a force allied to and compatible with their own. At their most brazen, the relationships described in this report involve active coordination during military operations between government and paramilitary units; communication via radios, cellular telephones, and beepers; the sharing of intelligence, including the names of suspected guerrilla collaborators; the sharing of fighters, including active-duty soldiers serving in paramilitary units and paramilitary commanders lodging on military bases; the sharing of vehicles, including army trucks used to transport paramilitary fighters; coordination of army roadblocks, which routinely let heavily-armed paramilitary fighters pass; and payments made from paramilitaries to military officers for their support. (The Sixth Division 2001)
The U.S. scarcely acknowledges Colombian military ties to the paramilitaries, in spite of evidence presented like the text cited above. The report cites former CIA director George Tenet, who, in a response to a question on the links between paramilitaries and the Colombian security apparatus, said, “You know, I'll have to get you an answer. I mean, we still look at that very carefully but I don't know. I can't -- off the top of my head, Senator, it is something that we are concerned with” (The Sixth Division 2001). This statement was made after the expansion of Plan Colombia through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative targeted Colombia for an additional $676 million—in addition to the already agreed to $1.3 billion the Clinton administration had agreed to in 2000—in lieu of the newly declared war on terror following the September 11 attacks.

While people within the U.S. are sometimes frustrated with their governments sponsoring of human rights abuses, whether indirectly or carrying them out as a tool of the war on terror, what is most important here is the attitude of Colombians and the ways that this affects the legitimacy of the Colombian military-paramilitary war against the FARC. If U.S. politics do not pressure leaders into respect for human rights, and the U.S. is left with a freedom of action in countries, then it only makes sense that U.S. client states will also act with impunity toward their populations. Legitimacy is lost both from the brutal treatment of society’s members and the perception that violence against society is often carried out to defend U.S. interests (corporations) or prerogatives (drug-trade).

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2 Hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee on Worldwide Threats to National Security, U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, February 7, 2001.
The Effects of Human Rights Abuses and Impunity on State Legitimacy-The Case of Colombia

In 2010, a group called the Madres of Soacha, filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) over the loss of their 16 sons during 2007-8 (Martinez 2010). Their sons, part of the “false positives” scandal, were promised jobs and led into the countryside. After leaving their homes in the suburbs of Bogota, the 16 boys were later discovered in a mass gravesite (Viera 2010). Yet these mothers’ complaint with the IACHR was a direct response to the Colombian government’s unwillingness to bind itself to an international treaty that would have required an inquest into the disappeared victims and provided support to their families in pursuing legal recourse. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2006, intended to enshrine the right to truth of what happened to those who have gone missing without explanation (Vieira 2010). Colombia ratified the treaty but denounced the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, which has the power to investigate and support the families in legal efforts to learn the truth, effectively undermining the treaty’s significance (Vieira 2010). Colombia claimed that the IACHR actually had jurisdiction in this area, prompting the complaint from the Madres of Soacha.

In conjunction with the Colombian state’s disregard for the processes of international law, abuse of protesters in camps, military/paramilitary ties and the failure of domestic law to deal with abuses, like the false positives, all highlight the need for international law to bring the perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice. In fact, of the hundreds of Colombian military personnel charged in the false positives scandal, thirty-one have been sentenced to prison terms (Sierna 2010). Sierna (2010), in an article for COHA, quotes UN Special Reporter on Extrajudicial killings, Phillip Alston, on the scope and impunity of the Colombian military,
stating “the quantity of cases, the geographic area it covers, and the range of military units involved, indicated that these murders were perpetrated in a systematic way, by a significant quantity of military personnel.”

The Colombian government loses traction with the peasant society and members of its own disadvantaged society when it privileges human rights abusers, drug traffickers, and advances U.S. counter drug policies like eradication and fumigation. Ultimately, the position of Colombia as a bulwark against Chavista influence in Latin America, center of Latin America’s war on terror as the war against the FARC is defined, loses the government favor with the public. The Colombian government, following Washington’s agenda, finds itself strengthened to perpetrate anti-guerrilla and drug actions using actors like the paramilitaries that ironically strengthen the legitimacy of state opponents like the FARC.

Peru’s Different Approach to Insurgency and Foreign Alliances

The 1990s saw an aggressive war, both physical and psychological, fought against the peasantry by both the Peruvian armed forces and the rondas under the leadership of Fujimori. Human rights and corruption charges have landed Alberto Fujimori in prison for the massacre at Barrios Altos, a community outside of Lima where members of the Peruvian armed forces participated in a death squad killing of 15 Peruvians (IACHR 2001). Vladimiro Montesinos was jailed for both leading the death squads responsible for over 7,000 extrajudicial killings, including the Barros Altos massacre, along with charges of embezzlement of $10 million from a Peruvian government purchase of Russian fighter jets. These leaders were not completely unpopular figures. The economic devastation of international isolation under Garcia had swept Fujimori into power with a popular mandate. His liberalization of the economy was welcome.

As he took office, Peruvians clamored for success against the Shining Path, especially the
urban masses who had witnessed recent incursions into their areas by a strengthened Shining Path reach (McClintock 2000, 19-20). Under Fujimori, Peru never undertook massive drug eradication efforts, yet did pursue insurgent fighters with rigor. The ties to the CIA did assist in capturing Guzman, which was vital in collapsing the Shining Path that in the early 90s posed a very real threat to the fragile Peruvian state (McClintock 2000, 20). Fujimori’s popularity was derived from his reduction of violence throughout the country during the 90s and his return of Peru from economic ruin. The first comes from his reelection in 1995. The next indication, and perhaps most important given what the population was supportive of, came when another rebel group, MRTA, took control of the Japanese embassy in late 1996 and demanded the release of 400 MRTA prisoners. Eighty percent of the population rejected this release and supported Fujimori and Montesinos’ ending the standoff without making a concession to the militants (McClintock 2000, 27-8).

International Environment Impact: Comparison for the Shining Path and the FARC

While the U.S. seems to have assisted the legitimacy of the Peruvian state through its ties to intelligence groups who captured Guzman, the U.S. also contributed to the peace between Ecuador and Peru. Ecuador and Peru, in the mid 1990s, became involved in a conflict over a long-standing border dispute as Ecuador sought opportunistically to take advantage of the internal security situation in Peru. It was a brief that lasted only four weeks (McClintock 2000 32-3), yet the peace negotiations would prove to enhance the image of the U.S. and Fujimori’s government at the same time. Luigi Einaudi, the U.S. special envoy for Ecuador-Peru peace process, was praised heavily by both Fujimori and President Mahaud of Ecuador for his superior efforts in bringing the parties together (McClintock 2000, 34). The agreement, negotiated by Einaudi, was supported by 56% of Peruvians, with areas near the Ecuador border being heavily
opposed to the agreement (McClintock 2000, 37).

Subsequently, the Peruvian public would become outraged as the corruption and violence of the Fujimori regime came to light, leading future administrations in Peru to pursue the leading figures that carried out the dirty war for crimes against humanity. Fujimori and Montesinos ended up imprisoned for their crimes in eradicating the Shining Path. This has stifled the scent of impunity that had justified the human rights atrocities. Fujimori was not extremely unpopular until the end of his term (as awareness of his corrupt, authoritarian, and brutal disposition toward opposition grew). Under Fujimori, Shining Path resistance to state power was significantly curtailed, with the Shining Path having only a few hundred members (and in 2008, the Shining Path had only around 300-500 members) (State Dept.: OCOC- Ch. 6, 2010).

By the late 2000s, the FARC was a much bigger international player than the Shining Path. In its Andean Counterdrug Initiative which included aid to Colombia, Peru, Panama, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Panama, the U.S. gave much more assistance to Colombia than Peru (Andean Counterdrug Initiative; State Dept. 2010). In 2006, 2007, and 2008, the U.S. gave Colombia $494,751,000, $526,035,000 and $366,968,000, respectively. For Peru, the U.S. gave, in the same years, $106,920,000, $103,165,000 and $36,844,000 (Andean Counterdrug Initiative; State Dept. 2010). This comparison quickly reveals that in no year did the U.S. give Peru 25% of the aid Colombia received, and this is not even counting the bases and operational help around the bases the U.S. provided as part of Plan Colombia. Additionally, its worth noting that in 2009, the Colombian government eradicated 104,772 hectares of coca via spraying, 60,557 manually, while Peru eradicated 10,025 manually and none through the use of fumigation (UN Drug Report 2010).

Clearly, the U.S. presence and geopolitical realities of anti-narcotics, counterterrorism,
and anti-Chavism are more prevalent in Colombian politics than in Peru. In Peru, counternarcotics and counterinsurgency do not seem to have fused in the same way they did in Peru. If the comparison is made between Peru of the 1990s and Colombia during the 2000s, the contrast in involvement with international geopolitics is revealing. In the 1990s, at the time of Shining Path’s peak-strength and total war waged by the state with the help of the CIA, the Shining Path went from threatening the Peruvian state’s power to an actor marginalized to drug trafficking corridors. In Colombia, post 9/11 and during the beginning of the Uribe administration, the Colombian government waged a total war against the FARC with U.S. bases for anti-narcotics throughout the country in the name of counterterrorism and curtailing the expansionary aims of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. The depth of U.S. help differs, offering an important contrast. The efforts by Peru, which had more limited U.S. involvement, led to a Peruvian state less reviled by its population and the international community. In fact, the leaders who led the brutal war that weakened the Shining Path have been brought to justice for their atrocities. So, while Peru does remain an unequal society (Peruvian Times 2010), it is not condemned as an illegitimate human rights violator and does not face a revolutionary threat to its power.

In Colombia, actions against the FARC seem to be guided by U.S. interests to defeat Venezuela’s proxy army, guerrillas who may hurt U.S. business interests, and discredit any ideology that opposes the narrative on economic orthodoxy. Resistance to the Colombian state seems prominent, both within Colombia and even among groups, like COHA in the United States, who condemn the State Dept. human rights certification (Serna 2010). The FARC, furthermore, does not lose credibility for the ties with international actors simply because they are not deeply substantiated enough to truly discredit FARC as a terrorist ally of the ETA, IRA,
or perhaps even worse a guerrilla proxy for Hugo Chavez’s war to discredit U.S. imperialism and capitalism. Given these facts, the international environment contributes to an exacerbation of the state’s brutality in Colombia, the same brutality that sows the discontent for sustained guerrilla activity that justifies an anti-guerrilla reaction from the state, thus providing an explanation of persistent revolution. In Peru, the impact is much less and the perpetrators of the worst violence have had no shield of impunity and have been brought to justice. The containment of the Shining Path did not have highly-visible support from the U.S., though CIA help did lead to the important capture of Guzman and produced important psychological tactics to discourage Shining Path militants. Yet a key part of the force that severely hurt the Shining Path came from peasant rondas that, due to a lesser zeal for coca eradication, were not as anti-state as some Colombian peasants were. A lesser emphasis on coca eradication limited the amount of indignation Peruvian peasants felt from the state and limited the Shining Path’s power by the end of the Fujimori administration. Since then, with the incarceration of Montesinos and Fujimori, a much lower zeal for continued revolution exists today in Peru.
Conclusions

The objectives of this paper have been to identify and test the validity of variables that can predict revolutionary potential and persistence. Through an analysis that compares the scope and trajectory of the FARC and the Shining Path’s strength, conclusions are drawn regarding what variables are most important for persistent revolutionary activity. Many variables are present in both cases and serve as control variables that validate the utility of a comparison between these two movements.

One of the first commonalities that was consistently present in each movements’ context was the process of modernization and the peasantry’s failure to attain political power. At the beginning, Moore (1966), Johnson (1982), and Huntington (1968) all provided insight into the revolutionary potential of modernization. For both the FARC and the Shining Path, their state’s attempts to foster economic and social development were at the center of their grievances. As Huntington (1968) states, the old actors (peasantry) became hopeful that higher demand for their produce would create a peasantry less subservient to patrons. Gurr’s (1970) relative deprivation argument serves as a useful tool here to understand the aspirations of the peasantry and their hopes for a more robust role in a society that was advancing technologically and materially. However, new demands for peasant produce never meant less room for patrons or expanded influence for the peasantry; instead, the peasantry would be the ones who would have to lose out. Traditional patrons to the peasantry would be replaced or morphed into agribusiness and mining companies that, through efficiency and technological sophistication, boosted the productivity of land to meet
rising demand. Indeed, modernization did disrupt the previous equilibrium established by years of patron-client relationships. Though hope existed both within the Colombian and Peruvian peasantry that political modernization would allow them to articulate their interests within state institutions, both peasantries were de-prioritized in favor of capitalist interests. Essentially, this is what Wolf (1969) argued was a central reason for peasant revolution.

Politically, the peasantry cannot by itself defeat the state. This explains why there are revolutionary attempts in both of these case studies. Yet, explaining the differences in scope of these movements while they seem to resemble each other across a number of control variables is the purpose here. Tilly (1978) wrote of a peasantry that was a rational actor able to make interest-calculations to determine whether or not an alliance with revolutionary actors was preferable to passivity toward the state. Tilly’s focus was on the revolutionary groups strength and potential advantages that it could offer the peasantry as key to what would motivate a peasantry’s decision to join or support revolution. Building on the peasantry as interest-seeking actors, Collier (2000) and Regan and Norton’s (2005) works each pointed to a peasantry that, if involved in revolution, was out to do so for personal gain rather than revolutionary aims. In these analyses, the drug trade’s potential to aggrandize peasants made them support the revolutionaries out of purely pragmatic motivations (Collier 2000). For Regan and Norton (2005), the drug trade was the way in which peasants were convinced that they should be willing to die for a cause that, were it successful (revolutionary overthrow of state), would not actually benefit the peasantry (Regan and Norton 2005). Drugs were a key part of financing for both the FARC and the Shining Path, state initiatives did lower drug trafficking in Peru, but it has never been eliminated in either country. While Colombia is a larger exporter of coca than Peru, the conclusion that this drives revolutionary activity should not be hastily made. The research
discredits the existence of resources and illicit crops as a basis for revolutionary fervor in these cases. The peasantry’s motivations are indeed self-serving. However, the aims of the groups that-for Regan and Norton and Collier-are using the peasantry to serve the leadership’s interests (FARC and the Shining Path) are land reform and solutions to land shortages and capitalist extraction of resources, reforms peasants favor. Also, both the Shining Path and the FARC pre-date drug trafficking, meaning there has been a historical struggle for power that peasants are a part of and that it is hard to assign drugs a role as an explanatory variable for persistent revolution when they have not always been present. Lastly, their argument fails to apply due to its lack of nuance in the contexts of these movements. For example, while peasant support for revolutionaries could come from coca growing peasants, displaced peasants do not grow coca because they are landless. Yet landlessness clearly contributes to revolutionary fervor and political opposition to the state. Essentially, the very ingredients for an increase in peasant participation in the cultivation of drugs-agribusiness, mining and energy sectors’ market domination, land seizure through concession (political favor), low wages, and environmental damages to peasant lands-could all create conditions for both drug trafficking and political resistance to the state. So, if two phenomena are related to the same variables, a higher occurrence of one (drug trafficking) should not be used as an instigator of the other (revolutionary activity).

With the personal profit motive discredited as a predictor of revolutionary persistence within the FARC and the Shining Path, it is important to examine the first of these two variables for significance. This is the variable of community structures and guerrilla incursion into these social structures. For each case, the insurgents utilized peasant support to avoid detection by the state, draw membership for its ranks, and to provide a basis for political advocacy. Each
insurgency has represented a viable source of employment for peasants that find little opportunities in the formal economy. A few key differences have emerged from an analysis of these movements’ roles in their respective peasant societies.

The next variable to be considered is from Moore’s analysis on modernization’s potential to transform lord-peasant relations. It can be stated with confidence that rents from lords did increase as modernization took hold and traditional elites tied to the countryside needed more wealth to compete with the emerging urban bourgeoisie. In Peru, the military seized lands from this traditional elite and collectivized large amounts of agricultural production and marketing. Yet new actors continued extracting some of the peasants’ crop and charged the peasants dues simply to complete bureaucratic paperwork to ensure legal title and membership for and within the cooperatives. Colombia’s traditional elite were left alone by the state and aided through state reform attempts to transition from traditional lord-peasant relations to favor new agribusinesses, mining and oil interests. Here though there is a qualitative difference in who was usurping peasant interests; the fact remains that peasants were either having rents increased or facing more expulsion at the hands of capitalist interests. The extent of this essay doesn’t allow a more detailed analysis of specific lord-peasant interactions, yet the broader context points toward a peasantry, in both Colombia and Peru, that is being squeezed by a rush for wealth emanating from the processes of modernization. Since this basic fact is true for both cases, it doesn’t seem as if it can be utilized as a key predictor for the differing trajectories of revolutionary fervor in these cases.

In lieu of Moore’s analysis, the state must be brought in as a potential aggregator of interests. Huntington’s (1968) vision of parties that could respond to peasant needs was tested in explaining the contextual features rebellion emerged within. In Colombia, the party system
emerged and peaceful transitions of power were executed without any interruption post-National Front. In Peru, the military’s role in politics from 1969 to 1978, serving the function of a political party, would start a tradition of military involvement that Fujimori would invoke during his autocratic era of rule in the 1990s. Although Colombia appears to, from an institutionalization perspective, have found a balance between the interests of society and the political elite; in this case, looks are very deceiving. The Colombian government’s proclivity for human rights abuses, corruption, and subservience to business interests precludes any conclusion from being drawn that involves giving credit to Colombian institutions appearance of democracy. In Peru, through military rule and later autocracy, revolutionary fervor was quelled. While later, post-2000, human rights violators have been brought to justice with intelligence leader Montesinos and Fujimori each serving terms for their roles in violence against Peruvian peasants. Thus, it appears that here the correlation of institutionalization and greater functionality of government to aggregate citizen demands and limit revolutionary impulses is inverted from what may have been expected. Peru, though its political parties appear to have failed to emerge and perform the role of connecting government to society, has managed to better quell revolutionary impulses than Colombia. Colombian political parties seem vibrant, electorally significant, and willing to play their part in a democratic system. However, they fail to serve the interests of peasant society, and thus fail in quelling the FARC’s social basis as evidenced by the FARC’s current strength.

If institutionalization of the state cannot determine revolutionary fertility, then perhaps it can be simply the decision by state-leaders to align themselves with different sectors of the society opposed to peasant interests. As Wolf (1969) makes clear, the state’s tendency to overlook peasant interests in favor of more powerful interests is a contributor to peasant anger and revolutionary enthusiasm. For these two case-studies, each political context demonstrates the
peasantry being dominated and exploited within the system, albeit by different actors. In Peru, fewer capitalist elites were encroaching on peasant interests than in Colombia. Instead, new patrons that could utilize their language skills, education, and knowledge of state bureaucratic procedures to extract surplus from the cooperatives and communities (which were never co-opted but wanted to sell produce) emerged. They ultimately represented a new elite that provided support for the state while taking surplus from the peasantry, undermining attempts to incorporate the peasantry into society through economic help. In Colombia, the state’s fostering of agribusiness, in addition to foreign mining and oil interests, that extracted Colombia’s resources contributed directly to the land squeeze of the peasantry. This was more direct than in the Peruvian case but still a similar situation where the interests of actors more powerful than the peasantry were allowed to prevail and prevent the peasants’ economic position from being improved despite stated and attempted reforms to quell peasant grievances. Ultimately, this variable cannot be decisive for predicting revolutionary fertility in these two countries. Both states’ political elites made similar choices in relation to the peasantry. In Peru, the peasantry was pacified, though economic hardship persists in the localities where the Shining Path has located its base and for much of the highland peasantry (Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times 2010). While in Colombia, the FARC carries on its struggle.

The next variable to be considered for validity is the land tenure patterns pointed to by Paige (1975). Paige ultimately stated that, the more land peasants are able to own or control for their own production, the less likely they would be to revolt. Moore’s juxtaposition of the Chinese and Japanese peasantries illustrates the likelihood that a peasantry that could be held together in tight-knit communities was more easily controllable by the state also provides a clue as to why community structure should be considered along with the land tenure patterns. In Peru,
the Shining Path had to win over entire communities to support its cause due to the social structure of the Peruvian highland peasantry. The communities are collectives that sell their produce as such, with those with individual access to land selling their produce as one to external markets. The individuals that would make up the Shining Path cadre were university students that were children of wealthy, land-rich peasants. The Shining Path was not necessarily a movement for poor landless peasants, though they exploited state failure to produce a land reform. Since the Shining Path was in some ways empowered through decisions by peasant leaders, when the state intervened and began persuading some of these leaders their interests would be better served by loyalty to the state, the social basis for the Shining Path began to erode.

In Colombia, the situation at the time of the FARC’s emergence was much different. The countryside had recently been ravaged and fragmented via La Violencia. Collective communities emerged with the sole purpose of protection. The FARC emerged out of a Communist-party-backed community’s response to state repression in the locality of Marquetalia. The peasantry where the FARC mobilized its social base was not communally organized as it pertains to production, instead maintaining a more individualistic society. The FARC worked to educate and bring to the peasantry a collective consciousness. To defend itself from the violence, parts of the peasantry associated with Liberal and Communist party elites took up arms. The FARC figured out ways to insert themselves into communities and with peasant individuals because they knew the peasant interests and confronted a peasantry suffering from what were perceived injustices, such as crop fumigation, human rights abuses, and landlessness, perpetrated by the state.

While at first the FARC appears to have found it easier to penetrate more dispersed communities than the Shining Path that eventually lost favor with peasant elites, the communal
structure and land tenure patterns doesn’t end up being the variable that is the source of the
difference. In fact, each movement found an audience for its message due to some of the same
grievances, the primary one being land shortages, with secondary reasons including access to state
services and excessive patron extraction (tribute). Shining Path brutality toward the peasantry,
considered here to be a manifestation of attempting to control communities, is a reflection of the
difficulty the Shining Path faced in attempting to win over peasants who were well off and not
always inclined to fight for radical change. However, the FARC itself has been noted to be
violent toward the peasantry when it struggled to garner support, though in its case the paramilitary
brutality toward the peasantry dwarfs it so exponentially that the FARC has never experienced a
broad-based withdrawal of support. While the community structures do differ, there seems to be
no way to tie this difference to peasant-insurgent relations. Each movement went into the
peasantry as outsiders and mobilized low-level peasants to fight for them. Insurgent-peasant
relations appear similar and only differ in terms of state success in pulling away support from the
guerrillas. What this points to is that it is the state’s success/failure in legitimizing itself to the
peasantry that may be more important.

Skopcol’s work on the international context’s impact on state decisions that might serve as
an igniter of revolution proves particularly useful here. As has been made clear, each state made
attempts at land reform in an attempt to stabilize peasant society. So, what remains to be
explored about state relations with the peasantry is the way in which the state’s external economic
and military relations with outside actors affect peasant society. The relations with external
actors, both military and economic, form the key element of a state’s political leadership’s
calculation on what is best for their country. Who the state’s leadership chooses to align itself
with from a bevy of international actors can play a role in state policy, hence impacting
state-society relationships. In examining this variable for Peru and Colombia, it becomes clear that each country’s status as Latin American nations ruled out the possibility of a simple analysis including a list of allies. The U.S. omnipresence in the region meant that the nature of each country to the region’s hegemon had to be performed. The main consideration was the extent to which each country followed policies that were supported and forwarded by the U.S., took positions on international incidents the U.S. favored, and was willing to depend on U.S. military aid for support and direction in repressing popular unrest in their countries. In addition to the state centered element of the international scene was an analysis of the support each received from international actors. Both elements were explored to determine to what extent each, the states relationship to the U.S. and the revolutionary’s relationship to external support networks, played in legitimizing either the state or the revolutionary’s political position and aspirations.

From analyzing the extent to which each countries relationship to the U.S. and external actors legitimized revolutionary politics, it can be seen whether or not this variable is important to consider. Once each country was analyzed, the comparison could then be performed to determine whether the country that had an international context that delegitimized state interests while promoting revolutionary politics also had a correspondingly greater amount of revolutionary size, scope, and significance. What was discovered was a rather clear correspondence between revolutionary scope and the international context’s delegitimizing of state interests. Colombia’s tendency to allow extensive penetration of U.S. corporations commensurate with U.S. military assistance to aid with Colombia’s internal security efforts, largely targeting the FARC, represented a significant deviation from Peru’s willingness to align with the U.S. in the same way.

In Colombia, U.S. corporations operate in areas that are defended by Colombian military/paramilitary units. While at the same time this is happening, the U.S. aids the Colombian
military that has extensive, and documented (The Sixth Division, 2001), ties to what are supposedly rogue paramilitaries. The paramilitaries protect corporate investments (infrastructure) and also suppress political mobilization against corporate interests with extrajudicial assassinations, including the essential extermination of the FARC’s political wing, the UP. Paramilitary extrajudicial killings comprise the majority of human rights abuses inside Colombia and cause societal fear for corporate-paramilitary-military interests and actors, legitimizing the revolutionary aspirations of the FARC. At the same time that U.S. support for human rights abusers, who are defending corporate interests, delegitimizes the state, the FARC’s ties to international actors has done little to delegitimize them within Colombia or even internationally. This is mainly because verifiable links of substance and significance have not been attainable by U.S. intelligence. For example, ties to the IRA (Northern Irish separatists), Basque militia, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez all represent Washington chatter meriting few mentions of the allegations in newspapers, but, ultimately, in official assessments never rising to the level of a vital element in the FARC’s operations. This failure helps explain why ties to “terrorists,” like those mentioned above, do not have much significance for the FARC’s legitimacy inside Colombia or on the international scene.

Peruvian foreign and domestic policy was by no means detached from U.S. influence. However, its state-security apparatus has never been as intimately tied to the U.S. military, and there is less correlation between the defense of corporate interests and U.S. involvement in Peruvian internal security. Thus, state security attempts at co-opting the peasants who, in the early 1990s, had once supported the Shining Path, were able to have noted success. While human rights abuses did happen, they were often discovered after they occurred and, because the Shining Path threat to the state had declined significantly by the late 90s and 2000s, were not an ongoing
problem for the Peruvian state. In comparing the Peruvian military’s penchant for supporting foreign corporate interests, it is clear that, to the extent it did so, it did not incite revolution. In fact the areas where the Shining Path was based were more economically isolated than other regions and not tied to corporate interests. So, in the Peruvian case, there was no widespread human rights abuses that took place continually over decades. Furthermore, some of the human rights abuses that have been uncovered have resulted in high-level prosecutions in the case of Fujimori and his lead intelligence official Montesinos. In addition, in the 1990s, Peruvian President Fujimori was less willing to pursue coca fumigation than his Colombian peers, who were adhering to U.S. preferences. Extrajudicial killings and crop fumigation are both extremely unpopular with poor peasants who are often powerless and have few prospects to earn a respectable living outside of illicit crops.

In the case of extrajudicial killings in Colombia, they occur during a process intended to defend corporate interests and often at U.S. insistence, in the name of stemming drug trafficking flows. The paramilitary strength was largely attributable to ties with the Colombian military, which is strengthened with U.S. financing, technical assistance, and advice on counterinsurgency methods. Comparable assistance to the Peruvian military was not forthcoming. It is clear that policies like crop fumigation and support for violent paramilitaries have perpetuated the delegitimization of the Colombian state in relationship to the FARC. While pitfalls such as these were largely avoided by Peru, social control was achieved with targeted killings of Shining Path leaders and direct peasant-military appeasement and cooperation. Poverty has remained a reality for Peru’s peasantry, yet its support for the Shining Path is largely gone, while in Colombia the FARC thrives. This distinction’s occurrence in the midst of differing policy approaches toward insurgent movements and their social base (peasants) validates the importance of the international
context in assessing revolutionary persistence and scope.

The international context seems to be the only variable that, upon comparison and analysis of the comparison’s validity, seems strongly linked to the disparate strength of the FARC and the Shining Path today. Other aspects of the paper that did not result in a distinction that pointed to increased revolutionary activity did not have such results based on deficiencies in theory. Largely, the theories used, particularly Moore, Scott, and Wolf, dealt with conditions and causes of successful revolutions. Using variables drawn from their writings to explain persistence of revolutionary activity absent actual revolution, though valid because of the common existence of modernization and its political implications, may fall slightly afield of what those scholars considered to be their work’s most valid contributions. Other scholars’ work like Tilly, Gurr, Hobsbawm, and Paige, point directly toward the propensity for peasant anti-state activity, with revolution being the goal in cases where the political opposition to the state was articulated and plans for state takeover were part of the doctrine. Ultimately, Skopcol’s work on the importance of state leaders’ interest calculations and alliance decisions in the international context provided the most compelling difference in the distinct trajectories of these two movements. This may not be necessarily due to the power of this variable. In fact, the two countries proximity to the U.S., the world’s longtime imperial power, has meant that each nation was subjected to strong pressure to modernize, develop integrated internal market economies, and open their economies to global markets. These pressures to influence may have something to do with geography and U.S. interest calculations. Thus, only tentatively can it be stated that the international context is a predictor of revolutionary zeal when it leads to a delegitimized state. It is likely that revolution and other serious anti-state activities can occur in countries where international actors do not play as large of a role as the U.S. has played (and continues to play) in Latin America. A more holistic
survey of revolution and anti-state actors than is possible here would have to be performed to affirm a more profound theory. This paper simply has affirmed the idea that the international context’s affect on state-society relations and social welfare must be examined in any case where anti-state activity is pervasive and persistent.
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