A STUDY OF CITIZENSHIP IN AUGUSTINE'S CITY OF GOD WITH A TRANSLATION OF PART OF ETIENNE GILSON'S INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Graduate Division

Indiana State Teachers College

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

---

by

David Francis Siemens Jr.

June 1954

INDIANA STATE TC LIBRARY

The thesis of David Francis Siemens Jr., Contribution of the Graduate School, Indiana State Teachers College, Number 751, under the title--
A Study of Citizenship in Augustine's City of God with a Translation of Part of Etienne Gilson's Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin--
is hereby approved as counting toward the completion of the Master's degree in the amount of 8 hours' credit.

Committee on thesis:

George E. Snook

Edward A. Tenney

Eugene Day Cobb, Chairman

Representative of the English Department:

George E. Snook

Date of Acceptance June 2, 1954

PREFACE

General outline of the work. This thesis considers the problem of citizenship on the basis of Augustine's definition of the State. But before this main problem could be considered, it was necessary to establish that Augustine definitely intended the revision of Cicero's standard definition. This secondary problem occupies the first part of the first chapter. The second part of this chapter criticizes Gilson's analysis of Augustine's concept of citizenship. This discussion is continued in the third chapter. There the first two chapters are summarized. This summary is followed by an attempted resolution of the problem on Augustine's terms and a summary of the conclusions reached.

The second chapter is a sort of parenthesis between the first and third chapters. In it is considered briefly the background, historically and philosophically, of the City of God, the work on which this study is based. This is followed by a consideration of the effects of Augustine's definition of the State on subsequent political thought.

The main body of the thesis is followed by a bibliography and three appendices. The first appendix forms an introduction to the translation of the portion of Etienne Gilson's Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin. In this appendix is also a bibliography of Gilson's books and pamph-

lets published in English, translated into English, and untranslated. The second appendix contains the translation of Gilson's Introduction to the Study of Saint Augustine, pages 225 to 242. The third appendix suggests some further studies which may be made.

Abbreviations used in this work. Because so many references to the works of Augustine are made, they have been abbreviated. Thus, all references in which no author is named, with the exception of note 23, page 23, refer to Augustine's works. A further abbreviation is used in all references to the City of God, CD (for Civitas Dei). This is followed by the volume and page numbers in Dod's edition of Augustine's works, if the work is found therein. Otherwise, the reference is to the translation noted in the bibliography. The one exception to this is in citations of the Confessions, which was missing from the set used by this writer. Therefore reference is there to the Pocket Book edition noted in the bibliography. In the second appendix, references in parentheses may refer to Migne's Patrologia Latina. In this case, the initials PL are prefixed. For example:

> CD, XIX, 24 (II, 339f) means: Aurelius Augustine, The City of God, book XIX, chapter 24; in Marcus Dods, editor, The Works of Aurelius Augustine (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1872-1876), vol. II, pp. 339f.

For the remainder, the abbreviations used in the

footnotes are standard, with the exception of A.V., which refers to the Authorized King James Version of the Bible, originally published in 1611. All references to the Bible, with the exception of some in Appendix B, are to this version, which is standard in the English-speaking world.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDICES PAGE

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

> In the long run what any society is to become will depend upon what it believes or disbelieves about eternal things.
> --Bishop Gore

Of all that has been written about the renowned bishop of Hippo, comparatively few works available in English discuss Augustine's peculiar definition of a state, and none has been discovered which even mentions the problem of citizenship which it brings up. Augustine, revising Cicero's definition of a State,[1] wrote:[2]

> . . . a people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the object of their love. . .

This definition brings up two interrelated problems. First, how can a State be formed solely by love, and how can men become citizens of such a State simply by their love of a particular object?[3] Second, and secondary but necessary

---

[1] Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Commonwealth, book I, chapters 25 and 32 (translated by George Holland Sabine and Stanley Barney Smith; Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1929), pp. 129, 137.
Quoted CD, XIX, 21 (II, 331); infra, p. 19.

[2] CD, XIX, 24 (II, 339f).

[3] See Etienne Gilson, Introduction a l'etude de Saint Augustin (Third edition: Etienne Gilson, director, Etudes

INDIANA STATE TC LIBRARY

to the main problem of this thesis, did Augustine actually teach that a State can exist without justice, as the quoted definition would lead one to believe?

The secondary problem. Before the main problem could be attacked, it was found necessary to validate the thesis that Augustine, when he revised the Ciceronian definition, fully intended the revision. On this point, McIlwain and Sabine deny that Augustine was refuting the view of Cicero, or even correcting it. They asserted that Augustine was merely refuting the heathen view that justice resided in the pagan Roman State. They argued that justice resided in the Commonwealth, though perhaps foreign to the pagan State.[4] This view has seemed to this writer to be a modern secularized transmutation of the medieval theory that absolute justice resided in the Christian, or ecclesiastical, State. This view would seem to imply that justice naturally and necessarily resides in republican or democratic governments.[5]

---

de Philosophie Médiévale, XI; Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1949), pp. 225-227. V. i., pp. 52-56. Cf. infra, pp. 12-16.

[4] Charles Howard McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), pp. 156-159.
George Holland Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937), p. 192.

[5] This, however, is denied by Augustine. See

Carlyle, who at one time strongly inclined to the view that Augustine had meant to change the definition of the State from what had been generally accepted by the Church,[6] wrote about twenty years later:[7]

> I am myself, therefore, not at all certain whether St Augustine did deliberately attempt to change the concept of the State. If he did, I cannot but feel that it was a deplorable error for a great Christian teacher.

It is beside the point of this thesis to consider whether Augustine made a mistake. It is sufficient to note that these three influential historians question Augustine's intention.

On the other hand, Figgis, Dunning, Gettell, and the Morrises, mentioning Augustine's political thought, propounded the view, though without elaborating arguments to support their position, that Augustine definitely intended to change the definition of a State.[8] In addition, Gilson

---

Gilson, op. cit., pp. 233f, 236f; v.i., pp. 68-70, 75f.

[6] R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Thought in the West (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons Ltd., 1903-1936), vol. I, pp. 166-170. A. J. Carlyle wrote this volume.

[7] A. J. Carlyle, "St. Augustine and the City of God, II," The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers (Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, editor; London: George C. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1923), pp. 50f.

[8] John Neville Figgis, The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's 'City of God' (London: Longman's, Green and

tacitly assumes that Augustine intended the change. To this view this thesis subscribes on the basis of the five succeeding arguments.

First, it seems rather unlikely that a man of the mental status of Augustine would lightly express an opinion, especially an opinion apparently at total odds with Cicero, whose writings he knew and respected.[9] Notwithstanding this respect, and the further fact that Cicero had weight as an authority, Augustine did not hesitate to disagree with him, as when he tagged him "philosophaster"--vaunted or overrated philosopher.[10]

Second, Augustine apparently reinforced the statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter through other statements in a similar vein.[11] It may be that he quoted Cicero

---

Co., 1921), pp. 59-63.
William Archibald Dunning, A History of Political Theories (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1902), p. 158.
Raymond G. Gettell, History of Political Thought (New York: The Century Co., 1924), pp. 89f; cf. p. 108.
C. R. and Mary Morris, A History of Political Ideas (New York: C. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924), p. 68.

9 CD, II, 21 (I, 74-77); III, 27 (I, 128f); IV, 26 and 30 (I, 165, 170-172); V, 8f and 13 (I, 189-195, 204f); IX, 5 (I, 359f); XIX, 5 (II, 308); XXI, 11 (II, 436); XXII, 6, 22 and 28 (II, 480-483, 521, 533).
Confessions, III (translated by Edward B. Pusey; New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1952), p. 33f.

10 CD, II, 27 (I, 87). Dods translated this: "a philosopher in his way."
See the discussion by Andrew F. West, "Philosophaster Once More," Classical Philology, V (January, 1910) 50-55.

11 CD, IV, 4 (I, 139f); XV, 8 (II, 63); XIX, 24 (II,

approvingly elsewhere,[12] but the preponderance of evidence appears to be against this approval. Especially is this true since at the beginning of the work Augustine noted that a change would have to be made in the definition of *republic*.[13]

Third, this interpretation is in keeping with Augustine's known tendency to accept fully the results of his theological and philosophical position. For example, it is quite repugnant to most men to believe and to declare that man has no real choice in the matter of salvation, that only a few men are elect by sovereign grace and that the rest of mankind are irrevocably damned, and that God is, nevertheless, absolutely just in doing this. Yet Augustine recognized and clearly enunciated these consequences of his position.[14]

339f).

[12] R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *op. cit.*, p. 167. However, at least one of the references which they cite, written the year before starting the *City of God*, does not seem to be simple approval of Cicero. See *Letter* 138, ii, 9f (XIII, 200-202).

[13] *CD*, II, 21f and 25 (II, 74-79, 84f).

[14] *The Enchiridion*, xxxif, xcivf, xcviiif, cii (IX, 198f, 240f, 242-245, 247).
A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, ix, xvi, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxvi-xxxviii (XV, 133f, 139f, 157, 159f, 162-165).
See also the discussion of predestination by Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-204.

Such an attitude is somewhat unusual among theologians. Though virtually all Christians recognize that God has final power to determine all things, very few have acknowledged the total consequences of this belief. Apparently it is too hard on man's natural pride to admit total impotence. Among the many denying--either tacitly or overtly--the absoluteness of God's election are such disparate fellows as the heretics Pelagius and Arminius, the Catholic of Catholics Aquinas, the reformer of the Reformation Wesley, and their followers. Almost isolated in their emphatic recognition of predestination are Paul, Augustine, Calvin, and, more recently, those who have followed in the Reformed tradition, whatever their denominational affiliation.

Fourth, Augustine's position relative to the State is not in such absolute contradiction with those of the other church fathers as would appear superficially. Irenaeus, who appears to have written at as much length as any on this subject, apparently adopted the Stoic definition of the State, as did Clemens Alexandrinus when he wrote:[15]

---

[15] Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, IV, 26. William Wilson, translator, The Writings of Clement of Alexandria (Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, editors, Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vols. IV and XII; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1882), vol. II, p. 219.

Cf. Irenaeus, Against Heresy, V, 24, par. 2. Alexander Roberts and W. H. Rambaut, translators, The Writings

> For the Stoics say that heaven is properly a city, but places here on earth are not cities; for they are called so, but are not. For a city is an important thing, and the people a decorous body, and a multitude of men regulated by law as the church by the Word--a city on earth impregnable--free from tyranny; a product of the divine will on earth as in heaven.

Carlyle said that this definition was followed by all of the church fathers he knew.[16]

However, Irenaeus left room for a denial of righteousness as necessary in government by writing, just below the previous reference:[17]

> Just as if anyone, being an apostate, and seizing in a hostile manner another man's territory, should harass the inhabitants of it, in order that he might claim for himself the glory of a king among those ignorant of his apostasy and robbery: so likewise also the devil . . . obtained dominion over man by apostasy. . . .

In the next chapter he continued:[18]

> And not only by the particulars already mentioned, but also by means of the events which shall occur in the time of Antichrist, is it shown that he, being an apostate and a robber, is anxious to be adored as God; and that, although a mere slave, he wishes himself to be proclaimed as king. For he . . . shall come, not as a righteous king, not as a **legitimate** king, [i.e. one]* in subjection to God, but **an impious**, unjust and lawless

---

of Irenaeus (Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, editors, Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vols. V and IX), vol. II, pp. 119f.

[16] A. J. Carlyle, op. cit., pp. 44f.

[17] Irenaeus, op. cit., V, 24, par. 4 (II, 121).

[18] Ibid., V, 25, par. 1 (121f).

* The brackets were in the translation.

> one; as an apostate, iniquitous, and murderous; as a robber, concentrating in himself all satanic apostasy . . . he will endeavour in a tyrannical manner to set himself forth as God.

Nearly the same argument was noted in Cicero by Augustine himself.[19] Hence, after Augustine noted that Rome was founded in bloodshed,[20] was expanded in evil and lawlessness,[21] and passed unjust laws,[22] and further that the emperor had usurped God's prerogative in claiming worship for himself,[23] he could not maintain that the Roman commonwealth was either legitimate or just.

In addition to these matters, directly noted by Augustine, there is another passage from Cicero which probably influenced him:[24]

> There is in fact a true law--namely, right reason--which in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect upon the bad. . . .

On the basis of the Augustinian anthropology, all men

---

19 CD, II, 21 (I, 74-77); XIX, 21 (II, 330-333).

20 CD, III, 6 (I, 95f); cf. III, 12f (I, 103-105).

21 CD, III, 13-30 (I, 103-132).

22 CD, III, 21 (I, 124).

23 CD, III, 15 (I, 108).

24 Cicero, op. cit., III, 22 (215).

are corrupt in their wills, except as they are visited by divine grace through revelation and election. Therefore, applying Cicero's definition, they cannot obey the true law, which has no effect upon the bad. Thus there can be no true law in the Roman commonwealth, for they did not even follow revelation, let alone all being elect. Hence, on this basis, Rome had no justice.

It is therefore this writer's settled opinion that Augustine honestly faced the results of the position of the church fathers, carrying their premises to their logical conclusion. He also faced the results of Cicero's position understood in the light of Christian doctrine, and acknowledged the rightlessness of the State as a necessary consequence.

Fifth, there is a definite unity manifested throughout the entire twenty-two books of De Civitate Dei. In the only study of the unity of the work that has come to light, Deferrari and Keeler strongly defend the thesis that the original conception of the work[26] and its final form[27] are

---

[25] Roy J. Deferrari and Sister M. Jerome Keeler, O. S. B., "St. Augustine's 'City of God': Its Plan and Development," American Journal of Philology, L (April, 1929) 109-127.

[26] CD, I, 36 (I, 47); cf. XI, 1 (I, 437); XVIII, 1 (II, 217f).

[27] Cf. Retractiones, II, 43; quoted in CD, Dod's preface, pp. viif.

essentially identical. They concluded:[28]

> The preceding table shows that St. Augustine, in writing the City of God, conformed to his original plan in its main outlines. The work turned out to be just what he had intended it to be from the beginning, and each book fulfills in general its definite part in the development of the whole. But we also see that St. Augustine writes in a rambling, leisurely style. He reaches his end indeed, but only after frequent pauses on the way, and several wanderings from the main road into circuitous bypaths. His goal is ever before him, and he keeps pushing towards it, but he will stop now and again to answer supposed objections, to give numerous examples, and to explain difficulties, even if they are foreign to his theme.

Inasmuch as these twenty-two books were composed over a period of about thirteen years, years filled with interruptions and with other work,[29] they have a remarkable unity. It may be, as McCabe says, that there is no "philosophical unity in the work."[30] But Pascal apparently

---

[28] Deferrari and Keeler, op. cit., pp. 126f.

[29] Joseph McCabe, St. Augustine and His Age (New York: F. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903), pp. 357f.
Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, "St. Augustine and the City of God, I," The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers (Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, editor; London: George C. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1923), p. 40.

[30] McCabe, op. cit., p. 360.
Cf. George Gordon Coulton, Studies in Medieval Thought (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1940), pp. 37f.

No doubt Oates would disagree with this opinion. See Whitney J. Oates, editor, Basic Writings of Saint Augustine (New York: Random House, 1948), pp. ix, xixf.
The writer of this thesis is persuaded that the major part of Augustine's lack of philosophical precision in Coulton's opinion (v.s., note 28) is the expression of his biblicism and his use of accepted biblical definitions. Coul-

better caught the true feeling of the work when he wrote:[30]

> The heart has its own order; the intellect has its own, which is by principle and demonstration. The heart has another. We do not prove that we ought to love by enumerating in order the causes of love: that would be ridiculous.
>
> Jesus Christ and Saint Paul employ the rule of love, not of intellect; for they would warn, not instruct. It is the same with Saint Augustine. This order consists chiefly in digressions on each point to indicate the end, and keep it always in sight.

It has therefore seemed necessary to this writer to conclude that Augustine wrote his settled and mature opinion of the State in the passage quoted at the beginning of this

---

ton accuses him of being illogical in making the Church one time Corpus Verum Christi, also Corpus Permixtum, and on occasion Externa Societas Sacramentorum. He acknowledges that this may be only a two-fold division into Invisible Church (the former) and Visible Church (the latter two). But these two usages--or very similar ones--are those of the New Testament, which permeated all of Augustine's thought. For church means congregation, the entire group of worshippers at a given location, such as Rome, Corinth, Colosse or the cities of Galatia. These were the visible churches, parts of the Visible Church. Again, the Church is the body and bride of Christ.* This is the mystic, Invisible Church. To say that Augustine's logic breaks down because he uses these established definitions appears to be, at the very least, unfair. Nor should one consider him illogical for not agreeing with modern concepts of the rights and limits of the Visible Church. It is patently foolish to try to make Augustine conform to modern philosophical usage when his writings were rather hortatory than pedantic, popular than strictly for the specialist.

* Eph. 1:22f; 5:23-33; Col. 1:18; cf. Heb. 12:22-24.

[30] Blaise Pascal, Pensees, 283. W. F. Trotter and Thomas M'Crie, translators, Pensees and the Provincial Letters (New York: The Modern Library, Random House, 1941), pp. 96f.

chapter. Any different conclusion, though propounded by the most respected scholar, has seemed to him to lead to graver problems than the simple acceptance of Augustine's statement as plainly meaning what it overtly said.

The primary problem. To turn to the primary problem, no work which is available in English has been found which has attempted to explain how, according to Augustine, a person becomes a citizen. Etienne Gilson, in his Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin, has raised the question and attempted to answer it. His discussion is so important to this thesis that it has been translated and inserted in the appendix.[31] Gilson's discussion proposes to answer the question which may be stated: How can what a person loves ipso facto make him a citizen of a state?[32] Augustine has defined a people, and hence a State, as "an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the object of their love."[33] Gilson, on the basis of this, argues that a common love, of itself, organizes a society. To illustrate this, he said that a group of men excited to love by the ability of a dramatic actor form a society.

---

[31] V. i., pp. 52ff.

[32] Gilson, op. cit., pp. 225-227. Translation infra, pp. 52-56.

[33] V. s., p. 1.

This passage is in large part lifted directly from Augustine, as Gilson himself notes.[34] It may be further noted that Augustine at least twice wrote that the two cities, Babylon and Jerusalem, or the earthly city and the heavenly, were formed by two loves.[35]

In spite of this apparent proof, it may be well to ask a few questions. First, what was Augustine's purpose in writing the passage which Gilson takes to illustrate his argument? Second, can love per se and ipso facto form a society? Third, inasmuch as Gilson concluded that "there are as many cities as there are collective loves," are there an indefinitely great number of cities? After considering these questions, we may arrive at a better understanding of the problem of citizenship as it is posed by Augustine.

In considering the first question, it must be noted that Augustine, in the passage mentioned, had been urging Christians to try to bring others to the knowledge of God. He wrote: "We ought to desire that they might join with us in loving God," and we should work to that end. From this beginning, Augustine chose the audience at "dens of iniquity," who urge others to applaud their favorite, to illus-

---

[34] Gilson, op. cit., p. 226, note1; v.i., p. 53f, note 1. See On Christian Doctrine, I, 29, par. 30 (IX, 24f).

[35] V. i., pp. 54f, note 3.

trate how Christians should the more strenuously urge others to love God, Who not only gives pleasure, but in Whom there is no disappointment. This is considerably different in its tone and import from the use to which Gilson puts it. In fact, it seems hardly just to seize upon this fragment which is used only as an illustration and to try to make it carry such a weight as the entire basis and concept of citizenship.

With regard to the second question, it may be noted that Augustine definitely stated that it was an agreement by rational beings as to the object of love that constituted the bond of a society. This may be described as a sort of social contract. This unity of feeling may form the basis for political unity. But it can hardly, as Gilson argues, immediately--both as to time and agency--form this political unity.

Using the same illustration from the theater, it may be asked how a fan club, which is a type of society, may be organized. Does a wildly applauding audience constitute a fan club? Certainly not! The members of that audience may be moved to form a fan club, but the club does not exist until they agree to form it.

But perhaps the greatest problem lies in the conclusion which necessarily follows Gilson's thesis. If a society is formed immediately by a collective love, then every

time a collective love appears, a society appears. And every time a society appears, a State appears. This Gilson recognized when he wrote:[36]

> When we give the name city to this group of men who are joined by their common love for a specific object, we say that there are as many cities as there are collective loves.

If this be true, then the doting parents and grandparents form a city when they join in admiring the bairn and in agreeing that it is greater than the admirable Crichton. But it is obvious that they do not form a City or State, but only a family. However strongly united they may be in their enthusiasm and love for this single object, they are a family and no more.

Again, if this thesis be true, one is brought to affirm that any two boys who agree that a certain girl is without peer, that she is absolutely lovable, any two such boys form a city. Though there may be agreement as to the object of their love, there is a greater likelihood of feuding than of fusion.

The difficulty encountered by this thesis goes beyond a quibble over whether several individuals independently love one object or unitedly love one object. It goes beyond the problem of mere size. The difference is qualita-

---

[36] Gilson, op. cit., p. 226. Translation infra, p. 54.

tive rather than quantitative. Thus it is evident that what a person loves does not immediately make him a member of a society.

At this point it is pertinent to ask what Augustine himself has suggested in his writings. No one will venture to say that he has at any point clearly and thoroughly explained himself on this matter. What, precisely, is a State, and what is a citizen, according to Augustine's own view? The answer to this question has been considered in Chapter III. But before passing to this consideration, it has been considered necessary to consider briefly the broad background of Augustine's writings. This occupies Chapter II.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

> Much of the book is but an expansion of Augustine's doctrine of grace applied on the scale of world history.
>
> --John Neville Figgis

To better appreciate and understand the problem, it is necessary to understand the historical conditions and philosophical antecedents of Augustine's greatest work, De Civitate Dei.

The historical situation. Historically, Christianity had finally become a power within the Roman Empire. It was, after a long struggle with a deified emperor, the state religion.[1] But, less than a century after its ascendancy, Rome had been sacked by the invading barbarians. The Romans who were still pagans attributed this disaster to the abandonment of the old gods and to the Christian refusal to worship the divine Caesar. At this point in history Augustine wrote De Civitate Dei as an apology for Christianity. It is this defense of Christianity against the pagan calumny that gives the entire work its tone. This is the theme of

---

[1] See Frederick M. Cramer, "The Evolution of Citizenship," Current History, XIII (October, 1947) 194-196.

the first ten books.[2]

Augustine also felt the impact of the barbarian invasions in the flood of refugees who reached North Africa and in the persons who felt that everything stable had been swept away to leave only anarchy. These he attempted to reassure by pointing out that all history has a purpose, whether man understands it or not. God is working in history to accomplish His will, to bring to completion the Heavenly City. This he deals with in the last twelve books, noting the origin of the two cities, their course in time, and their final consummation in eternity.[3]

The philosophical trends. Philosophically three rather distinct lines of thought merged in this work. The first was the political philosophy of the Stoic tradition. The second was the Neoplatonic doctrine of the Real-Ideal relationship. The third was the Biblical revelation and patristic thinking. To some extent these lines of thought overlap in individuals. Irenaeus, for example, combined

---

[2] John Neville Figgis, The Political Aspects of S. Augustine's 'City of God' (London: Longman's Green and Co., 1921), pp. 5f, 8, 29.
G[eorge] G[ordon] Coulton, Studies in Medieval Thought (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1940), pp. 40f.

[3] Figgis, op. cit., pp. 8, 29.
Coulton, op. cit., p. 42.

the first and third; Origen, the second and third. Yet the lines are sufficiently distinct to be considered separately.

As to political philosophy, Augustine was especially indebted to Cicero, whom he notes, quotes, and criticizes in several passages.[4] The basic definition of citizenship was taken from Cicero's De Republica, I, 32: "What indeed, is a state, if it is not an association of citizens united by law?"[5]

Somewhat the same train of political thought is to be found in most of the church fathers, notably Irenaeus.[6] These concepts were probably taken over directly from such Stoics as Seneca.[7] Seneca held that the State was an agen-

---

[4] CD, II, 21, 27 (I, 74-77, 87); III, 27, 30f (I, 128f, 132f); IV, 26, 30 (I, 165f, 170-172); V, 9, 13 (I, 190-195, 204f); IX, 5 (I, 359f); XIX, 5, 21-24 (II, 308, 330-340); XXI, 11 (II, 436f); XXII, 6f, 22, 28 (II, 480-483, 521, 533).

[5] Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Commonwealth (translated by George Holland Sabine and Stanley Barney Smith; Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1929), p. 137.

Cf. I, 25 (p. 129) and VI, 13 (p. 259): "For the supreme god who rules the entire universe finds nothing, at least among earthly objects, more pleasing than the societies and groups of men, united by law and right, which are called states."

[6] V. s., pp. 6ff.

[7] A. J. Carlyle, "St. Augustine and the City of God, II," The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers (Fossey John Cobb Harnshaw, editor; London:

cy required by the condition of mankind, not the highest agency of moral perfection as had been held by the ancients.[8]

From Plato and his successors, Augustine received an epistemological viewpoint which he modified to suit his position. Neoplatonists had developed Plato's Real-Ideal relationship into a concept where the real world, apprehended by the senses, is not identical with the ideal world, which exists in heaven and which forms the ultimate truth comprehended by the mind. Yet the Ideal is constantly manifested in the Real.[9]

Augustine made such a Real-Ideal relationship into a relationship between the temporal State and the civitas terrenae, and between the Church and the civitas Dei. Rome

---

George C. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1923), pp. 44f.
Cf. George H[olland] Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937), p. 181.

[8] Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales (Epistles), xiv, 2; xix (Richard M. Gummere, translator; E. Capps, T. E. Page, and W. H. D. Rouse, editors, The Loeb Classical Library; London: William Heinemann, 1917), vol. I, pp, 83-86, 125-133.

[9] Cf. Rupert [Clendon] Lodge, The Great Thinkers (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951), p. 33.
Cf. Joseph McCabe, St. Augustine and His Age (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903), pp. 357, 361.
Cf. G[eorge] Santayana, "Reviews of Books," The Philosophical Review, X (September, 1901), p. 515.
Cf. Maurice de Wulf, History of Mediaeval Philosophy (Ernest C. Messenger, translator; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952-), vol. I, pp. 80-82.

and Assyria, representatives of the temporal State, were not considered by Augustine to be identical with the satanically dominated city appointed to destruction, the societas impiorum. The latter was manifested by the former in such things as the persecution of the saints. But still it must be noted that members of the civitas Dei are also members of the temporal State.[10] Likewise the Church is not the civitas Dei, but is only an imperfect manifestation of it in time, for it includes some of the members of the societas impiorum in its ranks.[11] This distinction, however, is not always understood by Roman Catholic writers.[12]

From Biblical and patristic sources, Augustine de-

---

[10] CD, XIV, 28 (II, 47f); XV, 1f, 16 (II, 49-52, 80); XVI, 10 (II, 120f); XVIII, 54 (II, 292); XIX, 14, 17 (II, 322f, 326-328).

[11] CD, XX, 9 (II, 363-368); cf. XXI, 1 (II, 413). V. s., pp. 10f, note 30.
Cf. Coulton, op. cit., pp. 37-39.
Cf. W. Cunningham, S. Austin and His Place in the History of Christian Thought (The Hulsean Lectures, 1885; London: C. J. Clay and Sons, 1886), pp. 152-154.
Cf. Trumbull G[illette] Duvall, Great Thinkers: the Quest of Life for Its Meaning (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 176-178.
Cf. Figgis, op. cit., pp. 51, 68, 94f.
Cf. H. H. Scullard, "'The City of God,'" The Contemporary Review, CX (September, 1916) 376f.

[12] E. g., de Wulf, op. cit., pp. 92f.
In contrast, see Etienne Gilson, Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin (Etienne Gilson, director Etudes de Philosophie Medievale, XI; Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1949), pp. 238-240. V. i., pp. 79-85.
Also see the section of this thesis on the lasting influence of Augustine, pp. 24-28.

rived the idea of two kingdoms or cities. In the New Testament the two kingdoms are mentioned, especially the kingdom of God, also called the kingdom of heaven, of Christ, of God's Son, etc.,[13] contrasted with the kingdom of Satan and the beast.[14] The word city is also used of the heavenly reign[15] and of the reign of Satan or his representative.[16] Gilson points out that Psalm 86:6, in the Vulgate,[17] contains the very words, "Civitas Dei," and refers also to Augustine's comments on Psalm 64:2.[18] Further, Paul declared that "our citizenship is in heaven."[19] These matters are extremely important because Augustine took the Scripture literally.[20] He took the authority of Christ as

---

[13] Mat. 8:11; Luke 1:33; John 18:36f; Col. 1:13; Jas. 2:5; II Pet. 1:11; Rev. 11:15; 12:10. Cf. Mat. 5:35; I Tim. 1:17; 6:15; Rev. 15:3; 17:14; 19:16.

[14] Mat. 12:25f; Luke 11:17f; Rev. 16:10.

[15] Mat. 5:35; Heb. 11:10, 16; 12:22; Rev. 3:12; 21:1-22:5; 22:14, 19.

[16] Rev. 11:8, 13; 14:8; 16:19; 17:18; 18:10-24.

[17] Quoted CD, X, 7 (I, 392); XI, 1 (I, 436); numbered 87:3, A.V.

[18] Gilson, op. cit., p. 241. V. i., pp. 54f, note 3. Psalm 65:1 A.V.

[19] Phil. 3:20, in the Greek text.

[20] George Boas, The Adventures of Human Thought: The Major Traditions of European Philosophy (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1929), p. 117.
Duvall, op. cit., p. 171.
Cf. CD, XI, 3 (I, 438f).

final.[21] Hence there is no trace of Manicheanism in Augustine's writings.[22]

Besides these Biblical sources, in an ancient document, Christians are said to be citizens in heaven and sojourners on earth.[23] Origen expressed a similar idea when, defending Christians for their reluctance to take office and bear arms, he urged that they were members of another "national organization."[24] But it appears that the idea of the two cities, a heavenly and an infernal, was taken directly from Tyconius' Rules and his comments on the Revelation,[25] works which Augustine knew by a Donatist whom he

---

[21] Duvall, op. cit., pp. 167f.

[22] Gilson, op. cit., pp. 240f; v. i., pp.

[23] Epistola ad Diognetum, v; quoted by Joseph Henry Thayer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament (corrected edition; New York; Cincinnati, Chicago: American Book Company, 1889), p. 528.

[24] Origen, Contra Celsum, VIII, 75; The Writings of Origen (Frederick Crombie, translator; Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, editors, Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vols. X and XXIII), vol. II, p. 558.

[25] Figgis, op. cit., pp. 46f, 127, note 5.
Gilson, op. cit., p. 241.
It will be noted that the greatest concentration of verses bearing directly on the two kingdoms and the two cities was found in the Revelation. V. s., p. 22, notes 13-19.
It may be noted that Tyconius' comments on the Revelation have not been rediscovered, but the Rules have been published: F. C. Burkitt, editor, The Book of Rules of Tyconius (Cambridge: University Press, 1894). The former work was used in the pseudo-Augustinian homilies.*

esteemed highly.[26]

The impact of Augustine on political philosophy. Before leaving this section, it has seemed well to note Augustine's effect on later political writers. Such a survey will probably clarify what has been said relative to Roman Catholic writers[27] and help to place the following chapter in its proper perspective.

One word will nearly suffice to sum up Augustine's influence on this particular phase of political philosophy--nil. In almost every phase of thought, Augustine strongly influenced subsequent thought. But in defining Church and State, the concept advanced by Cyprian, which equated the Roman Catholic Church with the true Church and with the civitas Dei, became accepted everywhere.[28] Again, as the Church gained power over the barbarian hordes, there arose the dominant medieval tradition that every aspect of the life of every human being was to be subject to the power of

---

* Burkitt, op. cit., p. xii.

[26] Cf. On Christian Doctrine, III, 30, par. 42 especially, et sqq. (IX, 105ff).

[27] V. s., p. 21.

[28] Scullard, op. cit., p. 374. This was not held by Augustine. See Gilson, op. cit., p. 238; v.i., pp. 78f. See also the references under note 11, p. 21.

the Church. On this basis, there can be only one government, not two,[29] as in Augustine. In addition, Aristotle's Politics was exalted to the position of an "irrefragable canon."[30] These changes made Augustine irrelevant to the political thought of the Middle Ages. Still, to serve his purposes, Pope Gregory VII in the eleventh century conceived the State as the work of sin and the devil.[31] But apparently nowhere during the early medieval period was Augustine's definition of the State quoted,[32] though Cicero's definition reached some medieval writers through Augustine.[33] As a result of this disregard of Augustine's view,

---

[29] Figgis, op. cit., pp. 95f.
Otto Frederick Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages (Frederick Maitland, translator; Cambridge: University Press, 1913), pp. 30f, 101f, 103f, 124.

[30] Gierke, op. cit., p. 2.

[31] Ibid., p. 109, note 16.

[32] R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Thought in the West (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons Ltd., 1903-1936), vol. I, pp. 168f.
Cf. Cunningham, op. cit., pp. 152f.

[33] A. J. Carlyle, op. cit., p. 51.
But compare Ernest Baker, "Introductory: Mediaeval Political Thought," The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers (Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, editor; London: George C. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1923), pp. 16f:

> We can hardly, therefore, speak of any politics or political theory in the Middle Ages as a separate or distinguishable factor or subject of study. Politics, economics, ethics, theology--all these run into one and

Carlyle could write:[34]

> Augustine's own attempt to eliminate the conception of justice from the notion of the State is passed over in silence, and I can only say, therefore, that, if it was intended and deliberate, it had no significance; it had no correspondence with the movements of the human thought of later times, at any rate until we come down to the great but eccentric and abnormal genius of Hobbes in the seventeenth century.

However, Hobbes apparently did not derive any part of his concept from Augustine. Instead, he followed a development somewhat similar to Augustine's, except that he failed to return to orthodoxy. Augustine passed from his early orthodoxy to heresy and skepticism, followed by Platonism and a renewed orthodoxy. Hobbes went from Puritan Christianity, through Stoicism and humanism, to a semi-Platonic utilitarianism.[35]

Perhaps Machiavelli may be said to have antedated Hobbes in positing a State without justice, at least with-

---

> are blended together; or, more strictly speaking, politics and economics are subordinated to ethics, which itself is revealed ethics, and therefore theology. Here --with the one and fundamental difference of revelation --the Middle Ages are like the ancient Greek world; and mediaeval theory comes nearest to that of Plato. For in the ancient Greek world also politics and economics were subordinated to ethics; and in the thought of Plato ethics was in turn dependent, if not upon revelation, at any rate upon a system of metaphysics which had its analogies with mediaeval theology. . . .

[34] A. J. Carlyle, op. cit., p. 51.

[35] Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Elsa M. Sinclair, translator: Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952).

out justice on the part of the Prince, even though the traditional values were to be inculcated in the masses. However, Machiavelli's matter-of-course atheism[36] would seem to preclude Augustinian influence. He despised Savonarola's attempt to make Florence an earthly city of God.[37] The Venetian Senate blamed Tacitus for him.[38] Thus it is unlikely that either Hobbes nor Machiavelli is related to Augustine by anything more than coincidence.

Indeed, this writer has been unable to discover any political philosophy developed by anyone holding a view like Augustine's, and on the basis of Augustine's premises.[39] These premises, although seemingly unrecognized by Calvin, appear to be necessary to the philosophical expression of the teachings of the New Testament within the Augustinian-Calvinistic tradition. Carlyle apparently agreed to part of this when he wrote:[40]

---

[36] Valeriu Marcu, Accent on Power: the Life and Times of Machiavelli (Richard Winston, translator; New York and Toronto: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939), p. 47.

[37] Ibid., pp. 56-83, especially pp. 56, 74f.

[38] John Morley, Machiavelli (The Romanes Lectures, 1897; London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1897), p. 56.

[39] The closest thing discovered has been Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951). But it holds more than traces of the modern American optimism which attempts to make the State into a sort of secular kingdom of God.

[40] R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 168.

> It must . . . be recognized that St Augustine is impelled to abstract the quality of justice from the definition of the State, not by any course of reflection upon the nature of the State, but by his theological conception of justice,--a conception which might be regarded as true upon his premisses, but which can only be understood as related to those premisses.

It has seemed that the idea of a State without justice is generally repugnant to Christian thinkers and writers.[41] Still, these concepts seem necessary to a specific and radical Christian philosophy of the State.

---

[41] V. s., pp. 3, 24-26.

CHAPTER III

AN ATTEMPTED RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

> Hearken, my beloved brethren, hath not God chosen the poor of this world rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom which he hath promised to them that love **Him**?
> --James 2:5

Summary. In considering what Augustine had to say about a State, it has been concluded that he clearly intended the definition which he presented in book XIX of the City of God.[1] In further attempting to resolve the problem of citizenship with which Augustine's definition of the State confronts us, it has become obvious that this State cannot be brought into being immediately by the love of a common object, as Gilson has argued.[2] Thus one is left with the problem of citizenship completely unresolved to this point.

In proceeding toward the solution of this problem, it will be necessary to keep in mind, above all else, that Augustine is thoroughly saturated in Scripture.[3] A perusal of the footnotes of the City of God will reveal numerous pages on which are five to eight references to the Bible, in

---

[1] V. s., pp. 1-12.

[2] V. s., pp. 12-16.

[3] V. s., pp. 21f.

addition to which there are many allusions, more or less clear. This fact, this writer believes, is fundamental to an understanding of Augustine. Indeed, it is doubtful whether a man not somewhat inclined toward Biblicism can appreciate Augustine and understand him without considerable difficulty.

The problem. With these things in mind, it will be possible to proceed to the problem itself. Perhaps the readiest entrance may be obtained from Augustine's definition of the State:[4]

> But if we . . . say that a people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love, then, in order to discover the character of any people, we have only to observe what they love. Yet whatever it loves, if only it is an assemblage of reasonable beings and not of beasts, and is bound together by an agreement as to the objects of love, it is reasonably called a people. . . . According to this definition of ours, the Roman people is a people, and its weal is without doubt a commonwealth or republic. . . . I would not on account of its tastes, seditions, social and civil wars say either that it was not a people, or that its administration was not a republic, so long as there remains an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of love. But what I say of this people and of this republic I must be understood to think and say of . . . any . . . state or nation . . . which had a public government. For, in general, the city of the ungodly, which did not obey the command of God that it should offer no sacrifice save to Him alone, . . . is void of true justice.

In considering this definition of a State, it may be

---

[4] CD, XIX, 24 (II, 339f).

noted that there must be an assemblage of reasonable beings. The size of this assemblage is not of primary importance, for even a robber band is a miniature State.[5] However, a family, though it is the basic unit of a State, is not a State.[6]

With regard to the reasonable beings who may compose the State, they may be not only man, but also angels, fallen and pure, and God. For example, although a State in the common political sense contains only men, the earthly city contains both men and fallen angels,[7] and the City of God has God as ruler over angels and redeemed men.[8]

Still, only the assemblage of reasonable beings does not mean a State. It must further be bound together by an agreement as to the object of its love. From this it will be noted that Gilson's error consisted in not recognizing the fundamental nature of the agreement. But the crux of the matter is not simply the existence of an agreement, but the nature of that agreement, which is an agreement as to the object of its love. Thus one is brought to the question

---

[5] CD, IV, 4f (I, 139-141).

[6] CD, XIX, 7 (II, 310); cf. XIX, 16 (II, 326).

[7] CD, XIV, 13 (II, 27); also XII, 27 (I, 520); XIX, 9 (II, 313); XXI, 1 (II, 413).

[8] CD, XIV, 13 (II, 27); also XII, 9, 22 (I, 493, 514f); XXII, 1 (II, 472-474).

of the source of love.

The source of love may be most readily traced in the City of God, especially since the city-founding love has primarily a theological significance. On the part of the angels, this love is declared to be the gift of God:[9]

> We must therefore acknowledge, with the praise due the Creator, that not only of holy men, but also of holy angels, it can be said that "the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto them."*

With regard to the human part of the City of God, he added that they "believed Christ to be God, and therefore loved Him."[10] Anyone who is familiar with Augustine will immediately remember that the act of God is previous to faith on the part of the individual.

If this love comes by the will and gift of God to the members of the City of God, whence does it come for the members of the earthly city? Augustine wrote:[11]

> That the whole human race has been condemned in its first origin, this life itself, if life it is to be called, bears witness by the host of cruel ills with which it is filled. Is not this proved by the profound and dreadful ignorance which produces all the errors that enfold the children of Adam. . . Is it not proved by his love of so many vain and hurtful things, which

---

9 CD, XII, 9 (I, 493).

* Rom. 5:5.

10 CD, XXII, 6 (II, 481).

11 CD, XXII, 22 (II, 517f).

> produces . . . every kind of wickedness . These are indeed the crimes of wicked men, yet they spring from that root of error and misplaced love which is born in every son of Adam.

This is the second type of love, as they are contrasted in this passage:[12]

> Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God, "Thou art my glory, and the lifter up of mine head."* In the one, the princes and the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other, the princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying, while the former take thought for all. The one delights in its own strength, represented in the persons of its rulers; the other says to its God, "I will love thee, O Lord, my strength."** And therefore the wise men of the one, living according to man, have sought for profit of their own bodies or souls, or both, and those who have known God "glorified Him not as God, neither were thoughtful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened . . ."***

Thus citizenship in the earthly city is based on an agreement in love, and this love has its origin in birth. This is more clearly brought out in other passages, such as:[13]

---

12 CD, XIV, 28 (II, 47f).

* Psa. 3:3.

** Psa. 18:1.

*** Rom. 1:21-25.

13 CD, XV, 20 (II, 85); cf. XV, 2 (II, 52).

> For the earthly city and community of men who live after the flesh will never fail until the end of this world, of which our Lord says, . . . "The children of this world generate, and are generated."* But the city of God, which sojourns in this world, is conducted by regeneration to the world to come, of which the children neither generate nor are generated.

These are elsewhere contrasted as the earth-born and the regenerated.[14]

Thus, to summarize to this point, it may be said that the City of God or the earthly city is based on love, or, if a more modern word is preferred, interest. This interest or love is in turn based on birth, natural generation on the part of the earthly city and regeneration on the part of the heavenly.

It has been noted that the angels also are members of the civitas Dei or of the civitas terrenae. But how can this be, since they are neither born nor regenerated? They were, Augustine wrote, created members of the civitas Dei and never lost their citizenship, or fell from that position to citizenship in the civitas terrenae:[15]

> . . . I have undertaken to treat of the origin of the holy city, and first of the holy angels, who constitute a large part of this city, and indeed the more blessed part, since they have never been expatriated. . . For

---

* Luke 20:34.

[14] CD, XV, 20 (II, 89). Concerning the latter, see CD, XXII, 7 (I, 527); XV, 23 (II, 94); XX, 17 (II, 378).

[15] CD, XI, 9 (I, 445, 447); cf. XI, 11 (I, 450).

> when God said, "Let there be light, and there was light,"* . . . then certainly they were created partakers of the eternal light which is the unchangeable Wisdom of God . . .; so that they, being illumined by the Light that created them, might themselves become Light and be called "Day," in participation of that unchangeable Light and Day which is the Word of God. . . This Light** lighteth also every pure angel, that he may be Light not in himself, but in God; from whom if an angel turn away, he becomes impure, as are all those who are called unclean spirits, and are no longer light in the Lord, but darkness in themselves, being deprived of the participation of Light eternal.

Thus it may be noted that the difference between angels and men who belong to these two cities,[16] is that the angels were created good, but some fell. The former remained in the city of God. The latter joined the diabolical city. Men, on the contrary, are born fallen. Those who remain in this state join the fallen angels. Those who by grace are reborn to goodness in God join the good angels.

The manner in which this fall made the evil angels foreign to the City of God may be clarified by noting the possibility of treason or sedition. It was not applied by Augustine to the angels, but to the State, and then only in a single brief reference by way of illustration:[17]

---

* Gen. 1:3

** See John 1:9, quoted by Augustine.

[16] Augustine was emphatic that they are not four: CD, XI, 1, par. 1 (I, 481).

[17] CD, XIX, 12 (II, 316).

> And in the case of sedition, when men have separated themselves from the community, they yet do not effect what they wish, unless they maintain some kind of peace with their fellow-conspirators. And therefore even robbers take care to maintain peace with their comrades, that they may with greater effect and greater safety invade the peace of other men.

This would apparently indicate that the traitor breaks the bond of the State, and therefore his bond with the rest of the citizens, making himself alien and no longer a citizen. This opinion is strengthened by his statement that a robber band is an incipient State.[18]

But to return to the main line of thought, little has been said above of the political State. However, from the consideration of the birth of citizens, it is possible to note the State also. As citizens are begotten to the mystical States, so they are begotten to the political State. The difference is that the nature is innate in the former, but acquired in the latter, as Augustine said:[19]

> Then afterwards it was necessary that succeeding generations should preserve the tradition of their ancestors; that, drinking in this superstition with their mother's milk, the state might grow and come to such power that it might dictate this belief, as from a point of vantage, to all the nations over whom its sway extended. And these nations, though they might not believe that Romulus was a god, at least said so, that they might not give offence to their sovereign state by refusing to give its founder that title which was given him by Rome, which had adopted this belief, not by a

---

[18] V. s., p. 31, note 5.

[19] CD, XXII, 6 (II, 480).

love of error, but an error of love.

Thus it may be said that the love which forms any kind of State is, as the case may be, either innate or the result of such early nurture as to seem innate. In the case of the City of God, it is both. Birth has been noted above. As to nurture, ". . . its citizens grow by the grace of God."[20]

Conclusions. Thus at this point a resolution of the problem of citizenship as it is presented by Augustine has been reached. With regard to the City of God, by a divine act a person is born into this city. This birth grants the nature which loves God, and thereby makes a man a member of this State according to the definition given. With regard to the diabolical city, a person is born into it by natural generation after the fallen nature. This fallen nature makes him love anything which is contrary to God, and makes him a citizen of the earthly city according to the definition. With regard to the political State, by birth in that State a person begins to absorb that attitude which is an essential part of the nurture in that State. Thus he comes to love that which the other members of the State love, and, by definition, to be a citizen.

---

[20] CD, XX, 17 (II, 378); cf. XIV, 8 (II, 15); XIX, 4 (II, 301f).

In contrast, the angels who are citizens of the heavenly city are so by creation and grace, God granting them love of Him. Thus again one is led to the definition. The angels who are citizens of the earthly city are so by the fall, which perverts their will from the true love to a false love, and by definition makes them citizens.

On the other hand, to summarize the conclusions concerning human beings from the viewpoint of the definition, a State is formed by those who join together in the love of an object. This love is based in turn on the nature or nurture of the individual citizen. These are in turn based upon birth--carnal generation, regeneration, or birth in a particular location, as the individual case may be.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. ANCIENT SOURCES, LEXICONS, ETC.

AUGUSTINE, Aurelius, The Confessions of Saint Augustine. Edward B. Pusey, translator. New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1952. Pp. xiv, 301.

-------, De Libero Arbitrio. Francis E. Tourscher, editor and translator. Philadelphia: The Peter Reilly Company, 1937. Pp. vii, 442.

-------, The Works of Aurelius Augustine. Marcus Dods, editor. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1872-1876. 15 vols. The set used was missing vol. XIV, The Confessions, whence the notation above.
The City of God (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1948), 2 vol., is identical in pagination with vol. I and II of this set.

The BIBLE. Authorized King James Version.

BURKITT, F. C., editor, The Book of the Rules of Tyconius. Cambridge: University Press, 1894. Pp. cxii, 114.

CICERO, Marcus Tullius, On the Commonwealth. George Holland Sabine and Stanley Barney Smith, translators. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1929. Pp. ix, 276.

CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, The Writings of Clement of Alexandria. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, editors, Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vols. IV and XII. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1882, 1909. 2 vols.

DODS, Marcus, editor, The Works of Aurelius Augustine. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1872-1876. 15 vols.

IRENAEUS, The Writings of Irenaeus. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, editors, Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vols. V and IX. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1910, 1911. 2 vols.

NESTLE, Eberhard and Erwin, editors, Greek New Testament. Sixteenth edition; New York: American Bible Society, [1942]. Pp. 43, 671.

OATES, Whitney J., editor, Basic Writings of Saint Augustine. New York: Random House, 1948. 2 vols.

ORIGEN, The Writings of Origen. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, editors, Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vols. X and XXIII. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1910, 1911. 2 vols.

ROBERTS, Alexander, and James Donaldson, editors, Ante-Nicene Christian Library. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, variously dated. 24 vols.

SENECA, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales (Epistles). E. Caps, T. E. Page and W. H. D. Rouse, editors, The Loeb Classical Library. London: William Heinemann, 1917. 3 vols.

THAYER, Joseph Henry, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament. Corrected edition: New York, Cincinnati, Ohio, and Chicago: American Book Company, 1889. Pp. xix, 727.

TOURSCHER, Francis E., translator and editor; Aurelius Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio. Philadelphia: The Peter Reilly Company, 1937. Pp. vii, 442.

YOUNG, Robert, Analytical Concordance to the Bible. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1936. Pp. vii, 1090, 93, 23, 45.

B. MODERN STUDIES: ESSAYS AND ARTICLES

BAKER, Ernest, "Introductory: Mediaeval Political Thought," The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers. Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, editor; London: George C. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1923. Pp. 9-33.

CARLYLE, A. J., "St. Augustine and the City of God, II," The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers. Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, editor; London: George C. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1923. Pp. 42-52.

CHROUST, Anton-Hermann, "The Philosophy of Law of St. Augustine," The Philosophical Review, LIII (March, 1944) 195-202.

CRAMER, Frederick M., "The Evolution of Citizenship," Cur-

rent History, XIII (October, 1947) 193-198.

CRANZ, F. Edward, "De Civitate Dei, XV, 2, and Augustine's Idea of the Christian Society." Speculum, XXV (April, 1950), 215-225.

DEFERRARI, Roy J., and Sister M. Jerome Keeler, O. S. B., "St. Augutine's 'City of God': Its Plan and Development," American Journal of Philology, L (April, 1929) 109-137.

HEARNSHAW, Fossey John Cobb, "St. Augustine and the City of God, I," The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers. Fossey John Cobb Hearnshaw, editor; London: George C. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1923. Pp. 34-42.

-------, editor, The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers. London: George C. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1923. 224 pp.

SANTAYANA, G[eorge], "Reviews of Books," The Philosophical Review, X (September, 1901) 515-526.

SCULLARD, H. H., "'The City of God,'" The Contemporary Review, CX (September, 1916) 373-379.

WEST, Andrew F., "Philosophaster Once More," Classical Philology, V (January, 1910) 50-55.

C. MODERN STUDIES: BOOKS

ARTZ, Frederick B[inkerd], The Intellectual History of Europe from Saint Augustine to Marx. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1941. Pp. xix, 139.

BOAS, George, The Adventures of Human Thought: the Major Traditions of European Philosophy. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1929. Pp. v, 497.

CARLYLE, R. W. and A. J., A History of Medieval Political Thought in the West. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons Ltd., 1903-1936. 6 vols.

COULTON, G[eorge]G[ordon], Studies in Medieval Thought. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1940. Pp. 229.

CUNNINGHAM, W[illiam], S. Austin and His Place in the History of Christian Thought. The Hulsean Lectures, 1855. London: C. J. Clay and Sons, 1886. Pp. xiii, 283.

DE WULF, Maurice, History of Mediaeval Philosophy. Ernest C. Messenger, translator; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952- . 3 vols. (one published).

DUNNING, William Archibald, A History of Political Theories. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902. Pp. xxv, 360.

DUVALL, Trumbull G[illette], Great Thinkers: The Quest of Life for Its Meaning. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937. Pp. xx, 320.

FIGGIS, John Neville, The Political Aspects of S. Augustine's 'City of God.' London: Longman's, Green and Co., 1921. Pp. iv, 132.

GETTELL, Raymond G., History of Political Thought. New York: The Century Co., 1924. Pp. xi, 511.

GIERKE, Otto [Frederich], Political Theories of the Middle Ages. Frederick William Maitland, translator; Cambridge: University Press, 1913. Pp. lxxx, 197.

GILSON, Etienne, Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin. Etienne Gilson, director, Etudes de Philosophie Medievale, XI. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1949. Pp. viii, 370.

LODGE, Rupert [Clendon], The Great Thinkers. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949. Pp. x, 310.

McCABE, Joseph, St. Augustine and His Age. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903. Pp. vii, 516.

McILWAIN, Charles Howard, The Growth of Political Thought in the West. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932. Pp. vii, 417.

MARCU, Valeriu, Accent on Power: the Life and Times of Machiavelli. Richard Winston, translator; New York and Toronto: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939. Pp. vii, 314.

MORLEY, John, Machiavelli. The Romanes Lecture, 1897. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1897. Pp. 63.

MORRIS, C[harles] R[ichard], and Mary, A History of Political Ideas. New York: C. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924. Pp. xii, 190.

NIEBUHR, Reinhold, Faith and History. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951. Pp. ix, 257.

PASCAL, Blaise, Pensées and the Provincial Letters. W. F. Trotter and Thomas M'Crie, translators; New York: The Modern Library, Random House, 1941. Pp. xvi, 620.

SABINE, George H[olland], A History of Political Theory. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937. Pp. xvi, 797.

STRAUSS, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Elsa M. Sinclair, translator; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. xxi, 172.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SOME NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION OF GILSON'S WORKS WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THEM

The writer of this thesis, needing a portion of Gilson's Introduction to the Study of Saint Augustine, made the translation, which follows in Appendix B, of Part Two, "The Quest for God by the Will," Chapter IV, "The Christian Life," section II, "The Christian Society," pages 225 to 242.

To facilitate reference to the original, several observations may be made. First, the translator has taken the liberty of breaking the long French periods into shorter English sentences. Second, all the footnotes have been renumbered so that the numbering is consecutive throughout the section, rather than beginning anew on each page. A few notes, clearly indicated as additions, have been inserted. Third, for greater ease for those not facile readers of French, German, and Latin, all quotations from sources and authorities have been translated into English. Where an English translation of Augustine's work has been available, the reference has been to it rather than to the Latin edition, to which Gilson invariably refers. When a translation had not previously been published, the reference

has been left to the Latin edition, indicated by PL, followed by volume and column number. In every case, however, the citation has been translated. Reference to Augustine's works follows the pattern of the rest of the thesis.[1]

Brief note may be taken of the history of some of Gilson's works and their translations. His study of Augustine was first published in 1938, preceded by three translated works--two studies of Aquinas and one of Bonaventure--, one work being translated, and three untranslated books. Six works, first published after 1928, have also been translated.

During the time since the first appearance of Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin, it has attained recognition, even in American circles, as the standard introduction to Augustine's thought. Still, it had not been translated, nor was translation contemplated.[2] In France, it had reached its third edition by 1949.

In contrast, others of his writings which are not as

---

[1] See the Preface, p. iv.

[2] Correspondence in the writer's files indicates that no translation was known by any English, Canadian, or American publisher which had previously published Gilson's works in English translations, nor was any known by Roman Catholic publishers listing philosophical publications in the Philosophical Review during the past two decades.

important--certainly not as important from the viewpoint of the history of thought--have been, or are being, translated. This does not mean to disparage the works which have been translated, for they are worth translating. But his study of Augustine is eminently worth translating, and a translation is greatly needed.

This peculiar situation may be noted especially in the following bibliography of the works of Etienne Gilson. No claim is made that this bibliography is complete, except as regards translations. Further, it includes only books and pamphlets, not articles in periodicals nor essays in collections.

Works published originally in English.

Saint Thomas Aquinas. Reprint from the Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. XXI. Oxford: University Press, 1935. Pp. 19.

The Unity of Philosophical Experience. William James Lectures, Harvard University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937; London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938. Pp. xii, 331.

Medieval Universalism and Its Present Value. New York and London: Sheed and Ward, 1937. Pp. 22.

Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages. Richards Lectures, Virginia University, 1937. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. Pp. 114.

God and Philosophy. Powell Lectures on Philosophy, Indiana University. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941; Oxford: University Press, 1941; Toronto, Ont.: Ryerson, 1941. Pp. 147.

History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education. Aquinas Lecture, Marquette University. Milwaukee, Wisc.: Mar-

quette University Press, 1948. Pp. 49.

Terrors of the Year 2000. London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1949. Pp. 31.

Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto, Ont.: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949. Pp. xi, 219.

Wisdom and Love in St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas Lecture, Marquette University. Milwaukee, Wisc.: Marquette University Press, 1951.

The Breakdown of Morals and Christian Education. Toronto, Ont.: The Basilian Press, 1953 (?). Pp. 16.

Works translated into English from the French.

Le Thomisme: Introduction au Systeme de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Fifth edition; Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1947 (first edition before 1922). Pp. 552.
The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Edward Bullough, translator; G. A. Elrington, editor; St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1925 (1937). Pp. xv, 372.

La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1924 (1943). Pp. 370.
The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure. Dom Illtyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed, translators; London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938; Toronto, Ont.; Oxford University Press, 1938. Pp. xiii, 551.

St. Thomas d'Aquin: Textes et Commentaires. Paris: J. Galbada, 1925 (sixth edition, 1941). Pp. 380.
Moral Values and the Moral Life: the System of St. Thomas Aquinas. Leo Richard Ward, translator; St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1931. Pp. 337.

Christianisme et Philosophie. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1936 (1949). Pp. 168 (170).
Christianity and Philosophy. Ralph MacDonald, translator; London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939. Pp. xxvi, 134.

La Théologie Mystique de Saint Bernard. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1947 (1937 ?). Pp. 258.
The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard. A. H. C. Downes, translator; London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940. Pp. ix, 266.

Héloïse et Abélard. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1938 (second edition, 1948). Pp. 174 (255).
Heloise and Abelard. L. S. Shoole, translator; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951; London: Hollis and Carter Ltd., 1953. Pp. 209.

Dante et la Philosophie. Etudes de Philosophie Medievale, XXVIII. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1939. Pp. 339.
Dante the Philosopher. David Moore, translator; London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1949. Pp. xii, 338.

L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale. Gifford Lectures. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1944 (1948). Pp. 446.
The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy. A. H. C. Downes, translator; revised edition; London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1950. Pp. ix, 490.

L'Ecole des Muses. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1951. Pp. 270.
Choir of Muses. Maisie Ward, translator; London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1953. Pp. xxvi, 134.

Untranslated French works.

Index Scholastico-Cartésien. Paris: F. Alcan, 1913. Pp. ix, 355.

La Liberté chez Descartes et la Théologie. Paris: F. Alcan, 1913. Pp. 453.

Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale. Collection des Travaux de la Faculte des Lettres de Strassbourg, III. Strassbourg: Librairie Istra, 1921. Pp. viii, 291. Oxford: University Press, 1921. Pp. vii, 222.

La Philosophie au Moyen Age. Collection Payot, XXVf. Paris: (?), 1922. 2 vols.
This work is being published by Random House, New York, in the fall of 1954; 800 to 900 pages.

Descartes et la Metaphysique Scholastique. Brussels: Imprimerie Weissenbruch, 1924. Pp. 36.

Saint Bonaventure et l'Iconographie de la Passion. Paris: Picard, 1924. Pp. 20.

Introduction a l'Etude de Saint Augustin. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1928 (third edition, 1949). Pp. 370.

Etudes sur le Role de la Pensee Medievale dans la Formation du Systeme Cartesien. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1930 (1952). Pp. 345.

Pour un Ordre Catholique. Paris: Desclee, De Brouwer et Cie., 1934. Pp. 243.

Le Realisme Methodique. Paris: P. Tequi, 1937. Pp. 101 (103?).

Realisme Thomiste et Critique de la Connaissance. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1939 (1947). Pp. 242.

Les Idees et les Lettres. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1942. Pp. 300.

Theologie et Histoire de la Spiritualite. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1943. Pp. 27.

Philosophie et l'Incarnation Selon Saint Augustin. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1947. Pp. 55.

L'Etre et l'Essence. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1948. Pp. 330.

Saint Bernard. Bibliotheque Spirituelle du Chretien Lettre. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1949 (?). Pp. 396.

Jean Duns Scotus: Introduction a Ses Positions Fondamentales. Etudes de Philosophie Medievale, (?). Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1952. Pp. 700.

Gilson also edited: Rene Descartes, Discours de la Methode (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1925), xvi, 494 pp. At this writing, he is engaged in editing a collection of Leo XIII's encyclicals on social problems, to be published in New York by Image Books. No date was mentioned for its publication.

APPENDIX B

A TRANSLATION OF ETIENNE GILSON, INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN, PAGES 225 TO 242

Saint Augustine's doctrine is remarkable in that it always views moral life as implied in social life. In his view, the individual can never separate himself from the city. To discover the fundamental reason for this fact, which is also at the root of all moral life, it is again necessary for us to consider love, and subsequently to consider the will.

To understand the origin of social life, we may observe its formation during a public presentation, say of a theatrical performance. When the audience assembles to witness it, they are not aware of one another and hence do not form a society. But if any actor shows unusual talent, those whom he pleases enjoy him so greatly that they sometimes take a spontaneous delight in him which the theatrical art may maintain. They do not stop with simply loving the actor whom they enjoy. Soon a kind of fellow feeling is established among those who love him. When the spectators then love one another, it is obviously not on their own account, but on account of that one whom they mutually love. The proof of this is that the more an actor pleases us, the

more we applaud to induce the other spectators to admire him. We want not only to increase the number of his admirers, but to excite the lukewarm. If anyone disagrees with us, we dislike in him that scorn which he feels for what we love. Thus the love of an object gives rise to a society which is formed of all those who thus love and which excludes those who disagree. This conclusion, whose application is universal, is proved especially with regard to the love of God. The one who loves God finds himself, by the act itself, joined in a society with all those who love Him. He wills them to love the same Object as he. He wills this with a will infinitely mightier, because what concerns him now is not a mere theatrical pleasure, but is Bliss itself. There is also that which makes the righteous love all men in God, even though they be his very enemies. How shall he fear them? They are not able to take away his blessing. They even please him, for he recognizes that, if his enemies should turn to God unreservedly, these very men would embrace him as well as the God Who alone confers bliss, and they would necessarily love him as themselves, as a partner with them in the enjoyment of so very great a blessing.[1]

---

[1] On Christian Doctrine, I, 29, par. 30 (IX, 24f). Theologically, the basis of this community of love is found in the act whereby God in the beginning created a single man, Adam, in whom was contained the germ of all other men. This agreement of opinions is therefore an at-

This follows from the new character of love which of itself spontaneously gives rise to a society of which it is the bond. When we give the name city to this group of men who are joined by their common love for a specific object, we say that there are as many cities as there are collective loves. Now it is enough to remember the conclusions which precede to understand that since there are among men two loves,[2] it is necessary that there be two cities, to which all other human groupings are reducible. The group of men who lead the life of the old man, of the earthly man, and who find themselves united by their common love of temporal things, form the first city: the Earthly City. The group of men united in the bond of divine love form the second city: the City of God.[3] When once these two cities are un-

---

tempt to restore the primitive human unity. Cf. CD, XIII [sic, XII], 22 (I, 514f); ibid., 27, par. 1 (I, 519f); XIII, 14 (I, 534f); XIV, 1 (II, 1f).

[2] De Genesi ad litteram, XI, 15, par. 20 (PL, XXXIV, col. 437).

Inasmuch as it originates in the love of each man, the society is no more than are the individuals who compose it: "But let us suppose a case of two men; for each individual man, like one letter in a language, is as it were the element of a city or kingdom, however far spreading in its occupation of the earth." CD, IV, 3 (I, 138).

[3] "The two loves form these two cities; the love of God forms Jerusalem; secular love forms Babylon." Enarrationes in psalmos 64, II (PL, XXXVI, col. 773).

"Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the

derstood according to their real essence, moral philosophy proceeds to expand into a philosophy of history, distinguishing under the multiplicity of people and of events the persistence, since the beginning of the world, of two cities, and revealing the law which allows one to foretell their destiny.

The assembly of men who live in one city are called a people. If we, then, give the name of city to every group of men united by the love of a common object, we know by the same token what a people is. A people is an association of rational beings, united by a common will and by a common possession of that which they love. It is evident that these beings must be reasonable. Otherwise they would be incapable either of knowing the same object or of perceiving the common possession of their love. That they are united

---

contempt of self." CD, XIV, 28 (II, 47).

"And these we also mystically call the two cities, or the two communities of men, of which the one is predestined to reign eternally with God, and the other to suffer eternal punishment with the devil." CD, XV, 1, par. 1 (II, 49).

Concerning the common origin of these two cities in Adam, see CD, XII, 27, par. 2 (I, 520).

"And thus it has come to pass, that though there are very many and great nations all over the earth, whose rites and customs, speech, arms, and dress, are distinguished by marked differences, yet there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities, according to the language of our Scriptures. The one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit; and when they severally achieve what they wish, they live in peace, each after their kind." CD, XIV, 1 (II, 1f).

by their common possession is, for us, the origin of all society. What we have said of men may be said likewise of peoples. Men, we may say, are their wills, which is to say, their loves. Thus it may be said: like love, like people; inasmuch as love is the bond which constitutes a city, i.e. a society.[4] Therefore it is enough to know what a people loves to know what it is: ut videatur qualis quisque populus sit, illa sunt intuenda quae diligit.[5] Let us apply to the two cities this method of discrimination.

That thing which a society loves is what all its members are united to obtain. If all society, whatever it may be, has any common aim, it is peace. No doubt someone will immediately object that the opposite seems rather more evident. Civil wars and wars between nations do not appear to

---

[4] See the preceding note, the third passage cited, where civitates is presented as the mystical equivalent of societates.

[5] ". . . a people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love; then in order to discover the character of any people, we have only to observe what they love. Yet whatever it loves, if only it is an assemblage of reasonable beings and not of beasts, and is bound together by an agreement as to the objects of love, it is reasonably called a people; and it will be a superior people in proportion as it is bound together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it is bound together by lower." CD, XIX, 24 (II, 339f).

[The Latin above reads: "then in order to discover the character of any people, we have only to observe what they love."]

support this thesis. In reality, however, whatever their appearance, such acts do not contradict it. It is evident that there are no societies without wars. But why do these societies wage war except to establish peace? This is saying, in effect, that the peace desired by these societies is not any peace: certainly not a simple tranquility maintained at any price, whatever its basis. The peace which they desire is that true peace which satisfies everyone's desire, so that, if it be obtained, they want no more from war. In this sense it is proper to say that war is not waged for war, but for peace. When men fight, they desire, rather than oppose, peace, but they want it on their own terms.[6]

Thus, every society seeks peace. What then is the necessary condition without which peace is but temporary and imaginary? It is order. So that a mass of interests, and especially a mass of wills, may agree on the simultaneous pursuit of a single end, each must be in his proper place doing his job exactly as it should be done. This truth, which is evident at the heart of a material organism such as the human body, is none the less evident in human love or, consequently, in a society. The peace of the body is the well-ordered harmony of its appetites. The peace of rational love is the harmony between rational understanding

---

[6] CD, XIX, 12, par. 1 (II, 315f).

and the will. Domestic peace is the harmony of the residents of a single house according to order and to obedience. Civic peace is the same harmony extended from the family to all citizens. Finally, the peace of the Christian city is a perfectly ordered society of men who delight in God and love each other in God. Therefore, in all these cases, peace is the tranquility of order.[7] Are there two orders around which these two cities can be organized?

These two orders exist, and we already know them since they are mixed with the two spiritual races which we have previously distinguished: whatever is seen in the body is seen also in grace. On the one hand, the ungodly, who bear the likeness of the earthly man from the creation to the end of the world, are the first city. This city is always busy organizing itself according to an order which is proper to itself. This order consists in the control and enjoyment of chosen matters. Obviously, the order of this city is basically nothing but a mockery of the true order against which it is in permanent revolt. But since even thieves, though wild brutes, obey their own kind of law and

---

[7] "Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of one another in God. The peace of all things is the tranquility of order. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place." CD, XIX, 13, par. 1 (II, 319f).

respect a certain kind of peace, how can any rational beings find it possible to live without producing some kind of society? Even though it be evil, it, and all that is in it, is proper.[8] It is not then astonishing that it conserves, even in its very depravity, an appearance of beauty.

It nevertheless must be added that the peace of the wicked is a false peace, and that, compared to that peace of the just, does not even deserve the name. At its base its apparent order is nothing but disorder. The tyrant who exerts himself to force all members of the city to submit to him usurps, in reality, the place of God. The heavenly city, on the contrary, orders everything in view of assuring to its citizens Christian liberty, that is, the usage of all the things which lead to the enjoyment of God. We can

---

[8] "How much more powerfully do the laws of man's nature move him to hold fellowship and maintain peace with all men in so far as in him lies, since even wicked men wage war to maintain the peace of their own circle, and wish that, if possible, all men belonged to them, that all men and things might serve but one head, and might, either through love or fear, yield themselves to peace with him! It is thus that pride in its perversity apes God. It abhors equality with other men under Him; but, instead of His rule, it seeks to impose a rule of its own upon its equals. It abhors, that is to say, the just peace of God, and loves its own unjust peace; but it cannot help loving peace of one kind or other. For there is no vice so clean contrary to nature that it obliterates even the faintest traces of nature." CD, XIX, 12, par. 2 (II, 318).

"Now what is a state but a multitude of men bound together by some bond of concord?" Letter 138, ii, 10 (XIII, 202).

therefore conceive its order and its unity as a simple extension of the order and unity which reigns through the love of every just individual. By itself it establishes the true order, and alone enjoys true peace; it alone is therefore the home of a people worthy of the name. Finally, it alone is truly a city.[9] Thus the two cities are distinguished and opposed, as the very ends toward which they are ordained.

These conclusions raise a considerable problem, for they introduce a fundamental ambiguity into the very notion of the City of God. Even though Augustine has consciously accepted it as such, it has none the less often confused his commentators. On the one hand, carried to its logical conclusion, the distinction between the two cities ends by allowing only the City of God to exist. Only it is a city because it alone is all that a city ought to be. It is not

---

[9] "And therefore, where there is not this righteousness whereby the one supreme God rules the obedient city according to His grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him, and whereby, in all the citizens of this obedient city, the soul consequently rules the body and reason the vices in the rightful order, so that, as the individual just man, so also the community and people of the just, live by faith, which works by love, that love whereby man loves God as He ought to be loved, and his neighbor as himself,--there, I say, there is not an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgement of right, and by a community of interests. But if there is not this, there is not a people, if our definition be true, and therefore there is no republic; for where there is no people there can be no republic." CD, XIX, 23, par. 5 (II, 339).

sufficient to say, therefore, that the Roman republic has been unjust, because, in fact, it is not worthy of the name of republic. The same conclusion applies with equal force to the Athenian republic, or to the empires founded by the Assyrians and the Egyptians.[10] On the other hand, one cannot deny that, to speak correctly, the Roman republic has been a true republic, because, according to our definition of a people, it is a group of rational beings, united by the common enjoyment of that which they love. It is therefore an evil people, but it is a people, even though divested of justice and consequently deprived of true virtue.[11] If one should admit the first definition, the very antithesis between the two cities disappears, for only the one is left. If, however, one admits the second, how shall the two cities exist side by side, and what shall be their relationship?

No doubt Augustine considered the heavenly city to be the only one worthy of the name, since every city relies on peace, and it alone possesses true peace. Nevertheless, the problem which preoccupies him the most is the second, which basically presumes that the earthly city deserves, in some sense, the name of <u>city</u>. The long recital of the City of God, whose influence on the theology of history, and

---

[10] CD, XIX, 24 (II, 339f).

[11] CD, XX (<u>sic</u>, XIX), 24f (II, 339-341).

perhaps over history itself, will be decisive, up to Bossuet and later, is nothing but the reply to this question.[12] For the first time, perhaps, in this work, thanks to the light of revelation which unveils the beginning and the end hidden in the universe, human reason has dared to attempt the synthesis of universal history. Thus here, more than any place else in the Augustinian system, reason advances only in consequence of faith, since the problem is to organize the knowledge of that which is seen with that which is not as yet. Indeed, it is revelation alone which knows of the creation of Adam by God, and by which we learn of the two cities among which are divided the human race of which he is the father.[13] There is the birth of Cain, member of the earthly city, who in fact founded a city (Gen. 4:17),

---

[12] See Georges Hardy, Le "De Civitate Dei" Source Principale du "Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle," (Paris: E. Leroux, 1913). Note the very fair observations on pp. 27f, to which may be added that Augustine not only invented the theology of history but formulated the very notion of humanity, so that it has been ceaselessly revived and reinterpreted, down to Auguste Comte, as a society composed more of the dead than of the living, including the future, and held together by purely spiritual bonds. The City of God, along with Bossuet's Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle, will form part of the Bibliotheque Positive, in 158 volumes, for which Comte prepared the list. It is found in the fourth section, that of the Synthesis, in the fourth rank, i.e., (1) Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, (2) the Bible, (3) the Koran, (4) the City of God. Cf. A. Comte, Systeme de Politique Positive, vol. IV, p. 560.

[13] CD, XII, 27, par. 2 (I, 519f).

as though better to mark that his realm is of this world. On the other hand, Abel, the member of the city of God, did not found any city, as though to affirm that this life is no more than a pilgrimage to a very happy home.[14] This is also the revelation in which we are permitted to follow, through the course of history, the progressive construction of the heavenly city, even to foreseeing its completion. This highest end is, in effect, the establishment of the perfect city of God, according to the eternal blessedness which the chosen people enjoy. The continuing construction of this city according to the design of Providence is the deep meaning of history, that which bestows to each people its reason for being, that which assigns each role and reveals each destiny.

From his own definition, the two cities are mutually incompatible. Therefore Augustine has not imagined that they could ever coincide. Still, it is at least necessary that they coexist, and, consequently, that they find a modus vivendi which will allow the city of God to develop. When one examines their respective situations, one readily discovers that there is a plan according to which the two cities meet and live, so to speak, mingled, which is the earthly city. The inhabitants of the city of God are here

---

[14] CD, XV, 1, par. 2 (II, 50f).

below confounded in appearance with those who live in the earthly city alone. How shall they avoid this? They are men like the others. Consequently, their bodies require their part in the material good for which the earthly city is organized. Therefore they participate in its order and its peace, benefit like the others in what it procures, and bear the duties which it imposes.[15] Nevertheless, contrary to the life apparently common, the two people who live together in the earthly city never really merge. The citizens of the celestial city live with the others, but not as the others. Even when they perform the same acts externally, they perform them with a different spirit. On the part of those who live according to the life of the old man, the benefits of the earthly city are the ends which they enjoy. On the part of those in this city who lead the life of the new man, born of grace, the same benefits are no more than means which they use to bring them to their true end.[16]

---

[15] "Miserable, therefore, is the people which is alienated from God. Yet even this people has a peace of its own which is not to be lightly esteemed, though, indeed, it shall not in the end enjoy it, because it makes no good use of it before the end. But it is our interest that it enjoy this peace meanwhile in this life; for as long as the two cities are commingled, we also enjoy the peace of Babylon. For from Babylon the people of God is so freed that it meanwhile sojourns in its company." CD, XIX, 26 (II, 341).

[16] "Thus the things necessary for this mortal life are used by both kinds of men and families alike, but each has its own peculiar and widely different aim in using them.

From this deep-seated duality of attitude in the presence of the same objects arises the many problems which are all concerned with the real relationship of the spiritual to the temporal. Among these problems is the frequently debated question of the right of property. Augustine considers it on the basis of the reasons which are given.[17] Some esteem all property evil, godless and in contradiction to the teaching of the Gospel. Others, on the contrary, live by amassing riches and are prey to an insatiable thirst to possess. Both are mistaken, though from different motives, concerning the true sense of property. One can own legitimately, but this depends on the manner of possessing.

The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men's wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away." CD, XIX, 17 (II, 326).

[17] The fantastic interpretations which have frequently been given to the Augustinian doctrine at this point have been criticized in an excellent chapter by Bernard Roland-Gosselin in La Morale de Saint Augustin (Paris: M. Riviere, 1925), pp. 168-218.

On the Pelagian communism to which St. Augustine was opposed, see Otto Schilling, Die Staats- und Soziallehre des Hl. Augustinus (Freib. i. Breisgau, 1910).

Concerning the problem of slavery, see Nourrisson, La Philosophie de Saint Augustin (Paris: Didier et Cie., 1865), vol. II, pp. 54-56.

Those who tirelessly amass perishable goods to enjoy as ends do not recognize the essential relationship between the creatures and God. In reality, since God is the Creator, He owns all the works of His hands and He alone owns them. All belongs to Him, for He created all things.[18] It is therefore true, in one sense, that man owns nothing, and that ownership considered to be based on the rights of man alone is a kind of usurpation. On the other hand, if we descend from this plane to that of the relationships among men, it is clear that there exists a right of property, not of man with regard to God, but of man with regard to another man. The legitimate occupation, purchase, gift or inheritance is as much a right as a just possession. To seize by other means a benefit already possessed by others is to substitute for legitimate possession that which is no more than robbery and usurpation.[19]

When one has the advantage of this double point of view, the controversial texts of Augustine frequently gain a satisfactory sense. Not in a single passage of his writings does he consider human property as illegitimate nor counsel its abolition. On the contrary, if one consid-

---

[18] Enarrationes in psalmos 49, xvii (PL, XXXVI, col. 576).

[19] All references bearing on this point will be found in B. Roland-Gosselin, op. cit., pp. 187-189.

ers the relationship between men and God, he can rightly say that goods legitimately possessed in the temporal order are not illegitimate in the spiritual order. From this new point of view, the legitimate owners of earthly goods are not always those who possess them, and the Scripture has reason to say that the faithful own the riches of the whole world, in contrast to which the ungodly have not a penny.[20] Property cannot be as well defined by means of a title of acquisition as by the usage of the acquired thing. To abuse a good possession is evil. To possess it evilly is to possess it not. If, therefore, one considers this theoretical question, he is able to say that these things rightfully belong to those who know how to use them in consideration of God and of heaven, which is to Augustine the only legitimate use. A redistribution of earthly goods according to this principle would be a profound revolution, but it is neither possible nor desireable. Where can be found the truly just or, among their small number, those who would want it, to whom may be given those goods evilly possessed?[21] On the other hand, supposing that one finds

---

[20] According to the Benedictine editors, in the Septuagint Version, Prov. xvii, after verse 6 (PL, XXXIII, col. 665, note a).

[21] This seems to us to be the sense of the formula: "You observe how many are discovered on this basis who should return what belongs to another, yet how very few

them, they will not in the least desire the goods which must be assigned to them, for the less one loves money the better he possesses it. These things cannot but remain as they are. That property is correctly apportioned and held according to the laws of civil right does not make those who possess it to use it as they should. This iniquity should none the less be tolerated, because these laws of civil right at least restrain those who evilly use their own from inflicting further evil on the others.[22] Justice will reign perfectly in another life, in that heavenly city where the just, who know how to use all things as they should be used, will possess all things.[23]

---

return it . . .," which we cite later.* It will not be difficult to find that the unjust owners must admit what they are; but to find just possessors able to use it well will be very difficult.

* [See note 23.]

[22] B. Roland-Gosselin exactly summarizes Augustine's thought in this way: "Here below, unless it be injurious to social peace, it is not the proper use of things, but their legitimate possession, which establishes the right of property. A thief is not pardoned because he distributes his thefts as alms; nor is the worst miser kept from possessing his father's goods." Op. cit., pp. 206f.
Refer to Augustine, De bono conjugali, XIV, 16.

[23] Surely if we prudently consider what is written: "Faithful men share the whole world, but the unfaithful do not have even a penny," do we not reprove all who are seen to enjoy themselves in lawful acquisitions, and to use them ignorantly, with seizing another's goods (opposition between to enjoy, frui, and to use, uti)? Certainly it cannot be another's goods if it possessed lawfully. But they only

When one reflects on the essential matters which this solution to the problem implies, he is greatly helped by the Augustinian concept of the connection between the heavenly city and the earthly city. To apply the rules which are valid in the one to the level of the other is to confound both and to destroy the whole.[24] The earthly city has its order, its right, its laws. Since it is organized for a

---

possess it lawfully who possess it justly, and they possess it justly who are good. Therefore all that is possessed evilly belongs to another; and that which is used evilly is possessed evilly. You observe how many are discovered on this basis who should return what belongs to another, yet how very few return it. You likewise observe how many, whoever they may be, disregard this truth to the extent that they are able to justly acquire more property. Obviously, justice not only has nothing evilly, but it has nothing that it has not prized. Money truly is held evilly by the evil. By the good it is held better as it is loved less. Thus the latter endure the evil men who have money evilly, though some who are called citizens are established lawfully. It is not as it later will be made, when all will belong to those who use it well, but it is kept so that those who use it evilly may be the least disturbed. On the other hand, the faithful and just, who rightfully own all things, . . . will arrive at that city where the eternal inheritance is, where there will not be any local justice, but where, on the contrary, the wise man will have the supremacy, and they will then possess what was truly theirs. Letter 153, vi, 26 (PL, XXXIII, col. 665).

[24] Properly understood, the problem is not to spare the injustices committed against the civil law. Goods evilly acquired ought to be returned: "For example, we do not interfere with the following of earthly customs and laws nor with the returning of what belongs to another." (loc. cit., col. 665); further, in addition to the responsibility to make these restitutions by gentle means, he cannot attempt to take from its possessor what he legally possesses under the pretext of using religiously what he uses evilly. See Letter 157, 39 (PL, XXXIII, col. 692).

specific state of harmony and of peace, it should be respected, defended and maintained--so much the more since the citizens of the city of God live there, participate in the benefits which it assures, and enjoy the order which it realizes. But it is none the less true that this relative order is very far from agreeing with the absolute order which it opposes in a great many points. This is caused by what the temporal law directs, namely, that which assures social order and social peace. These are opposed to what the eternal law orders, which is the submission of the temporal to the eternal.[25] It is surely desirable, and to some degree possible, that the two orders coincide. Nevertheless, the second is pointed out as being essentially an ideal order, whose perfect realization will not take place in the first.

If it be thus, the difficulty is to know what the city of God is to expect--and, in case of need, to demand--from the earthly city in each situation. Since the citizens are in part the same, what is the proper order and the proper right of each one? What about the conflicts which are inevitable between the two orders? How is one to define the rights and responsibilities of the Christian in case of conflict? Is it necessary to reform everything, or

---

[25] De libero arbitrio, I, 15, par. 32 [pp. 78-87?].

should everything be endured?

It will be well to observe first of all that the earthly city has nothing to fear from the City of God. Rather the opposite is true. To be sure, the principles in whose name their citizens act are very different. Yet those which govern the Christian life are found to require, and that very strongly, exactly what the laws which govern the city try to obtain. This does not seem evident at first glance, because the Gospel teaches not only non-resistance to evil, but that one should render good for evil. Though this be true, how shall anyone suggest that the State may decide not to defend itself against its enemies?[26]

But plausible as it is, the objection is not valid. What is the ostensible end of civil society? Harmony and peace. It is the better to encourage this that the laws prohibit the taking of revenge, which is nothing more than forbidding anyone to render evil for evil. The Christian law certainly goes much further. Still, in the overt act, it only helps to establish in the city the rule of the good over the evil, which is the sine qua non of order. In reality, no opposition can arise between the two cities so long as the earthly city subjects itself to the superior

---

[26] See the letter of the Volusians to Augustine and the objections which it contains, Letter 136 (XIII, 174-176).

laws of justice. A state which can have soldiers, officials and--in a general way--its citizens in accord with the ideal of Christianity, shall assuredly have nothing left to desire.[27]

When the earthly city breaks its proper laws and thus infringes on justice, what happens? The citizens of the heavenly city who are members of it merely continue to observe the civil laws which the earthly city professes to forget. From the disorders which result from the general contempt of the laws, the just suffer, and pardon, much. The part of their environment which they are able to correct by themselves, they correct. What they are not able to help, they endure with patience. For the rest, they continue to observe the laws which the others claim to despise. At this point the radical distinction between the two cities in the midst of their very harmony appears clearly. So long as civil society observes the laws which they themselves have passed, the members of the city of God which form a part of it do not seem different to the observer. Everything outwardly indicates that both parties aim above all else at the order and peace of the earthly city which

---

[27] Letter 138, ii, 12-15 (XIII, 203-206). Concerning the legitimacy of war from the Christian point of view, see B. Roland-Gosselin, op. cit., pp. 142-149.

they inhabit. At this time, however, their manner of observing them is quite different. The citizens of the earthly city consider it an end. The just, on the contrary, work to maintain them simply as a way to attain the city of God. Thus in the ruin of the earthly city which has thrown off all restraint, one sees---in spite of the occasional evidence that they observe the laws of the city like everyone else---that the city was not actually what they obeyed, for in a sense it does not exist, and it renounces the laws at their imposition, yet they still observe them. If the citizens of the city of God thus continue to practise moderation, continence, kindness, justice, harmony, and all the other virtues in a city which dispenses with them, though they have never practised them with the viewpoint of this same city, it is well that they have practised them to their profit. The Christian is the very careful observer of the laws of the city, precisely because he only observes them because of higher aims than those of the city.[28]

What limits, then, are assigned by such a doctrine to the conflicts between State and Church? God Himself has

---

[28] Letter 138, iii, 17 (XIII, 208f). This luminous text specifies in addition that if God preserved the respect of virtue in ancient Rome, it was in order to prepare the ways to the divine city and to make its constitution possible. This is the central historical theme of the City of God.

laid down the rule which defines them: render to Caesar that which is Caesar's, and to God that which is God's. When Caesar demands what is due him, the Christian renders it, not for love of Caesar, but for the love of God. Like the good sovereign, the evil one has his authority from God, which He grants to him for ends whose nature is unknown to us, but whose existence is not to be doubted. There is no accident for the Christian.[29] When Caesar claims as his what is due only to God, the Christian refuses it to him, not through hatred of Caesar, but through love of God.[30] Thus again the earthly city has nothing to fear from the Christian, since, as a submissive citizen, he will love rather to suffer injustice than to arm himself with violence and will prefer rather to bear the unmerited chastisement than to omit the divine law of charity.[31]

---

[29] The texts were assembled by Gustave Combes, La Doctrine Politique de Saint Augustin (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1927), pp. 83-85.

[30] Letter 185, ii, 8 (III, 479-520).

[31] "As therefore, we are saved, so we are made happy by hope. And as we do not as yet possess a present, but look for a future salvation, so it is with our happiness, and this 'with patience'; for we are encompassed with evils, which we ought patiently to endure, until we come to the ineffable enjoyment of unmixed good; . . ." CD, XIX, 4 (II, 307).

"And therefore the apostle also admonished the Church to pray for kings and those in authority, assigning as the reason, 'that we may live a quiet and tranquil life in all godliness and love.'* And the prophet Jeremiah, when pre-

In keeping with these principles, Saint Augustine never extols the adoption of a definite form of civil government. The history of Rome, always present in his memory, suffices to convince him that, according to the nature of the people who are to be governed, this constitution may be preferable to that. When a society is composed of thoughtful men, alert guardians of the common good, each of whom subordinates his personal interest to that of all, nothing prevents the authorization to elect from their own number magistrates charged with the administration of the republic. But when this same people progressively deteriorates internally to the kind of citizens who prefer their private interest to the public interest, the elected officials become venal and the government passes into the hands of the worst criminals. Why shall it not be right that a good man, arising at that juncture, should take from the

---

dicting the captivity that was to befall the ancient people of God, and giving them the divine command to go obediently to Babylonia, and thus serve their God, counselled them also to pray for Babylonia, saying, 'In the peace thereof shall ye have peace,'**--the temporal peace which the good and the wicked together enjoy." CD, XIX, 26 (II, 341).

Cf. CD, VIII, 19 (I, 333-335), and the sermons concerning the martyrdom of St. Stephen, Sermones 314-319 (PL, XXXVIII, col. 1425-1442).

In accord with these principles, Augustine always is the opponent of the pain of death and of torture; see on this point G. Combes, op. cit., pp. 188-200.

* I Tim. 2:2; variant reading, "purity."

** Jer. 29:7.

people the right of conferring public office and should reserve this right to a small number of magistrates who are likeminded?[32] The eternal law alone is unchangeable. The temporal laws are not. In the same way, when he praises the happiness of the Christian emperors, Augustine takes care not to confuse the temporal order with the spiritual order. It is less in their secular prosperity than in the justice of their administration and from their submission to God, that he makes this happiness to consist.[33]

One may thus be tempted to believe that the radical heterogeneity of the two domains assures their complete independence in the doctrine of St. Augustine. But this is not so, for other considerations proceed to reestablish the relations which the theory seems to break. It is a fact, for example, that after finding it repugnant for a long time, Augustine progressively inclines toward a closer and closer collaboration between the religious authority and the civil authority. The sight of his own city attracted to the

---

[32] De libero arbitrio, I, 6 (pp. 30-37).
CD, V, 17 (I, 208f).
Source of St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, Ia, IIae, q. 97, art. 1, end.

[33] CD, V, 24 (I, 222f). What interests him especially is to prove, in opposition to the pagans, by the example of Constantine, that the reign of a Christian emperor can be successful. CD, V, 25 (I, 223f).
Cf. Letter 138, iii, 16f (XIII, 206-209).

Catholic Church solely by fear of the imperial laws has struck his spirit acutely, and, nearing the end of his life, he admits with less and less scruples the legitimacy of recourse to secular arms against the heretics and the schismatics.[34] Is it necessary to see in this attitude the

---

[34] See the typical text: Letter 93 (VI, 395-440). Note especially i, 2 (396f): "Oh, if only I could but show you how many we have even from the Circumcelliones, who are now approved Catholics, and condemn their former life, . . . who nevertheless would not have been brought to this soundness of judgment had they not been, as persons beside themselves, bound with the cord of those laws which are distasteful to you!"

Persecution is legitimate if it is the persecution of evil by the good: "In some cases, therefore, both he that suffers persecution is in the wrong, and he that inflicts it is in the right. But the truth is, that always both the bad have persecuted the good, and the good have persecuted the bad: the former doing harm by their unrighteousness, the latter seeking to do good by the administration of discipline . . ." ii, 8 (401f). "Now you see, therefore, I suppose, that the thing to be considered when anyone is coerced is not the mere fact of the coercion, but the nature of that to which he is coerced, whether it be good or bad . . ." v, 16 (409).

From this springs the legitimacy, even the excellence, of the laws passed by the Christian emperors against the sacrifices of the pagans. See iii, 10 (403f).

From this, finally, Augustine's own development gives a favorable judgment on the employment of force against the heretics: "I have therefore yielded to the evidence afforded by these instances which my colleagues have laid before me. For originally my opinion was, that no one should be coerced into the unity of Christ, that we must act only by words, fight only by arguments, and prevail by force of reason, lest we should have those whom we knew as avowed heretics feigning themselves to be Catholics. But this opinion of mine was overcome not by the words of those who controverted it, but by the conclusive instances to which they could point. For in the first place, there was set over against my opinion my own town, which, although it was once wholly on the side of Donatus, was brought over to the

denial of the very ideal of the heavenly city and a tendency for making it coincide with the earthly city?

The embarrassment in which one finds himself in the presence of these various texts is due to the confusion which spontaneously arises between two pairs of seemingly contradictory terms: State and Church on the one hand; Civitas terrenae and Civitas Dei on the other. But, from the point of view of Saint Augustine, these two pairs do not coincide. The earthly city is not the State. In effect, all the members of the former city are predestinated to eternal damnation. But the future elect ones necessarily constitute a part of the State where they were born and in which they live. One must not, therefore, confound the earthly city, a mystical entity according to Augustine's own expression, with such and such a real city realized materially in time and space. Inversely, as surprising as this may seem, the Church is not the City of God, for this city is the society of all the elect, past, present and future. Not only were there manifestly some of the elect righteous before the formation of the Church of Christ, but there are preserved, apart from the Church and perhaps even among its persecutors, future elect ones who will submit to its disci-

---

Catholic unity by fear of the imperial edicts, . . ."
v, 17 (409f).

pline before dying. Finally and above all things, there are within the Church many men who are not of the number of the elect: habet secum, quamdiu peregrinature in mundo, connexos communione sacramentorum, nec secum futuros in aeterna sorte sanctorum.[35] Saint Augustine accordingly rigorously expresses his thought when he declares that the two cities are mingled here below and that they will remain so until the last judgment conclusively separates the citizens of the one from the other: perplexae quippe sunt istae duae civitates in hoc saeculo, donec ultimo judicio dirimantur.[36] But what then remain facing each other will obviously not be the Church on the one hand and the State on the other, but the divine society of the elect and the diabolical society of the damned. Considered on the basis of their essential meaning, these two pairs of terms are entirely distinct.

However, Augustine often enough expresses himself with sufficient ambiguity to explain why a fair proportion

---

[35] "So, too, as long as she is a stranger in the world, the city of God has in her communion, and bound to her by the sacraments, some who shall not eternally dwell in the lot of the saints." CD, I, 35 (I, 46). Translator's note.

[36] "Of course these two cities are intermingled in this age, until they are separated by the last judgment." CD, I, 35 (I, 46f). See also XVIII, 49 (II, 381f). Excellent remarks on this point will be found in J. N. Figgis, The Political Aspects of S. Augustine's City of God (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1921), especially chapter III, pp. 51-53, and IV, 68-70.

of commentators have not understood the difference. In a noted passage from the City of God,[37] he expressly declares that the Church is from the present time the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of heaven. Is not this clearly to restore under a different guise the identification which we have come to reject? By no means, for the kingdom of Christ, which actually is the Church, since He is with it until the consummation of the ages, is not the City of God. His kingdom definitely allows the tares to grow with the wheat, whereas He will not have the tares mixed with the good grain in the heavenly city.[38] It is thus correct that

---

[37] CD, XX, 9, par. 9 (II, 363-365).

[38] Reuter believes that this text identifies the Church with the communio sanctorum. In his desire to refute Reuter, who seldom recognized the hierarchical and concrete aspect of the Church, Figgis (op. cit., p. 69) opposes to his the opinions of Schols and Seidel, according to whom Augustine has spoken of the Church as a visible and hierarchically organized body. Reuter is indeed mistaken, but Figgis is mistaken in thus concluding that Augustine "makes an identification of the Church with the Civitas Dei." Augustine in this passage identifies the Church with the kingdom of God, but he distinguishes two kingdoms of God: the one provisional, in which offenses are still found, which offenses are precisely what the Son of Man will have reaped by the Angels at the end of time, when the tares will be separated from the good grain; and the true kingdom of God, which contains only the elect and is certainly identical with the City of God: "We must understand in one sense the kingdom of heaven in which exist together both he who breaks what He teaches [scil., the one who will not do what He teaches him]* and he who does it, . . . and in another sense the kingdom of heaven into which only he who does what

* Notes by Gilson.

the Church is the kingdom of God, but not that it is the City of God. All that one can say is that the State is essentially foreign to, and indifferent to, supernatural ends. It is, according to the strong definition which one man has given to the World: "human society organizing itself apart from God."[39] It is not at all surprising, from these conditions, that the members of the State who are only members of the State become henceforth the citizens destined to the earthly City, and, by the same token, one may legitimately mingle them.[40] On the other hand, although the Church is not the City of God, it is the only

---

He teaches shall enter. Consequently, where both classes exist, [scil., the good and the bad]* it is the Church as it now is, but where only the one shall exist, it is the Church as it is destined to be when no wicked person shall be in her. Therefore the Church even now is the kingdom of Christ, and the kingdom of heaven. Accordingly, even now His saints reign with Him, though otherwise than as they shall reign hereafter; and yet, though the tares grow in the Church along with the wheat, they do not reign with Him." CD, XX, 9 (II, 364f). This text thus confirms the distinction of the concept of the City of God from the concept of the Church instead of the reverse.

[39] Creighton's formula, cited by Figgis, op. cit., p. 58.

[40] "For, in general, the city of the ungodly, which did not obey the command of God that it should offer no sacrifice save to Him alone, and which, therefore, could not give to the soul its proper command over the body, nor to the reason its just authority over the vices, is void of true justice." CD, XIX, 24 (II, 340).

* Notes by Gilson.

human organization which tries to build it. Since it is plainly designed, founded and helped by God to recruit the elect of the heavenly kingdom, it is natural that, in principle, its members should be the future citizens of the kingdom. From this arises the simplified antithesis to which Augustine occasionally reduces history: two cities, Babylon and Jerusalem; two peoples, the damned and the elect; two kings, the devil and Christ.[41]

One will not therefore consider Augustine either as definitely having the medieval ideal of a civil society subject to the supremacy of the Church,[42] or as having con-

---

[41] "On the other hand, what does it say that all the various errors of the enemies of Christ are: Is there not but one? I am bold to say clearly that there is only one: for there is one city opposed to another city, one people opposed to another people, a king opposed to a king. What does this mean--one city opposed to another city? Babylon is the one; Jerusalem is the other. In spite of anyone wanting to be called by a different mystic name, there is still one city opposed to another city. The devil is the king of the first. Christ is the king of the latter." Enarrationes in psalmos 61, 6 (PL, XXXVI, col. 733).

"Babylon is said to be a city of the second century. In this way there is a holy city, Jerusalem. There is also an evil city, Babylon. All the evil ones belong to Babylon, in the same way that all the saints belong to Jerusalem." Enarrationes in psalmos 86, 6 (PL, XXXVII, col. 1166).

[42] "A difference between the heathen and the Roman states was not discussed by Augustine. He saw in the former as in the latter no more than the temporal state resting in sin. The only one in which by divine right order rested was for him the theocracy of the Church." H. V. Eicken, Geshichte und System der mittelalterlichen

demned in advance such a concept. That which remains strictly and absolutely true is that in any case the earthly City, much less the City of God, must not be confused with any form of State, whatever it may be. However, the State can, and eventually ought to be, used for the proper ends of the Church and, through it, for those of the City of God. This latter is a totally different problem, concerning which Augustine raises no objection. Inasmuch as he has never clearly formulated the principle, the idea of a theocratic government is not unreconcilable with his doctrine. If the ideal of the City of God is not implied in this idea, it is not excluded either.[43] A stranger to all the nations

---

Weltanschauung (third edition, 1917), p. 144.
From the analysis which precedes, one sees immediately how far Eicken is from Augustine's real viewpoint.

[43] What must come from the Middle Ages is not here the point of Augustine's doctrine. Concerning this it may be remarked:
I. The doctrine which confuses the City of God with a theocratic empire, although it be a genuine mistake, was inevitable from the social and political circumstances which favored its development.
II. Augustine himself had been compelled toward such a position (a) in admitting the legitimacy of recourse to secular arms against the heretics; (b) in imposing on the State, as a duty, its self-subordination to the ends of the City of God. The method and limits of this subordination cannot be known to be determined a priori.
See on this point the excellent remarks of Figgis, op. cit., pp. 79f, and also: "Now Augustine (however you may interpret him) never identified the Civitas Dei with any earthly State. But he had prepared the way for other people to do this." Op. cit., p. 84.

and all the States, it recruits everywhere the citizens which compose it. Indifferent to the variety of languages, of mores and of customs, it attacks none; it destroys none which are good and useful. It works, on the contrary, to improve in all the different nations that which each of them contributes to the service of the earthly peace--provided that there is nothing in them opposed to the final establishment of the peace of God.[44] Thus it prepares itself

---

[44] "This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities of the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace. It therefore is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities that it even preserves and adopts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduced. Even the heavenly city, therefore, while in its state of pilgrimage, avails itself of the peace of earth, and, so far as it can without injuring faith and godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisitions of the necessities of life, and makes this earthly peace bear upon the peace of heaven; for this alone can be truly called and esteemed the peace of the reasonable creatures, consisting as it does in the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in God. When we shall have reached that peace, this mortal life shall give place to one that is eternal, and our body shall be no more this animal body which by its corruption weighs down the soul, but a spiritual body feeling no want, and in all its members subjected to the will. In its pilgrim state the heavenly city possesses this peace by faith; and by this faith it lives righteously when it refers to the attainment of that peace every good action towards God and man; for the life of the city is a social life." CD, XIX, 17 (II, 327f).

One may get an idea of the characteristically philosophical repercussions of this doctrine in studying Leib-

here below for this perfect social life, though without being able to attain it here: quoniam vita civitatis utique socialis est.[45] This is the life where absolute order will reign, by the union of wills according to a common blessedness--eternal life in the bosom of God.

The meaning and bearing of this doctrine has been often discussed. Some people have seen a survival of Manicheanism in the City of God. The City of God is opposed by Augustine to the earthly city as the Manichean kingdom of good and of light is opposed to that of evil and of darkness.[46] But, first of all, it does not seem that Augustine himself has in the least suspected such an affiliation, for the sources of his doctrine to which he refers us are solely scriptural. The idea of a city of God is expressly suggested to him by Psalm 86:6: Gloriosa dicta sunt de ti, civitas Dei.[47] The classical opposition between Babylon and Jerusalem is sufficient, on the other hand, to suggest

---

nitz, Discours de metaphysique, chapters XXV-XXXVIII; and Malebranche, Meditations chretiennes, XIV (ed. H. Gouhier; Paris, 1928), pp. 305ff.

[45] This is the last clause from the quotation in the footnote above: "For the life of the city obviously is social." Translator's note.

[46] G. Combes, op. cit., p. 36.

[47] "Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God." Psalm 87:3, A.V. Translator's note.

the idea of an evil city opposed to the divine city.[48] Finally, the antithesis of the two cities is already formulated in the known writings previous to Augustine, for example in Tyconius. This disposes of this unprovable psychological hypothesis concerning the germination of this idea in his thought.[49] Be that as it may with regard to its origin, it ought to be left clear that, in every way, the Augustinian doctrine of two cities not only has nothing Manichean in its basic terms, but also that it is firmly anti-Manichean. According to Mani and his disciples, there is an opposition between two cities, the one good by nature, the other naturally evil. According to St. Augustine, the idea of an evil nature is inconsistent from its terms. For

---

[48] "Likewise observe the names of these two cities, Babylon and Jerusalem. Babylon is interpreted by confusion; Jerusalem by the vision of peace." Enarrationes in Psalmos 64, 2 (PL, XXXVI, col. 773). Cf. Enarrationes in Psalmos 86, 6 (PL, XXXVII, col. 1105f).

Other possible scriptural sources are suggested by P. de Labriolle (editor of the Confessions, XII, 11, par. 12 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1925-1926), vol. II, p. 337, note 1, which refer with reason to the Apocalypse.

[49] See the parallel texts in the edition of the Rules of Tyconius,* where the opposition between civitas Dei and civitas diaboli is found. Consult on this point Figgis, op. cit., pp. 46f, 127 and 127, note 5. Compare, for the same sense, H. Scholz, Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte (Leipzig: J. C. Hindrichs, 1911), p. 78, and B. Geyer in Ueberwegs-Grundriss, 11th ed. (Berlin, 1928), vol. II, p. 114.

* F. C. Burkitt, ed., The Book of the Rules of Tyconius (Cambridge: University Press, 1894), cxxii, 114 pp.

example, the earthly city is good by nature and evil only by the perversity of its will.[50] Augustinianism, being a doctrine where the very darkness, insofar as it is, is good, constitutes the very negation of the Manichean dualism.

It is the more useless to try to find the distant sources of the doctrine, concerning which he hides nothing about its origins or intentions. Here, as everywhere else, faith precedes understanding and gives birth to it. It is therefore from the Scriptures that one must begin to discover the point of view of Augustine. That which strikes him is that the revelation makes us to know the events, from the creation and the fall, concerning which we should otherwise live without knowledge, but which are nevertheless the key to universal history. Afterwards it is that which shows us the purposes of God and permits us thus to foresee that future history will have sense as it has had in the past. All that one discovers about the universe seen from

---

[50] "These two angelic communities, then, dissimilar and contrary to one another, the one both good by nature and upright by will, the other likewise good by nature but depraved by will, as they are exhibited in other and more explicit passages of Holy Writ, so I think they are spoken of in this book of Genesis under the name of light and darkness; . . ." CD, XI, 33 (I, 478).

"That the contrary propensities in good and bad angels have arisen, not from a difference in their nature and origin, since God, the good Author and Creator of all essences, created them both, but from a difference in their wills and desires, it is impossible to doubt." CD, XII, 1, par. 2 (I, 481).

the viewpoint of space: being, goodness, order, proportion, beauty, truth--all find themselves again in the succession of the states of this universe across the various intervals of time. Augustine's point of departure is therefore the revelation which, in conferring on history the universality which our fragmentary empiricism cannot attain, and especially in revealing its origin and its end, renders possible the theology of history and confers on the universe an intelligibility in the order of time.

In adopting this first point of view, Augustine engages himself necessarily in admitting a second, that of the underlying unity of mankind and of its history. Since God, in foresight, wills and directs the sequence of historical events, from its beginning even to its approaching end, he necessarily makes every people and every man act his part in the same drama and contribute according to the measure determined by Providence to the realization of the same end. In a certain sense, therefore, the totality of humanity is only a single man subdued by God to the purifying and illuminating trials of a progressive revelation. However, these gifts and this enlightenment are only clearly effective to the future elect, members of this communion of saints who are, as Leibnitz would say, of this "republic of spirits," whose formation and completion is the final reason for the universe and for its history. Thence arises the

exceedingly profound concept of a mystic city made more of dead and future beings than of living ones--a perfect society which alone is clearly worthy of the name, since it was founded by the love of God, and since it alone realizes the ideal of society, which is peace and justice. It is, in a word, a perfect society,[51] so that all the others are only disappointments or possibilities. It is not, therefore, by accident, but by a thorough faithfulness to the requirements of his methods and of his fundamental principles, that the doctrine of Augustine expands itself into a theology of history.

---

[51] "Societe fin." Translator's note.

APPENDIX C

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

While this study was being made, a number of matters of importance for further study or translation were noted. With regard to translation, a complete translation of Gilson's Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin will meet an important need. Perhaps others of his works should also be translated, but the greatest urgency seems to attend this work.

Also, several of Augustine's works should be translated. Some new translations have appeared rather recently, and some will no doubt appear in the new edition of the works of the church fathers, now in preparation under the editorship of Johannes Quastens of the Catholic University of America. But, at this writing, a number of Augustine's works are not available in translation.

A question was raised in connection with the survey in Chapter II, pages 20f: Is there a direct connection between Augustine and Plato, as opposed to a Plato-Neoplatonic-Augustine relationship? This writer has not been able to investigate this problem. However, Gilson's bibliography notes ten German, seven French, four Latin, and three Italian--but no English--studies of Augustine's sources. Several of these studies, to judge by their titles, appar-

ently connect Augustine with Plotinus and Neoplatonism, but others apparently trace the connection directly to Plato. Thus there seems to be room for a thorough study, in English, of these relationships.

It has also been noted, on page 28, that there is room for an exposition of a specific philosophy of the State on Augustine's terms. This the writer has hopes of attempting.

But, to his mind, more important is the making available some means for ready reference to all of Augustine's works. Gilson notes that there is a Latin index: D. Lenfant, O.P., Concordantiae Augustinianae (Paris, 1656, 1665), two volumes. But this is not especially helpful to English-speaking students. Hence it has seemed to this writer that a condensation or precis of all of Augustine's works, accompanied by a copious index, would be a boon to all students of philosophy. If others can be persuaded that this is a worthy project, it will form part of the writer's doctoral studies.

In this connection it may be remarked that the reading of Augustine's writings is always profitable for edification. However, it is discouraging to plod through hundreds of pages in the hope of securing a brief discussion of two on a specific point. And Augustine himself admits to

being prolix.[1] Because of this difficulty, coupled with the lack of translations, this thesis has certainly omitted some material from works other than the City of God which bears on the subject. This must have been the experience of other students as well, hence this concern with making Augustine readily available to every student.

---

[1] CD, IV, 34 (I, 176).

INDIANA STATE
T.C. LIBRARY