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A LIBERATING INTENT: THE AMERICAN CIVICS CURRICULUM IN ILLINOIS HIGH SCHOOLS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CRITICALLY CONSTRUCTIVE CITIZENRY

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ABSTRACT

Civics education and constructive criticality are not usually found within the same curriculum. In America the two concepts tend to be considered as antithetical in content and practice. Students and teachers do not approach education about the citizen’s responsibilities with great necessity or urgency, and when they do approach the subject it is from the perspective of inherent rights that should not be questioned, since they are by birth granted, albeit only to some. The idea of criticality is also not considered to be part of the developmental need of a citizen, since the overall sentiment associated with it is one of negativity. However, a philosophical analysis of the foundational principles of both concepts demonstrates a singular genesis, one that has been obscured through the erroneous development of a citizenry for the sake of the maintenance of the status quo. This research develops a clearer picture of the state of civic education in the United States through a review of the pertinent literature in the field, including the historical texts considered to be foundational to American civics curricula, as well as the most prominent texts presently in use. The study clarifies this image further through the design and application of a philosophically analytic tool based on a hermeneutic review of concepts, predominant language usage, and critical reasoning. This extension is accomplished by scrutinizing a particular civics curriculum to determine its philosophical similarity to the concepts of the originating documents of the United States. A culminating summary of the results derived from the analysis concludes the study, along with some pedagogic suggestions
that should help align future curricular designs more closely with the founding principles of the American republic.
PREFACE

The empowerment of citizens through a critical understanding of their responsibilities and rights is a necessity for the maintenance of a republic founded on the principles of freedom. A historical and philosophical relationship with the founding concepts, inherent within the texts of that republic, demands an active and constructive understanding of criticality. The responsibility for the maintenance of that analytical, active, and non-acquiescent citizenry lies in part in the curricula generated, the texts and assessments that support them, and the pedagogies used by teachers in the act of developing the next generation of citizens of that republic. If that mandate is not exercised in the courts of reason we call classrooms, then the result will be a dangerous maintenance of power in the hands of others whose agendas may have no alignment with the principles of a free and developing republic.

This study demonstrates how the use of a tool for textual analysis can aid in developing the critical and constructive understanding of a citizen, empowered by the ability to reason, within a paradigm of freedom. It validates through the use of that tool the indispensible responsibility to doubt authority as a process of growth in the study of civics. Consequently it focuses upon a review of the discourses and texts that generate power within the American republic. It concurrently focuses on the hermeneutic analysis of multiple civics texts and their subsequent curricular development. With a focus on intellectual scrutiny, based on the review of language usage and the concepts of educational epistemology, the study reviews assessments of
civic knowledge and their association to the advancement of a responsibly-taught critical citizenry.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This study examines the relationship between the educational curriculum studied by the founding fathers of the United States, selections of their written works, and the present civics curriculum in Illinois high schools. It looks for subliminal intent in educational theories across three selected time periods: colonial and postrevolutionary America, as well as the current epoch. It makes an assessment of power and its usage, by an intellectual oligarchy, through educational restrictions associated with criticality in education. It designs a tool to search out these restrictions from a comparative hermeneutic perspective. Conclusions and recommendations for further research are offered in the final chapter.

Background

The founders of the American republic were united in more than just their political ideology; they were united by their educational curricular history as well (Rudolph, 1962). This was an educational history overflowing with a mixture of Puritan Christianity, and with the coming of the revolution, with enlightenment philosophy as well (Honeywell, 1931; Koch, 1943). However, the focal point of the founders’ educational development also included a curricular emphasis on the perennial concepts of humanistic education via the classics of the western world (Richard, 1995; Rudolph, 1962; Winterer, 2002). Therefore, the essence of the paradigm within which the founders developed intellectually was a tripartite combination of
Calvinist-based Protestant religious belief, enlightenment-based political theories centered on freedom and the power of criticality, and a classical hermeneutically-focused perennial education (Hoeveler, 2002; Honeywell, 1931; Richard, 1995; Rudolph, 1962; Winterer, 2002). Such a combination developed the minds of men like James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who were alumni of Princeton University and the College of William and Mary, respectively (Ketcham, 1990; Richard, 1995; Rudolph, 1962). Within that development, one can see the focal lessons of the texts that these, as well as the other founders of the American republic, read in classical fashion; lessons that would develop a power base that could subliminally be kept under the control of an aristocracy of the intellect (Honeywell, 1931; Segal, 1984). Evidence of an abhorrence towards criticality and the need to maintain, in perpetuity, an uncritical perspective can be seen in the changes that were made to the original Declaration of Independence by founders like Benjamin Franklin and John Adams (Peterson, 1984). These men, who had been, at least in the case of Adams, raised on the classical texts of ancient criticism and rebellion, made sure that the text of the declaration was rewritten with the language of future maintenance of the status quo, not the language of persistent rebellion (Peterson, 1984; Richard, 1995). Ironically, the texts that the founders learned their craft from include those written by such critical authors as Cicero, Plato, Virgil, Aeschylus, Caesar, Demosthenes, and Homer among others, and they became the educational foundation of the revolutionary generation (Ketcham, 1990; Koch, 1943; Peterson, 1970; Richard, 1995). However, the privilege of learning the lessons of the classical intent to develop critical reason seems to have been reserved for the elite keepers of the political faith, not for the common people (Rudolph, 1962, 1965). The historicity of this privilege, and the problems associated with its inclusion within the civics curricula of the educational system of a
democratically-based republic are at the core of this research on American education (Gutmann, 1987).

A Statement of the Problem

Civics education and constructive criticality are not usually found within the same curriculum. The two concepts have a propensity to be considered in America as antithetical in content and practice (Giroux, 1997; Gutmann, 1987) Students and teachers do not approach the education of the citizen’s responsibilities with great necessity or urgency, and when they do approach the subject it is from the perspective of inherent rights that should not be questioned since they are by birth granted, albeit only to some (Giroux, 1997; Janowitz, 1983). The idea of criticality is also not considered as part of the developmental need of a citizen, since the overall sentiment associated with it is one of negativity. However, a philosophical analysis of the foundational principles of both concepts demonstrates a singular genesis, one that has been obscured through the erroneous development of a citizenry for the sake of the maintenance of the status quo (Butts, 1980; Giroux, 1997; Janowitz, 1983).

Purpose of the Study

This research develops a clearer picture of the state of civics education in the United States through a review of the pertinent literature in the field, including the historical texts considered as foundational to American civics curricula, as well as the most prominent texts presently in use. The study clarifies this image further through the design and application of a philosophically analytic tool based on a hermeneutic review of concepts, predominant language usage, and epistemic reasoning. This process is accomplished by scrutinizing a particular civics curriculum to determine its philosophical similarity to the concepts of the originating documents of the United States. A culminating summary of the results derived from the analysis concludes
the study, along with some pedagogical suggestions that should help align future curricular
designs more closely with the founding principles of the American republic.

**Need for the Study**

The empowerment of citizens through a critical understanding of their responsibilities
and rights is a preeminent and indispensible need for the maintenance of a republic founded on
the principles of freedom (Honeywell, 1931; Koch, 1943; Peterson, 1984). A historical and
philosophical relationship with the founding concepts, inherent within the texts of that republic,
demands an active and constructive understanding of criticality. The responsibility for the
maintenance of that analytical, active and non-acquiescent citizenry lies in part on the curricula
generated, the texts and assessments that support them, and the pedagogies used by teachers in
the act of developing the next generation of citizens of that republic (Gutman, 1987). If that
mandate is not exercised in the courts of reason we call classrooms, then the result will likely be
a dangerous maintenance of power in the hands of others whose agendas have no alignment with
the principles of a free and developing republic (Giroux, 1997).

**Significance of the Research**

This research determines whether there is evidence of a hidden curriculum of social-
political control embedded in the discourses and in partnership with the negation of critical
intellectual development in the civics texts of Illinois high schools. It attempts to demonstrate
whether a historical and perennial anti-critical relationship exists between the founding texts of
the American republic and the texts and assessments currently used in those high schools. It
reviews and analyzes the formative texts of the American republic for evidence of curricular
intent. This then allows a more veridical perspective to be seen relative to the effects of any
curricula in civics education.
Subsequently, the study focuses on suggestions for an intervention pedagogy whose purpose is to begin to eradicate the restrictive educational practices that result in the exclusion of the student from individual power. It demonstrates how the use of an analytic tool, hermeneutics, can aid in developing the critical and constructive understanding of a citizen, who is empowered, by the ability to reason within a paradigm of freedom, to truly become democratic. It validates through the use of that tool, the indispensible individual and group responsibility to doubt authority as a process of growth in a democracy (Ober, 2008).

Assumptions

This study is based on three general assumptions. It assumes that in a democratically-based republic criticality is an important cognitive skill for a student to acquire. It assumes that the development of a nonacquiescent citizenry is healthy for the evolution of such a republic. It further assumes that education for participatory liberty, through instruction for a life based on the understanding of civil responsibilities and rights, is of greater importance than an education for an acquiescent participation that can lead to political apathy.

Limitations

This research is limited to a subjective selection of the major texts and assessments of three curricular periods in American educational history: colonial and postrevolutionary America and the current epoch. Finally, the study is limited to one curricular episode: civics curricula in Illinois high schools. Further generalizations or extensions of the premises of this study would require that the hypothetical premises and the tools of analysis be extended to other intermediary periods in American curricular and educational history and that a mixed methods analysis of the thesis be generated. Lack of this approach to the study constrains the extrapolation of the theory from being used in a social science research perspective. In essence, the limits of the design are
evident; this is not a quantitative study. However, the limits do not restrict the theoretical validity of the tool or its findings relative to the texts since the nature of the analysis is qualitative and seeks a perennial cognitive perspective: the inclusion or exclusion of critical learning methods from the curricula under consideration regardless of any quantifiable evidence. This, by nature of the inviolate character of the founding texts, could give evidence of the linguistic manipulation of philosophical concepts during the periods under discussion.

**Delimitations**

Limiting this study to the Illinois civics high school curriculum and its texts allows for a practical review of a present curriculum. This, in turn, allows for a veridical intellectual bridge to exist between the theoretical perspectives of the thesis and the current application of the concepts. Furthermore, the introduction of the specific current curriculum allows for verification in practice of the study-generated tool of analysis. This, in turn, gives credence to its use in future praxis relative to the other curricula. Therefore, the boundaries that have been set allow for a practical application of the analytic tool that will generate results for the focal context, the state of Illinois civics curriculum and its inclusion or exclusion of critical reasoning.
CHAPTER 2

Review of the Literature

This review of the literature is divided into eleven parts that are all thematically related to the research. First, the review begins by looking at the pertinent literature associated with the concepts of aristocracy and yeomanry in relation to republican social order and hierarchy. This literature will initiate an understanding of the concepts of intellectual class divisions and those associated with a pastoral versus an urban civil ethic. Second, the review then focuses on the concepts of civil liberties and the morality of civics within a natural law perspective. This literature helps generate a focus on the combinatorial association between ethics and politics during the three focal epochs and relate these concepts to the idea of a natural right philosophy, a philosophical perspective that was prevalent among the founding fathers. Third, the review continues with a look at the intellectuals of the epochs in question as well as at one of the philosophies that greatly influenced the founders’ revolutionary perspective: enlightenment philosophy. It then turns to a discussion of the major texts of the periods including the Constitution of the United States as well as the Declaration of Independence and the social contracts inherent in them and in the other focal texts of the periods.

Next, the review aims towards the foundations of democratic theory as a premise to understanding its theoretical principles. This review helps the research by laying the necessary groundwork for the comparative study of the governmental structure of the three periods. The
review then looks at the remnants of Jeffersonian republicanism to help generate an understanding of a critical perspective gone missing ideologically and empirically. It then focuses on two sections sequentially, one on the concept of nationalism and its ideological effects on nation building and the other centered on the concept of a republican-based education. These concepts allow for a more educated comparison of the two premises pedagogically.

Finally, the review centers on the concepts of revolutionary ideology and the analytic tools used to prove the thesis of the research. This is done in order to understand further the origins and outcomes of that ideology and to view the particular dialogues connected with these in light of the founding texts of American civics education via the tools of analysis.

**Relevant Historical and Theoretical Issues**

**Aristocracy and yeomanry.** Aristocracy and yeomanry are two focal points associated with the idea of cultural development in early American history. Whether it is the focus of prerevolutionary Christian-based evangelical theology or the enlightenment philosophy of the postrevolutionary period, the central actors in the American stage of civics development from a cultural perspective relative to education and government are the yeoman and the aristocrat (Appleby, 1978; Holifield, 2003).

The perspectives of these two class divisions in the early American colonial and republican days were ideologically generated through the inclusion of the pastoral viewpoint in the education of the founders (Richard, 1995; Winterer, 2002). This outlook, which focuses on the hypothetical, classical, and ethical purity of the farming yeoman and the intellectual urban aristocrat, is prevalent historically in the works of the Greek and Roman authors whose writings made up the core of the curriculum of the founders and their predecessors in America (Richard, 1995; Rowe & Schofield, 2005; Rudolph, 1962; Winterer, 2002). The yeoman farmer was
considered ethically pure by men such as Jefferson, and this ethic was exemplified by the character of Patrick Henry. The characteristics of a Virgilian pastoral purity were seen in the self-sufficiency of the frontier farmer, who made his way in the wilderness without any aid and who excluded slavery from his capital acquisition. This was seen as ethical in the yeoman of the period specifically due to the fact that in rural prerevolutionary Virginia wealth was not considered as based upon monetary holdings, but on the ownership of land and slaves. Therefore, the concepts that focus the purity of the yeoman relative to the ideals of the founders are the concepts of self-sufficiency, sacrifice, and the repugnance of idleness (Hofstadter, 1973a; Koch, 1943).

The concept of an urban aristocracy, evident since the founding of Harvard in 1636, needed to have the inclusion of the ethical yeoman among its ranks, but only to a degree. The urban intellectuals historically included the graduates of the founding universities of New England: Harvard, Yale, and William and Mary, to name only three. These men were members of the clergy and included also the administrators of the cities and the teachers of the future citizenry. These intellectuals of the urban settings would include in their conceptual essence the ideas of Protestantism and the classics, where the yeoman only brought with him the ability to read and accept with stoic empiricism his lot in life, one that would eventually disenfranchise him from a republican power base of participatory democracy (Appleby, 1984; Hofstadter, 1973a; Rudolph, 1962).

In order to achieve this inclusion, one that would hypothetically change the aristocracy of the inherited to the aristocracy of talent and virtue that would be more in line with the ideals of the new republic, a series of attempts to reform education were considered by the founders. Leading the way in this reform was Thomas Jefferson, with his Bill for the General Diffusion of
Knowledge, alongside of which can be found the work of Benjamin Rush and others (Honeywell, 1931; Peterson, 1984; Rudolph, 1965).

This mentality, one of inherent pastoral righteousness, was to shift to a new focus of energy in the American paradigm, and its cause would be the inclusion of economic factors into the mix. Appleby (1978) introduces the concept when she states that “the roots of liberal social thought did not lie in past politics or classical theories of government, but rather can be traced to the first writings on the free market economy” (p. 940). Therefore, when the founders began to speak and argue and write on theories of government, albeit for the sake of the development and perpetuity of freedom, their theoretical genesis was to include a classical mentality with an economic drive. This would imbue the founding with an economic perspective that would initiate the tripartite paradigm of civics in America, a paradigm of classical perspectives, Christian theology, and economics. This would bring to bear on the birth of American culture the initiation of what Appleby calls a “new social order” (Appleby, 1984). Hofstadter (1973a) and McDonald (1958) respectively add impetus to this makeup of the social system through their own perspectives on the social conditions of the epoch. Hofstadter focuses on the period up to 1750, and McDonald carries the banner of social and economic infusion through to the initiating ideas of the Constitution.

The concepts that begin to shed light on the development of the mind of America moments before and after the revolution are both overt and subliminal. The classical perspectives of ethical purity associated with the concept of yeomanry and the intellectual aristocracy were to combine with the exigencies of economic reality and its consequent social development to give a clarifying effect to the founding. Furthermore, the façade of classical pastoralism and meritocracy were to be developed within the subliminal intricacies of economics and socio-
politics. How this paradigm would play out through the education and civic development of the residents of America can best be seen in the inclusion of the concepts of natural law, rights, and morality within the cultural mix of the nation.

Civil liberties and morality within a natural law and rights framework. There is evidence that the founders were raised in the belief that there was a natural law based on reason and that reason united the natural inclinations in man to the rational law of the universe (Winterer, 2002). Natural law had its foundations on Greco-Roman stoic philosophy and was included in the political belief system of the young republican founders through the works of John Locke as a liberating educational concept (Algra, Barnes, Mansfield, & Schofield, 2005; Tarcov, 1984). The idea that a natural set of rights can be derived from a natural law was to be associated with the new nation by the inclusion of Lockean concepts with the Protestant Christianity of the founders (Dolhenty, 2003; Holifield, 2003). However, many of the founders included in their beliefs the impact of the enlightenment through the works of Locke and the Scottish philosophers and teachers that educated them at the Ivy League colleges that they attended (Rudolph, 1962). Within this educational system, the idea of a natural-law natural-right relationship flourished in the minds of the founders (Honeywell, 1931; Ketcham, 1958). However, the focus of most of their concepts needed a scientific and evidential perspective to give credence and balance to their point of view, and this came wholeheartedly from the realist and empiricist perspective that they used to ground their theories. As Ketcham (1958) states in his watershed essay on James Madison: “Madison was inclined to center his attention on the observable facts of human nature, and leave the moralizing and speculating to less sober and less realistic minds” (p. 68). In essence, then, the founders’ moral principles were Stoic, Christian, skeptical via the work of David Hume focused on the nature of man as volatile and changing as
seen in the works of Aristotle (Ketcham, 1958). Man’s nature, therefore, needed help in being brought to the mean of his ontological existence, and that mean was to be generated not through Hobbs’ political theory, but through the republican pathos of the skeptical philosophers, the Roman rhetoricians and philosophers, and the Greek classical thinkers, who focused on realism first and foremost relative to the ethics and politics associated with civil liberties (Ketcham, 1958; Koch, 1943; Richard, 1995). Throughout the founding, the idea that rights were inalienable was also associated with the responsibilities associated with the privilege to have those rights (Lloyd & Lloyd, 1998). Therefore, the main arguments that were generated for the understanding of civil liberties, the moral principles inherent in them, and the natural law that gave these credence were philosophically generated and empirically defended (Ketcham, 1958; Koch, 1943).

**Philosophy, intellectuals, and enlightenment.** The philosophical development that led to the founders’ perspectives comes from the unification of the philosophy of the enlightenment with the classical roots of a series of specific theories and an in-depth understanding of those theories via the constant reading and memorizing of the works of their representative authors.

These philosophical theories, Greek by genesis and Roman by subsequence, became the philosophical mother’s milk of the founders of the American republic (Rowe & Schofield, 2005). Evidence also points to the inclusion of the political progressive theories of the French philosophers and political empiricists who generated the texts of the social revolutions of the 1700s, including Rousseau and Montesquieu (Koch, 1943, 1950). In both political camps of the founders, republican and federalist, the influence of the classics and the enlightenment can be seen, for both Jefferson and Hamilton give veridical evidence of their fealty to these writers (Honeywell, 1931; Koch, 1943; McDonald, 1958; Winterer, 2002). Consequently, examples of
this can be seen in the Epicureanism of Jefferson combined with the Ciceronian moralistic and political theories that drove men like John Adams to constantly quote these authors in public in order to give credence to their political exigencies for the new American nation. It is these philosophical perspectives that drive the language and the concepts of the new nation-builders throughout their tenure (Koch, 1950; Rowe & Schofield, 2005; Winterer, 2002). The literature on this is clear, and of both a primary and secondary nature, for the founders speaks of their debt to the classics and the enlightenment, as do a plethora of writers throughout the epochs to the present (Algra et al., 2005; Hoeveler, 2002; Honeywell, 1931; Kurland & Lerner, 1987; Richard, 1995; Rudolph, 1962; Winterer, 2002). The influence of these classical writers upon the individual intellectual development of the founders can also be seen in the social and political compacts that they generated for the new republic.

The Constitution, constitutionalism, social compacts and their origins. There is a large amount of written work on the idea of the Constitution. The central perspectives of divergence conceptually can be seen to generate from the original differences in interpretative ideology between the federalists and the republicans of the revolutionary and postrevolutionary era (Cornell, 1999; Hamilton, Jay, & Madison, 1937). The social compacts that the constitutional perspectives generated in the two political camps had a plethora of foundations. These included classical Greek and Roman perspectives, as well as the perspectives of the time periods immediately before and after the revolution. The idea of the need for an intellectual aristocratic meritocracy on one hand and the concepts of pure democracy and the yeoman spirit on the other competed to be included in the wording of the instrumentalities of the founding (Adler, 1987; Hoeveler, 2002; Hofstadter, 1973a; Koch, 1943; Kurland & Lerner, 1987).
It is in the wording that one finds the original ideas of constitutional theory and in their perennial intent that we see the time-independent nature of the Constitution. This is evident in the seminal work on the Constitution generated by Adler (1987), where the centrality of words and phrases such as

- equality, inalienable rights (or human rights), [the] pursuit of happiness, civil rights (to secure human rights), the consent of the governed, the dissent of the governed . . . justice,
- domestic tranquility (or civil peace), [the] common defense (or national security), [the] general welfare [and] the blessings of liberty. (p. 30)

imbue the Constitution with philosophical language that could empower due to its capacity to liberate through elucidation or to restrict the citizen’s understanding through rhetorically generated confusion. Consequently, Adler (1987) does not believe that the citizenry of the United States during the late twentieth century understood the words or the foundations of the Constitution or of any of the texts associated with it. An example of this is seen in the fact that there is acceptance among most members of the general public that the Constitution generated a democracy, when in reality no democracy was generated by the constitution until universal suffrage was included in it in the twentieth century (Adler, 1987). Further descriptions of this and other accepted verbiage that allows for confusion and disenfranchisement due to rhetorical manipulation by a select few can be seen in the lack of participation in the founding of the United States by members of the yeomanry. With the exception of Patrick Henry and Benjamin Franklin, very few members had not studied at one of the colonial institutions of higher learning, making them members of an intellectual, if not a landed, aristocracy (Best, 1962; Hoeveler, 2002; Honeywell, 1931; Rudolph, 1962, 1965).
Regardless of this disenfranchisement or the unequal distributions of intellectual capital and land among citizens, the institutionalization of the Constitution through law is the supposed arbiter of justice amongst divergent classes, and as such is a check upon the misuse of power by the few over the many when the few are empowered to rule (Kurland & Lerner, 1987; Schwartz, 1993). The question not foreseen, or maybe subliminally included by the founders in their executive vision, was what would occur if the empowered few would constitutionally be allowed to choose their judges. How independent would the Constitution be from the powerbrokers of the future and what intent could be seen in the codified constitutional language of independence and freedom?

The Declaration of Independence: origins, sources and intent. The idea that a declaration of independence is purely an American tradition is unfounded. The concept of independence, from the dependent state of a colony into a sovereign state, has existed throughout the annals of recorded history (Strauss & Cropsey, 1987). The idea that a nation could be built that would allow for the best of classical political philosophy and republican government, albeit best in the mind of the founders, in the eighteenth century came about due to a declaration of independence founded on those principles in America (Dana, 1900; Rowe & Schofield, 2005; Segal, 1984). The concept of that declaration as unchanging and therefore a standard that would give credence to the solidity of the state as later embodied in the Constitution of the United States was not the intent of its original author, Thomas Jefferson (Cappon, 1959; Detweiler, 1962; Koch, 1950; Peterson, 1984). Jefferson believed in the concept of a growing and critically developed set of texts relative to the founding (Peterson, 1984; Segal, 1984). The fact that Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence was manhandled and massaged into a work that he did not completely approve can be seen by his inclusion in his writings of a comparative and detailed
review of what he originally wrote versus what was added to and deleted from it (Segal, 1984). In essence, the basic review of the differences leads one to see a decline in criticality and a careful replacement of the critical intent with words that maintain power and credulity in the hands of the few. The irony of this is best seen in the original inclusion of the concept of words related to and indicative of common sense, which Jefferson according to Detweiller (1962), wanted to have as the focus in the Declaration of Independence. Common sense is not authoritarian by nature, since the purpose of that commonality is equality of the understanding by all who read the words, not just by the elite. Dana (1900) further discusses the implications of wording differentials in his article on the Declaration of Independence, where he compares the different drafts of the instrument to the Virginia Bill of Rights authored by George Mason. Further scrutiny of these instruments shows word omissions inclusive of, but not limited to, words such as equality, independence, and nature, which can through their exclusion from draft to draft be considered as restrictive towards inclusions of criticality in the instrument. Further changes of course can best be seen in the actual draft, where a sequential comparison of the Declaration of Independence is included in Jefferson’s papers as edited by Peterson (Dana, 1900; Detweiler, 1962; Peterson, 1984). This then could be seen as a usurpation of basic democratic principles for the sake of what could be construed as a republican façade or a federalist ploy for legitimizing governmental control through the political use of confusing language. In essence, to help clarify these issues a review of the concepts, theories, and basic tenets of democracy needs to be considered in greater depth.

**Democracy: theories and principles.** When one considers democratic theories and their principles Diamond (1959), states that “our major political problems today are problems of democracy; and as much as anything else, the Federalist papers are a teaching about democracy”
However, the *Federalist* papers are also a teaching about the need for a central government in charge of the everyday operation of a nation as well as an attempt to convince a state, New York, of the need to vote for the ratification of a constitution that would generate such a federal government; democracy in this case was a secondary perspective (Hamilton et al., 1937). In essence, the concept of a democracy was Greek in its foundation and developed into an American republican institution. The ideas of mass and elite, democracy and knowledge, and opposition to unruly crowds that without education lead governments to ruin are not just a contemplation on the part of the federalists of the American founding; they are a deep and complex set of issues that have recently been best explained through the works of Ober of Stanford University. In his work, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*, Ober (1989) describes the impact of specific variables on the relationships between the government of the people in ancient Athens and power. In his work one can see the influential impact on the *demos* of rhetoric, as it shapes the ideology of the people (Ober, 1989, 2008). For Ober democracy is the combination of civic participation of the enfranchised people of a nation, enfranchised by birthright, protected by a set of laws and energized by a formal and informal discursive system necessary for the negation of apathy and the inculcation and development of a practice based on the accumulated knowledge of the people (Ober, 1989, 1998, 2008; Ober & Hedrick, 1996).

**Lingering remnants of Jeffersonian republicanism, ideology and philosophy.** In a sense, what Ober (1989) discusses from an ancient Athenian perspective has a greater connection to the works of Thomas Jefferson than to the majority of the other founding fathers of the American republic. In Jefferson we see a living paradox of ideologies, a supporter and aggressor for the rights of the people as seen in his opinion of the yeoman farmer, while at the same time calling for a meritorious system of education to develop the aristocracy of the intellect in the new
nation (Appleby, 1982; Gabriel, 1950; Koch, 1943; Peterson, 1984). It is within this dichotomy of ideology that we see the real genius of Jefferson’s American political philosophy; a philosophy of Stoicism and criticality combined with a thirst for realism that maintains a perennial respect for the discipline of the ancient writers of the Greek and Roman world (Honeywell, 1931; Koch, 1943; Peterson, 1984). Jefferson’s concepts of merit, the pursuit of happiness, and general education as a way to enliven the republic with a democratic infusion of criticality and rationality have been considered as relevant connections to the demos of the present American political stage (Boyd, 1953; Gabriel, 1950; Schlesinger, 1964).

Nationalism and nation-building in the early republic. The American civics stage, a stage based on the political ideology of republican government and democratic theory, is also a stage that is based on the ideas of nationalism and nation building (Hofstadter, 1973a, 1973b; Reisner, 1922). The men who opposed the federalism of the founders generated a states-rights opposition that was silenced by the drive of nationalism and patriotic duty to country and concepts whose words found sympathetic ears across the socio-economic classes of the American republic. Words such as freedom and liberty, as well as righteousness and godliness, associated themselves with the American ethos to formulate a pathos of unity that manipulated the perception of the nation into a country of zealots and political evangelists ready to press the banner of democracy into the hearts of all nations that did not believe in the primacy of the concept (Cornell, 1999; Hofstadter, 1973a, 1973b; Kettner, 1978; Roelofs, 1976).

Republican, or liberal, education. Therefore, politically and historically there has been a two-sided approach to the development of the civics education of the citizen. One side of the political structure focused on the ideas of nationalism and federation as central to that development, while the other focused on a more critical and republican, or state-centered,
This dichotomous discourse has maintained itself in the course of American education. At times, it has taken the limelight of the great play of pedagogy in the United States, and at others it has subsided under the stress and need for unity caused by fear of war or aggression towards the nation as a whole (Butts, 1980; Janowitz, 1983). Regardless of the stress caused by dissension or the communal mindset of unity based on a general security-based need, the fact still remained during the periods under consideration, as it does now, that a liberal education empowers the citizens to understand their responsibilities, not just to enjoy the rights that those responsibilities grant (Adler, 1988; Bellamy, 2008; Colby, Ehrlich, & Stephens, 2003). Therefore, the fact that there was a historical precedent for understanding the discourses of a democracy in the minds of the founders, and that an education needed to be designed to include the necessary content, skill and pedagogy to help a citizen achieve that understanding, was ever-present in the minds of the founders, for they had been part and parcel of such a system (Hofstadter, 1973a; Holifield, 2003; Honeywell, 1931; Kagan, 1991; Koch, 1943; Ober, 1989, 1998, 2008; Peterson, 1984; Richard, 1995; Rudolph, 1978; Winterer, 2002). Even Benjamin Franklin, who had not followed the orthodox educational system of the rest of the founders but had been educated by the physical act of setting type, understood the need for a critical, if not a scientific, investigative educational system (Best, 1962). However, the impact of selective inclusion in government participation, based on the factors of capital acquisition, affected the system in a way that was either foreseen and included in the political and governmental arena by the founders or not. The reasons for and against that inclusion must be considered and reviewed from a time perspective relative to the onset of the revolution and reviewed for evidence through the primary discourses generated by these revolutionaries. This historical and philosophical design, its impact, and its perennial drift into our epoch needs to be
considered relative to the present educational system in order to have a better understanding of its innate purpose versus its past and present constructs (Abowitz, 2008).

**Revolutionary ideology: origins and outcomes.** The revolutionary ideology of the founders comes from a multiplicity of sources. The central tomes associated with this perspective are Greek and Roman classics which the founders all shared as texts during their educational careers (Adler, 1987; Boaz, 1997; Hamilton et al., 1937; Hoeveler, 2002; Hofstadter, 1973a; Holmes, 1995; Koch, 1943; Richard, 1995; Winterer, 2002). The inclusion of these texts in their dialogues for the sake of giving their perspectives can be seen in their private correspondence as well as their public discourses (Bailyn, 1967; Cappon, 1959; Ketcham, 1990; Koch, 1950; Kurland & Lerner, 1987). But these new and at the same time old concepts—new because of their enlightenment fervor and old because of their genesis in the classics of the ancient world—were engulfed by a series of minute religious differences based on the different perspectives of the Protestant Christian faith of the founders (Cousins, 1958; Lerner, 1987). What happened to these revolutionaries? Was their brand of radicalism just another façade for the sake of maintaining power in the hands of a new few? Did their education help develop this radical façade? It is critical to this research to assess these perspective questions, exploring their impact politically, educationally, and philosophically (Young, 1976). The radicalism of the founders and their understanding of enlightenment philosophy, coupled with the Christian differences among them, imbued by their education, and developed from a belief in the perennial heroics of the ancient Greeks and Romans, laid the foundation for their discourses and their subsequent texts. These texts have become the driving force behind modern American law, civics, and education, and have, in turn, affected the lives of millions.
In order to see and clarify whether the founding concepts inherent in the texts generate
the need for a critical mindset as part of the makeup of its citizenry, the study turns to a
descriptive and comparative review of the concepts leading to the development of its analytic
tool. It is imperative in attempting to understand this design process that one comprehend that
the bare minimum of the apex has been presented here. Further detail emerges through the
analysis of the instruments.
CHAPTER 3

Method of Research

This research employs an original analytic tool that combines a series of qualitative perspectives of study in educational research. These include critical hermeneutic analysis, epistemic educational analysis, and semantic and conceptual analysis. The tools are then selectively combined, through the use of a schema, and focused on determining the semantic and cognitive connections between the concepts inherent in the texts and discourses of the three historical periods under consideration: the prerevolutionary, postrevolutionary and present epochs in American history.

The study then focuses its attention on current texts used to teach the curriculum of civics in the high schools of the state of Illinois. In summary, the research generates an originally designed assessment tool that allows for a comparative hermeneutic review and dissection of texts, curriculums, and assessments relevant to the thesis of the study across three time periods in American history. Figure 1 shows a schema of the research tool and its planned approach to the analysis. The tool focuses on three perennial perspectives within the texts: politics, economics, and religion. The tool also investigates declarative versus critical cognitive constructs as shown by the type of conceptual language generated throughout the discourses, specifically, the presence of higher-order versus lower-order questions. This understanding allows for a demonstration of the critical or acquiescent nature of the textual language.
Figure 1: Analytic tool for semantic cognitive analysis
Tools of Analysis

Critical hermeneutic analysis: Jürgen Habermas and Leo Strauss. The first perspective that the analytic tool focuses on is critical hermeneutic analysis. Critical hermeneutics finds its central proponent in the figure of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas is a critical theorist from the second generation of the Frankfurt school of social-critical analysis. He was a student of Theodoro Adorno, one of the founders of the school. The critical hermeneutic perspective is one that focuses, through the review and analysis of texts, on the development of emancipatory knowledge. This intellectual construct is based on the perspective that can best be seen in the work of Demetrio, where he states that to Habermas “knowledge is a product of the society which is often mystified and reified, and that through critical reflection such mystifications and reifications can be overcome” (Demetrio, 2001, para. 1). The tool of analysis that Habermas generated is based on a combination of foundational theories that include the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud and the social philosophy of Karl Marx (Kolakowski, 2005). The combination of these perspectives based, one on introspective dialogue and the other on the dialectic of social power struggles, give historical stability to critical hermeneutics. Furthermore, they lead the way into the third section of the foundation of the perspective; the hermeneutic work of Hans Georg Gadamer (Demetrio, 2001; Gadamer, 1994; Habermas, 2003). It is in the differences between Habermas and Gadamer that one begins to see that the linguistically-accepted assumptions on the part of an individual, relative to society’s good intentions and veridical presuppositions, can lead one intellectually astray from an objective critical perspective (Demetrio, 2001). Critical hermeneutics, therefore, looks for a rational, authentic consensus of meaning and generates through the concept of communicative action a noncompetitive and ethically-discursive technique based on what, from an economic or game-
theory perspective, would be called a principle of noncompetitive advantage or a Nash-equilibrium, as seen in the work of mathematician and game theorist John Nash (Nash, 1950). The difference between the two perspectives can be seen in the fact that one is competitively based on accumulation of success and the other on the success of the truth that best benefits the social system. The work of Habermas is therefore based on the principle of humility, not the acquisition of strategic capital. For Habermas, any strategically-based game can and does lead toward two types of deception, unconscious or conscious, with the undergirding of the two concepts being ideological distortion for the unconscious deception, and manipulation and seduction for the conscious deception (Demetrio, 2001). For Habermas, as demonstrated in Demetrio’s work, the key to understanding the social critical development of humanity lies in understanding “the strategies that people use in carrying out communicative business in specific context” (Demetrio, 2001, ¶ 11). Therefore, Habermas’ system of critical hermeneutics focuses on the illocutionary speech act and its predominant component, which is structure. According to Habermas, the illocutionary speech act can take one of three forms. It can be a constantive, whose predominant structural components are propositional and generate a cognitive form of communication with a thematic validity claim of truth. It can be an avowal, whose structures are expressive, as its mode of communication, and which generates a validity claim of intention to truthfulness. Or else it can be regulative and have an illocutionary structural component that focuses on the social world, establishes legitimate relations socially, and is interactive in its communication. This particular speech act, which interests Habermas the most, seeks a validity claim to rightness. Habermas, states Demetrio, seeks these acts within the discourses that he analyzes in order to measure the texts for “their conscious or unconscious agenda and their will to power” (¶ 14-17). Habermas, according to Demetrio, calls this method universal pragmatics.
The analytic tool generated by this research focuses on the ideas that are linguistically associated with Habermas’ claims to validity and their hidden agendas.

To expand on this, the analytic tool searches for the political and philosophical structures associated through textual analysis as demonstrated in the work of Strauss. Strauss’ work on politically-based philosophical hermeneutic analysis seeks to consider, as does the work of Habermas, the hidden or esoteric intent of the author inherent in the work (Strauss, 1989; Strauss & Cropsey, 1987). To do this, the analyses will look to three perennial perspectives associated with any historical period: religion, economics, and politics. The assumption is that these three contexts can aid in clarifying the forces that could have affected the authors’ intent.

**Definitional and epistemic focus: Israel Scheffler.** The work inevitably focuses on determining whether conceptually, socially, philosophically and linguistically there is a curricular intent relative to critical thinking in the texts of the founding as well as in the present texts on civics in Illinois high schools. The ideas and foci of the critical-thinking perspective are considered and reviewed from a series of works standard to the field (Kurfis, 1988). The works of Israel Scheffler demonstrate-a focus on the concepts of definitional and conceptual intent, which the research tool includes in its analysis and schematic structure. The ideas of Scheffler relative to descriptive, stipulative, and programmatic definitions give greater impact to the analysis of critical versus noncritical intent in the texts and discourses under consideration (Scheffler, 1960; Soltis, 1968).

**Curricular intent, power, and ontology.** Further impact is generated analytically by the research tool through the inclusion of the work of Giroux, whose ideas on education, culture, schooling, and skills development specifically within curricula in the social sciences are at the leading edge in the field of critical pedagogy and theory (Giroux, 1978, 1997; Giroux & Pena,
Further concepts inherent in the analytic tool will be based on the ideas of Freire (1985) and Foucault (2005). These two theorists have been associated with the critical pedagogic and hermeneutic movement, respectively. Their work on politics, culture, and power will allow for a more exact interpretation of criticality in educational scenarios, or the lack of it to be seen. Foucault’s concepts have allowed the researcher to initiate a hermeneutic technique that will be critical in demonstrating the impact of socially-acceptable linguistic norms in hermeneutic analysis. Another philosopher who provides a theoretical base for the present research tool is Martin Heidegger (1962), with his ontological hermeneutic perspective, specifically the hermeneutics of being. Heidegger’s perspective allows us to see the human being as a living text in the act of becoming existentially authentic vis-à-vis educative ethos and pathos. The work of Amy Gutmann (1987) further allows us to see the existential responsibility within the context of civics in a democratic education.

**Dialogue as process.** This research is based on the belief, from the perspective of the researcher, that there is a need for a critical system of civic education that will lead through its inclusion in the civics curricula of American schools, to a greater participation in the civic responsibilities of citizenship. It is based on a perception that a perennial and critical veracity exists in the classical texts of European culture, and that they can, when correctly understood and objectively introduced into the school system, effect a positive change in the development of the youth of America (Adler, 1988). Furthermore, the researcher fundamentally and emphatically believes in the need for a discursive system founded on ethics and communicative action as indispensable to the process of critical development in education (Adler, 1987; Bellamy, 2008; Cornell, 1999; Demetrio, 2001; Habermas, 2003).
The perennial hermeneutic textual analysis is but a tool for that development. The present research system’s radical perspective in developing democratic principles versus republic-based perspectives should be evident through the generation of questions relative to that differentiation, and expects that process—one that focuses on the development of great questions to be central to the educational process (Foucault, 2005; Gutmann, 1987; Strauss, 1989; Strauss & Cropsey, 1987). The belief underlying the research is simple: criticality is a life source for a democracy and for any educational system founded on that principle and should be nourished within our schools (Giroux, 1978, 1997; Giroux & Pena, 1979; Gutmann, 1987; Habermas, 1998). This allows a student to successfully take on the journey of their ontological path in critical development. With those subjective premises in evidence, the research turns to the questions central to the study.

**Central Research Questions**

The research questions for this study include the following:

1. What disciplines made up the curriculum of prerевolutionary and postrevolutionary American education? And how did the education of the founding fathers of the United States affect their educational program for the republic?

2. What were the intents or expected results of an American Colonial and immediate postrevolutionary education? And in what way did those intents influence critically-constructive methods of education?

3. Was a general mandate to education one of the intents of the founding fathers?

4. Did the lack of a federal mandate to education in the founding documents of the United States assist in or prevent the introduction of critical reasoning into the educational program of the American republic?
5. What vestiges of these historical intents are found in contemporary Illinois high school civics curricula?

The first question, addressing the disciplines that made up the curriculum of prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary American education, focuses specifically on declarative historical information needed to determine the core curricula that affect the educational development of the mind of the founders. Furthermore, it is generated to construct a comparative structure across the two initial time periods of intellectual development relative to the founders. Consequently, the second part of the question focuses on the effect that the disciplines studied by the founders had on their educational views and the programs they generated.

The second question focuses on the intents inherent in the education of the founders and continues to discuss that education from a critically constructive perspective by asking higher-order questions that focus on cognitive processes beyond declarative knowledge-- specifically, questions that focus on construction of links between the historical and educational concepts and that ask for ethical perspectives relative to them. The third research question attempts to bridge the gap between theory and practice in regard to the founders’ perspectives and their actuality in law and its mediums. The fourth research question tries to maintain a balanced and objective perspective in the face of the fact that no mandate to education was included in the founding documents and attempts to look at that fact in terms of both positive and negative effects relative to critical reasoning. The fifth research question attempts to focus the discussion on present texts and seeks to discover vestiges of the intent of the founders within the discourses, assessments, and published texts of civics curricula in Illinois high schools.
Subsequent Research Questions

1. Did the creators of the original curriculum of American prerevolutionary education intend to develop critical reasoning ability in the student? What evidence of their intent exists in the texts of the epoch?

2. Is there evidence in the writings of the founding fathers that they intended to have a general mandate to education?

3. What can be seen in the founding documents of the United States that would assist in or prevent the introduction of critical thinking into the educational program of the nation?

4. Is there evidence that the immediate postrevolutionary American civics education curriculum was intended to develop a citizen’s ability to reason critically?

5. From prerevolutionary times to the immediate postrevolutionary period, what curricular shifts can be seen associated with power struggles based on religion, economics, and politics in America?

6. What evidence exists that the current American civics curriculum is intended to restrict or develop critical thinking?

7. Is the current Illinois high school civics curriculum based upon the restriction or development of critical reasoning?

The above research questions discuss with greater detail the central research questions and are linked to them conceptually, chronologically and philosophically. The central premise of the questions is whether the idea of criticality was inclusive and inherent in the founders’ mindset when they generated the discourses and texts that our laws are based on, and whether the current educational system includes or excludes criticality in its curriculum. The central premise
and the questions that naturally evolve from it generate the concepts inherent in the analytic tool intrinsic to this research.

**Conceptual Outline of Tool Design**

The central concept of this research is the idea of a democratic education and what that means in a republic. The goal of such an educational premise could be found as antithetical to the reality of a republican functional education. Regardless of the antagonisms that might surface between these two political systems, it is assumed that the democratic premise still drives the theory of civics education in the United States. Therefore, the goal and the subsequent measureable objectives of that goal need to be clarified through an analysis of the documents, texts, and assessments used to teach them. Part of the process associated with this clarification is an understanding of the particulars of the analytic tool used to make the determinations associated with the research premise. To do justice to the parts that make up the analytic tool, the following section will give a general description of the concepts that the tool synthesizes and the subject matter experts that have given light to them.

**Goal**

The central goal of this research and its analytic tool is to measure the realities of civics education in America, using Illinois as a sample, and view them in comparison to an accepted standard. That standard in this case has been established through the work of many subject-matter experts. Based upon this description, the research tool is sectioned into two distinct, yet thematically-related, perspectives, inclusive of their respective subject matter experts (SMEs): a descriptive and prescriptive analytic.
Descriptive Analytics

Israel Scheffler and definitional analysis. The first process that the analytic tool presents from a descriptive perspective determines the types of definitions that are inherent in the discourse. This focus is based on Scheffler’s (1960) definitional analysis. The process allows the analyst, from observed and expressive linguistic usage, to determine whether one of three or any combination of the three definitional types is present in the text. The three definitional types include stipulative, descriptive, and programmatic definitions. Stipulative definitions are centered on the relative time period of the phenomena and work only within a stipulated set of conditions. Descriptive definitions, on the other hand, have no stipulation associated with them nor are they based on norms; they are simply objective descriptors of phenomena. They tell what a thing is, not whether it has value or only works under certain conditions. Programmatic definitions are value loaded and fit a perspective ethical action system that has a moral end.

This initial section of the analytic tool focuses on the lower-order thinking (LOT) questions associated with declarative knowledge of the phenomenon; who, what, where, and when. Determining the definitional type of these LOT questions allow the researcher to see the inherent nature of the language used, shown by the grammatical nature of the words used to describe the phenomenon, and its programmatic value focus. The need for a more in-depth analysis of the LOTs leads the research to the field of literary hermeneutics, and due to the philosophically critical and political nature of the dissertation subject matter, this section focuses on the work of Leo Strauss.

Leo Strauss and esoteric hermeneutic analysis. Strauss was a political philosopher of longstanding acclaim from the University of Chicago who developed a system of hermeneutic or textual analysis anchored on Platonic political philosophy. His central premise is that there are in
essence two ways of reading any text: exoterically and esoterically. His initial readings in the 1930s of the works of the Jewish intellectual Moses Maimonides initiated him into the hermeneutic esoteric world of the men who had influenced Maimonides. In essence, this led him down an associative path of textual links based on the cryptic meaning of wording whose discovery, which culminates for the sake of our research tool in the recognition within any text of a key that will unlock the hidden meaning of the work under consideration, became central to his new reading of classics of social, political, and religious culture (Smith, 2009).

This methodology depended on not just the discovery of the key words, which by and large are associated with literary concepts, such as irony or satire, but also on the understanding of the historical situation of which and in which the authors wrote. The combination of the literary, cultural, and historical conditions under which the authors labored are viewed as additional drives that caused their messages to be hidden in the medium. Additionally, Strauss intimates that the motive for the authors’ concealed agendas was their personal responsibility to maintain the reasoned art of philosophical inquiry, as well as its intellectual conversation, via their texts among the initiated (Smith, 2009). It is the contention of this research that the messages that Strauss as well as other hermeneutic analysts have historically discovered in the texts are focused upon the maintenance of power intellectually. The perennial lenses, or time-independent paradigms of interpretation that seem to surface continuously in association to this structure are economic, political, and religious in their nature. These lenses are used to further identify and clarify the hermeneutic esoteric message of power, its ownership, maintenance, and denial via the analysis of texts. This analysis focuses on textual implications about power and its uses via the shaping of personal ethics as action systems designed to attain a socially-accepted moral end. In order to understand the impact of these lenses, the research tool focuses next on the
work of Michel Foucault and his concept of the ethics of the self in relation to power and its structures.

**Michel Foucault: power and the ethics of the epimeleia.** Foucault’s research programs can be considered systems of social analysis relative to knowledge and power via a review of language. They are historically reduced to three stages of intellectual development: archeological, genealogical, and ethical. Each of these stages has an evolutionary effect on the other and is evidential of Foucault’s life journey with scholarship (Foucault, 2005; Olssen, 1999). It can be sumised that Foucault’s first major structure of analysis relative to the study of systems of thought in cultures was aptly named the archeology of knowledge, due to the innate historical nature of the system. The logic is as follows: the concept of archeology, in Foucault’s perspective, is an embedded historical approach to systems of thought and knowledge, which he calls epistemes. These systems are controlled by regulations that are not controlled by grammar and logic; they are beyond them.

The rules work beneath the consciousness of individuals. Therefore, a more precise definition would need to consider the archeology of knowledge as a system of concepts, which need to be viewed as possibilities that determine boundaries, in a given sphere of influence that is bounded by and immersed in historical contiguous thought. So, in the case of the history of medicine, as an example, the diagnostic concept changed from the use of classification-based descriptors to a diagnostic language of symptoms that in turn mutated to a paradigm of anatomically-based structures of discourse that shaped the field with a clinical method of analytic communication.

This paradigm was identified by historical analysis of texts relative to the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century medical practices and discourses by Foucault. In these texts, the individual shift from the
pathologically-based discourse of inevitability and morbidity is changed to one of hope via the understanding of the human being as an object of positive knowledge, and therefore a description of curative possibilities begins to permeate the language (Olssen, 1999, p. 11).

The evolution from this descriptive system, which allowed for a comparative analysis to be generated of historical presuppositions, but which would not be capable of determining the causes of transitional thinking from one perspective to another, gave birth to the idea, by Foucault, after an interpretive reading of Friedrich Nietzsche’s *The Genealogy of Morals*, of the genealogy of knowledge. In this perspective, a focal point within a specific system of thought, albeit uncovered by his archeological system, can be used to describe and trace what Olssen (1999) calls the “descent and emergence by which a given thought system comes into being and is subsequently transformed” (p. 9). Therefore, the result is viewed as contingent on historical turns or transitions that are not the logical outcomes of rationally-inevitable trends. The connection between the systems and their dependence on each other chronologically are evident; however, the focus of the analysis at this point is in discovering a reason for the transitional perspective in thought from one positional paradigm to the other. In essence, the genealogical model “aims to explain the existence and transformation of elements of theoretical knowledge (savoir) by situating them within power structures and by tracing their descent and emergence in the context of history” (Olssen, 1999, p. 13). Therefore, according to Olssen, Foucault has found that there is a perennial tie between power and knowledge that explains change in speech formations and systems of knowledge. These systems are viewed from a perspective that does not focus on traditional cause-effect assumptive logical association. Instead, the perspective focuses on necessary relationships for their existence through a charting of their characteristics in order
to determine “the means by which truth is produced, and the criteria of rationality that they establish” (Olssen, 1999, p. 12).

Since the focus of our tool development is akin to the analysis of power and knowledge through the use of language in education that develops critical thinking, the connection between Foucault’s systems and the research tool is self-evident. Specifically, this can be seen in the second system of Foucaultian analysis: genealogy. This next evolutionary step further expands Foucault’s program by looking at what causes transitions from one way of thinking associated with knowledge and power to another. Therefore, according to Olssen (1999),

[genealogy] thus asserts the historical constitution of our most prized certainties about ourselves and the world in its attempt to de-naturalize explanations for the existence of phenomena. It analyzes discourse in its relation to social structures and has an explicit focus on power and on bodies. It is interested in institutional analysis and technologies of power aiming to isolate the mechanism by which power operates. (p. 13)

However, it is within the realm of the affective control of individuals and the relationship of the mechanisms of knowledge production and control where the connection to the research tool of this study finds greater connection to the Foucaultian perspective at this junction. Within that realm and its focus on “power…genealogy aims to document how culture attempts to normalize individuals through increasingly rationalized means, by constituting normality, turning them into meaningful subjects and docile objects” (Olssen, 1999, p.13). Therefore, power defines change through its relations with subjects. This change alters the focus from interpretation and hermeneutics to the analysis of historical tactics and strategies (Olssen). Foucault does not want to look to hermeneutics as the end result of an analytic method and does not want to think of the
hermeneutic results as metaphysical and in a Platonic sense ideologically essential, since to do so implies the ability to accept an un-attainable perfection through the “removal of every mask to disclose an original identity” (Foucault, 1977, p. 142).

A further relative connection to the purpose and effectiveness of the junction between the Foucaultian perspective and the research tool of this proposal lays in the fact that genealogical analysis does not take history at its word but rather shows that concepts such as liberty, for example, far from being fundamental to human nature, or at the root of human attachment to being and truth, are rather the invention of the ruling classes. (Olssen, 1999, p. 13)

The third stage of Foucault’s analytic system is the ethical. This stage focuses on the “conception of the history of ethics as a history of forms of moral subjectivation and of those practices of the self intended to support and ensure the constitution of oneself as a moral subject” (Foucault, 2005, p. xix). Within this stage the focus of the research at hand is the singular form of experience, in our case educational discourses on civics via texts, between the subject, the student, the teacher and the curriculum, and truth. Foucault, in what were to be his last lectures at the College De France, returns to his roots as a philosopher and searches within this intellectual paradigm for a connection among all his modes of analysis that is persistently historical and ontological; he finds this in the Greek and Hellenistic philosophers of ethics. Even though his range of interests has covered divergent fields, such as the history of the psychiatric profession and the history of sexuality, the focus is one of constancy relative to the history of thought and power. Specifically, the perspective of a

challenge for any history of thought is precisely that of grasping when a cultural phenomenon of a determinate scale actually constitutes within the history of thought a
decisive moment that is still significant for our modern mode of being subjects.

(Foucault, 2005, p. 9)

If we then focus on a summation of his tools relative to the research at hand, we find that the cultural phenomenon, the systems of bottom-up action, the rules that define systems beyond logic, and the hermeneutic to genealogic evolutionary links through language that allow for a discovery of the transitions from one way of thinking to another relative to knowledge, power, and its controlling effect are the foundational concepts of Foucault’s method of analysis in regards to systems of thought and their consequences. When those consequences affect the modern situation in a field of knowledge acquisition such as education in any manner that denies criticality through the loss of empowerment, Foucault becomes a clarifying lens for analysis.

Within this perspective, the accepted and pedagogically-trained ethics of subjectivity can become reductive mediums of social empowerment. That is, the ethics of the subject can be considered as disempowering if the educational system trains to a noncritical ethic that denies an understanding of true self-knowledge by denying or excluding an understanding of caring for the self as a prerequisite.

The question this poses is what is that care of the self or epimeleia and where does it lead us within an educational system in regard to criticality? One answer could be that it leads to a greater understanding of the need for critically-constructive thinking as a result of a caring educational system, one that helps to develop the care of the individual in conjunction with his or her self-knowledge. Therefore, from this perspective, individual development can be connected to the call to action of critical theory as a link between the individual and the social group. The methodology for such a development and for such an evolutionary link between the two is part of the crux of this research and can be seen in the link between the work of Foucault and another
social philosopher who has generated an understanding of these concepts within the educational environment, Jürgen Habermas.

**Prescriptive Analytics**

**Habermas: Critical theory and communicative action.** Habermas and Foucault have had many disagreements, mostly focused on their interpretation of the foundational principles of a critical-action theory as well as other perspectives whose descriptions would not be done justice by the brevity of this medium. However, both philosophers agree on language as the central medium for human-coordinated social action (Finlayson, 2005; Foucault, 1977, 2005; Olssen, 1999). Habermas, a second-generation member of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, bases his social theory on epistemology and generates its extension from a prescriptive and normative level that focuses on what behavior should entail in a socially-based democracy (Habermas, trans. 1984, 1987; Palmer, 2006). Regardless of this prescriptive focus, but with the proviso that it will return to do justice to the prescriptive section of the tool design, the research looks to the descriptors that Habermas uses to explain the social situation of the educational phenomena. Habermas, like Foucault, focuses some of his early work on the uses and abuses of power. However, his perspective is more traditional than Foucault’s in that he views the praxis of power as secondary to the subjects that control that power and the economics of the system that generates the power, where Foucault looks to the experience from a bottom-up perspective focusing on the praxis as the message. Therefore, Habermas looks to the inequity of the system of capitalism as the cause for the injustice it perpetuates upon the subjects that are affected by that structure. So, like his teachers at the Frankfurt school, Habermas believes that the inherent nature of capitalism is to perpetuate hegemony, a state where “ideology and unequal power relations operate with the tacit consent of all participants, even the disempowered, contributing
to their acceptance of their disempowered positions” (Palmer, 2006, p. 216). This hegemony in essence will help to eliminate or at least ward off revolts or crises based on motivation, politics, economics or identity issues. For Habermas the focus of the work of social-critical theory relative to education is based on the concept of the “creation and nurture of ‘generalizable interests’ and the commitment to the achievement of a democratic society” (Palmer, 2006, p. 216). These are both considered part of the educational social program. These interests are social constructs that constitute knowledge and are what shape and in a sense determine what the objects are that are to be seen as knowledge. Their function is seen by Habermas as ideological and therefore controlling, since ideology for him is a method of legitimizing, through the manipulation of language, concepts that will perpetuate power in the hands of the empowered (Habermas, 1979). But how are these generalizable interests to fit within the educational paradigm of critical theory? For Habermas they are to be seen as paradigms that can cause change through a program, a program for changing or generating values, beliefs, and practices that will generate worthwhile educational knowledge. Therefore, knowledge in his perspective is not neutral; it represents empowerment of values, socially-generated values. This definition raises a question: who shall select the constructs of power so as to be egalitarian and socially just? According to Habermas, the answer is “the community of scholars who operate in [a] particular paradigm” (Palmer, 2006, p. 217). For Habermas, these scholars need to focus on three cognitively-based interests that determine the worth of the knowledge: “prediction and control, understanding and interpretation, and emancipation and freedom” (Palmer, 2006, p. 218). He gives these interests specific names: technical, which focuses and describes scientific methodologies, laws, control, prediction and passive objects of research; practical, which deals with interpretive hermeneutics and a qualitative approach to research; and emancipative, which
not only includes the two previous descriptors, but goes beyond their programs to attain a praxis that is aimed at emancipation and social justice (Habermas, trans.1984, 1987; Palmer, 2006). Therefore, Habermas wants to generate awareness through his program of the “repressed and submerged determinants of un-free behavior with a view to their dissolution” (Palmer, 2006, p. 218).

Habermas’ work on education can impact multiple pedagogical venues, from curricular design to curriculum content via critical pedagogy as seen in the work of Henry Giroux and others. Critical to this tool design are the pedagogical exemplifications of the Habermasian perspectives on generalizable interests. These focus on the inclusion within texts and discourses of cooperative and collaborative classroom work, discussion-based work, autonomous and experiential learning perspectives, negotiated learning, community-related learning, problem-solving activities, students’ right to use talk as a method of classroom learning via freedom, and the inclusion of the teacher as a transformative agent promoting critique (Palmer, 2006). Therefore, it is in the pedagogical encounter with the lived experience that Habermas’ critical theory impacts the curriculum as a tool of social change. Within those parameters, the descriptors begin to become a prescription for change. How that change comes about is mirrored by Habermas’ epistemic evolution in which he begins to generate a system of action based on language that is known as the “communicative turn” (Habermas, trans.1984, 1987). Within this paradigm, communicative rationality is seen as an action system that will allow, through the concept of the *ideal speech act*

the freedom to enter into a discourse . . . so as to check questionable claims. . . . ,
evaluate explanations . . . modify structures of concepts . . . assess justifications . . .
alter norms . . . interrogate political will . . . employ speech acts . . . orient to a
mutual understanding between participants . . . respect the rights of equal autonomous partners . . . achieve a consensus based on the force of the argument alone, [and] . . . adhere to the speech act validity claims of . . . truth . . . legitimacy . . . sincerity . . . [and] comprehensibility. (Palmer, 2006, p. 220)

These transformative perspectives relative to education are sought linguistically within the discourses, texts, and assessments that this research focuses on. Specific to the transformative concept is the work of Henry Giroux.

**Giroux: Curriculum as transformative agent.** Giroux’s prescriptive work is based on the critical theory perspective relative to education known as critical pedagogy. This is a teaching perspective based on the questioning through language of the non-emancipatory structures of education. These structures deny the inclusion of marginalized voices as well as encourage the acquiescence of the majority of students who are being taught through a functionalist instrumentalism designed to generate them as replacement parts that do not feel the need to question their place in the hegemony they live in. For Giroux the answer to this stagnant and non-democratic situation is based upon the concepts of a series of interventions that he considers necessary for the hegemonic cycle to be eradicated. Central to the development of the tool of this research is the selection of what seems to be the essential tenet of these prescriptions for intervention: language. The idea that schools and curriculums need to be

[reconstructed] as democratic public spheres [where] ethics are of central concern [and where the] questioning of educative practices that perpetuate inequality, exploitation, and human suffering [is generated, so as to allow] the celebration of difference in democratic society [which in turn demonstrates the multiple cultural foundations of the society; this
in turn] demands that a language of solidarity and politics be developed. (Palmer, 2006, pp. 282-283)

The idea of including in the search parameters of the research tool a language that is culturally representative of diversity and ethics as a system of democratic action associated with social justice, that critiques ideologically-entrenched structures, allows this research to further advance its program of both descriptive and prescriptive analytics so as to be able to lend further credence to any results it generates associated with the inclusion or exclusion within a discourse of critical thinking.

Prescriptively, these linguistic tools of analysis are further seen by Giroux as critical productive pedagogical interventions, which evolved as his thought developed from a purely Marxist-based critical perspective to an ideological structure that combines critical theory and Foucault-like postmodern perspectives. This generated in Giroux the need to extend the venue of his work to the curriculum and to society (Giroux, 1997; Giroux & Pena, 1979; Palmer, 2006). These interventions are focused upon two concepts that orbit continuously around power and its consequences: voice and border pedagogy. Giroux focuses an attack on the status quo upon the lack of inclusion of these concepts within the educational hegemony. The two concepts allow for the inclusion and participation in the polity of disenfranchised and marginalized members. One, voice, focuses on the language-based inclusion of non-traditional perspectives, considered as such by the voice of the empowered, within the hegemonic structure. The other, border pedagogy, attempts to include within schools and later within curricula, the critical participation of teachers and students in the design and application of educational power structures so as to legitimize through action the aforementioned voice and its subsequent effect: social justice in an educational setting (Giroux, 1992; Palmer, 2006). But what is the generative impulse for social
justice; where does it come from? Is it a force that generates energy in being human or in becoming empowered through some medium over time? Is it an act of becoming in a transformative and transcending way relative to power and its structures? Does the human being become, then, an empowered entity or one devoid of power while traveling in an educational ontological journey? These are the questions that connect us to the next theorist in the analysis, Martin Heidegger.

**Heidegger: The ontology of the human as an interpreted text.** Heidegger’s work has been considered some of the most difficult to decipher and understand in twentieth century Western philosophy. His thematic structures focus on the concepts of being and time, which are consequently the titular words of his most famous tome, *Being and Time*. Heidegger divides this work into a set of two analytics or divisions of analysis. The first, named the existential analytic, focuses on a series of connected concepts revolving around the idea of the world. These include essence, existence, the a priori nature of existence, what it means to be in the world, seeing, and the concept of the “they-self” (Heidegger, 1962).

The second existential analytic focuses on the concept of understanding, and its breakdown consists of concepts such as “State-of-Mind,” fear, understanding as interpretation, and language, to name a few of its foci. From there Heidegger concentrates on the following concepts: care, reality, truth, death, authentic existence, time, and history. It is on the last two conceptual foci that this research centers. These two concepts in conjunction with a basic understanding of dasein, meaning a human being acting human, allows for a greater clarity of what the research calls a being in the act of becoming, ontologically interpreted over time as a human text. This text, in turn, allows the human being to be included hermeneutically in the analytic medium exemplified in figure 3.2 as a member of the family of mediums descriptive of
the cultural discourses of power (Gelven, 1989). Therefore, the study needs to stipulate a series of definitions: what is *dasein*, what does Heidegger mean by time, how the research interprets it, what is history in Heideggerian terms, and what is its impact on *dasein* and time (Heidegger, 1962). By generating these definitions from an educational, ontological, and hermeneutic perspective, the study allows for a more clarifying interpretation of the connection that exists among the subject matter experts under consideration and subsequently allows for that clarity to be seen in the nexus of the evolving nature of the tool design of the research relative to civics and education.

**Gutmann: Democratic education.** The main definitional standard of an American democratic education can be seen in the work of Amy Gutmann. In her seminal work, *Democratic Education* (1987), Gutmann describes and defines the concept of a democratic education from a philosophical perspective that owes much to a mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian ideology along with a blend of critical theory and liberalism. Gutmann’s perception and subsequent definition of the concept of a democratic education is that it needs to develop the critical ability of the student to constructively challenge the status quo if the status quo denies the individual freedoms that develop one’s ability to attain a good life. This good life is intellectually focused and socially harmonious; that is, it considers respect for others exemplified by rational deliberation amongst students as indispensible to a democratic way of life. Therefore, the freedom to make informed choices through the medium of rational deliberation is imperative to a democratic educational experience. Inclusive in this educative democratic process is the ability to attain moral freedom from the perceptions of others’ ideological concepts of moral righteousness, and the ability to develop moral virtue of one’s own. Inclusive in this is Gutmann’s concept that democratic education needs to teach students how to participate well as
citizens in a society. Therefore, defining critical terms, their action-based perspectives, and their ethical implications relative to criticality and power are central to the understanding of the democratic educational concept in America.

In summary, according to Gutmann (1987), a democratic education needs to develop freedom to think without outside pressures, a social consciousness that is empowered by criticality of thought, an intellectually-based social harmony established by respect, and the pursuit of virtue defined by the search for what has a great similarity to the Aristotelian good life. Therefore, three central premises of a democratic education for Gutmann are nonrepression, nondiscrimination, and the development of a democratic virtue.

**Foci of Theorists and Description of Tool Extension**

In reviewing the foci of all the theorists under consideration, the research demonstrates the impact of the combinatorial nature of their work in its tool design. The reduction of the theoretical perspectives into the major concepts of the authors and the further reduction of their concepts into words that can be applied to the analysis of texts and other subsequent discourses does not generate a minimal view of the theorists’ overall perspective. The research does not take the subject matter experts out of context; instead, it lends to them a new vitalizing impact in interdisciplinary interpretation that can be used in a sequential fashion to interpret texts and discourses from a different overall perspective relative to power and its usage in educational venues.

The tool of analyses now extends itself to include the premises and effects of the linguistic presuppositions of the previous model and its original theorists, as well as the theoretical perspectives of new theorists. Within this new grouping is included the ethical foundation of Foucault and his perspective on power and care of the self as a precursor to self-
knowledge, as well as the transformative perspective of Giroux via an interpretive understanding of null curricula and hidden structures and their curricular impact. Inclusive of this transformative and power-based discursive analysis is the work of Martin Heidegger and his interpretive theory of being, time, and becoming, relative to the student and her or his critical ontological perspective (Guignon, 2006; Heidegger, 1962). Furthermore, the research includes the critical pedagogy and communicative-action theory of Habermas as a descriptive and prescriptive medium of analysis and intervention, as well as the previously described work of Scheffler (1960) and Strauss (1989) in definitional language and exoteric and esoteric analysis. Each theorist is linked through the two foci of culture and power to a hermeneutic medium focusing on three time-independent paradigms of analysis—politics, economics, and religion—in order to generate through their association a dialectically clearer intent relative to education and critical thinking within the phenomenon under study. The following schema demonstrates that evolution as an extension of Figure 1. It breaks the system of analysis into three segments—culture, the analysis of power, and hermeneutics—that are numerically labeled, and follows a vertical as well as a horizontal alignment of power relationships and hermeneutic perspectives.
Figure 2: Evolution of the analytic tool for semantic cognitive analysis
CHAPTER 4

Results

The results relative to the three time periods required an approach that focused on historical, social, and cultural factors influencing selection of curricula (and subsequent questions associated with them) that allowed for the analysis to generate a veridical set of results vis-à-vis the tools of analysis. The selection process for the curricula and subsequent assessments associated with them focused on historically impacting discourses within the American educational and governmental system. These discourses focused on political, economic, and religious issues which have at one time or another been central to the concept of civics in America. These three perspectives generated an understanding in America of what citizenship was supposed to be. From those perspectives a cognitive based and hermeneutically focused tool was applied to the focal periods under consideration.

The analysis was initiated within the first of the three foci, the prerevolutionary epoch lasting from 1636 with the founding of Harvard until 1776; the second included the design and writing of The Declaration of Independence. The prerevolutionary period focused on the Harvard curriculum, and the postrevolutionary period on the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. Both of these foci were exemplar in their capability for fitting within the textual hermeneutic paradigm of the research. Further results were attained from a general review of primary and secondary sources that focus on the founding curricula of
revolutionary universities and some major policy statements, such as the Morrill Act and the Enabling Act of 1802, affecting the curricula of postrevolutionary universities covering the period from 1776 to 1900. The analysis of the present-day or modern-period, focusing on the twentieth century and projecting forward from 1900 to the present, concluded with the review of two texts relative to the focus of the research within Illinois high schools: *Magruder’s American Government* (McClenaghan, 2008), the accepted standard in the field of civics education nationwide for almost one hundred years (Walker, 2002), and *The Illinois Handbook of Government* (2009), which, as stated by a local school superintendent, is used statewide as a supplemental text in preparation for the constitutional examinations that the students must pass in order to graduate from high school (personal communication, Mike Gouch, March 19, 2009).

**The Prerevolutionary Period**

*An introduction to the Harvard Curriculum.* In one way or another, the original Harvard curriculum has been the paradigmatic model for the majority of classical and liberal arts curricula since its inception in 1636 (Rudolph, 1978). This iconic academic status and the university’s position as the first institution of higher education in America has made its curriculum and the subsequent questions associated with the examinations of its graduates during the first 140 years of its history a perfect focal point for the analytic tool generated by this study. The curriculum at Harvard was the product of religious zeal and a theocratic governmental structure in the New England colonies of the seventeenth century (Miller, 1983; Morison, 1936). The curricular structure was based on a three-year course of study that focused heavily on classical languages and the pedagogical theories and curricular foundations of Petrus Ramus at the University of Paris during the previous century (Morison, 1936). In essence, the course of
daily study focused on one subject a day, with the first hour based on lecture by the professor on the fundamentals and theories of the subject.

After this initial discourse, the students would “work over the subject-matter of the lecture …at the fourth hour [they] recite to the teacher and during the last two hours they discuss and dispute, in order to apply independently what they [have] learned” (Morison, 1936, p.140). The subjects of study included logic, Greek grammar, Hebrew grammar, rhetoric, divinity, ethics, politics, Aramaic, Syriac, arithmetic, geometry, history, astronomy, and the nature of plants, or botany (Morison, 1936). Within this daily structure over a three-year period, subjects that are rarely seen now except in specialist courses within private and classical university curricula aided in the development of what was a linguistically-based, religiously-centered humanist course of study.

These pedagogies included a deep study of etymology, or the origin of words; syntax, or the study of the rules that form grammatical sentences; prosody, or the metrical structure of verse; dialects usually pertaining to differences in Greek language; poesy, or poetry, and the practice of its composition; imitation, or copying from an original work; composition, or the generation of a short essay written as an academic exercise; epitome, or the generation of a brief summary of a book; declamation, or a rhetorical exercise on a given theme; and disputation, or the formal debate of a thesis or topic (Collins, 1997). The majority of examinations relative to this curriculum for the prerevolutionary period were oral and made available to the candidates for “the M.A. degree and higher at ‘Vespers,’ the important full-dress disputations two days before the Commencement” (Morison, 1936, p. 581).

It is evident that very little changed during the first one hundred years of Harvard’s curricular life from a content perspective. Small changes to the curriculum occurred relative to
the inclusion of some sciences and the focus on the time spent on literary or linguistic studies, but the emphasis on a classical curriculum derived from the classical *Trivium* and *Quadrivium*, as they were massaged into a more British concept vis-à-vis the Cambridge and Oxford university methods and their graduates, who were the founders of the New England college, maintained its primacy at Harvard (Morison, 1936). Interestingly, the names given to the two methods of examination are a bit different than what is seen or expected in present-day American universities. As stated above, the idea of a question or questions for examination purposes is more implicitly seen in the second degree, the M.A., than in the Bachelor’s, and the titular name for the bachelor’s examinations ironically was Theses, which today is related to the written research paper that an M.A. candidate defends orally after the fact (Morrison, 1936). Therefore, in summary,

theses are propositions on the several liberal Arts and other subjects studied in the undergraduate course, which any member of the graduating class, if challenged, was supposed to be able to defend in Latin, by the recognized rules of syllogistic disputation. It was arranged beforehand, as part of the Commencement Act, that designated students should defend certain theses, which (beginning with the sheets of 1653) are distinguished from the others by special type, or an index finger. The questions were defended or opposed by candidates for the master’s degree, at masters’ Commencement on the afternoon of Commencement Day. (Morison, 1936, p. 578)

Focusing on the theses in order to find the expectations associated with the types of questions used by the examiners, relative to cognitive process associated with critical thinking in the curricular-based examinations, allowed for determination of the ratio of lower- to higher-order questions to be generated.
An application of hermenutic analysis. The hermeneutic analysis is divided into a series of questions that focus the research tool amongst three windows of interpretation that are perennial, ethics, power and declarative knowledge. The analysis then finishes with an overall summation of criticality inherent in the texts under consideration.

The ethical analysis of assessment protocols. The bachelor’s propositions for defense were reviewed for content but were not as fruitful in relation to the research since they were based on a more restrictive methodology for defense, the syllogism, and were expected to be defended without the perspective associated with objection to the theses even being considered. However, they did yield some interesting results, as can be seen from the following translations of the theses of 1678. From the Theses Technologicae, we see that the question selected for syllogistic proof deals with what is de facto stated as a showing no evidence or non datur, to wit: “Non datur Metaphysica ab aliis Discipinis distinct” –that is, Metaphysics shows no evidence of being a distinct or separate intellectual discipline (Morison, 1936, p. 167). It is interesting to note that according to the definition of the Theses Technologicae, the syllogistic defense of the position was to be generated with an interdisciplinary character, implying a liberal and relatively higher-order thinking process. Further representations from the same Bachelors’ Theses of 1678 focus on physics, albeit a broad interpretation of the subject that included within its parameters questions dealing with ethics as a subject. Within this generalist rendering of the discipline, the research showed what at first sight seems a very powerful free-thinking and objective statement combining epistemics and ethics: “Voluntas semper determinatur ab ultimo Intellectus practici Judicio” (Morison, 1936, p. 167). The translation of this statement is that the will must always be the final arbiter of practical opinion or judgment. On face value, the words seem to be extremely liberal and forward thinking; however, once the essence of the traditional religious
definition of the will is seen, as generated by God, one can begin to see the development of an underlying intent in the theses, an intent that is religiously focused.

As can be seen from the above results, the tool of analysis was focused on three fields of examination relative to the historical focus of this research: logic, philosophy, and ethics. These were selected because the three fields are associated historically with the development of a student as well as with the development of a citizen. The hidden or hermetic nature of the questions, inclusive of the questions that would on face value only seem to be associated with a liberal arts perspective, consistently leads to a religious essence as central to the veridical nature of the questions or statements under discussion. An example of this can also be seen from the same sheet of questions for the bachelors’ theses of 1678, where the question of ethics is obviously discussed in terms of its religious implications, as seen in the following: “Ethica non datur Specie distinct a Theologia” (Morison, 1936, p. 167). A translation of this (ethics is not a different idea or species than theology) shows the evidence of a Christian perspective as the driving force behind the truth of the assertion. The implication is self evident: the theological or religious analysis of human behavior is not considered different than the ethical method of behavior. In essence, the idea of an action-based system whose goal is to achieve a moral end is encapsulated in and equivalent to the didactic method of religious action exemplified in theology or the study of God.

The analysis of power in assessment protocols. Continuing our analysis of the Master’s and bachelor’s prerevolutionary Harvard curriculum from a power-based perspective, one that allows us to see power as knowledge and the freedom to use that knowledge and to seek a free and nonsectarian interpretation of that knowledge as acceptable will focus on using the results. The contention of this analysis is that it will demonstrate an intellectual hegemonic structure at
work within the Harvard curriculum of the period. Consequently, this structure traditionally exemplified a nonsectarian impetus which is evident from the prima fasciae perspective of the Harvard curriculum. However, the reality of its impetus was the maintenance of a status quo and of an elite group that could use the techniques of criticality for the sake of maintaining power in the hands of its educated sons. Therefore, the maintenance of power was the indispensable emphasis inherent in the discourses studied at Harvard. This maintenance is the reality of its sectarian shift, from a religion-based perspective in education to a liberal perspective, which regardless of its face value as seemingly liberating, is in reality constraining relative to democratic educational principles, and perpetuating of its oligarchic authority and the subsequent power that this authority generates.

*The analysis of assessments for content and declarative knowledge.* The third section of the research analysis focuses on content and declarative knowledge. The section revolves around a series of eight questions with their respective definitions. These questions initiate the research into the hermeneutic versus declarative perspective inherent in the discourses. The questions begin by asking what the exoteric or face value of the message of the text is. Then question two focuses on which time-independent paradigm of interpretation is most evident, and which is least evident in the texts under consideration. The next question focuses on whether historical support exists for the absence of a paradigm in the texts, and leads further into what general assumptions are evident within them. The analysis then takes a more general declarative turn and asks what types of questions are evident and missing in the texts from a cognitive perspective associated with lower- or higher-order thinking. The analysis then turns towards developing the ratio of lower-order to higher order questions within the sample text being researched.
Application of tool for semantic cognitive analysis. A sample of the questions for disputations at Harvard during the prerevolutionary period, originally conducted entirely in Latin, has been translated for this dissertation. These questions address multiple and diverse subjects, as well as a religious ethic. For this dissertation, the questions were selected as follows. Morison (1936) provides all questions that survive in their original form, without interpretation. These questions cover a period of 65 years. Within this body of text this researcher selected all that were germane to this dissertation (all questions that could possibly allow critical thinking, as well as questions involving interdisciplinary application, logic, and ethics). The translator (chair of the department of Foreign Languages at Eastern Illinois University) translated all that he could translate from the archaic scholarly version of Latin that was indigenous to Harvard University during this time period, fully 93% of what he was given. Thus the sample size shows no selection bias on the part of this researcher and appears to be more than adequate in sample size.

The set of questions analyzed is as follows:

Can matter and form exist separately? (Respond in the negative.)

Can the soul endure after the body? (Respond in the negative.)

Are the laws of astrology valid? (Respond in the negative.)

Can it be that the elements are the sole cause of mixed things? (Respond in the negative.)

Is everything that is created destroyed? (Respond in the negative.)

Art comes into being by means of a basic principle. (Support the statement using interdisciplinary evidence.)

Is Socratic dialectic the light of the Microcosm? (Argue in the affirmative using syllogistic logic.)

The right way to happiness is virtue. (Support the statement using syllogistic logic.)
Can it be that first matter will have had form? (Respond in the negative.)

Can it be that the rational soul be the form of man? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Can it be that the whole and the parts are differing essentially? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Can it be that all-perfect-being is able to be defined perfectly? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Can it be that Nature is created? (Respond in the negative.)

Is being equivalent to knowing? (Response not suggested in the translated text.)

Can it be that the greatest and the smallest are given in nature? (Respond in the negative.)

Are creation and existence dependent upon each other? (Response not suggested in the translated text.)

Is it given that the middle path is determined by primary and secondary causes? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Can position, movement, and time have a single meaning together with the spirit? (Respond in the negative.)

Can it be that the act of creation be eternal? (Response not suggested in the translated text.)

Can the difference between good and evil be known by the laws of nature? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Is our ability to think the cause of some sort of lapse? (Respond in the negative.)

Is the prototype of all being (creation/things having existence) given in the first being (moment of creation/initial creation)? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Is that which gives continuation to all creation given by means of the first (creation)? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Can it be that the world will have been created for eternity? (Respond in the negative.)

Will the dogma of God destroy the free will? (Respond in the negative.)
Would God punish sins because of their natural character? (Respond in the affirmative using poetic format.)

Do all teachings strive toward ἐνπρᾶξια (eupraxia) [doing things well] (Respond in the affirmative.)

Is all evil personal? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Is any cause given outside of divine will? (Respond in the negative.)

Can it be that the first created men/humans/people were sent away from the gifts of nature as a result of sin? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Can it be that man is the unimpeded source of his own actions? (Response not suggested in the translated text,)

Can it be that original sin is both sin and punishment? (Respond in the affirmative.)

Can it be that will/desire is always defined? (Response not suggested in the translated text,)

By applying our analytic tool for semantic cognitive analysis to the sample questions and theses, the research discovered the ratio of lower- to higher-order thinking inherent in the sample of the Harvard commencement questions and theses of the period. Consequently, the research was able to begin the analysis of the pre-revolutionary curricula and their effects on student cognitive development and attain the following results. Inspection of the above questions shows that they all appear to be higher-order questions. However, they do not actually allow for the use of independent critical thinking outside the religious framework of prerevolutionary Harvard.

**Hermeneutic analysis of curriculum.** The hermeneutic analysis of the curricular content focused on three perspectives: an ethical analysis, an analysis of power, and an analysis to determine cultural implications associated with declarative versus critical cognitive perspectives.
inherent in the language of the discourses (see Figure 2.). The analysis then developed these perspectives into textual inquiries (see appendixes B, D, and F).

The ethical analysis. The first perspective inquiry dealt with an ethical analysis of the curricular content; explicatory definitions associated with the ethical analysis can be found in Appendix A of this research. The first general question associated with the analysis asked whether an ethical perspective was evident in the curriculum. It focused the analysis on discovering whether a definition of goodness was implied or described in the texts and discourses associated with the curriculum in the prerevolutionary period (1636-1776). Evidence of this implication was discovered throughout the Harvard prerevolutionary curriculum. The focus on religion, Bible study, and the subsequent emphasis on original language studies relative to Christian doctrine from a Calvinistic Puritan perspective was abundant (Morison, 1936). Therefore, the implication of a goodness was immediately associated with the unification of religion and Christian development of the Harvard student. He was viewed as someone who would become a true representative of the faith and a future minister or in common parlance at the time, a son of the prophets (Morison, 1936; Hoeveler, 2002; Winterer, 2002). Further evidence of this can be seen from the actual breakdown of the daily studies of the students as reported by Morison (1936), where he states that the curricular “details are such that we can arrange [the curriculum] in a time-table or tabular view” (p. 140). This table gives further evidence of the conception that a goodness was to be associated with religious understanding and study, since divinity or catechetical studies and Hebrew Bible readings, work in New Testament Aramaic, and Syriac accounted for six hours a week during year one of study for the first degree, eight hours a week during year two, and seven hours a week during year three. When one considers that the school day was six hours, the focal impact of religion as a moral goodness that
demanded intense study and practice is self-evident. In essence, during the first year a sixth of the school week was devoted to pure religious study, with the majority of the rest of the week’s classes focusing on subjects such as rhetoric and grammar associated with the native languages, which would be read vis-à-vis the catechetical work (Morison, 1936).

The second question focused on whether there was a predispositional language evident in the texts, language that assumed that the reader already had an understanding of ethical perspectives associated with the expectations of the author towards the reader or student. Looking at the concept of the disputation, an intrinsic part of the curriculum of the period at Harvard, one sees an assumptive expectation relative to method. The students were expected to know a

Time honored style of debate …a most important part of the curriculum …[that] had for their subject matter the several Arts that were studied, and were conducted by the rules of logic, according to a ritual that was practically unchanged from the days of Abelard. (Morison, 1936, p.143)

Therefore, assumptions of understanding and capacity to use logic were evident in the curriculum, and so was the expectation of the ability to use Latin with facility, for the disputations, even though they were exercises in quick thinking that demanded a certain mastery of the material under discussion, were all to be done in Latin (Morison, 1936; Hoeveler, 2002). Therefore, the assumption of Latin and logic as a beneficence that would generate correct methods of argument vis-à-vis the subject matter was found to be inherent in the curriculum. Latin and logic were considered tools that would aid in generating an expected good, the betterment of the student’s capacity for argumentation relative to the subject matter of the disputation. This in itself is not a negative perspective in pedagogy; a betterment relative to
thinking in a logical way is extremely helpful in defending a position. However, the fact still remains that the expectation and assumptive language associated with the use of Latin and logic exists in the discourses, and is just one example of this perspective.

The third question centered the research on discovering the focus of the language being used in the discourses: political, religious, moral, legal, and so forth. The results of this investigation are seen in the titles and focus of the titles being used to teach the students at that time. The Bible was central to the curriculum, as were the classics of Greek and Roman history and philosophy, exclusive of any authors that are antithetical to the development of the Puritan perspective on Christianity. This can be seen in the Harvard Chauncian Code of College Laws of 1655, which includes a section on the reading of authors, which states that

It is appointed that in the teaching of all Arts such Authors be read as doe best agree with the Scripture truths, wherein the speciall care of the President and fellows shall be used and their direction therein attended. (Morison, 1936, p. 145)

In this vein we can see a more accurate perspective of the representative authors of the Harvard college student of the period vis-à-vis the work of Tutor Henry Flynt in 1723, where he states that the students who were freshmen at Harvard were to “recite the Classick Authors Learn’t at School viz Tully Isocrates, Homer, Virgil, with the Greek Testamt” (Morison, 1936, p. 146). Indicative of this classical education are other ancient authors, including Aristotle, Cicero, Hesiod, and Sophocles, as well as others whose works were more contemporary; these included “Barclay…Milton…and Descartes…[as well as others]…now forgotten who were then highly respected in the learned world” (Morison, 1936, p. 154). Consequent to this emphasis, and its linguistic return to an idealist perspective and a humanist vein, the research finds that not only is the language directly assumptive in its expectation of what the student should focus on—
religion and classics—but it focuses on specific authors in review of what was then the equivalent of our high schools, their ‘Schools,’ and by stating the authors’ names the curriculum gives us the titles, and from those titles we see the focus of the language. Representative of these are the Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Aeneid (Morison, 1936). A simple review of the plots of these titles shows us that the focus is on a hero and his trials and tribulations, both internal ones as in the issues that face Achilles in the Iliad, where he cannot grow ontologically unless he uses other talents that are not innate, and in the plight of Odysseus, where the same concept is evident. One also sees this replicated in the work of Virgil, where the hero Aeneas and his plight vis-à-vis his pathos and intellectual ethos is the central focus in relation to religion. Regardless of the author or the work under consideration, the moral and religious lesson is ever-present in the curriculum, as is the intellectual and physical tension that is only to be resolved by correct thinking. It is within this perspective of the correctness of the thought process that the focus of the language is seen, for throughout all the titles mentioned the religious perspective is evident as a moral compass (Jaeger, 1945).

This Christian moral focus is evident even though, as Morison (1936) states,

Harvard was attempting to produce the whole Arts curriculum of Cambridge, and a little more: the medieval Trivium and Quadrivium (without Music); the Three Philosophies; the Learned Tongues; and a smattering of classical belles-lettres. It is not the specialized course for Protestant pastors, but a Christian gentleman’s education that is offered to the youth of New England. (p.150)

In this quotation, the research shows that the amalgamation of a liberal education was inclusive and surrounded by the languages of the scriptures and the idea of a Christian perspective as essential to the forming of a gentleman (Morison, 1936; Hoeveler, 2002; Winterer, 2002).
However, the research has shown that the breadth of field of study and the methodologies used such as the declamations and the theses defenses as well as the idea of copying out a ‘system’ or synopsis of each Art when [students] began the study therof [sic]...[in order to]...provide a logical skeleton of the Art, made by an expert, on which the student could build with his own notes...[to have been a creative method similar to a thought map that would be]...a neat dichotomy, branching out like a family tree, on which the student could conveniently hang all the knowledge that he acquired from books and lectures (Morison, 1936, p. 155)

are clearly forward-thinking and creative in the sense that they allow for the individual student to design his own methodology in order to develop the compendium of knowledge into a syllabus-type of structure that he could later develop from the lectures and readings he would attend (Morison, 1936; Hoeveler, 2002; Winterer, 2002). Student freedom, in making judgment decisions on how to study, is viewed differently by different teachers during the period and as such is seen in the research findings as ethical constrictions on critical thinking. Examples of these differentials can be seen in the letters of two graduates of the 1650’s, each advising a Harvard student of the next generation how to order his studies. A careful reading of these two letters, by Leonard Hoar (A.B. 1650) and Thomas Shepard (A.B. Aug. 9, 1653) ...will repay anyone interested in scholastic methods. Hoar’s seems to fit in more closely with the use of systems. He gives his freshman nephew, Josiah Flynt, elaborate directions as to classified notebooks, following the definitions and distributions (i.e., dichotomies) of the incomparable P. Ramus; and in ‘this labyrinth’ he recommends ‘Mr. Alexander Richardson’s Tables ...as an Ariadne’s thread.’ Richardson ...[seems to have been a coach or tutor] ...compiled numerous
systems, manuscript copies of which were floating about Harvard in Hoar’s college days. In 1657 … they were printed in a book entitled ‘The Logicians School-Master,’ … Besides an extended treatise on Logic, it contains ‘systems’ of grammar, rhetoric, physics, ethics, astronomy, medicine, and optics … Thomas Shepard (A.B. 1653), who served the college as tutor shortly after graduation, advises his son Thomas (A.B. 1676) to take notes by double-entry: journal and ledger. In the one he would boil down the substance of each author as read, preserving bright quotations to use in his disputations; in the other, [he would] classify the extracts according to subject. (Morison, 1936, pp. 156-157)

Even though both systems are ingenious or interdisciplinary in their genesis, the fact remains that the concepts associated with the methods are bound to the ability to dispute only on known subject matter; nowhere is there a concession to creative generation of new subject matter except in the methods, and then there is no need in essence to design or invent new methodology. Instead what we find in these systems are the study notes of the past, albeit in certain cases the readings still needed to be done, but only insofar as the system of previous scholars guided them to read. Therefore, thought relative to constructive criticism of subject matter may be there during the disputations, dependent on whether one was chosen to defend or attack a position, but creativity in design of new material from the old was not part of the action-based system to achieve a moral end. It is interesting to note that a synoptic tome that was very popular in the 1600’s by Johannes Stierius titled the Doctrina Spherica focusing on Ptolemaic Geometry gives no mention or credence to the Copernican perspective, without a doubt in order to save the “seventeenth-century students much labor in ‘getting up’ systems known to be obsolete, yet necessary to be known” (Morison, 1936, pp. 156-157). Therefore, one can see the effect of this
relative to the religious ethically-driven perspective; it is a negation of veridical truth for the sake of catechetical obedience.

Subsequently, the research finds that the focus of the language in the prerevolutionary Harvard curriculum is restrictive of criticality and is exemplary of religious obedience to the Puritan faith. Within that paradigm an ethic of action is exemplified that is interestingly able to generate a creative mindset but only within the paradigm that is accepted by the faith of the College founders.

The fourth question asked for evidence of a definitional perspective in the discourses vis-à-vis Israel Scheffler’s definitional analysis of texts as stipulative, descriptive, or programmatic (see Appendix B for further clarification of these definitional types). The definitional perspective inherent in the curricular discourses of prerevolutionary Harvard in regard to Scheffler’s analysis is programmatic. This can be seen vis-à-vis the aforementioned curricular emphasis on religious and classical training. This emphasis is cocooned in a curricular program that supports the religious emphasis via the philosophical and reasoned perspective of the classical authors. Interestingly, this is shown but not discussed to a high degree, since to do so would demonstrate a blasphemous intent in the curriculum (Morison, 1936; Hoeveler, 2002; Winterer, 2002). This was a constant perspective, with the exception of the *thesis technologica*, which allowed for and emphasized an interdisciplinary perspective that seemed to have excited many with anticipation of the defenses associated with them during commencement. These questions were more associated with a liberal education and emphasized the Hellenistic perspective that a liberal education would “prepare a man to cope with any situation” (Morison, 1936, p.164). However, regardless of this liberal and Hellenistic viewpoint that focused on an interdisciplinary view of education, both the Harvard student and his antecedent brother, the scholastically-trained
medieval student, considered that “there was no unbridgeable gulf between Christianity and Greek Philosophy; the one was rightly conceived as growing out of and fulfilling the best aspects of the other” (Morison, 1936, p. 164). Therefore, regardless of the inclusion of the more liberal language and concepts associated with the interdisciplinary thesis, the programmatic focus, one associated with religion, was ever-present and used as a focus for all curricular and assessment perspectives.

The last question in the ethical analysis of the curriculum searched for any programmatic structures in the texts associated with ethics, power, or cultural development as described by the authors as a goal. It is the fifth question of the analytic instrument relative to ethics, and it focuses on relating the text to Scheffler’s 1960 definition of a programmatic discursive structure in order to discover which of the three perennial windows of interpretation, inherent in the Analytic Tool for Semantic Cognitive Analysis, is evident in the work under consideration.

There are two ways to determine the text’s programmatic structure and its consequent window of perennial interpretation. The first is to note which window is consistently used as a method of verification of the subject matter that predominates in the curriculum; the second is to see which window is least used for that same purpose. The logical justification behind the first of these two methods of hermeneutic analysis is that a consistent usage of a window demonstrates the accepted programmatic structure through sheer persistency. This verification is seen by this research as a demonstration of the social acceptance of a particular window of interpretation and its dictums as the cause-célèbre of the ethics of the historical period and the texts of that period under consideration. The second logical justification for the analysis is that any perennial structure that is missing will, by its absence in the discourses despite its traditional social importance, be considered during that time period as a pariah or as non-existent in relation to the
goal of the predominant ethical paradigm. Since the three windows are by definition perennial and self-evident in their importance to all social and historical periods in one way or another, their absence can only substantiate the programmatic structure that is oppositional to it.

Therefore, by seeing both the inclusion of a particular window and the exclusion or minimization [of the use and subsequent importance] associated with the disuse of another, as well as the lack of objectivity seen in the absence of the oppositional semantic and ideological structure in the texts, one can deduce the emphasis or primacy of the ethical program that is considered as the focal developmental human structure in the time period under consideration. Within the time period and curricula of prerevolutionary America, the emphasis of religious language as an ethical structure, developed and substantiated by the entrance requirements, curricula, and texts used at Harvard and other subsequent centers of higher education on the eastern seaboard of the American colonies, gives evidence of a hierarchical structure relative to the three windows of perennial interpretation. This hierarchical structure places religion at its apex. It also includes within it a progressive liberal culture, whose language, evident in the theses and general curricula associated with the seven liberal arts, can be seen as logically based and analytical in its structure. However, this liberal perspective is placed within a veil of religious intent that continues to be seen even in the textual choices that are seen as acceptable for the development of the proper Christian student as made by the trustees of the founding colleges, and evidenced by the questions for disputation generated at commencement by and for the Master of Arts candidates (Morison, 1936). These questions which are evidence of a liberal mentality and which show a strong emphasis on Natural Philosophy, Logic, and Liberal Arts and Metaphysics, are cloaked in a language that regardless of its liberal face value is representative of divinity as the final arbiter of truth. Again, as Morison (1936) states, “to the Harvard student,
as to the medieval scholar, there was no unbridgeable gulf between Christianity and Greek Philosophy; the one was rightly conceived as growing out of and fulfilling the best aspects of the other” (p. 164).

The analysis of power. The second perennial window of interpretation focuses on the analysis of power relative to the Harvard curriculum during the prerevolutionary period. The model asks six questions of the texts and their discourses. The first asks how power is defined in the text under consideration relative to the subject, the person or persons under consideration, and the object or phenomenon or intellectual entity that the subject is focusing on. Although no absolute definition of power is self evident, the research found that the ability to logically argue for a position, albeit one that was socially and in the case of our subjects religiously acceptable, was empowering and educationally focused within the curriculum (Morison, 1936; Rudolph, 1978). The second analytic question focused on whether power within the texts was discursively implied or declaratively stated. As with the section on Ethics as a perennial window of interpretation, which was defined as an-action based system used to attain a moral end, the definition of power must also be stated so as to be able to determine the implications or declarations of it within the texts and discourses. Therefore, the research defines power as the ability to use a knowledge base freely in order to attain an authority that liberates a subject from sectarian and inauthentic interpretations of acceptability and self-discovery. This was not evident in the texts as shown in the analysis of the theses and disputations. There the research showed what can be described as a liberal restriction of the mind for the sake of the perpetuation of a mentality associated with the ultimate truth of scripture over logic. All of the questions considered in the sample, even though they ask for a higher order cognitive responses, are shrouded in a language of religious evidence and require a stipulated correct answer. In the
discourses and texts one finds the consistent development of logic not as the means of attaining a free and scientifically evident result but as a means of attaining a controlled result that on face value seems free due to the use of the tool of logic. The overpowering drive of the curriculum and of the rules and regulations associated with its pedagogical method, the syllogism and scripture as final arbiter of truth, was focused on using the tools of analysis in vogue at the time for the sake of proving the dogmatic consistency of scriptural truth as justified true belief.

In order to fully comprehend the effect of this power the research also defines the authority that enforced the power base. It explains it as the ability to generate an authentic and socially acceptable enforceable action. Furthermore, it explicates authenticity as the result of any action that is not derived purely from acquiescence to social acceptability, but instead is generated from the individual act of existential self-discovery (Kaufmann, 1975). In essence, authority is more than the ability to generate an action that is socially accepted and enforceable by some agency; it is also an action whose genesis is found in the individual existential act of self-discovery. Consequently, student power and authority are indispensable to authenticity if one is to generate an ontologically critical education. And that education is one that develops and supports a constructive criticism of accepted dictums and axioms across all disciplines in order to generate within the individual the courage to question as she journeys towards an existential discovery of what it means to be an authentic self (Kaufmann, 1975; Morris, 1990). This authenticity is not evident in the texts under analysis if one uses 21st century eyes to view them. However, within the mindset of a puritan school system whose goals were the development of a functioning system of theocratic replacements for the community, the authenticity of existential self discovery was to be found only within the paradigm of the religious law and only relative to the acceptance of it as the cause of causes for all human action. That the mind was allowed to
think relative to the truths inherent in it was only considered as an act of God associated with the choice he gave man relative to the use of free will (Holifield, 2003). Since the future ministers and administrators of Harvard considered themselves as the sons of the prophets it was only natural that the chosen be allowed to deal with the instrument of god’s grace given to them for the purpose of discovering the intellectual power inherent in the truths of his scriptures (Morison, 1936). Therefore, this existential self, a self subsequently defined as a being whose further goal is the elimination of an econo-centric result-based mentality and its replacement with an aesthetic perspective of existence as its goal--in other words, and in a Foucault-like fashion, a change from a commerce-and-acquisition based mentality to a mindset that focuses phenomenal and intellectual action and ethics on the creation of a beautiful life as the goal of a being’s existence--was being developed in the minds of the sons of Harvard by their ability to reason within the paradigm of the scriptures as ultimate truth (Foucault, 2005; Holifield, 2003). For the students and the faculty as well as for the entire society of the city on the hill, they were being ontologically developed within the freedom of the light of God’s truth, which to them was a beautiful existence (Hofstadter, 1973a; Holifield, 2003).

The second question relative to the analysis of power focuses on whether power within the text is implied or declared. The questions that the research reviewed do not demonstrate that a freedom which is inherent in the declared definition of power (see appendix C) is evident from a modern understanding of the term. The texts do, however, repeatedly show declaratively an implied freedom based on the ability to use logical deduction and syllogistic reasoning. However, as has been mentioned earlier in this research, this freedom is to be allowed only within the scriptural paradigm and only accepted when it shows evidence of the dogma of the scriptures. Therefore, power relative to absolute freedom to develop a critical constructive
interpretation is not evident since the freedom that is demonstrated does not allow for any negation of scriptural belief regardless of logical evidence supporting that negation. The third question relative to the analysis of power asks whether there are discourses or declarations used to control physical or cognitive human processes in the text. The curricula themselves are extremely restrictive and demonstrate an authority that is religious and administrative. Examples can be seen in the drafts of the Harvard rules and regulations generated by the likes of Cotton Mather and Presidents Dunster and Chauncey. These demonstrate not just a controlling authority relative to the curriculum, but also an authority associated with the thought process and physical movements of the students inclusive of prayer and partaking in foods and libations during their stay at Harvard. This can be seen as extending from the initial work of Cotton Mather, titled *Harvard’s First Fruits*, to the Chauncian reforms that included the introduction of the Harvard press into the university (Morison, 1936). Another example of discourses that controlled cognition and human physical processes at Harvard come from the incident associated with the Harvard faculty and George Whitefield in 1744. Mr. Whitefield was chastised most grievously by the Harvard faculty and administration for exercising what at that time was not protected by the yet-to-be-written American Constitution; free speech. He wrote a monograph of over ninety-five pages dealing with the restrictions and state of well-being of the curriculum and mind of the Harvard students. He was charged with what was at that time considered misguided conduct in writing and thought. To the Harvard faculty this misguided action, and by that they meant action not guided by their accepted interpretation of the scriptures, was known as enthusiasm. The faculty stated that Whitefield had no right to state what books the students at Harvard should read, and that he was, due to his publishing his sentiments which were contrary to theirs, “an uncharitable, censorious and slanderous Man; which indeed is but a natural Consequence of the
heat of Enthusiasm” (Hofstadter & Smith, 1961, p. 62). However, it was not only at Harvard that a controlling influence upon the body and mind of the student was present; Yale College suffered as well. An example of this control of physical human processes is evident in the Cleveland affair at Yale of 1745. In essence two students while at home went with their parents to a church that was not recognized by the overseers of the university as a bona fide church. The result was that both students were judged to be personae non grata by the college and expelled for their transgressions against the college’s accepted church, as is seen from the following:

The said John and Ebenezer Cleaveland, in Withdrawing and Separating from the publick Worship of God, and attending upon the preaching of a Lay-Exhorter, as aforesaid, have acted contrary to the rules of the Gospel, the laws of this Colony and of the College; and that the said Cleavelands shall be publickly Admonished for their Faults, aforesaid: And if they shall continue to Justifie themselves and refuse to make Acknowledgement they shall be expelled. Thomas Clap, Rector. (Hofstadter & Smith, 1961, p. 80)

Further examples can be seen from the Yale Laws of 1745, where the students are held to rules and regulations that do not just cover curriculum and pedagogy, but that include throughout the presence of religious dogma as the guiding light of reason. The titles of the chapters give evidence to this; they range from Admission to the college based on linguistic ability with the works of Cicero, Virgil, and the Greek Testament, inclusive of the student’s ability to give evidence of “a blameless and inoffensive life,” to the six rules in the second chapter dealing with “a religious and virtuous life” (Hofstadter & Smith, 1961, pp. 54-55). Further evidence of the control over cognitive and physical processes can be seen in chapter four of the Yale Laws which are totally dedicated to punishments ranging from expulsion for “Blasphemy, Fornication,
Robbery, Forgery, or any other such Great and Atrocious Crime” (Hofstadter & Smith, 1961, p. 56). Inclusive in these crimes, but with some resort to alternative punishments, were tale bearing, profane swearing, the denial of Holy Scriptures or any part of them to be the word of God, subversion of the fundamentals of Christianity, disobedience towards superiors, challenging turbulent words, wearing women’s clothes, idleness, lying, defrauding, or any such immorality, including picking locks, drinking within a two mile radius of the college, jumping out of college windows, singing, loud talking, making noise during study time, screaming, association with rude or disorderly or idle people, entertaining after nine at night, showing contempt for authority, going out of the college without a hat, coat or gown, keeping a gun in the college yard, being offensive to the people of New Haven, and not attending prayer service twice a day (Hofstadter & Smith, 1961). It is evident from the examples given that a control of both cognitive and physical processes is part of the paradigm associated with the discourses in education of the Harvard and Yale curriculums.

The next question posed of the discourses under consideration focuses on whether power is associated with pedagogy or curriculum in the texts. Since our definition of curriculum is based on seeing it as a course of study inclusive of multiple media and venues relative to a topic, and since the power it should generate in the student is seen as the ability to use freely the knowledge acquired from the curriculum in order to attain freedom from sectarian subjectivity, the answer to this question from a curricular perspective must be no. The curricula at Harvard and later at Yale are restrictive in that the paradigms are focused upon a sectarian religious perspective. Therefore, no freedom to disagree existed regardless of any and all methods of pedagogy used which might generate a critical thinking process contrary to those paradigms. A look at the Harvard curriculum of 1642 demonstrates the restriction of the curriculum, which
attempts to develop methods of logical disputations and declamations but only allows them to be proved to the standard of the stated religiously-based curriculum (Morison, 1936). This theme is recurrent throughout the Harvard programs and, as mentioned above, it has been shown to gravitate outward towards curricula of other universities, as seen in the cases associated with Yale College. Therefore, power, as described by our analytic tool, is restricted, since the curriculum denies the freedom to use knowledge in a free manner. The pedagogies used do not restrict the ability to develop creative or critical thinking, lecture and declamation; and other techniques are not restrictive per se. However, they are set upon, and controlled by, the proviso that the criticality developed through them must construct only agreement with scriptural authority relative to any discipline under consideration or study (Hofstadter, 1961; Morrison, 1936).

The next question in our analysis of power within the curriculum asks if the subject, the student, is being considered as a being ontologically becoming or evolving educationally (see appendix C). To be considered as ontologically developing, the student must have a relationship with the object of consideration, the curriculum. This relationship has to develop a logical consistency between the subject and the object, which generates a discourse grounded on freedom. In our case this needs to be an academic freedom that gears the student toward an authentic, non-imitative, and non-dogmatic understanding of the object of consideration. This is not evident in the Harvard curriculum. The only way that the pedagogies and curricula of pre-revolutionary Harvard can be viewed as ontologically developing relative to the education of the student is from a restrictive perspective. This perspective would allow for a constructive criticism to exist, as long as it serves the purpose of dogmatic maintenance. Subsequent to this the evidence demonstrates, through the texts discussed and analyzed, that the ontological
development of the student is restricted and formal; set within a specific phenomenological and intellectual paradigm that does not allow existential authenticity but that focuses instead on the reproduction of Christian values as necessary to the understanding of all disciplines (Morison, 1936). This perspective allows us to see whether the final question in the analysis of power within the curriculum of pre-revolutionary Harvard treats the subject, the student, as a text. A text is written, it is the opinion of subject matter experts relative to an object of intellectual consideration. These objects are known as disciplines or have specific names such as mathematics or metaphysics. When considering the students of pre-revolutionary Harvard from this perspective, one can see that the restrictions placed upon the use of their critical development, the use of the criticality for the sake of the perpetuation of the Christian faith, is in a sense a method of authorship and it is the perpetuation of that authorship and its reproduction that is ever-present in the work of the administrative powers over the student body vis-à-vis the pre-revolutionary curriculum at Harvard, and, as has been shown, at other colleges as well. The wording of the Harvard history of Cotton Mather, the wording of the faculty’s arguments against Whitefield, and the wording of the curriculum of 1642 all have as their goal the design and development of a declarative text that is capable of using logic to perpetuate its understanding of truth, a truth that is being justified by belief, and a belief that is being justified by the dogmatically accepted conception of truth (Hofstadter, 1961, Morison, 1936).

**Analysis of content and declarative knowledge.** The analysis of content and declarative knowledge focuses on eight basic questions relative to a text or texts. The first question focuses on discovering what the exoteric or face value of the text is. Within the texts, curricula, and assessments that the research has considered in conjunction with the prerevolutionary period in America, the ever-present message is one of religious pre-eminence. Therefore, the second
question, which asks which independent paradigm of interpretation is most evident, becomes a moot point; religion rules the day and life of the student, the curriculum, and the teacher’s interpretations of the texts inclusive of the classics associated with the noble pagans of Greece and Rome. The continuous mention of the scriptures in all of the texts under consideration, the penalties levied against students at Yale and Harvard for not being at daily prayer, the consistent focus on the development of a Christian gentleman, the dual purpose mentioned in the works of a learned ministry and a learned administrative sector, albeit an administrative sector that supports a theocracy, is evidence that the exoteric message is based on the religious time-independent paradigm of interpretation. The message is therefore religion first, man second. The third question relative to content and declarative knowledge asks which independent paradigm of analysis is least evident. Within the texts there is very little mention, if any, of economics or an economic focus. The idea of funds associated with the founding of institutions of higher learning during the period is restricted to the initial monies needed to establish the schools and the amounts that the students needed to pay for their room, board, and tuition. It is a known entity and an expected entity. However, it is not the ever-present driving force of the curriculum or of the texts involved in educating the students of the universities. The only focus of an economic perspective is in the development of a library and in the need to fill the shelves of that library with the needed books for the development of the mind of the student body. The mention of John Harvard’s gift of funds and books, as well as the inclusion of the colonial governmental structure in the financial development of the institution, allowed Harvard to be less dependent on philanthropic gifts for its survival in the early stages of its development; however, the fact of cost relative to books is well documented. This documentation is evident in regard to the Harvard library as shown by Morison (1936) when he writes out the orders and rules from the overseers
of Harvard towards the rectification of the library and the library-keeper. Consistently, throughout the rules and regulations one sees the focus on the cost and upkeep of the books in the library as well as the importance given to the acquisition of the books. One interesting example of the inclusion of cost relative to book damages stated that “any person whatsoever [who] shall be found injurious to the Library by abusing or not carefully restoring any Book borrowed by him . . . shall pay double damage and be debarred from borrowing” (Morison, 1936, p. 286). Further mention of monies and economic conditions are seen in the fact that at that time any book in the library was held to the proviso that “no book shall be sold unless in the Library there be two or more of the same sort” (Morison, 1936, p. 267). Books were considered so valuable that only men who held the M.A. degree were allowed to borrow them without the permission of the university president. Within this part of the university curriculum, for a library has to be considered part of any curriculum that focuses its work on a perennial perspective, the concept of philanthropic gifts was pre-eminent and the donors’ names were registered in a catalogue system for reference and thanks. Also, the concept of the monetary value of books was so prevalent and the idea that a book was capable of denting the university coffers was so great, that part of the curriculum was geared towards the copying in an individually creative system a synopses of the lectures and an outline of the readings done by graduates, which were included in the library catalogue. This was done not just to help students to pass the thesis questions and oral examinations on a subject, but to subsidize the cost of acquisition via the manuscripts of the previous students (Morison, 1936).

The next question in the analysis of declarative knowledge within the discourses and texts of the period focuses on whether there is a historical support for the absence of a paradigm in the text. The idea that the economic factor is included only vis-à-vis the acquisitions of the
library and the tuition of the student does not by itself lend credence to a historical perspective supporting the general exclusion of the concept. However, if we focus on the reasoning associated with the window of interpretation that is prevalent, religion, and realize that one of the main concepts behind the separatist mindset of the protestant reformation was the use and perceived abuse of money by the Catholic church, we can begin to see the aversion to including the concept within the educational curricula of the institutions of higher learning in New England. The idea of monies as a corrupting influence, the idea of funds as associated with salvation, was not to be considered as part of the intellectual development of the new prophets of Christianity. To do so would be tantamount to supporting one of the concepts that the Reformation was designed to fight, the purchase of salvation (Miller, 1983, Morison, 1936). Therefore, the historical support for the absence of the paradigm of economics in the texts, from the perspective of acquisitions associated with the development of the minds of the future ministers of the puritan congregation has, from the perspective of aversion to popery and the misuse of the faith, a historically supportive structure. The next question focuses on whether there are any general assumptions in the texts under consideration. The majority of texts associated with curriculum and the assessment instruments of Harvard College all assume an understanding on the part of the student and the teacher, of the basic tenets of Puritan theology. This can be seen in the fact that all texts and curricula are to be focused on scriptural evidence or at least not to go against the reasoned logic of the word of God--where reason is the scriptures--as the foundational principle of truth. Examples of this abound: the questions generated for commencement have a predominant theme of religion throughout. Also the basic premise that can be seen throughout is the idea of a covenant between the students, the teachers, the College, and the word of God. The idea of a covenant and its binding nature as a contract between the
prophets of the city on the hill and their God is part of the Puritan theology which is assumed, along with the concept of predestination, to be understood by all students of the college (Miller, 1956, 1983; Morison, 1936). Descriptions of this and other religiously-based assumptions are seen in the wording of multiple statements from the texts and commencement questions of the time, which assume an understanding of Puritan theology (Morison, 1936). Examples of this assumption are seen in the federal theology, as described by Miller (1956), where he states that

 Congregational and Independent Puritans developed their conception of the church covenant and the social covenant out of a more fundamental exposition of the covenant as a universal term for describing the innermost personal relationship between the Christian and Jehovah. Also the covenant became their way of conceiving the relationship of the creator to the created universe. (p. 143)

Miller (1956) further clarifies the concept of a federal theology and a covenant when he states in conjunction with the expectation of an assumption of denominationally-based Christian knowledge that

This “federal theology” was not so much a separate or self-contained system—in doctrinal theology, all Puritans were what we call “Calvinists”—as it was an idiom, taken both from the Old Testament and from contemporaneous legal thinking, for expounding the mystery of the election and perseverance of the saints. . . [in a sense God has seen in his elected saints, those that have been saved by his Grace, the ability to generate a contract with him] . . . and condescended to treat with man as an equal and to draw up a covenant or contract with His creature, in which He laid down the terms of salvation by which, putting off His arbitrary freedom, He would henceforth abide. (p. 143)
One of the most important things associated with this covenant theology from an educational perspective is seen in the fact that the salvation of man through the Grace of God was dependent on his understanding and reasoning after the election of the saint had been attained through the gift of Grace. This development of reason at that time was the responsibility of Harvard at first, and then afterwards, with some minor alterations, it became the stewardship of the nine founding colleges of the American republic. Selection and assuredness became the two foundational principles of salvation via the education of the Christian gentleman; education and the unity of thought between law, reason, and the scriptural logic verified those principles as an inherited right of the sons of the saints (Miller, 1983; Morison, 1936).

The next question asks what types of questions are evident in the texts. The question types are interestingly evident of a higher cognitive order. The majority of questions in the commencements and disputations ask for logical reasoning that focuses on how and why type answers. These have been discussed in detail before and the evidence has been shown to be both liberal, freedom of expression via methodology, and critical, constructing an argument for and against in some cases, in its conception. Yet the freedom generated by the question type is restricted by the many constraints of the theological paradigm. As was shown in previous sections, there are some questions that simply ask for a declarative answer or attempt to assert the statement; however, the emphasis is on proof and logical discourse within the constraints of religious reason. The types of questions missing from the text are those that allow for a criticality that radically changes or challenges the theological paradigm. There are no questions that are to be disputed or proved in the positive if they are associated with showing the religious perspective as wrong in any fashion. The ratio of lower-order to higher-order questions within the texts under consideration is ironic in that the percentage is lopsided, over 90% of the questions focused on
higher-order thinking relative to the sample asking for how and why answers—versus lower
order questions that focused only on declarative knowledge. The irony is seen by the fact that
dogma is seemingly to be challenged with reason but only to affirm the futility of the challenge
and to prove with reason the greater veracity of the scripturally based answer (Morison, 1936).

**Overall criticality in the Harvard curriculum.** It is evident from the findings that the
overall criticality in the Harvard pre-revolutionary curriculum is restricted to the perpetuation of
a position. This position, regardless of the discipline under consideration in the curriculum, is
one of restriction to a dogmatic Christian perspective that must be adhered to even if the
criticality demonstrates the falsity of the dogma. The reasoning associated with criticality is to
verify the selectivity of the saints, the sons of Harvard, as those chosen by the Grace of God to
be his elected representatives on earth; a group of highly educated, reasoning, and logically
thinking theocrats that had a call to evangelize to the Calvinist-based congregational and puritan
faith.

**The Revolutionary and Postrevolutionary Period**

The plethora of assessment methods, oral and didactic, that existed throughout the
prerevolutionary time period becomes scarce during the revolutionary period. The search for
assessments relative to critical thinking and civics education curricula has resulted in the
discovery of a paucity of material for analysis. Curricula exist, as witnessed by the work of
Thomas Jefferson in the development of the University of Virginia course of study, as well as in
James Madison’s West point curriculum (Rudolph, 1962, 1978). However, the assessments
associated with those curricula are lacking. For these and other curricula of the period, such as
the plan for the curriculum of the University of North Carolina written by William R. Davies in
1795 or the Morrill Acts of the mid-to-late 1800s, one finds a paucity of assessments (Hofstadter,
& Smith, 1961). Confirming this lack, Dr. David Barker, an expert on the time period under consideration and its educational history, states that he cannot recall seeing any assessments relative to civics education or critical thinking amongst the primary sources he has had the opportunity to consider (personal communication, October 19, 2010).

**Reasoning for a Focus on Hermeneutic Analytic**

Due to the lack of assessments relative to the subject at hand, the research has no basis for affirming any conjecture that could be made from the language of the curriculum documents. Due to this enigma, the only recourse left for the research process was to complete a hermeneutic analysis of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution as a catalyst to the modern period of civics education. Within these two instruments, however, one can see the influence of certain philosophical traditions that have affected the reasoning of the modern civics curricula. Therefore, the purpose of the analysis of the two founding instruments of the American republic is to focus on the hermeneutic results generated in order to see the efficacy of the analytic tool from an interpretive perspective focused on the founder’s original intent and to determine whether in that analysis one can find reasons for further research associated with the theses of this research. In essence, the two texts are being reviewed as a conceptual bridge to the present state of civics education.

However, before advancing to the Declaration and the Constitution, the research looked at some specific curricular foci that developed after their acceptance as the seminal documents of the American republic in order to see the specific educational parlance used in relation to the philosophical principles written within the two documents. The foci of educational instruction were religious belief and administrative training. These two perspectives were used to foster the secular government based on Christian religious beliefs. The historical shift from the
prerevolutionary period to the revolutionary and postrevolutionary period—and the philosophical foundations of this shift—were assessed by applying the hermeneutic tool of analysis and its tripartite method to some of the main curricular primary sources of the period. Again using the nineteen-question process previously applied to the prerevolutionary period, the results showed some interesting changes in the foundational perspectives of the curricula. The curricular battle began anew, not between denominational differences associated with instructional focus but between educational foci themselves. The spotlight of the first government act for the proliferation of education was “the 1802 act [known as the Enabling Act of 1802 which allowed the entrance of Ohio into the union and that provided two townships of federal land for the endowment of a university in each new state carved out of the national land holdings” (Rudolph, 1978, p. 8). This act was a legislative action that showed the governmental use of the educational initiative as a reason not for the sake of educational and cultural advancement but for the promotion of a westward settlement that would expand the republic. The use, then, of educationally-based initiatives associated with economics and expansion—a methodology that would repeat itself again and again throughout the westward expansion of the American republic—demonstrates the manipulative methodology that the power brokers of the hegemony would use to perpetuate their control and guarantee the maintenance of the status quo. This subsidized support of westward expansion kept the working classes separated and unable to communicate. Coupling this distance factor with a restrictive education that denied criticality by focusing on training for survival on the frontier, one sees the concept of divide and conquer working well within the republic for the hegemony. Simultaneously, the shift in interests from the theocratic principles of educational activity in the prerevolutionary period to the secular hegemonic maintenance principles of the revolutionary and postrevolutionary period can also be
seen in the “Morrill Land-Grant Act [of] 1862, which endowed the beginnings of agricultural and mechanical colleges in all states, and was an act as much for getting rid of land as for supporting education” (Rudolph, 1978, p. 8) the education it supported though was not a classical humanistic and critically developmental one but one focusing on the aforementioned survival needs associated with western expansion.

Consequently, the most impacting perspective relative to the theses of this research is that the philosophical focus was shifted to the development of the industrial and agriculturally-based social classes and not simply focused on the elite of the American society. However, as has been mentioned, this is a façade that on one hand seems to express the democratic values awakened by the revolution and present in the two founding instruments, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, but on the other perpetuates the class division in American society between those that could afford the time and money for a classical education and those that would focus on a technical and agrarian education. What this shift in fact does is to demonstrate the government support of the differentiation of the curriculum of the elite from that of the masses. The essence of this can be seen in the fact that the Morrill Act of 1862 and 1890 both stated that their purpose was to formulate

without excluding other scientific and classical studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life. (Morrill Land Grant-Act of 1862, 2010, §4)

Therefore, even though the language includes the so called liberal arts, the focus was on vocational training relative to the industrial classes, with the further proviso that the selection of
pedagogy and curriculum was to be made by the legislatures of the states. The purpose of this dictum is self-evident, a differentiation of curricular intent that focused on the training of the masses in mechanical arts. The idea of change, criticality, and any other rhetorical or cognitive arts that develop criticality are not at the forefront of this historical and very functional focal shift in curricular intent. These legislative acts demonstrate the involvement in education of the hegemony during the industrial and agricultural power epochs of America. The philosophical perspectives that gave rise to those acts came from the ideological shifts that were the educational food for thought of the founders and can best be seen in the two founding documents of the republic, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

**The Declaration of Independence.** The Declaration of Independence was an amalgamation of known perspectives on ethics and politics, not a new set of principles associated with novel governmental perspectives. Thomas Jefferson, its author, in a letter to James Madison dated August 30 1823, stated that “it was never his charge to invent new ideas, altogether, and to offer no sentiment which had ever been expressed before” (Dana, 1900, p. 322). To reinforce that statement, Madison responds in agreement as follows:

Nothing can be more absurd than the cavil that the declaration contains known, and not new truths. The object was to assert, not to discover truths, and to make them the basis of the Revolutionary act. The merit of the Draught, therefore, could only consist in a lucid communication of human rights, in a condensed enumeration of the reasons for such an exercise of them, and in a style and tone appropriate to the great occasion, and to the spirit of the American people. (Dana, 1900, p. 322)
To what extent this assertion can be considered an ethic, an action-based system whose purpose is to attain a moral end, can be seen in the following results vis-à-vis the application of the study’s research tool.

**The ethical analysis.** The first question relative to the ethical analysis of the declaration asks for the definition of goodness implied in the text. Following suit with our definition of ethics stated above we can comply with the findings of Adler (1987), where he states that the central ideas of the Declaration can be seen in five concepts: human equality, inalienable rights, the pursuit of happiness, the consent of the governed, and the justification for a coup-deétat. Therefore, in accordance with the research tool’s definition, one finds that the new definition of goodness can be considered as the effect of having a state of being where human equality and the pursuit of happiness are considered inalienable rights of people in a republic, and that when those rights are not secured under the consent of the governed there exists a justification for revolution against the hegemonic structure. In essence, the good is freedom and independence and the allowance of criticality to the point of radical revolt when the freedoms of equality and pursuit of happiness are suppressed by hegemony. Therefore, goodness is based on criticality and freedom.

The second question of ethical analysis asks whether there exists assumptive language, which is language that assumes the reader will understand the meanings of particularly important terms such as the central ones mentioned above. That understanding of these philosophical and political terms can only come from an education that has allowed and aided in the understanding of these concepts. One cannot expect the yeoman farmer to be able to express an understanding of the ideas of happiness as expressed, by Aristotle in his Ethics, or of human equality and the consent of the governed, as expressed by Montesquieu in his Spirit of the Laws or Locke’s two treatises on Government, without training in the classics and in the Enlightenment philosophy of
the epoch (Adler, 1978; Strauss & Cropsey, 1987). Therefore, without equivocation, assumptive language is prevalent. An example of this can be seen in the opening paragraph of the Declaration when the author discusses the idea of a people as one people. The concept of people is not just the idea of a group of men and women, but has a distinct meaning derived from the works of the Roman orator and barrister Cicero where in

his *De Republica*, [he] had defined a people as ‘not a collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of them in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good’ therefore a multitude of persons forms a single people when they are united for a common purpose and are willing to cooperate in its pursuit. (Adler, 1987, p. 36)

Further proof of assumptive language associated with ethics and politics, as well as the classics and enlightenment philosophy, abounds throughout the document, along with implications of an understanding of justice, rectitude, rights as implied by nature and its God. This and other statements generate and imply an agreement on the correctness of the action by the approval of the Supreme Being through his representatives, the elected members of Congress, an implication that borders on the divine right of kings as the administrative representatives of God--whom they constantly summon as the final arbitrator of their reasoned logic as seen in the last paragraph of the Declaration, where the authors, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of [their] intentions, do, in the name, and by the authority of the good people of [the] colonies solemnly publish and declare that these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States …[and again a few lines down we see the continuation of the plea to God as his representatives when they ask] …and for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection
of Divine providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor. (Adler, 1987, p. 37)

The question raised is why is there a need for this supplication from men who are well versed through their education in the philosophical principles expounded in their writing? The answer lies in the fact that the assumptive language needs to create acceptance by those who are or will be governed by the founders of the republic. Where can one find greater impetus for acceptance of that controlling structure than in the metaphysical implications of a divine being, omnipotent and omniscient, and in this case, seemingly supportive of the hegemonic structural change?

The next question in our analysis asks what the focus of the assumptive language is. A review of the instrument shows that the emphasis of the text is on giving reason for the hegemonic shift. The essence of the language, as mentioned above, is on securing in the minds of the common man the idea that the power brokers of the new republic have a good intent, and are to be considered as the inheritors of the power of the hegemony by the authority of philosophical reason and logic as well as by the divinity of God. This is evident in the statement which declares that it is the “right …[of the people] …it is their duty …[when faced with an abusive government that places them] under absolute despotism, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security” (Adler, 1987, p. 166). So in essence the language focuses on explaining the cause of action for the sake of change and anointing it with righteousness born out of the frustration of the common man and the intellect of the select few. The injection of the reason as providential and philosophically natural is a combination that permeates the intent of the text.

The definitional perspective inherent in the language of the discourse is exoterically descriptive yet stipulative. It demonstrates the particulars of the cause for the need to separate
from the current hegemonic structure while at the same time stipulating the need as imperative for the present condition to change. However, the theme throughout the text is programmatic. This can be seen by the consistent emphasis on blind acceptance of the idea of goodness represented by the language of religious righteousness, philosophical correctness and the natural right and order of a self-generating political state of being. The programmatic definitional position is without equivocation well crafted towards a time-independent perspective of democratic justice, one that will last in the hands of the people. Therefore, the perfection of the language which even generates a semiotic understanding through symbolism as seen by the idea that God is the driving reason behind the trust, albeit a symbolism that is Christian in its conception, is seen in the fact that ethics, power, and culture have been fused into a unity. This unity is generated through a belief system that esoterically will be in the controlling hands of the learned classes, the new guardians, but will be supported by the masses through the idea that they are the masters of their own destiny--and because of the methodology of reasoning and symbolism attached to the perspectives, the masses will accept this as right and just.

**The analysis of power.** Further analysis of the Declaration shows that power, defined by the research tool as an ability to control through educational means, both cognitive and physical human processes, rules the instrument. The text does not define power relative to hermeneutic and existential liberation, as expressed in the ability gained, through some method such as education, to use knowledge freely in order to attain liberation from controlling social and individual structures or from sectarian and in-authentic interpretations of acceptability and self discovery. Instead, the idea of power seen in the Declaration is one of control through acquiescence based on ignorance on the part of the masses of the philosophical perspectives of
the hegemonic replacements. This is, of course, given credence by the words that associate the new hegemony with the goodness of God.

Power within the text is declaratively stated; however, the implications are hidden within the textual wording since the audience of the epoch, with the exceptions of the educated elite, had no recourse to the classics as authority for the actions of the new guards of the state. This can be seen in the fact that, with the exception of a few men such as Patrick Henry and Benjamin Franklin, the majority of the new guards of the hegemony were educated in classical colleges under a curriculum that focused on the Greek and Roman classics (Richard, 1995). The public was, in fact, barely able to do much more than feign understanding of the sermons of the men who preached to them on Sundays and in a few cases read the Bible. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that during the “American Revolution, except in New England, there was no public provision for elementary education in the American colonies” (Rudolph, 1965, p. xvi):

Only relatively few colonial Americans received any formal education beyond the elementary subjects. Secondary schools were rare. Private tutors and the local clergyman carried the main burden of college preparation. There were public secondary schools in New England, a few private schools in the middle colonies, and even fewer in the South—all of them concentrating on the Latin that led to college and a career in one of the learned professions. (Rudolph, 1965, p. xvii)

Therefore, in regard to the controlling nature of the language in the text as well as the association of the textual wording with a specific curriculum, the research finds that the essence of the structure of the language in the Declaration relative to the education of the masses is premised on acquiescence and control of action. These same words are undoubtedly associated with curricula
where the actions of the elite are given impetus towards that control, as can be seen via the curricula discussed in the previous section of the research.

The next two questions in the analysis of power within the text ask whether the subject of the educational system associated with the text can be seen as ontologically evolving in an authentic manner educationally. From the perspective of the elitism inherent in the language of the text it is clear that upon the shift in focus from a dogmatic perspective as the *sumum bonum* to the enlightened perspective that placed man as a maker of his own fate politically, the educated member of the society was ontologically becoming an evolved subject of the understanding. The fact that the curricula used logic and reasoning coupled with the essence of Locke’s perspectives on understanding and the empirical emphasis that came into the university systems during the epoch only lend credence to the epistemic journey towards a future closer to authenticity in their thinking. From the perspective of textual personification the research found that the subjects, the elite known as “we the people,” are being hermeneutically considered as a text that is evolving into a philosophical interpretation of the hermeneutic intent vis-à-vis Gadamer’s and Heidegger’s interpretation of the term. The evolution from a romantic hermeneutic interpretation of being as text to a philosophical one based on the being as evolving towards authenticity is only capable of being seen within the elite of the people (Gadamer, 1994; Heidegger, 1962). The public is in a different perspective from a hermeneutic viewpoint. There the perspective is one of exoteric interpretation only—the face value of all that is seen and expected vis-à-vis the elite’s verbiage—therefore, one is shown a two-class system of hegemonic maintenance associated with a hermeneutic duality and supported by a semiotic symbolism of religious validity and reasoned inquiry. The content of that reasoned inquiry relative to the Declaration needs to be viewed from the perspective of declarative knowledge.
The analysis of content and declarative knowledge. In analyzing the Declaration for declarative knowledge, the research asked eight questions of the text. The first of these focused on determining the exoteric, or face-value, message of the discourse. This has been discussed previously in the research findings, but merits a brief reconsideration. The five-part structure of the exoteric message of the Declaration, human equality, inalienable rights, the pursuit of happiness, the consent of the governed, and the justification associated with the overthrow of the government, make up the crux of the face-value message of the Declaration. That message is that it is a mandate of justice and a natural right of humanity to overthrow an unjust state of governance that denies the aforementioned rights to its members. Therefore, justification for independence becomes the exoteric message of the Declaration.

The time-independent paradigm of analysis that is most prevalent throughout the text is political, with a smattering of religious sentiment to validate the revolt against the denial of the aforementioned rights, a smattering intended for the benefit of all as a metaphysical support for the desired action: God wills it. The least evident, yet most impacting, reason for the revolt deals with the injustices of economics. In the Declaration there are six places where economic concepts are considered as impacting reasons for the revolution; the king of England’s refusal to pass laws that would encourage migrations and the subsequent increase on his behalf of “the conditions for the new appropriations of land” (Adler, 1987, p. 167), the dependency of judges on the king for their payment of salaries, the negative effect that the king generates in controlling and cutting off trade with other nations, the imposition of taxes without consent or representation, and the colonies’ ability, once independent, to establish commerce, and finally, a pledge: to have these and other grievances redressed they “mutually pledge to each other [their] lives, [their] fortunes, and [their] sacred honor” (Adler, 1987, p. 169).
This burning fervor, associated with the unfair actions relative to the economic conditions based on the mandated protocols of the British crown just prior to the American revolution, is hidden esoterically within the text of a series of works during this time period, including the Declaration, and, demonstrated historically by the aforementioned economic protocols and restrictions generated by the British crown which included not furnishing enough coin to be able to purchase goods and services from without the colonies save for those from England. Further restrictions include not allowing the colonies to mint their own coin, trade with other countries, and print paper money. Add to these injustices an increase in taxes without the inclusion of a voice in the British government to represent the colonies’ interests and one has the economic conditions that historically support the revolution. There is no absence of the interpretive paradigm of economics from the discourse of the text. However, it is an interesting fact that the paradigm is only mentioned three times, once for a restriction by the England on trade, then again as has been stated for imposition of taxes and finally towards the end of the Declaration we see that part of the freedoms sought by the separation from England is the establishment of commerce. It would be illogical not to include in the Declaration some mention of this paradigm, since a successful economic condition is imperative for the success of any new nation. But to only mention it three times is indicative of the overpowering effect of the political paradigm vis-à-vis the Declaration. The research does not see any reasoning for the economic conditions to be so diminished in impact from the wording of the Declaration. The impetus towards a reaction from England relative to the subject of revolution was being fuelled during this period, inclusive of all interpretive paradigms, by Tom Paine, whose words gave much attention to the causes of the revolution. Therefore, the research cannot see any historical support for the restrictive use of the economic paradigm from the text (Paine, 2009; The Colonial Economy, 2009).
There are a series of general assumptions evident in the text of the Declaration. The reader is supposedly able to understand the language of a scholar-citizen of the period, a language well versed in the concepts of justice, natural rights theory, and the Aristotelian concept of happiness as a pursuit that is inherent in the nature of man. Therefore, the instrument assumes that the reader is one of the educated gentry and not a common man of the frontier, for nowhere in the instrument is there a leveling of language towards what was then known to be the state of educational acuity of the common man, which was that he or she was almost illiterate as shown above (Rudolph, 1965).

The text of the Declaration is declarative in its content and intent. It poses no questions; it stipulates a resolve to action and delineates the reasons for the action, which is separation from the British crown and the establishment of a country formulated upon a series of principles as a union of individual sovereign states, states that would later be ratified into a union by its representatives. This is expected of a document that is not asking for support for a decision but stating that the decision has already been made, describing the causes of injury that have led it to the action, and giving the metaphysical and physical support that it depends on to justify the subsequent action of rebellion.

In a sense the document gives answers to questions that are subliminally posed from a lower-and higher-order perspective. The statements in the Declaration are therefore answers to questions that its reader envisions after the fact. The research showed that the particular lower-order questions dealing with who, where, when, and what, are evidently answered in the instrument. It tells us who is injured: one people that need to dissolve political association with another nation so they can attain separate but equal station amongst others as entitled by God. The where, or geographic position is simple: America, the colonies, and England. This also
supplies us with the who of the entanglement with greater clarity, to some extent relative at least to who the people were. The when of the action is written prior to the first paragraph of the Declaration as July 4, 1776. The time, place, and people declared and their political and administrative positions stated in the same paragraph, the Declaration then turns to responding to its higher-order questions, which focus on the why and how of the matter. It is interesting that through the use of breaches of natural rights and accusations of cruelty to intellectual reason and common sense, the Declaration shows a method of answering the meat of what is wrong, associated with why the rebellion is justified; through the persistent addition of reasons that associate the action of the sovereign with breaches of ethics, natural rights, and the law of God, the Enlightenment is negated by the actions of the sovereign. The how of the rebellion is evident in the last lines of the Declaration where the signers, as was stated earlier, mutually pledge to each other their “lives, [their] fortunes, and [their] sacred honor” (Adler, 1987, p. 169). This is a declaration of war as much as one of independence, for the signers are signing their lives and their fortunes onto the success of their enterprise upon their honor and with the belief that God is on their side. The types of questions missing from the text vis-à-vis the answers that are evident are questions that would position the responses from the British perspective. No answers are evident from the British, so no questions generated can be seen as objective, for no representative of the offending sovereign has been given a chance to respond, save the few times that the authors of the Declaration have themselves stated the responses, and those have been negative ones, which from a research perspective denies objectivity in the responses.

From a purely analytic perspective associated with assessments generated by the authors of the Declaration, there are no questions that can be seen as associated de facto with the discourse. The methodology that the research has generated as an addendum to that paucity is
only shown as a hypothetical conjecture dependent on the opinion of the reader for its impact. It is intended as only an opinion that may bear some clarifying fruit for the reader; to that end the research has generated the following lower-order to higher-order ratio based on the fact that the declarative statements in the Declaration, as has been stated above, are all loaded with ethical and natural right implications that taint them as opinion that can be mined for reasons, albeit reasons that generate a one-side response, but reasons of what ought to have happened, which are implied esoterically within the addendums to the declarative statements. Therefore, the overall ratio is as follows: there are 27 declarations of fact associated with lower-order cognitive processes, each associated with subject matter attached that give ‘ought’- type reasons of a negative nature, and three purely declarative statements of who the parties to the dispute are, when the dispute is occurring or has occurred, and where it is occurring or has occurred. If we accept the premise of the ‘ought’ perspective as elevating the questions associated with the reasons for grievance to higher-order processes, then the ratio is seen as one lower-order question to 27 higher-order questions.

**Overall criticality in the Declaration of Independence.** Therefore, besides the face value or exoteric analysis of the questions as prima facie lower-order types, all that is demonstrated is the American perspective. In such a case no criticality is evident in the text of the Declaration that is constructively fair, for the other side has not been given a chance to respond in kind and therefore no evidence that the response is veridical can be attained. Furthermore, if one considers that the declarative statements all generate, with the three exceptions noted, opinions that are given credence or supported as veridical by philosophical implications, then the results of the analysis can only show that the instrument under consideration is not critically objective. Regardless of the historical actions that caused the separation of the two parties to the dispute, no
oral or written responses are shown except grievous ones selected by the Declaration’s authors and that is, as has been stated, an unbalanced perspective that lacks criticality (Adler, 1987). It is imperative that one understand the implication relative to the Declaration having more than one author, for it was edited after Thomas Jefferson’s initial draft was turned over to the likes of John Adams and Benjamin Franklin. In reviewing the original instrument, one sees that the effect of the editing on Jefferson’s work was evident and upsetting to the original author. This can be seen by the fact that Jefferson published a line-by-line comparison of his original Declaration with what was accepted by the founders and later published as the final product. An analysis of the differences between the original document and the final text demonstrates a shift that denies a critical mindset being associated with the original, a negative criticality but a criticality just the same. Examples of this shift can be seen in the following textual differences between Jefferson’s work and the final draft of the Declaration. In the second paragraph of the Declaration, Jefferson had originally included the terms inherent and inalienable relative to the rights of man; the changes in the document eliminated the concept of inherent. Later on in the paragraph Jefferson had included words that mentioned the time period of revolution as a distinguished period; this comment was also eliminated from the final product. Further changes include the following substitutions, obstructed for suffered, colonies for states, us for these our states. Aside from these individual word changes, entire paragraphs, whose essence were critical and incendiary to say the least, have been eliminated from the Declaration. The central question associated with these excluded paragraphs, which included religious connotations of assuredness relative to the need for separation and independence, is why should this revolution be done at all? This research will give a perspective on this in the next chapter (Peterson, 1970).
The Constitution of the United States. The second text that the research analyzed for criticality and curricular content was the Constitution of the United States. An analysis of the Constitution of the United States that focuses on the ethics implied and overtly stated in the instrument needs to begin with a basic introduction that allows for certain particular premises to be understood. It is imperative that one come to grips with the fact that until the Constitution was ratified, there were no United States as we know them. Furthermore, one must understand that the Constitution’s most important impact on the lives of the people that it addressed was that it turned them from subjects to citizens, from subjects of a king to citizens of a republic, not citizens of a democracy (Adler, 1987).

It is therefore very important to understand what the concept of goodness is in relation to the idea of a republic and the responsibilities implied relative to such a concept vis-à-vis the citizen of that republic. The idea of goodness from the perspective of a republic and its citizens, when the republic is a federal one, as in the case of the American republic, is first seen in the Preamble to the Constitution, where the mention is of a more perfect union. This is seen as a goodness because the elimination of the despotic nature of the sovereign over the subjects can be considered as beneficial if the subjects themselves perfect their union as a people by electing others to govern for them and in such a way govern themselves by choice, and in that action become a people, not a group of subjects. Therefore, the first goodness, the one that makes the union more perfect, is one of surrendering the sovereignty of the individual states for the sake of the benefit of self-rule. Ironically, within the states this ‘self-rule’ will be administered by others (Adler, 1987). However, those others are to be appointed by those who relinquished the sovereignty, but it is in that action, one of choice, that the act of self-determination can be seen as the ethical act of goodness. This is important, for to see these concepts in action would allow
us to define the term best relative to the concept of an ethic. Therefore let us see the results that the analytic tool generated in regards to this action-based definitional perspective within the Constitution.

*The ethical analysis.* The first focus of the tool of analysis is the ethical perspective inherent in the text under consideration. The first question that the ethical analysis asks requires a definition of goodness as implied in the discourse. This conceptualization of goodness is associated with an action based system whose focal end is a moral end. Therefore, goodness is a moral end associated with an action that is implied or overtly stated, to be needed in order to attain that moral end. In essence, the research is asking, what is the good action that is implied in the text? In the Preamble to the Constitution, the idea of goodness is exemplified by the concept of the general welfare. As Adler (1987) states:

> Any interpretation of the meaning of the phrase had to satisfy two requirements …as an element in the common or public good that the government was being created to serve directly …[and] as a means to the pursuit of happiness—the ultimate end to be achieved by a just and benevolent government. (p. 115)

Further evidence of this intention can be ascertained from John Locke, as cited in Kurland and Lerner (1987), where he states that

> though Men when they enter into Society, give up the Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power they had in the State of Nature, into the hands of the Society, to be so far disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of the Society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and Property; (For no rational Creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the Society, or *Legislative* constituted by them, can
never be suppos'd to extend farther than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one’s Property by providing against those three defects above-mentioned, that made the State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie. (Vol 2, p.1)

Here the evidence suggests that the good of society can only be attained by the surrendering of the individual rights that members of that society enjoyed in their natural state of existence. The definitional construct of goodness is shown as a sacrifice of the individual for the sake of the society. In turn the commonwealth of the society, the goodness of the whole, is to be controlled by laws that are known to the membership and that are adjudicated in regards to redress for public offenses, by impartial judges (Kurland & Lerner, 1987). It is important to note that the Preamble to the Constitution is the central repository of the ethical perspective and of a great deal of the assumptive language inherent in the Constitution.

The best way to see the results of the first three questions of the research tool’s ethical analysis –which look for the definition of the good, the existence of assumptive language, and the focus of that language –is to translate these three questions into two basic interrogatories associated with the Preamble. These two interrogatories are: How does the Preamble define the general welfare, and how does that welfare differ, if it differs, from the public good? The research shows the following systemic result. The general welfare is defined by Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the American republic, as a combination of the four major clauses of the Preamble to the Constitution with an economic catalyst. This catalyst can be seen in his 1791 Report on Manufactures written while he was Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, where he states that “the National Legislature has express authority “to lay and collect taxes …and …provide for the …general welfare” (Adler, 1987, p. 118). That is to say, that justice, domestic tranquility, a common defense, and liberty need to be united with the
economic capacity to produce capital in order for it to be considered the definition of the general welfare. In essence, Hamilton is stating that the general welfare is one that will allow for the development of the common good, albeit one that will also depend on the government’s facilitating what the citizens cannot facilitate for themselves through taxes and in so doing aid in providing for the common good through this association of the people and the economic system.

This development will in turn indirectly allow for citizens to pursue Hamilton’s idea of happiness, an idea that is seen as the focal shift from a philosophically Aristotelian perspective of intrinsic happiness vis-à-vis intellectual pursuit, to an economically-founded one that equates the acquisition of capital with happiness. It is important to note that Hamilton did not imply that all citizens were to be included in this pursuit, only those that could afford it. This implication and its economic consequences, which excluded the majority of the population from the pursuit of happiness under this definitional construct, stayed in play in the American cultural mêlée until the 1930s, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt began to generate economic policies to bring “the forgotten man” into the economy (Adler, 1987).

Continuing the ethical analysis, we find that in viewing the text for a definitional perspective vis-à-vis Israel Scheffler’s definitional construct, the text is evolutional. That is to say that the ethical descriptors begin by generating a stipulative result, a result that will solve the issues at hand at the moment that it is being considered historically. But it is also a programmatic evolving definition, for Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, and the other architects of the text see the Constitution as an ethical and systematic program associated with a specific phenomenon that they wish to see eliminated, the oppression of a people by a governmental structure. However, there is a further question that the ethical analysis asked of the Constitution, and that is this: if a programmatic position was inherent in the discourses, was the program based on ethics, power,
or culture? It is evident from the language of the Constitution that it is an instrument bent on the preservation of a specific political and governmental structure. It is further evident that the language it uses to attain that political and governmental structure is one that focuses on combining the three concepts mentioned.

The Constitutional language focuses on an ethic as a system of action to attain a moral end. That moral end is the combination of the five central concepts inherent in the Preamble to the Constitution: justice, domestic tranquility, the common defense, liberty, and the general welfare. To attain this ethic, the Constitution sets out a series of didactic statements that are intended to maintain power in the hands of the people, and in so doing develop a culture for the new United States. That culture and its power are combined in the concept of the general welfare and how it attains the public good.

In the case of the new nation, at least in the eyes of Alexander Hamilton, this was to be viewed from the perspective of economic power and its accumulation. This accumulation would allow the United States to shift from an agricultural economy, which was not seen by Hamilton as progressive, to an industrial one, which he saw as capable of competing in the future with other nation states. It is, however, a program that was federally empowering and individually restricted to the members of the polity who could afford to be players in the economic conditions that would allow for that shift (Adler, 1987). Further evidence that the concept of restricted membership was evident on both the Republican and Federal sides of the Constitutional ideology can be seen in James Madison’s Federalist 10, where he states that the best methodology for governance is the election of representatives to the government as a cure for factions being generated and overcoming reason in government. Furthermore, he states that pure democracies are not capable of generating
longevity and equality but that instead

Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. (Kurland & Lerner, 1987, Vol. 1, p. 129)

This is ironic, since by electing representatives the governance of the polity was to be based on the ability of a learned and landed factional group to represent the common man and in turn guarantee the benefits of a prolonged and safe environment for that representative democracy to exist (Adler, 1987; Diamond, 1959; Kurland & Lerner, 1987). Repeatedly the Constitutional language focuses on an ethic of action that is based on the ability of the learned to demonstrate to future and present constituencies that they, the landed and elected representatives, were the best leaders of the people and the republic. Not to think in such a fashion was contrary to the ethic of existence associated with the maintenance and survival of the American republic. Once the perspective of representative government had been rationalized as the best method for the perpetuation of the American democracy, the language of the Constitution becomes more didactic and behavior oriented. It begins to focus on a more grandiose perspective such as the right to revolution as seen in James Madison’s Federalist 40, where words associated with the framing of a national government for the good of the union are used and 46 where Madison again focuses on attempting to “enquire whether the Federal Government or the State Governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people” (Kurland & Lerner, 1987, Vol. 1, p. 279). It then continues to discuss this perspective on the right to govern as resolutely depending on understanding that
the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone; and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth no less than decency requires, that the event in every case, should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents. (Kurland & Lerner, 1987, Vol 1, p.279)

However, it needs to be reiterated that the intent of the founders, when saying “we the people,” is to be understood as “we” the representatives of the people, or as Madison ironically calls them above, the common constituents. The next analysis brings us to a closer understanding of the effect and definition of power relative to the Constitution. This is done through further consideration of a perspective that associates the concepts mentioned above with an action system and the attainment of specific goals, as can be seen in the Constitutional language associated with power. This was synthesized through the tool’s questions on the concept.

**The analysis of power.** The first question associated with the concept of power is a declaration of the definitional construct generated by the research tool relative to the subjects, the persons or objects, phenomena or nuomena, of the text. Within that environment, the Constitution and the first 12 Amendments which were composed during the time period between the 1787 and 1804, we find that the word “power” itself is mentioned 18 times. Within those instances the definitional construct is one that associates power with authority throughout the document. This definition is declaratively stated throughout the text, and is meant to show the authority to control physical human processes as well as cognitive processes. Examples can be seen in Article One, where the power or authority to impeach rests in the hands of the Congress, as does taxation, defense, duties, excises, etc. Within this article we again see the unification of
an ethical perspective and the concept of the people, for in it we read that Congress will have the authority to provide the general welfare, and within that construct the “people” are the Congress, or with greater clarity, the membership of the Congress is the people. This can be seen clearly in the article’s statement that power is to be granted to a legislature and as such it is vested in the Congress as representatives of the people. In a sense, the membership of the Congress is stating that the law of the land will allow them to rule the land for the people, that is, for themselves. So the instrument of authority that is supposed to be clearly an exoteric declaration of the law of the land, which was caused by a rejection of autocratic control, is to be based on the selection of a few to rule the many, with their approval. However, any oversight associated with the membership of the few, overstepping or returning to the rule of the past historical situation, vis-à-vis an autocracy, is only capable of being policed, impeached, by the governing body itself. Therefore, the control of actions and thoughts is now legally entrenched in the hands of the elected few. It is interesting to note that nowhere in the discourses of the text is power associated with educational methods or curricula. The Constitution is interestingly silent on the subject of education. However, as Kurland and Lerner (1987) have shown, the extent of classical knowledge needed to understand the message and intent of the Constitution is vast and focuses on a classical curriculum that extends from an assumption of knowledge of the Roman orators to the classical political theories of Montesquieu and Hobbs, to name but a few. One needs to simply look at the Federalist Papers to see how much Roman political and governmental theory is entrenched in the assumption of knowledge associated with the texts under consideration (Adler, 1987; Bailyn, 1967; Diamond, 1959; Richard, 1995; Winterer, 2002).

Extending the analysis of power to the second article of the Constitution, we find that power is now discussed and defined further as the authority of the President to grant reprieves,
make treaties, and fill vacancies. This extends the concept of authority, and does so without an oversight, except of course the oversight power of the Congress, which is a body designed and populated by “the people,” a group of white landowners, resident subjects of the previous colonies of England in America, who with few exceptions had all been educated at the nine founding colleges of New England (Rudolph, 1962, 1978; Winterer, 2002). Therefore, we see that the result of this particular inculcation of power is maintenance of authority within the body of the Congress.

Article Three of the Constitution focuses the power or authority of the government’s national law on declaring what specific cases in law are in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the land. This article defines this as all cases in law and equity as well as acts of treason. Here we see the power of interpretation of all cases of law, albeit relative to the Constitution, as well as legal recourse associated with acts of treason, put in the hands of a group of nine individuals who ironically are selected by the general manager of the nation, the President, and whom need to be approved by a majority of the Congress. Therefore, we see that decisions relative to punishments for infractions against the laws established by the Congress are to be in the hands of a membership selected by the President and approved by the same people who generated the laws, a flawless cycle of functional maintenance with no room for any interpretation but itself (Adler, 1987).

Article Four of the Constitution focuses within Section Four and Five on the power to eliminate or make all rules that are considered as needful in relation to property and territory of the United States. It further grants authority to the federal government upon application from the legislative body of the state, or the executive if the legislature cannot be convened, to interfere in any acts of domestic violence within the state (Adler, 1987). Here the power or authority to
interfere in actions that endanger the membership’s real property is seen as indispensable. Evidence of this exigency can be seen in the proviso of allowing the executive of the state to make the request as binding as if the legislature had generated the request of the federal government. The idea of urgency associated with the endangered real property is evidence of the indispensible need for this authority; it is this authority that defends the People as a landed aristocracy endangered from without.

Amended Article Ten of the Constitution focuses its language concerning power on the concept of delegated powers and their absence from the text. It reads that any powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by the instrument are to be reserved for the states, or for the people. Now in this particular case the language of power at first seems to be very republican in its basis. The absence of an authority, or the lack of its being denied by the instrument, allows a power to be kept in the hands of the individual states. However, if the definition that we have discovered of the meaning of the words the People is to be taken into consideration, then the effect is that the authority, it can be argued, is in the hands of the representatives of the people and not the individual states. For, it is undeniable, and explicit, that the governmental structure of the United States is a republic, and as such a representative one where, as we have stated above, the People are the landed gentry who are the representatives of the masses. Therefore, power is not diffused to the states or to the common man regardless of the wording used (Adler, 1987).

The next article that mentions power in the Constitution is amended Article Eleven. In the opinion of this researcher, this is the most enigmatic article within the Constitution, since exoterically it shows a greater consideration for the citizenry than for the interpreted definition of the People. In essence it reads that the judicial authority of the United States cannot extend to
lawsuits for or against a state by citizens of that state, another state, nor of or a foreign country. It allows for a true separation of powers between state and federal entity by denying legal interference in those cases, including cases of equity (Adler, 1987).

Questions four, five, and six of the research, also relative to the analysis of power, focus on issues of education. Question four asks whether within the text under consideration power is associated with educational methods or a curriculum. The exoteric message that the Constitution focus on is one of power as authority and from that perspective historically, the entire Constitution can be seen as a programmatic curriculum. The analysis of the pedagogical technique inherent in the Constitution shows that the text is a didactic and declarative one. It shows both rewards and punishments, and it declares the uses of and restrictions associated with power as authority to act in a way that is acceptable to the authors of the text. That is, the Constitution, exoterically, teaches us what we can and cannot do and declares that emphatically.

Most, if not all, of the instrument focuses on lower-order cognitive processes that concern who, what, where, and when. The results do show a higher-order thinking process associated with the instrument, but only within the context of answering for the reader the methods for the solving regressions from the standard plan of action. Therefore, the instrument answers for the reader certain questions on how things will be done or dealt with. There is no evidence to support that the subject, the individual reader, is seen as a being ontologically becoming or evolving educationally; rather the reader is viewed as perpetually the same. Nowhere is there any mention of the possibility for change relative to our definition of power. That definition reads as power being the ability to use a knowledge base freely in order to attain an authenticity that liberates a subject from sectarian and inauthentic interpretations of acceptability and self-discovery. When we combine this definition with the definition for authority that the research developed, which
reads as the ability to generate an authentic and socially acceptable enforceable action where, authority is the ability to generate an action that is socially accepted and enforceable by some agency, and whose genesis is found in the individual existential act of self-discovery, we see that the essence of an ontological and free authentic development is not part of the didactic and declarative base of the Constitution. Therefore, no individual educational evolution or authentic development of the individual as a part of the process is shown in the text. As such, the subject, the individual reader, is not seen as a text that is allowed to write itself authentically in the joint venture between itself and the Constitution, but is shown as a paradigmatically enclosed and functionally restricted member of the polity. That is, the reader is being told what his or her rights are within the state structure from a federal and state perspective, how they will be protected as a member of the polity, what those protections involve, and what will occur if any member of the polity, individual or state, does not adhere to the provisions set up in the text.

The analysis of content and declarative knowledge. The textual analysis of the Constitution shows that the exoteric or face-value message of the text is one based on setting a paradigm for the authority of the hegemonic structure of the new nation. Throughout the text we see the verbiage of authoritative structure in a declarative form that, as has been mentioned, is didactic and functionally based; that is, it is intended to set the citizen into a uniform pattern of action that does not allow for any criticality towards the essential elements of the text. Instead, the Constitution focuses on the development of that functionality as a stipulation to citizenship and to the membership of that citizenry in the hegemonic structure of the polity. Examples can be seen by the parameters that restrict membership and consideration relative to the citizenry in Congress as well as for the office of the Presidency and Vice-Presidency. Further restrictions associated with lengths of tenure in office and taxation, as well as issues that allow for the
federal appropriation of property as well as other cases, demonstrate this principle of acquiescence to the function of the paradigm and the reproduction of a membership that will accept that acquiescence (Adler, 1987). Thus we can see that the exercise of power through the creation of acquiescence in the citizen is the guiding principle underlying the curriculum and its assessments.

The research shows that amongst the three time-independent paradigms of analysis, religion, economics, and politics, the most prevalent focus is on the concept or concepts associated with political power. The wording of the instrument is loaded with this focal perspective associated with the traditional conception of power as authority. The entire instrument is focusing on perpetuating the authority of the federal government relative to the association of the states as a union. The amount of evidence to the end mentioned above is so great that it is in essence self-evident. The more interesting result relative to this and its consequent question—what is the least evident paradigm of interpretation—is to be seen in the fact that the next two interpretive paradigms are used in the following descending order, economics and then religion. The text focuses on questions of economic conditions relative to the authority of certain actions and the needs that those conditions generate such as the need for taxation associated with the formation of a militia. However, religion is used only once and that is in the First Amendment to the Constitution, where the right to religious choice is venerated and protected by the federal government. It is interesting that a group that uses the concept of natural right as a cause for their actions consistently and God as a representative generator for their actions mentions an aspect of godliness only once in the foundational text of their polity. The next question the research asked about the text was whether there was historical support for the absence of the paradigm in the text. The historical research showed that social prejudice that
occurred prior to the writing of the Constitution--fear of autocratic manifestation associated with some focal religiosity--was esoterically ever-present in the Constitution and exoterically written in the Declaration. This is seen in the conjunction between the Declaration and the Constitution, specifically in the first paragraph to the Declaration and the Preamble to the Constitution. There one sees the foundational principles associated with these prejudices as fears that needed to be eradicated for the sake of the future of the republic by these men who signed one or both of these documents. These men who were all children of the Enlightenment were also children of the reason for the founding of the original colonies, and that reason was without equivocation religious. The religious concept associated with freedom and economics, as well as the idea that only a Christian religion was to be included in the new republic, was evident from all perspectives that were associated with the negation of popery and the invocation of the natural-rights theory of the Enlightenment.

These concepts as well as the need for an established ethical system would, in the minds of the founders, help maintain and develop the republic. This thought can be heard in the voice of Benjamin Rush, one of the republic’s founders and a signer of the Declaration, when he states that

Such is my veneration for every religion that reveals the attributes of the Deity, or a future state of rewards and punishments, that I rather see the opinions of Confucius or Mohammed inculcated upon our youth than see them grow up wholly devoid of a system of religious principles. But the religion I mean to recommend in this place is the religion of Jesus Christ. …further on he states] A Christian cannot fail to be a republican …the Old Testament, is the best refutation that can be given to the divine right of kings and the strongest argument that can be used in favor of the original and natural equality of all
mankind. A Christian, I say again, cannot fail of being a republican, for every precept of the Gospel inculcates those degrees of humility, self-denial, and brotherly kindness which are directly opposed to the pride of monarchy and the pageantry of a court. (Rudolph, 1965, pp. 10-11)

Further evidence of this ethical association with religion and republican ideals can be seen in the countless times that the founders used the concepts of duty, honor, and God in their parlance. Furthermore, let us not forget that these men but with few exceptions were all educated at the nine founding colleges of the American colonies, colleges that all had a strong relationship to Christian denominations and that included in their curricula not just the languages of the Bible but the development of Christian men. These colleges, which later turned into universities, also based their pedagogies and curricula on the development of administrative personnel for the colonies, and these founders of the republic were the result of these perspectives in conjunction with the Enlightenment perspectives previously mentioned. Evidence can be seen in the opening paragraph of the Declaration, where the reason for the separation of ‘the People’ from England is seen in the “separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitles them” (Adler, 1987, p. 35). Here the venerated decision is based on the natural right to be free as generated by the word of nature’s God and as such it is considered ethical and republican. Therefore, religion is mentioned, but only as the foundational and reasoning causal principle to action in both the Declaration and in the Constitution. Subsequent materials in the Constitution, aside from the mention of the “blessings of liberty” are devoid of any mention of religion exoterically, but esoterically, due to the aforementioned reasoning, the entire structure is connected to the religious principles of nature’s God (Adler, 1987). Therefore, the assumptions evident in the text are that the readers have come to an understanding of the impact of the
Enlightenment philosophy in conjunction with the religious principles of Christianity. Further assumptions are to be found in the belief structure of the message of the Constitution, which is that the readers are all in accord and support the message of separation from England and union with each other to formulate a new nation under the rules and regulations that it enumerates. This assumptive wording was in urgent need of support and that is seen from the fact that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote a series of pamphlets in order to convince the residents of New York of the benefits of the federal Constitution, pamphlets called later by the title *The Federalist Papers* (Hamilton et al., 1937).

**Overall criticality in the Constitution.** The Constitution as a text is, as has been stated, based purely on declarative knowledge and focuses on lower-order thinking that centers on the concepts of who, what, where, and when. Therefore, there are no higher-order questions on the text, just declarations of principles of action and responses or consequences to rejections of the rules that guide the actions of the citizenry. That is, the ratio of lower-to higher-order questions is 100 to 0.

These two texts, the *Declaration of Independence* and the *Constitution of the United States*, have shown us from a hermeneutic perspective that they are in essence a catalyst for the intellectual perspective to follow during the third focal era that the analytic tool focused on, the modern period covering the 20th and 21st century to date. The catalytic impetus, based on a shifting of emphasis from the maintenance of a cultural perspective to a shift in the focus of that perspective, is evident in the amalgamation of ideologies that can be seen in the texts of the Revolutionary period. These ideological perspectives, based on the philosophical principles of the Enlightenment and the Reformation, gave impetus to a duality of education that exoterically was shunned but esoterically perpetuated through the selective system of admissions and
curricula that existed in the institutions of higher education where the founding fathers learned their administrative craft. These curricula and pedagogies, as well as the selective admissions mentioned, show a great divergence in the capacity for the creation of a critical-thinking citizenry, a capacity that is greater than that of the public land-grant universities that opened in the mid-1800s and that still exist today (Cousins, 1958; Hoeveler, 2002; Lerner, 1987; Richard, 1995; Rudolph, 1978). To see this differential effect in the modern period relative to the general citizenry, with the understanding that the general citizenry is mandated to attend secondary school, the study turned to an analysis of the most prevalent texts in use for the education of the citizenry and focused on a sample of the population, the high-school students of Illinois.

The Modern Period

The analysis of the modern period focused on the epoch from 1900 to the present. It looked at two seminal texts, Magruder’s *American Government* (1921) and the *Illinois Handbook of Government* (2009), which are being used to educate citizens in the United States, including high-school students in the state of Illinois.

*Magruder’s American Government.* The undisputed standard for the teaching of American government to high school students in the United States is Magruder’s *American Government*. Walker (2002) reports that the text was first published in 1917 and held a 70% share of the market for sales of texts used in government classes until 2002, giving it an 85-year tenure. This text is still the preferred selection among school districts, with some relatively small changes in textual choice in the state of Illinois (Mike Gouch, personal communication, Oct 4, 2010). The original author, Frank Abbott Magruder, taught at Oregon Agricultural College and Princeton University and maintained control of the editions until he turned the editorship over to William A. McClenaghan, “a professor emeritus at Oregon State University” (Walker, 2002,
Using the state of Illinois, with its more than 800 school districts, as a sample of the national population is an effective method for having a reliable source for the research analysis. Furthermore, an estimated 70%, or approximately 608 schools, of the 869 high schools in Illinois are using Magruder’s text in their government classes, so including the book as part of the analysis seems valid (schooltree.org, 2010). The analysis also reviewed The *Illinois Handbook of Government* (2009) due to the fact that it is used extensively within government classes to supplement the Magruder text in Illinois (Mike Gouch, personal communication, Oct 4, 2010). The analysis also compared the Magruder 1921 edition of the work with the 2002 edition in order to see whether there were any changes in the assessment of general content of the material presented.

**Hermeneutic analysis.** The hermeneutic analysis of Magruder’s text followed the same path of questioning that was used with the previous texts, focusing on ethical, power and declarative and content-based inquiries. The overall criticality inherent or missing from the texts was then reported based on the results of the questions. Further analysis was done due to the assessment protocols that were available within Magruder’s texts. However, the *Handbook of Illinois Government* did not include any assessment protocols, so only a strict hermeneutic analysis was generated for that text.

**The ethical analysis.** In Magruder’s 1921 text, the definition of goodness is associated with four declarative and functional aims: the responsibility of a future citizen to help develop better government, the understanding of the social development of the state as developing from the needs of changing conditions, the ability to show and understand the actual operation of the three levels of government--national, state, and local--and their infrastructures, and the clarification of the persuasive impact of the judiciary, and to present the social-political
problems of the day. However, the ethical perspective as designed by this research focuses on that same citizen’s ability to understand goodness not just as a functional civic and paradigmatically set method of understanding, but as the result of any action that helps the self and others to live a beautiful existence. Included in this perspective is the understanding that beauty is the creation of a phenomenon that allows the self and others to attain a natural state of euphoria, a sublime sensation of awe. That sentiment must come to being where existence is seen as the active construction, or ethic, of a daily life beyond survival and the acceptance of mediocrity. In this case the citizen becomes engaged and takes ownership through an understanding of the fact that mediocrity is the acceptance of, and acquiescence to, a non-constructive and non-critical thinking process. Within Magruder’s original text, at least through the time that he had authorial control of the work between 1917 and 1949, the ideas represented include a critical perspective as seen in the extension of the title of his work which included the phrase ‘with a consideration of the problems of democracy’ (Magruder, 1921, p. iv). It is interesting to note that the text was considered anti-American and removed from use in certain states due to the negative effects of the McCarthy hearings in Congress on anti-American activities. Specifically, this can be seen from the fact that

During the Joseph McCarthy era after World War II . . . a number of conservative critics, notably Lucille Cardin Crain and Allen Zoll, called for the book’s removal from schools because of its allegedly procommunist stance. Crain’s attacks appeared in the

*Educational Reviewer*, a quarterly newsletter published by the Conference of American Small Business Organizations. Zoll assailed the book in privately issued pamphlets. The criticisms of Crain, Zoll, and others included charges that the textbook promoted communism by endorsing the United Nations Charter and by referring to the U.S. Post
Office as a practical example of socialist policy. As a result, the book was removed from schools in Georgia, Texas, and Arkansas and was the target of pressure in several other states. (The Work, 2010)

The impact during the time under consideration was great enough to affect sales and usage as demonstrated by the removal of the text from the above three states in the post-World War II era. From that perspective, any suggestion of civic responsibility and goodness, as defined by our research tool, would undoubtedly also have been considered as subversive to the security of the state.

After the authorial and editorial shift from Magruder to his protégé William A. McClenaghan, the text changed. Interestingly, the material that would focus the readers on those issues was largely de-emphasized by an action that can best be described as bulking up (Walker, 2002). In essence, due to the pressures of interest groups and others who wished to have their perspective represented in the tome, as shown by user polls, the material that was added to the text was American by social acclamation and acceptance. Also, it did not replace older material but instead was added to the work on a year-to-year basis, making the work reach over eight hundred pages with a weight of over six pounds (Walker, 2002).

In this way, the text grew not in a creatively developmental cognitive fashion, but in sheer bulk as a response to fear of market loss and unacceptability by the decision-making membership of the republic. The majority of what was added to the text was declarative in its content (Walker, 2002). In essence, the increased inclusion of stipulative definitional perspectives, as defined by Scheffler (1960), generated insertion of material within the work based on an acquiescence to fear of market share loss within a “$4.5 billion dollar business’’
(Walker, 2002, para. 2). In summary, ideas associated with the problems of democracy, and a critical perspective on the republic, were de-emphasized.

The majority of the textual discourses associated with an ethical perspective, as described above, assume an interest in civic responsibility associated with an almost religious reverence. This can be seen in the chapter titles and in the way the material is presented in Magruder’s 1921 edition, which begins with the importance of government and end with the description in chapter XXIX of social legislation, which shows an incredible reverence for the polity as an instrument of social justice and empowerment, a reverence sadly missing in the post-1948 editions. Magruder’s 1921 edition also includes a chapter on civil rights, to which he dedicates 10 pages; he also dedicates 18 pages to the previously-mentioned importance of government. Further chapter titles that are related to the concept of an ethic as an action-based system that is skills based and that could direct the civics student to attain a morally good end include Chapter XXVIII, which is focused on public education and encompasses 23 pages (Magruder, 1921).

In order to determine whether there was assumptive language in the textual discourses, the research focused on the three chapters mentioned above as well as on the Suggestions section of the appendices. This was done due to the fact that these particular chapters, by the nature of their content, are more related hermeneutically to higher-order thinking as well as to the thesis of the research at hand. Furthermore, the remaining chapters in the 1921 edition of Magruder’s American Government are focused on declarative content and were analyzed from that perspective.

For Magruder, the importance of government, an importance that implies the goodness of government, is based on the idea that individuals cannot singularly attain the same capacity to guarantee the goodness associated with the polity. Consequently, as he states, “government is
important because through cooperation we are able to maintain peace, security, justice, and public services more easily than if individuals acted singly” (Magruder, 1921, p. 1).

Furthermore, Magruder focuses his interpretation of importance, relative to government and its subsequent implied goodness, upon historical concepts—he describes the *Mayflower Compact* and connects its ideas of just and equal laws to submission and obedience for the sake of the body politic—and upon the need for economic taxation in order to be able to attain peace, security, justice, and public services. This is evident from the following statement written by Magruder in the 1921 edition, where he states that

> Each individual may not directly assist in maintaining peace, security, justice, and public services; but every person who has money to spend contributes his part toward the support of those who are employed to do the work [and that] the cost of government is borne by individuals through taxation. (pp. 1-2)

The concept of economic cost was eminent throughout the first chapter under analysis. This chapter includes sections on the cost of government, its increase as a natural phenomenon, the benefits associated within the expenditures inclusive of independence, protection of property from criminals, the maintenance of peace and order, the general protection of health, of life, as well as the care of the poor and the helpless, and the inculcation of free public education and the protection of public morals, to name but a few of the benefits associated with government and taxation (Magruder, 1921). The chapter also focuses on a more altruistic perspective of government that is akin to the concept of social justice in speaking of the protection of “the Poor against the Oppression of the wealthy” (Magruder, 1921, p. 15). However, this is also done from an economic perspective in that the example given for this protection is associated with price-
gouging and price wars generated by companies in different parts of the country without the consideration of the economic conditions of the inhabitants of the areas described.

The text of this particular chapter is not really assumptive in its wording; it does not assume the understanding of any technical or philosophic language that would restrict the understanding of the reader. However, as mentioned above, the focus of the language is the assimilation of the philosophical position of the importance of government as goodness with the economic need to maintain that goodness through taxation for the sake of social justice and the perpetuation of the polity. There is no doubt from this perspective that the definitional focus in regards to Scheffler’s (1960) work is programmatic. The combination of the political and governmental perspective with the economic hypothesis demonstrates the importance given to the philosophical concepts in the text. These concepts associated with the goodness of social justice and safety are without equivocation a combination associated with an ethical program, and therefore a programmatic construct, albeit one different from the definitional construct of this dissertation. In regards to the final question of the research associated with ethics relative to this chapter the results show that the programmatic structure of the definitional position is based on the development of a cultural ethics based on the idea that the importance of government makes it a goodness. That is that the need for government actions to secure certain benefits of the nation makes the exigencies, such as taxation, a needed good. Therefore, the emphasis is on the development of a culture of acquiescence to the importance of sacrifice for the sake of good government, a government that will focus its goodness on the ideals of safety and social justice.

The next chapter under analysis in the Magruder (1921) text was chapter XV, titled civil rights. Within it the author defines civil rights as follows:
The civil rights of an individual are all the legal rights he has except the right to vote and to hold office, which two rights are known as political rights. An individual has a right to do anything which is not prohibited by the laws of the land; but inasmuch as the laws of the land are continually changing, the individual’s rights are also continually changing. (p. 206)

The chapter continues to enumerate the ethical perspective of goodness as a right in regards to the Constitution of the United States, and follows the standard breakdown of the Constitution and its provisions, inclusive of the right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process and delineates the rights beyond the control of Congress or the individual states. It further discusses ten amendments to the constitution including religion, habeas corpus, and freedom of speech and the press. The chapter discusses concepts associated with social justice vis-à-vis the protection that the Constitution gives the citizenry. An example of this can be seen in its mention of a case in the state of Arizona where a law in 1914 provided that any company or individual that employs more than five persons must employ not less than 80 percent qualified voters or native-born citizens of the United States. This law was declared unconstitutional because its enforcement would have discriminated against aliens and thus would have deprived them of the equal protection of the state’s laws. (Magruder, 1921, p. 210)

Therefore, the ethical perspective found within this chapter can be summarized as one focused upon law and social justice generating a goodness based on fairness to all under the protection of the law.

Assumptive language is evident in this chapter, since the reader needs to have a certain understanding of legal parlance to be able to get the most from the information given. However,
the author does explain the points of law and any Latin terms used with examples and cross-references to aid the high school reader. The focus of the language in the chapter is the legalities associated with the civil rights of an individual and the responsibilities that the national government has towards the protection of those rights. The chapter also focuses on what the national and state governments do not have the right to do vis-à-vis the individual rights of the citizen in regards to the Constitution.

The definitional perspective inherent in the language of the discourses is mainly descriptive, but the social justice program is evident throughout the chapter. Within this chapter the programmatic definitional position is based on developing an understanding of the ethics of social justice as part of the culture of the nation.

The third chapter under hermeneutic consideration in Magruder’s 1921 text is Chapter XXVIII, which focuses on the concept of public education. The chapter covers the subject with subtitles that span the breadth of the field from the history of elementary-school growth to secondary-school issues, and it even focuses on university and land-grant college education and curricula. The ethical perspective of this chapter is the idea of education as both an equalizer in relation to the need for cost-effective and optimal growth as a nation, and as a means to successful competition in relation to other countries; for example, Germany is mentioned in the chapter as a country in which industrial education results in great progress. With those concepts in the mix, the action-based ethic implied is one of education for industrial and agricultural efficiency. Throughout the chapter, the goodness associated with efficiency vis-à-vis education permeates the conversation as does the economic foundation and apportioning of that foundation for the development and continuance of the system. Therefore, the chapter demonstrates, in its ethical results-based focus, a functional perspective. It also shows an experiential pedagogic
belief in that it talks of practical methods of learning and on-the-job training as part of a
county’s education. Therefore, the good is practical, developmental, and experiential, while also
focused on greater production and a more efficient way of developing quality. The text’s
language throughout is one that considers the student and explains all definitions with a nice set
of examples. The focus of the language is loaded with economic and commercial tendencies that
show the focus as business centered and technologically or industrially driven. The definitional
perspective is programmatic and is based on the development of an economically-driven culture
that can be best served through an education that focuses on efficiency and practicality in both
agricultural and industrial settings. Education is seen as empowering society to develop a culture
of commercially efficient and competitively superior developers and consumers of the markets.

McClenaghan’s 2008 text varied greatly, hermeneutically speaking, from the 1921
edition relative to the definition of ethics. First, the 1921 edition covers 29 chapters over 417
pages; the 2008 edition covers 25 chapters over 746 pages. The content shift includes the
addition of sections on media, public opinion, and the respective technologies—for example,
radio, television, newspapers, and the internet—that affect the civic understanding of the citizen.

The majority of the language in the text is straightforward and explains the concepts
under consideration, but the language is more assumptive of previous knowledge than the 1921
edition. An example can be seen in the section on income tax, where the reader is assumed to
know the concept of a mortgage, a school loan, and other deductions, as well as the term
“deduction,” which is not explained well. Examples like this abound in the text and are too
numerous to list here. It is enough for the research to demonstrate the point with a few examples
such as the one that assumes that the reader will know what a Gallup poll is. The reader is told
what a poll is, but the techniques of that poll itself are not described; instead, general polling
processes are explained. Another assumption is that readers will understand the law of probability, which is discussed relative to reliability in polling. The description of the law includes the concept of an honest coin and an honest toss, both of which are not explained. The tendency continues throughout the text, and interestingly the text also controls assumptive effect by highlighting the words that the editors believe are of import in the work, giving us another future venue for the analysis of the paradigm that the ethics of the hegemony focus on.

A more important change is the focal shift in what determines “goodness” in political and governmental life. In the 1921 edition, the emphasis is on social justice, economic understanding, and basic declarative knowledge of the government’s structures, protocols, and texts. In the 2008 edition, the perspective is more declarative, and opinion is not as socially focused as in the 1921 tome. For example, throughout the 1921 edition Magruder states his opinion of the “good” and gives his reasons for his opinion, whether stating his belief that women need a different education than men because they are the mothers of the republic, or stating his opinion on the need for taxation as indispensable for a solid government to exist.

In addition to the shift in what determines goodness, the McClenaghan’s (2008) edition also adds extensive suggestions for increasing student understanding of declarative knowledge. The text’s exoteric emphasis on editorializing is minimal if present at all. However, the esoteric intent is evident in the pedagogies suggested for the actual study of the material by the plethora of experts that have been amassed prior to publication as reviewers and editors. There is an entire section that walks the student through using the text for, as the publisher states, “success.” These suggestions are stated as methods that will allow the student to “understand how our government works and to encourage [the student] to be an active, participating citizen” (McClenaghan, 2008, p. xviii).
The methods suggested above begin with a chapter preview, an online technological exploration of the concepts covered using multimedia, a skills-for-life section that includes, for example, how to vote, how to register, and how to get to a polling place. Each chapter includes a section on how one can make a difference and why it matters; a “Close Up” section, which focuses on primary sources associated with the topic under discussion; a Face the Issues section, which forces the student to see a different perspective on the concept being considered in the chapter; a series of inserts called “The Enduring Constitution”; timelines that are linked to a website dedicated to the text; and charts, graphs and visuals to aid the visual learner and to demonstrate graphically any statistical information (McClenaghan, 2008). The 2008 text is further divided into seven units, with an average of three to four chapters per unit. The first unit covers the foundations of the government, the second focuses on political behavior and government by the people, the third deals with the legislative branch, the fourth the executive branch, the fifth the judicial, the sixth political and economic systems, and the seventh participation in state and local government.

A third shift involves increased assessment, primarily assessment for declarative knowledge rather than for critical thinking. The ideological content becomes primary, and the critical-thinking components are secondary to constant testing of the student for content knowledge. In the 1921 edition, students are asked to discuss the material in groups; however, in the 2008 edition, the focus is more individualistic. Thus, the concept of goodness in the 2008 edition is one based on individual development of declarative understanding, which is constantly tested. Regardless of the sections on critical thinking that are included, the emphasis is on declarative knowledge and short- and long-term acquisition of data and the supportive structures, such as legal cases and legislation, that support the data. Goodness is to be seen in the
understanding of the principles of government as shown through the numbers attained in assessments. However, constructive criticism capable of affecting a radical change is nowhere to be seen, nor is it mentioned as part of an ethic of existence. Nor is there any mention of issues that are focused on radical change or methods that are not part of the republican paradigm. In essence, the 2008 edition lacks the fresh and awakening sound of the 1921 text, with its radical comment in the title of the problems associated with democracy. In summary, goodness in the 2008 edition is seen as knowing what to do within the paradigm of the system of republican government and being able to measure that knowledge, regardless of all the sections associated with critical thinking evident in the text. Participation and critical thinking within that structured paradigm are seen and discussed but are secondary to the acquisition and self-evaluation of declarative knowledge.

The language focus in the text is one of understanding the declarative knowledge of the text. It is not critical or radical in its focus. It is explicatory and focused as was said above on the assessment of the data and concepts. An emphasis on lower-order thinking is prevalent, and the analysis of the assessments demonstrated that focus, as will be shown. The definitional perspective inherent in the discourses is descriptive, but it cannot be said to be non-programmatic. The program and its ethic are present in an esoteric sense. The work is declarative, as has been stated, but it is also programmatic in that it does not drive the student to action from the discourses. That is, the esoteric intent is one that maintains the paradigm of the republic as growing within the bounds of its perception of reason. It does not allow in its language a methodology that evolves from the critical to the radical and as such denies a construction of anything except what the safety of the paradigm allows.
In reviewing the discourses, their combinatorial nature--as critical, declarative and acquiescent--focuses the text on a position exoterically that demonstrates criticality and development of reasoned discourse relative to civic duties and rights. However, these are not allowed to be radically different than those inherent in the wording that demonstrates the intent of the founding documents as paradigms of civic maintenance of power. As has been stated before, any discourse that does not allow for the radical shift in criticality from the intended goals of the founders is bound to the goals described by the terms of the paradigm that initiated the discourse, and as such is restrictive of growth, ethic, and goodness as defined by this research. Without equivocation, this program is based on the maintenance of power and the development of a culture of acquiescence to that power by making the participants in the civic system believe that they are truly and authentically free in their actions, when in truth they are being trained to respond to a set of rules and regulations that make them feel free but as was stated by Rousseau have kept them “everywhere in chains” (Rousseau, 2005, p. 3).

The analysis of power. In Magruder’s 1921 edition, power, which is defined by the research tool as the ability to use a knowledge base freely in order to attain an authenticity that liberates a subject from sectarian and in-authentic interpretations of acceptability and self-discovery, is closer to the existential intent of the tool’s definition than the characterization of the term inherent in the 2008 edition. This can be seen from the assessment modules at the end of each chapter that divide themselves between declarative knowledge and a series of 286 discussion questions that are focused on a reasoned approach and response to issues dealing with social justice, ethical reasoning, civic understanding, and individual development (Magruder, 1921). The 2008 edition does allow for a more individual focus relative to the concept, as is seen throughout the work. However, the paradigmatic controlling influence of the textual focus on a
functional approach egocentrically based on the amassing of declarative knowledge and its assessment negate the effect of an existential development in the reader. Therefore, power is defined by both texts as involving the individual in the process of government, but focusing, in Magruder’s 1921 text, on a discursive system whose programmatic end, relative to learning civics, is social justice and the reasoned understanding of rights and responsibilities of citizens as shown in chapters XV, XXV, and XXVI (Magruder, 1921).

Within McClenaghan’s 2008 edition of the text, the concept of power relative to the subject (the student) is not viewed as critically developing a mind that will, if the need arises, become radical for the sake of the society; instead, the power of the educative process is seen as a method capable of controlling the individual by focusing on the declarative knowledge and assessment rewards previously mentioned, which do not call for higher-order cognitive processes to be used, and which are assessed with examinations that measure short- and long-term memory. These methods reinforce the declarative process for the individual and as such focus the educative process on a non-experiential pedagogical perspective that denies the student the reasoned and free choice of involvement in the process of education and understanding. This can be seen in the majority of the chapters; an example is evident in chapter 1 of McClenaghan’s 2008 edition, where a ratio of 23/2 exists between lower- and higher-order questions. This gives the student only a 9% assessment relative to the information presented that is based on critical thinking concepts that focus on “how” and “why.” This in essence denies the subject the authenticity that liberates her from sectarian and in-authentic interpretations of the information presented, and forces her into a state of acceptability without being educated to an acceptance of criticality as part of her educational focus. This is evident since the only acceptable effect is the one chosen for her understanding through the curricular control of the paradigm by others, a
control that does not completely deny criticality but presents it as secondary at best. This can be said of any text that does not follow an existential and authentic perspective, but it becomes critical in relation to any text that is used to develop an understanding of a civic responsibility that ironically focuses on the preservation of freedom.

From this perspective, in both texts, power is declaratively stated; however, in McClenaghan’s 2008 edition, the ideology of freedom and its connected actions, actions as associated through the tool’s definition, are not evident. That is, the developmental aspect of the authenticity of the being, the subject, the student, is not evident; what is evident is a façade of declarative knowledge, assessment, and critical thinking that does not allow for a creation of freedom, but instead develops maintenance of the perspective of freedom that the hegemony supports. In Magruder’s 1921 text, the focus on a discursive process amongst the students after consideration of lower-order concepts (who, what, where, and when) allows for the how and the why of the issue to become part of the conversation, permitting an authentic discourse and opinion without the indoctrination of multiple mediums that bombard the student with a pre-set propaganda of the illusion of freedom.

These perspectives on power are used to control both cognitive and physical processes: the text demonstrates everything from voting to how to understand and analyze political cartoons. The declarative focus of McClenaghan’s 2008 edition, dealing with methods of action that cover a plethora of civic responsibilities, does not allow the student to ask whether those methods are wrong in any shape or form; they are prescribed as best practices by the authority of the subject matter expert, the editor, who knows more and knows better on the subject than the student, and since he receives the support of the teacher, school, and district, must be stating the
truth, not just opinion. Unfortunately, as Walker (2002) shows, percentage sales and market
niche control have made the economic reality into epistemologically-accepted truth.

Both texts are intended to effectively associate power, at least their definition of it, with a
curriculum and an educational method. McClenaghan’s 2008 edition associates power with
curriculum and pedagogy, as has been stated, in a functional and declarative mode; that is, its
purpose is perpetuation of the status quo via an educational curriculum that is assessment based.
Magruder’s 1921 edition also has an educational program associated with its curriculum, but as
has been stated, it is more experiential in concept and focuses on developing the individual for
the greater welfare of the society without developing a sectarian perspective that separates and
empowers the few over the many. The methods and techniques evident in the assessments of
Magruder’s 1921 edition are developmental, socially conscious, and democratic in their
perspectives; McClenaghan’s 2008 edition, on the other hand, focuses more on the individual
and includes techniques of critical thinking in its curriculum, but is centered on developing an
acquiescence that is inherently missing from Magruder’s 1921 edition.

In reviewing the perspectives of the subjects, the students, in regard to the texts and how
the authors seem to view them ontologically, the results are extremely interesting. Magruder’s
1921 text allows for a greater existential and social development, a combination not usually
found in an educational setting. The evidence of this can be seen in the type of questions that the
text includes for discussion. These questions lean to a greater degree towards higher-order
thinking than one would expect; at least there is a greater degree of “if-then” and “what if” type
questions, as well as questions that ask how and why, than just mere declarative questions of
lower order that focus on who, what, where, or when. In McClenaghan’s 2008 edition, the
majority of questions call for declarative and non-opinion-based responses. The edition does
include some higher-order questions, but as will be shown in the section on semantic cognitive analysis, Magruder’s 1921 edition has a greater percentage of higher-order questions. Therefore, the ontological perspective in the two texts is different. The Magruder text focuses on an ontological development that is closer to the definition of that perspective inherent in the research tool, and McClenaghan’s 2008 edition demonstrates a more traditional object-based perspective of declarative information as a catalyst for the development of the individual within the socially-accepted norms of the republican hegemony. In reviewing whether the subject (the student) is being viewed or discussed as a text, neither tome demonstrates that. Instead, they both are considerate of the fact that they are developing the individual for active inclusion within their perception of American society.

*The analysis of content and declarative knowledge.* The exoteric, or face-value, messages of the texts have similar yet different foci. On the outside, both texts are driving home the idea of civic education and its consequent development of an informed citizenry, yet Magruder’s 1921 text does this in a more socially constructive way and uses more socially proactive language, as is seen in its persistent use of wording asking, within the paradigm of the social civic perspective that has been presented, whether the individual believes that “right” or “wrong” has been done relative to the issue and asking for higher-order cognitive perspectives relative to the answers. Examples of this can be seen in the assessments for the first chapter of Magruder’s 1921 edition, where 50% of the questions dealing with the declarative content section of the text ask “how” or “why” questions of the reader. This tendency continues throughout the text and is also evident to a greater or lesser degree in its questions for discussion sections. To read this edition is to step into a more amicable environment where the principles of democracy and social justice are prevalent and where the individual’s perspective vis-à-vis an understanding of right and wrong
are more assured and expected in decision-making. Furthermore, this text demonstrates in its pedagogical methodology a respect for an environment where the student is considered foremost as a member of society. This is seen here to a greater extent than in McClenaghan’s 2008 edition, as evidenced by the different focus of the two texts vis-à-vis the student. In one, as has been mentioned, the declarative nature and individual development of the functional subject leaves any amicability relative to the group or social setting without a feeling of camaraderie. In Magruder’s 1921 edition, the social system is foremost, and the respect shown to it is evident in the language and the directional discussions that the content always seems to lead to.

In both editions under analysis, the results showed that political considerations are the focal point of the assessments and as such are the most evident time-independent paradigm of analysis. In McClenaghan’s 2008 text, for example, the total number of words that the author considered most important associated with politics equaled 432 out of 565. These words are part of the text’s assessment module labeled Political Dictionary. This is a section of each chapter that focuses on words of importance relative to the material. These words are highlighted and referenced with their correlative textual page numbers for definitional purposes, and as a sample of the population demonstrated well, the focus of the political paradigm of interpretation is central to the emphasis of the text. The least evident paradigm of analysis is religion, generating only 19 words that the author considered of high importance based on the definitional protocol mentioned above. The historical support for this absence is based on the fact that McClenaghan’s 2008 edition came into its own in the post-1948 period, which was affected greatly by two foci of interpretation and consideration, the traditional separation of church and state concept, and the search for and persecution of anti-American perspectives driven by the House Un-American Activities Committee of the post-World War II era.
These two phenomena caused the text to focus on declarative, politically-based information having an American government and political agenda. The texts assume that the reader or subject is versed in basic civic understanding, as demonstrated by the language used, which in Magruder’s 1921 text has a higher intellectual expectation than does McClenaghan’s 2008 text, which averaged between 10 and 20 definitional exigencies in each chapter. The language of the older text is relatively free of explanations and of definitions, focusing less on declarative knowledge than on the teaching of criticality. As stated above, the more recent text is very explicative of concepts and loaded with definitions about all aspects of government and economics.

The question types evident in both texts are divided into declarative and critical perspectives, with the inclusion of specific discussion questions of a stipulative character in Magruder’s 1921 text. This edition is balanced in its question types; it includes critical-thinking questions, but it also includes questions that are socially and experientially focused and that ask for a construction of nuomenal material. The more recent text asks for some construction using the data and information it presents, but does not focus on the social and experiential discussion perspective as much as Magruder’s 1921 text does.

McClenaghan’s 2008 text uses more varied question types, but the emphasis is on declarative knowledge for assessment purposes. For example, the more recent text divides its assessment modules into the previously-mentioned section, titled Political Dictionary, which refers the student to specific pages in the text for clarifications of what the author-editor considers difficult words. The text also includes a second section, titled Practicing Vocabulary, which uses a multiple set of pedagogic assessments—matching, multiple-choice, fill in the blank, as well as other basic declarative assessment models that generate a more quantitative
assessment of short- and long-term memory relative to the material of the text. The text also includes an on-line progress monitor and its own website where technology helps to guide the student to a greater understanding. The text does include a critical-thinking section that asks the student to draw inferences and to make deductions, as well as to make comparisons and draw timelines; however, all these methods of assessment attempt a qualitative assessment of declarative content.

**Application of tool for semantic cognitive analysis to the texts.** The two texts, when analyzed by qualitative methods that have been designed specifically for this research, demonstrated and validated the theses of the research and the efficacy of the research tool as is demonstrated below. Evidence of a differential between the two texts and their assessment methods vis-à-vis criticality and declarative knowledge was seen through the sample used for textual analysis which consisted of 10 out of the 29 chapters in the 1921 text. There we find 97 higher-order discussion questions, compared to 90 questions in the 2008 edition. However, these numbers, even though very close, do not show the fact that the 2008 edition includes a large number of descriptive inquiries within its critical-thinking section, a section that is approximately equivalent in content to the 1921 section on social and experiential discussions, which makes the 2008 edition less capable of generating the *logos* or discussion-based critical and social-based perspective that is more evident in the 1921 edition. Within the 1921 text, the discussion or higher-order questions equaled 97 of the 241 questions, or 40%. Thus the lower-order questions equaled 144 of the 241 questions, or 59%, with a 1% error margin due to rounding off to the nearest decimal. However, McClenaghan’s 2008 text shows a slightly different set of results.
Looking at a similar-size sample, in this case 10 chapters out of 25, the discussion or higher-order questions equaled 90 of the 351 questions, or 26%. Thus the lower-order questions equaled 261 of the 351 questions, or 74%. A comparison of the two texts shows that the percentage of higher-order questions focusing on critical cognitive processes dropped by 14% between 1921 and 2008.

**Overall criticality in Magruder’s American Government.** In looking at the concept of criticality in the Magruder series, both Magruder’s 1921 edition and McClenaghan’s 2008 editions, one discovers that the idea of a critical-thinking perspective, or of a critical perspective that would elevate the student-citizen to a level of non-acquiescent development, is limited and if evident at all it is exoterically seen but esoterically denied. This can be seen by the fact that both tomes have critical-thinking sections; both ask for the student to create results; and to one extent or another both ask for a socially systemic method of learning to be included in the pedagogical system associated with the book. However, the necessity for a radical change associated with an analysis of a social or political situation pedagogically being developed through these tomes is not there. The participatory, republic-based, and representative-driven system is seen as the methodology for membership in the state. Furthermore, the newer edition of the text shows a consistent use of declarative methods of assessment and learning coupled with an increase in technology resulting in greater solitude for the student, a solitude that separates the individual from the group and by doing so divides and diffuses the reactionary capacity to be united in a rebellious effort. Along with this text, in the state of Illinois the prevalent pedagogical and curricular action is to give the student a copy of the *Illinois Handbook of Government* (2009). The result of an analysis of that work follows.
**The Handbook of Illinois Government.** The *Illinois Handbook of Government* (2009) is a guide to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Illinois state government. It is given to most students in conjunction with preparation for the Constitutional examinations, both federal and state, that they are expected to pass in Illinois high schools prior to graduation.

**Hermeneutic analysis.** The *Illinois Handbook of Government* (2009) is declarative in nature and does not per se include any critical perspective that could be used to develop a critical citizen who would evolve when needed into a radical activist capable of alleviating through authentic action any issues that would disenfranchise her from her place in the hegemony. From that perspective, the following results were gathered relative to the tool of analysis designed for this research.

**The ethical analysis.** The *Illinois Handbook of Government* (2009) is published by the Illinois Secretary of State. Its premise is that it is designed to help the reader educate herself to the democratic process. It further stipulates that active participation in government is crucial to a citizen. The author is supposedly the Illinois Secretary of State; in 2009-2010 that was Jesse White. However, no sure sign that he is the author is present in the text with the exception of his name prominently embossed on the title page of the tome. The particular edition that this research reviewed hermeneutically celebrated the Abraham Lincoln birthday bicentennial. The perspective in the text associated with the good is that an action based civic perspective needs to be well informed. The definition of this “well informed” concept is described as a citizen who understands the workings of government at the state and federal level. The knowledge associated with this is strictly declarative and it is expressed that way in the text. The language of the text assumes an introductory understanding of terms associated with federal issues, such as what the makeup of a republic entails. The text then shifts from a language base to a visual pedagogic
perspective that shows who the representatives and senators are at the federal level as well as what state districts exist. This visual perspective is demonstrated via maps and pictures of the elected officials with their addresses and other personal information. All state officers are then addressed by the text with their perspective duties described in some detail. The next section of the work focuses on the Illinois state budget, using a set of pie charts to describe the breakdown of the revenues and expenditures of the state. An explanation of the legislative branch follows with accompanying flowchart showing the relationships between the different members of the legislative section. Methods, functions, and powers then are described relative to state government as are the individual state officers; the methodology for making a law is also explained. All state elected officers are then shown with their pictures and addresses after which a reapportionment map of the state of Illinois is produced showing the legislative and representative districts. The different committees and commissions of state government are described and their functions explained. The executive branch is then shown through the use of a flowchart followed by the contact information of the different departments of state government that had not previously been given. The educational system of the state is then given with its corresponding statistics for the 2009-2010 year. The language and expectations of the reader’s ability to understand political theory and the language of politics continue to be demonstrated throughout the text. The next section that shows that expectation is the judicial section which combines a flowchart with a series of descriptors of the different types of courts that exist in the state. The text then introduces the reader to the different members of the Illinois Supreme Court and the appellate court officers and justices. The text then reproduces for the reader the Constitution of the United States and all 27 amendments, and then reproduces a copy of the Illinois State Constitution, as amended in 1970. The handbook then generates a statistical
numerical chart of Illinois based on demographic information and breaks down all the symbols associated with the state. Interestingly, and in conjunction with our theme in this research, the handbook states the following:

Illinois students are required to pass a Constitution exam before graduating from high school. Adults who have not graduated from high school and want to obtain a General Education Development (GED) certificate also must pass the exam. To assist those students, the Illinois State Board of Education has produced a Constitution Study Guide…The Study Guide is available in English and Spanish. (Illinois Handbook of Government, 2009, p. 104)

The handbook then goes on to advertise where the guide can be ordered from and at what cost to the reader. In summary the focus of the language is descriptive, assumptive of previous knowledge relative to political science and republican government theory. It also has a definitional perspective that is mainly descriptive, but betrays itself as a programmatic text in that it stipulates the need to both study for an exam that it generates a study guide for so as to be able to graduate from high school in Illinois, and it also shows its programmatic perspective in the fact that no assessments of any kind are generated, instead all information is paradigmatic, existing within a declarative perspective that is devoid of criticality throughout the text. The central programmatic and descriptive perspectives in the text demonstrate an emphasis on cultural development focusing on power and its acceptance by the student. This is solidified in the results, through the non-critical perspective inherent in the text, and is driven towards the goal of perpetuating acquiescence to the authority of the power behind the text, the authority of the subject matter expert, the government.
The analysis of power. Power is defined in the text as a driving esoteric intention couched within the esoteric cloth of a liberal republic nurtured by democratic principles. The reality of the esoteric intent is that the definition of power that the text describes is one of coming into the fold, of functional acceptance and of non-critical intellectual development. It focuses on declarative knowledge and does not include any assessments at all within its covers. The definition of power inherent to this research is alien to this text; nowhere in the handbook is there any method for the authentic development existentially of the student citizen. All conceptualizations of power within the text are declaratively stated as informative declarations relative to the government of the state and the republic. From this one can see that the discourses are used to control, through the absence of critical thinking perspectives, both cognitive and physical human processes. The text controls the thinking relative to the correctness or incorrectness of an action or though as that action or thought relates to the hegemony. It is also evident from the quotation above, that the concepts of maintenance and functionalism in civics education are associated with an educational program and a curriculum which are associated with the texts under consideration. There is also no ontological evolution of the subject associated with this particular text. The only development that is demanded by the text is the development of a citizen that has been assessed as a member of the society supporting the hegemony vis-à-vis the passing of the constitutional examinations at the high school level. Therefore, the student can be seen, hermeneutically, as a functionally acquiescent text that is being written by the school system in support of the state.

The analysis of content and declarative knowledge. The face value message of the text is that one needs to have a reliable short-term and long-term memory capable of focusing on declarative knowledge in order to be a good citizen. Furthermore, it implies that this goodness
will be evidenced by the ability to pass the constitutional examinations that are driven by the declarative content of the texts being analyzed by this research. The most evident time independent paradigm of analysis is political in this text. This is seen from the fact that the word government alone is mentioned 145 times, versus the word economic/s which is mentioned 21 times, and the word religion, which is mentioned only 4 times throughout the text making it the least evident time-independent paradigm of interpretation.

Historical support for the absence of the religious paradigm mirrors the results found within the Magruder (1921) and McClenaghan (2008) texts. The separation of church and state perspectives focusing the traditional fear of having a religious faction influencing the government of a plurality of peoples whom have a plethora of religious preferences historically make the religious paradigm a window that assures political ruination and possible revolt against the hegemony. These results are traditionally not acceptable to the controlling faction in charge of the government. The general assumptions evident in the text are synonymous with the preservation of the status quo. The previously mentioned political paradigm of interpretation is not just the most prevalent it is the most symbolic relative to the paradigmatic way that it is used to control the critical thinking process of the reader, as has been mentioned, through the exclusion of the methods capable of generating a divergent opinion. It is assumed that the student will not challenge or be able to challenge in a successful manner the declarative knowledge needed to pass the constitutional examination needed for graduation from high school, and the educational methods and curriculum demonstrated in the texts assume that acquiescence to futility of effort and reinforce it since there are no questions of any type, lower or higher order, for assessment in the text. Because there are no questions in the text, there is no ratio available of lower order to higher order relative to assessment type that would demonstrate the failure to
include criticality in the text. However, that in itself is evidence of the a non-critical perspective associated with the text, because absence of higher order thinking and the inclusion of declarative information, which focuses on lower order thinking, will undoubtedly generate results that are based on short term memory and not be associated with concepts that ask for opinion and constructive criticism.

**Overall criticality in the Illinois Handbook of Government.** As has been stated, an absence of criticality whatsoever in the *Illinois Handbook of Government* (2009) is documented. This is due to the purely descriptive and declarative nature of the text along with the complete lack of assessments.

**The texts and the national and state-generated social studies standards.** The national and state standards considered for this research focused on grades 6-12. The relationship between these two sets of standards is reflexive. This is seen by the fact that they mirror each other in suggested content. They both focus on the general knowledge needed to pass the Constitution examinations generated by the individual districts in Illinois needed for students to graduate. The national standards were developed by the Center for Civic Education with support from the U.S. Department of Education and The Pew Charitable Trusts. Three thousand individuals and organizations participated in the two-year project to identify what students should know and be able to do in the field of civics and government at the end of grades 4, 8, and 12. [.these standards have] been used as a model for state curricular frameworks and standards throughout the country. The United States Department of State has distributed an international edition of the *Standards* to other nations through its Public Affairs
Offices and other agencies throughout the world. (National Standards for Civics and Government, 2007, para. 1-2)

The state standards were developed to mirror, to some extent, the national social science standards—specifically those associated with constitutional issues and government—and also include within their structure what a resident of Illinois needs to know as a citizen of the nation and the state. This includes economic, historical, and political/governmental factors and data that should be included in the district-generated constitutional examination for graduation from high school. The information covered by the standards, specifically associated with the focus of this research, includes the following expectations:

American patriotism and the principles of representative government, as enunciated in the American Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, and the proper use and display of the American flag shall be taught in all public schools and other educational institutions supported or maintained in whole or in part by public funds. No student shall receive a certificate of graduation without passing a satisfactory examination upon such subjects. Instruction shall be given in all such schools and institutions in the method of voting at elections by means of the Australian ballot system and the method of the counting of votes for candidates. (Illinois State Learning Standards, 2002, para. 1)

The standards come in two parts, titled as learning and performance standards and are associated with general goals, benchmarks, and performance descriptors that support each other. The standards generally describe how well students perform at various points on an educational development continuum. This continuum shows how students can demonstrate mastery of
progressively more difficult content and cognitive skills over ten incremental stages of
development [labeled (A) through (J), with (A) being associated with the first grade and
(J) being associated with grade 12]. Performance within each stage can be assessed by the
extent to which students are meeting the standards (i.e., starting, approaching, meeting,
exceeding). Performance standards include four essential elements: performance
descriptors, performance levels, assessment tasks, and performance examples. (Best et
al., 2002, p. 1)

Therefore, the structure of the standards is shaped as a pyramid, with the descriptors at the base,
the benchmarks, starting, approaching, meeting, and exceeding, above them, followed by the
learning standards on the next rung, and finally at the apex of the pyramid the goals for the
student relative to the civics education model. This educational model, whose content is selected
by a bureaucratic structure—the state boards of education and the national office of the secretary
of education—suggests the material that should be included in the district curricula. These
suggestions are measured by the assessment modules that focus on them, which in the case of
this research are the constitutional examinations on civics generated by the individual districts
and/or high schools in the state of Illinois. Inevitably this assures that a student attains the
necessary skills and content that the bureaucracy determines is needed for a student to become a
bona fide citizen (Best et al., 2002).

**Ratio of lower to higher order questions.** In the analysis of the national standards for
civics and government, which are in question form, the results showed that 65% of them were
based on lower-order cognitive processes and 39% were based on higher-order processes. The
lower order to higher order ratio was found to be 17 to 9 generating a resulting ratio of 1.88. This
demonstrates that for every higher-order operation discovered there were almost 2 lower-order
operations based on declarative data expected to be generated by the authors of the test modules in the school districts. In the analysis of the Illinois standards, 45% of the types of questions suggested were of a lower cognitive order, while approximately 55% were of higher order; this result is extremely interesting, as it shows that the state expects at least a 10% greater inclusion of higher-order operation questions in the assessments. Also, the ratio generated by the lower-order versus higher order operations was found to be 0.84 which brings into a bit more clarity the higher-order expectation of the state in the suggestions relative to question type that they would like to see included by districts in the constitutional tests for graduation from Illinois high schools. The number shows that less than one lower-order question is expected for each higher-order question generated. It is interesting to note the greater regard for criticality and higher-order thinking at the federal versus the state level. On face value, this seems to demonstrate that the State of Illinois is responsible for its declaratively based assessment in civics. This perspective gives the federal government a more existentially authentic and ontologically developmental look.

Hermeneutic analysis. It was the decision of the researcher that, because the standards are written in question format--and because no declarative text is generated with great content--analysis of the standards should proceed using only the semantic cognitive analysis section of the research tool. This gave a clearer quantitative and qualitative picture of the hermeneutic intent of the standards vis-a-vis the question types found in the texts. The questions are set in lists relative to specific declarative subject types; therefore, the discourses lent themselves with greater affinity to a ratio and proportional analysis of lower- to higher-order questions.

Effectiveness of analytic tools and summary of textual analyses. The analytic tools were extremely effective in demonstrating hermeneutic and qualitative perspectives within the
texts. They also allowed the research to determine, through the analysis of primary sources and the assessments associated with those sources, the amount of criticality evident in the texts under consideration. This was done by showing both ratios of lower-order to higher-order thinking, and by generating proportions relative to the total number of questions involved in any particular assessment. The tools also allowed the research to show what perennial window of interpretation was considered as most important and also least important by the authors under consideration. The tools then allowed for a more historical perspective relative to those windows to be followed in the analysis, giving the research greater clarity as to what variables might have caused the focus or lack of focus associated with the perennial window being considered. The combination of the hermeneutic perspectives, which also focused through a series of questions on determining the ethics of the texts and the concept and use of power as defined by the research tool, allowed for a clearer understanding of the intent of the language evident in the texts. Therefore, by combining these interpretive mediums, the research was able to show whether there was an avoidance or active inclusion of critical thinking principles in the texts and assessments considered during the three time periods viewed relative to civics education. The result allowed for a clearer understanding of the relationship between the expectations of the government and the curricula and assessments they wished generated for civics education in Illinois.
CHAPTER 5

Conclusions and Suggestions

Review of Findings

The three time periods reviewed demonstrate a unity in restricting the development of critical thinking amongst the population of America. The prerevolutionary period demonstrates a religious bias that was enforced vis-à-vis higher education, which supported the sectarian elitist perspective of the hegemony, since the common man was not privy to such an education. Furthermore, within the structure of higher education, very little criticality was allowed: even the responses to questions used at commencement to show mastery of subject matter were restricted to those supportive of scripture (Hofstadter, 1973a; Hofstadter & Smith, 1961; Holifield, 2003; Miller, 1983; Morison, 1936; Richard, 1995; Rudolph, 1962).

The revolutionary period fared no better. The enlightenment philosophy of the period generated a further entrenchment of the sectarian intellectual elite within the power structure of the state. It did this by introducing science and mathematics, as well as modern languages, into the curriculum, again curricular materials that were not available to every member of society. During this time period, the view of capital acquisition as an end that is good was introduced into the educational mix via the works of Adam Smith allowing capital, science and religion to join forces in the entrenchment of the intellectual aristocracy as ruling members of the hegemony. This with the continual use of humanistic curricula developed the intellectual elite as the power
brokers of American society (Koch, 1943; McDonald, 1958; Richard, 1995; Rudolph, 1965; Winterer, 2002).

The modern period extended hegemonic control by creating a secondary-school civics curriculum that generates compliance rather than criticality. This was demonstrated by the types of questions generated for assessment of civic understanding within the McClenaghan (2008) edition of Magruder’s (1921) text. This shift in editorial content was generated after the simultaneous shift in the socio-political focus of the late 1940s in America. A shift that called for a more patriotic, less critical, and more essentialist based pedagogical perspective in civic education caused by the new anti communist focus of the nation. The effect of this change in perspective is demonstrated by the greater number of declarative knowledge and lower cognitive order assessments, and the subsequent reduction in group and social justice type questions that require higher order thinking perspectives from the student, within the McClenaghan edition. Stability, as equated with a thinking perspective that would not cause doubt in regard to the status quo’s methods of government, is exemplified in the assessment modules of the McClenaghan edition, where only a brief amount of each chapter is given over to the particulars of critical thinking, and then only within the constraints of the paradigm generated by the hegemony. That is, no radical perspectives, coming from the increased knowledge that criticality generates, are considered at all within the assessments. This omission allows for the text to both include criticality in the pedagogy and curriculum, and at the same time deny its efficiency and possible negative effect upon the hegemony.

Thus the three time periods under study here all show a common thread of hegemony, whether it be religious, capitalist, or social-class domination. Within this research, the central proposition, philosophical in essence, is that there is a singular genesis of civics education and
constructive criticality that has been ignored relative to the education of students in civics classes in modern times. This proposition was reviewed with special reference to Illinois high schools and to the founding documents of the republic, the *Declaration of Independence* and the *Constitution*. Further analysis, of a comparative nature, was made between these instruments and the most prominent texts used in civics classes within Illinois. This analysis showed that the philosophical connection associated with an enlightened and critical thinking people had been obscured. The foundational philosophical presence sought in the instruments was born from the ideas of the ancient Roman republican system, bred in the mind of the founders--Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton--being the then living examples of the philosophical focus, which united with the Enlightenment philosophy of the American revolutionary period developed into the political and governmental principles of the American republic.

The research results demonstrated that the sampled texts in current use include a perfunctory smattering of critical thinking, but that the majority of the materials covered in the curriculum focus on declarative knowledge of lower-order questions that exclude any criticality in the cognitive process of the student associated with civics. Therefore, even though the texts include sections for both experiential and critical development of thinking, and were not given an approach that demands urgency or considerate respect in balance with the more declarative lower-order thinking perspectives seen in the modern texts, the lack of enthusiasm for the principles of reason and constructive criticality demonstrated the fact that numerically and consistently across all texts considered, the major focus of assessment modules was on lower-order cognitive questions based on declarative knowledge. The general perspective of the texts, as shown by the hermeneutic analysis used, suggested that the authors saw in civics education more a *right*, one that did not need to be exercised or challenged with reasoned critical discourse,
than a responsibility to be exercised in the courts of reason, the classrooms of America. Thus the authors seemed to believe—or at least acquiesce to demands of the state—that civic involvement should simply be descriptive in its nature and declaratively rote in regard student involvement and its assessment. In essence, civics was to be considered and accepted but not challenged. It was not in any way to be regarded as a critical responsibility of citizenship, but could and should be accepted as a medium of educative acquiescence to the powers that be, to the hegemony as evidenced by the curriculum requested of individual districts by the state. The resulting intellectual product, the student citizen, would then be more accepting of the inevitability of his or her powerlessness in the government of the republic. The subsequent result to this is a student who is not educated to challenge the mandates of the government relative to their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Ironically, the national standards were found to be more critically focused than the individual state standards in their suggested assessments. Regardless of the national focus in assessment request, the state standards were found to be of a more intensely declarative nature and were also more numerous than the national requests. The educational system that allows for this reduction in the critically constructive development of the student is simply generating an intellectual product that acquiesces. The product, the subject, the student, does so because he or she cannot criticize constructively, nor, if need be, take the next step in active political participation and become a radical activist who will defend and secure her rights. In this case, ignorance is bred via a lack of critical knowledge and methods that are not considered by the schools as important strategies needed by students for their development as citizens. This was evident from a historical perspective across all three time periods considered by this research. This discovery has generated a series of questions based on that paucity of present critical educational development.
The most important questions that have come from these findings focus on modernity and ask why this situation in school civics classrooms is so prevalent, and why it is supported by the individual districts in the state of Illinois. In order to see the connection between the lack of criticality and the assessments, further research needs to be conducted demonstrating the philosophical connection between the state standards and a sufficient sample of individual district-generated assessments used to fulfill the national-and state-mandated constitutional graduation requirements. To achieve that goal, the research generated a series of central and subsequent research questions, as well as a research tool that was applied to the texts of the three time periods under consideration. With the results of the hermeneutic and cognitive analysis in mind, the research now looks at the implications generated by the answers to these questions.

**The Central Research Questions**

The following are the central and subsequent research questions of this study. The first question begins by asking for a basic description of the disciplines that made up the prerevolutionary curriculum in America and then focuses on asking how that education might have affected the founders’ educational program for the public. The results of the analysis showed that the prerevolutionary curriculum in America was based on the ethics of Christian religion, specifically the Puritan strain of Protestantism as practiced by the 17th century settlers of Boston, Massachusetts, in conjunction with the classical humanist education that was brought by the majority of those settlers from England, an education reflective of the Cambridge and Oxford university curricula which they had experienced as graduates of those universities.

These curricula generated a critical mind in conjunction with a restriction of focus. This restriction was based on the paradigm of theocracy that the settlers generated as the method of governmental administration for the new world, for their city on the hill, which they considered
the new Zion, was to be governed by the word of God. This structured control of criticality, developed by the use of the recitation and the declamation, which forced students to be creative in support of the perspective or in attack against it, was controlled by the religious paradigm throughout (Miller, 1983; Richard, 1995; Rudolph, 1962, 1978). The effect that this pedagogical and curricular constraint had on the prerevolutionary public was twofold: it developed in the mind of the student a critical capacity to think logically, creatively, and constructively, albeit within the theocratic perspective, and it focused the equivalent of secondary-school education on preparing children to pass the entrance exams to the colleges. These entrance exams were based on the capacity to read, write, and translate Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, the languages of the Bible, into each other. This linguistic capacity, as well as the critical yet controlled development of the mind of the Christian gentleman, was the focus of the college system in prerevolutionary New England, a system whose goal was the development of a learned clergy and administrative corps. Therefore, the effect on the public was that it would be able to develop itself along the lines of the Cambridge and Oxford models and develop a corps of administrators and clergy from amongst its ranks that could replace the original and subsequent retirees from the theocratic system.

This effect is an extremely important point, since this perspective of functionalism continues to be a part of the educational system of America to the present and is perpetuated by the greater amount of lower-order questions over higher-order questions used to train citizens in the modern texts that the research analyzed. When one views this training model and the tradition of rejecting a civics education that does not subsidize the hegemony, it becomes evident that the tradition of restrictive thinking is part of the American culture and is perpetuated by maintaining higher-order thinking and its development within the hands of those being trained to
be the ruling sect of that hegemony (Giroux, 1988; Miller, 1983). The fact those in power did not consider criticality to be needed by the masses for membership in the republic, demonstrates the negative influence that the hegemony generated towards critically-constructive methods of education.

To determine further the intent of American colonial and immediate postrevolutionary education, the research looked at the two founding instruments that were written to support the American republic and its separation from England, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. Research was also done to determine if a general mandate for education was inherent in the political, economic, or ethical intents of the founding fathers of the republic. In essence, no discussion of education was found in these instruments. This series of questions led the researcher to ask whether the lack of a federal mandate to education in the founding documents of the United States assisted in or prevented the introduction of critical reasoning into the educational program of the American republic. The lack of any educational federal mandate within the two instruments allowed the individual states to generate their own educational mandates. However, the states themselves focused their efforts on elementary level educational dictums and based these on the opinions of subject-matter experts in the field of education. These experts included the founders of the republic, particularly Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and Benjamin Franklin, who wrote respectively about the need to find talent amongst the masses and develop an intellectual aristocracy, the need to develop a Christian ethic in education, and the need for a more scientific and practical perspective in education (Best, 1962; Honeywell, 1931; Rudolph, 1965).

Therefore, the historical evidence demonstrates a shift from a theocratically based system that allowed criticality and its development in education to work only within the religious
paradigm, to an educational system that is attached to individual state control, is supportive of a non-critical, financially-induced and practical educational system perpetuated by the federal government through programs such as the No Child left Behind Act. This subliminal shift and its restriction on criticality are esoterically evident within the writings of some of the founders and the economic impetus of the federal laws associated with education.

These restrictions and the vestiges of their historical intents are found in contemporary Illinois high-school civics curricula. The lack of extensive training in critical thinking within the texts analyzed, the focus on declarative knowledge, the lack of any federal mandate except for those associated with economic remuneration for essentialist curricular attainments in math, science, and reading, for example, give a similar view of the past and let us see this trend as a perennial perspective relative to education in America (Cousins, 1958; Giroux, 1988; Gutmann, 1987; Hofstadter & Smith, 1961; Honeywell, 1931; Miller, 1983; Rudolph, 1965).

In summary, the historical shift that was generated as the United States expanded westward towards the Pacific Ocean brought with it, in the 1800s, a shifting focus of educational thought. This shift allowed for a vocationally trained yeomanry to be developed via industrial and agricultural educational concepts, subsidized by federal laws, which allowed land for universities to be developed along those objectives. The philosophical association between this shift and the founding principles of the republic are evident only once the economic and political foci of the laws are interpreted anew.

The original intent of the republic and its founders, a theoretical construct that is debated continuously, has never denied an economic condition as prevalent among its principles. This perspective allows us to see the philosophical manipulation of the principles of the Enlightenment, principles such as those dealing with natural rights and democratic government,
manipulated for the preservation of an elite new class of aristocrats. This new elite was educated at the founding schools of the republic with curricula that included the development of critical perspectives relative to the texts they were studying, allowing them to be trained in the rhetoric necessary for the development of a series of instruments that could be considered from two perspectives, a critical and a functional one.

The manipulation of the philosophic principles within the texts, a linguistic one based on semantics, generates a double meaning; this is evident in the wording of the founding instruments of the American republic. An example of this wording is best seen in the misconception associated with the word “the people” as well as others that are of a more metaphysical nature such as “happiness” and its pursuit. The founding documents manipulate the understanding via a set of ambiguous words that invite misinterpretation. Evidence of this manipulation is seen in those people who confuse the population of the present United States with “the people” discussed by the instruments. The original “people” were white male landed gentry, slave owners who were educated at the top institutions of higher education in America, a far cry from the understanding in present society, which states that “the people” are all members of the society who hold citizen status. The misinterpretation of the wording continues and has in some cases even been considered as the mark of genius relative to the constitutional drafters; the open-ended language is seen as part of an evolutionary perspective relative to the document’s ability to be considered as a time-independent instrument of interpretation relative to the rights and regulations of the American republic (Bailyn, 1967; Diamond, 1959; Hoeveler, 2002; Kurland & Lerner, 1987).

Therefore, the interpretation relative to the founding instruments of the American republic began to evolve from the philosophical foundations of democracy towards the
philosophy of a republican government mirroring in theory and structure the Roman republic inclusive of its bicameral structure; a de-jure democracy in a de-facto republic (Kagan, 1991; Lerner, 1987; Ober, 1989; Rowe & Schofield, 2005). The rebirth of the classical perspective, via the humanism of the European teachers of the founders, generated the American Enlightenment; however, the perception of a free democracy that would be ruled “by” the people shifted to one that included the rule of the land and its freedom “for” the people by a landed and educated aristocracy (Appleby, 1978, 1984; Bailyn, 1967; Cousins, 1998; Diamond, 1959).

In essence, the philosophical shift also included, as evidenced by the writings of Alexander Hamilton, a need for a strong central government and a focal shift from the metaphysical concept of freedom to the realist perspective of remuneration and capital. This allowed for the subsequent infrastructure of America to be based on the perception of capital acquisition as equaling a strong democratic process through a federal perspective that would allow for a strong defense of the nation vis-à-vis military power and the ability to trade in the international market with respect from other nations (Appleby, 1984; Bailyn, 1967; Boaz, 1997; Hamilton et al., 1937; McDonald, 1958).

**The Subsequent Research Questions**

The subsequent research questions focused the tool more precisely by including a more detailed set of interrogatories, relative to the instruments and the founders’ intent in regard to criticality. They also helped to focus the research tool by helping to determine whether there was any focus on development of criticality in the education of citizens across the three time periods. Some of the questions have already been discussed, such as whether the creators of the original curriculum of American prerevolutionary education intended to develop critical reasoning ability in the student. The research has shown through its analysis that this was so, but
in a restrictive fashion, based on evidence from the hermeneutic and cognitive ratio analysis of the assessments of the period.

The study has also shown that the framers did not include any focus on education in the founding instruments, but they did show great interest in shifting that responsibility to the states, albeit with certain constraints generated by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson relative to the need for national university, as well as the efforts of Benjamin Rush that focused on the need to strengthen the republic with a nationally-supported moral Christian education at the elementary and college level (Bailyn, 1967; Butts, 1980; Cappon, 1959; Hofstadter & Smith, 1961; Honeywell, 1931; Kettner, 1978; Lerner, 1987; Rudolph, 1965).

It has been shown that aside from the curricular shift from a classical education to one more associated with science and industry, no specific assessments could be discovered that would lend evidence for or against the inclusion of criticality in the postrevolutionary curricula (Honeywell, 1931; Rudolph, 1965, 1978). A greater focus on science and math, as well as a shift in languages to some degree from Latin, Greek, and Hebrew to English, French, and later German, simply demonstrates an emphasis on the Enlightenment philosophy, as well as the influence of John Locke and other empiricist thinkers on the founders (Hoeverler, 2002; Honeywell, 1931; Tarcov, 1984; Winterer, 2002). The paucity of assessments during this period denied a more precise analysis of the expectations of the curriculum and a citizen’s ability to reason critically. However, the hermeneutic analysis that followed, which focused on the instruments of the founding as educational catalysts in a civics curricular perspective, demonstrated that there was an exoterically evident shift that reduced criticality and included a more declarative knowledge base in the curriculum. The esoteric analysis of the instruments showed that after the catalytic shift, a preponderance of political and religious focus was
generated in the civics texts which did not include critical higher-order thinking perspectives to any great degree in their assessments. The civics texts did, however, include, from the first quarter of the twentieth century to at least 1948, an experiential social model that asked for the generation of discursive practices amongst the students, and focused on questions that asked for higher-order reasoning associated with social justice (Magruder, 1921).

The research then focused on issues of power across the time periods and generated a definition of that concept stating that power is the ability to use a knowledge base freely in order to attain an authenticity that liberates a subject from sectarian and in-authentic interpretations of acceptability and self-discovery. The historical power struggles of the periods under consideration did not demonstrate this definition of power as self-actualization except in the restrictions associated with the curricula and the texts considered. The definition that was discovered in the texts was one that found power and authority to be synonyms and therefore looked at power as a series of struggles to attain and maintain authority. The breakdown of these struggles centered on the three perennial windows of interpretation.

Philosophically, the struggles focused on the argument between a natural-rights theory of government and ontology and the concept of predestination associated with the religious distinction between popery and Protestantism. These philosophical perspectives in conjunction with the political window of interpretation, which focused on the argument between servitude to the crown and political independence, and the economic window, which revolved the arguments around taxation without representation, restrictions on trade with other nations, and the freedom to follow an independent international trade route, were the central issues relative to power as authority to act during the pre- and postrevolutionary periods. The curricular shifts that followed these perspectives included theocratic education, humanism, capitalist economic theory, and the
social contract and states’ rights theories of the political, economic, and religious thinkers of the
times, including John Locke, Adam Smith, and Jonathan Edwards, to name but three.

The power/authority perspective and its curricular result continued into the twentieth
century with the exigencies of the econocentric mind-set, a perspective that is self- evident
within the American economic and political system. As a result, the university and secondary
school curriculums went from a liberal arts perspective to an essentialist perspective, based on
the need to develop a culture focused on the acquisition of capital in order to fulfill the leaders’
need to be authoritative in all dimensions of political and civic life vis-à-vis the citizen and the
state. This was also seen as a historical perennial reality in America when the curriculum
changed again in the post-WWII era and began to focus on social justice issues that were
later replaced, along with the experiential curriculum, by a more science-based curriculum.

This curriculum was based on a competitive position that would become the cold war
between the political ideologies of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
This antipathy led to and included a shift from an agriculturally based perspective in education to
an industrial and later a technological one as the focus of the curriculum (Appleby, 1984; Boaz,
Olssen, 1999; Rudolph, 1978; Tarcov, 1984). This shift in curricular content is evident in the
current assessments associated with the most popular texts of the American civics curriculum, as
was shown by this research and its results section.

The numerical prevalence of declarative knowledge over criticality in curricular
assessments, the lack of a critical perspective, and the reduction in social and social-justice
perspectives over the 91-year history of the major civics text in America demonstrated the lack
of interest, even blatant restriction on the part of the economic powers that control textbook
publication, in including the critical development of cognitive processes among American students of civics. The current Illinois civics curriculum is representative of this restrictive perspective relative to criticality in civics education since the majority of its over 800 school districts use the text that 70% of the nation uses for American civics education, which is the same text that has held sway over the field since 1917, *Magruder’s American Government*. The declaratively-based and functionally-focused perspective of this text is further supported by the *Illinois Handbook of Government*, which simply generates declarative data and information for the students, giving support to the declarative nature of the curriculum and its assessment modules.

**Implications of Findings**

The results show us that an essentialist perspective loaded with acquiescence to authority and focusing on declarative knowledge and lower-order thinking, is being perpetuated by the economically-driven forces behind texts, assessments, and curricula in the civics curricula of Illinois high schools. The necessity for students to have a pro-active involvement in the civics curriculum is absolutely imperative in Illinois and in America.

The need for critical thinking and a fearless radical involvement by students in the maintenance of civil intellectual rights, as well as an understanding of the responsibilities that are associated with the maintenance of those rights, needs to become part of the pedagogical and curricular environment in education. Without an active and meaningful involvement in the skills of critically constructive thinking, the American high school student, the citizen of the near future, will remain acquiescent to the authority of the teacher, her opinion, the textual subject matter expert we call an author, the economically driven perspectives of capital acquisition as an end instead of a means to an end, and, in the end, to the result of believing in the helplessness of
a citizen in an almost nihilistic state of civic numbness (Giroux, 1978, 1988, 1997). This attitude on the part of our students will allow those educated within a critical perspective to maintain authority in their hands within the hegemony and develop the beginning of the end for any socio-economic middle-class advancement vis-à-vis public education in America.

How are we to guarantee that an involvement in criticality and, if necessary, in a radical perspective becomes part of the educational system in American civics education? The focal shift that brought American civics education to a pseudo-critical perspective, one that is exoterically demonstrated by the lip service given to it in the texts used to teach citizenship and civic rights and responsibilities, has now focused itself on the next stage of its evolution, the technological. This research has found that the major text used to teach the hegemonic testament includes an electronic medium for the student to use in addressing the questions of civic involvement, albeit questions written for her by the econocentric focus of the market-driven authors and the hegemony that subsidizes it. This is done through endorsements and supports that either praise the texts as truly representative of the founders’ intent, or claim these texts to be anti-American and not representative of their perspectives of what an American civic education should be.

Therefore, what is missing in the civics education of Illinois high-school students, and quite probably is missing from the majority of the high schools that are using the text that was analyzed by this research, is the idea that focusing on declarative lower-order thinking to a greater degree than higher order thinking within civics education will develop the student into an acquiescent and pliable member of the hegemony. It is imperative that we realize that this acknowledgment is what is missing because awakening to the fact is the first stage in becoming involved in changing it. Not to do so, not to become involved in the radical change needed to
eliminate this situation is tantamount to accepting the perspective that we do not live in a
democratic republic, but that we are living and teaching students to live in an acquiescent state
within an econocentric intellectual oligarchy where only those who can afford to go to schools
where critical thinking and a challenging spirit exist will be able to exercise the right of being a
member of the hegemony.

Furthermore, the perceptions that are generating the acquiescence to textual and political
authority as the priests of goodness in America are being perpetuated by that same econocentric
model that focuses on acquisition as an end. This perception becomes reality for our students
when the market forces endorse the acquisition of capital as goodness and not as a means to
generating goodness. The ideas and ethics associated with these perceptions are manipulated
through any curricula that negate criticality and that focus on essentialism as an end because no
truly new or creative solution to any question will be generated if the acceptable and trained
response is to be acquiescent and mediocre. Historically, acquiescence and mediocrity are
personified in any curriculum that does not focus on growth through creative constructive critical
thinking as exemplified by discourse that is open and radical if need be (Appleby, 1984; Butts,
1980; Colby, et al., 2003; Cornell, 1999; Freire, 1985; Giroux, 1988; Gutmann, 1987; Habermas,
1988; Janowitz, 1983).

Regardless of this acquiescent curricular reality, the technological impetus that has
become part of our students’ everyday lives needs to be exploited in the critical pedagogies of
the future. This use of technology will allow for and aid in the intervention strategies needed to
combat the result of these curricular essentialist and acquiescent methods. The central method of
curricular intervention based on this present curricular reality needs to generate a shift in the
perspectives of our high school students. This shift must realign the students’ perspectives from
econocentric to one that is capable of developing in them the courage to criticize and the drive to create. The question this poses is: to create what? The answer this research offers is the creation of a substitute to capital, namely the creation of beauty. An aesthetic creation of any kind by a student will promote this shift if the same resources that have been driving the econocentric mind are applied to it.

To demonstrate this shift, the research developed a series of definitions that were metaphysically focused upon this perspective and included them in the hermeneutic tool of analysis. By generating the definitions inherent in the research tool based on this focal shift, the research was able to show more clearly whether there was a program, associated with the three perennial windows of interpretation within any of the time periods under consideration, one that was centered on the negation of criticality and the development of acquiescence. This would be evident if the definitions that were generated—a series of constructs associated with a clearly stated metaphysical and subjective focus that centered its analysis on ethics, power, and declarative knowledge with a view towards the ontological and authentic existential development of the subject—were discovered to be different than the definitional constructs that emerged from the hermeneutic and cognitive analysis of the texts under consideration.

The results gave evidence to this difference: they produced a series of results that defined power, ethics and religion, as well as what was considered good, in a much different way than the way expressed in the definitions constructed by the research. Therefore, these definitional constructs, generated by the researcher and used in the hermeneutic analysis, are based on the ability to be critical and constructive relative to the individual and her creative development relative to thought and action within the society. From that perspective, the definitions are a therapeutic tool for the eradication of the submission inherent in an essentialist and acquiescent
curriculum. The fact that they are based on the generation of beauty—an end and not a means but an end, that produces a greater good for the individual and the society, a good that in many periods of history has been considered as perennial—allows the intervention that shifts the mindset from the individual as accepting of the econocentric mind as good, to one that focuses her development critically in a constructive fashion for both individual development ontologically and aesthetically of the self and the society.

Therefore, in that new mindset the individual student is taught that criticality is good; that it is needed in order to take care of the self and the mind; that the shift in focus towards a creative ethic, an action-based system that will help develop a moral or good end, is more important than one that simply gives a mediocre and unimaginative result that can be quantified; and that instead of the acquisition of capital, a qualitative result is more important for the measurement of her development as a member of the state. Consequently, she will learn that it is a responsibility of the citizen not just to be a citizen but to develop the concept of citizenship into one that helps her live a beautiful life (Foucault, 2005; Heidegger, 1962; Kurfis, 1988; Makkreel, 1995; Morris, 1990; Olssen, 1999).

**Recommendations for Further Research**

The recommendations arising from this research are centered on two questions: what we have not discovered, and therefore still do not know about the state of civics education in America, and how we should we go about discovering it. Our limited sample of documents could not provide evidence, of a qualitative or quantitative nature, that shows a national non-critical trend across all texts being used in civics curriculums in American high schools. We have also not been able to compare the pedagogic methods or the individual Constitution tests that are district generated in Illinois high schools. And we have not generated absolute evidence of any
conspiracy associated with hegemonic negation of critical thinking in curricula. Such evidence could be ascertained using a comparative method of qualitative analysis that would deduce, from the basic textual and discursive structures, thematic relationships that could then guide researchers into more detailed analysis of intent.

We also do not yet know whether the state of the civics curriculum in Illinois is evolving relative to criticality. A comparison of different critical thinking stages across states or countries would generate a good baseline to work from. These analyses, in conjunction with tests that would determine the ability levels of the students relative to critical and constructive thinking, could be attained from a survey of the students’ perspectives on civics and the application of a critical thinking exam such as the Watson-Glaser examination (Watson & Glaser, 2011).

Further research consideration should also be given to the effect that a capitalist perspective, as viewed from the effect of publisher sales projections, might have had on the textual content relative to the editions of the Magruder and McClenaghan versions of the text, as well as what influence the body politic, vis-à-vis the No Child Left Behind Act (USDOE, 2001), might be having on content and assessment. Also, future research should focus on the recent macro-democratic movement in American civics education and how the historical perspectives associated with different time periods might affect the inclusion of certain curricular content in future editions of the text, as well as on how the post-1948 political language affected the curriculum from a pro- or anti-American perspective.

These approaches will generate both a qualitative and quantitative picture of the actual ability to apply critical thinking relative to civics by students in the target population. An analysis of the individual district- or high school-based Constitutional examinations needs to be done, and an analysis of the prevalent pedagogies associated with the curriculum needs to be
generated, in order to compare the federal and state standards, the texts, the pedagogies, and the examinations. Only through a process that is this thorough can the evidence be more precise relative to the initial findings generated by this study.

Including aesthetics as an additional window of interpretation in the analytic model will help to show that the creation of beauty, rather than the present econocentric mindset, and should be the focus of future curricula and pedagogies. Also needed is further research of an ontological nature on the student as she develops criticality. This research will examine the student’s educational career as the process of a being, the student, in the act of becoming individually better as a person and as a constructive member of society.
References


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APPENDIX A

Definitions for Use in Ethical Analysis*

1. Ethics in educational instruction is an action-based system whose purpose is the specific achievement of a moral.

   A. Morality is here defined as a culturally-inclusive means of developing lasting individual and social goodness.

      i. Goodness is the result of an action that helps the self and others to live a beautiful existence.

         a) Beauty is the creation of a phenomenon that allows the self and others to attain a natural state of euphoria.

         b) Existence is the active construction of a daily life beyond survival and the acceptance of mediocrity.

      ii. Mediocrity is the acceptance of, and acquiescence to, a non-constructive and non-critical thinking process.

2. Power is the ability to control, through educational means, cognitive and physical human processes.

3. Culture is the specific phenomena or nuomena a society is known for.

Therefore, the ethical side of this tool looks to see if in the language of a text a program is inherent that negates an ethical perspective that would develop lasting individual and social
goodness. The tool looks at the discourses and assessments in the texts to see if a state of acquiescence to mediocrity is evident in them vis-à-vis the phenomena of power and culture.

*The author has generated these definitions based on his understanding of the literature reviewed.
APPENDIX B

Questions for Use in Ethical Analysis

1. What is the ethical perspective, what is the “good,” implied in the discourses?

2. Is there assumptive language in the discourses?

3. What is the focus of the language?

4. What is the definitional perspective inherent in the language of the discourses?

   Scheffler’s definitional analysis lists three possibilities:

   A. Stipulative—Application of a description and program for a specific time-dependent situation.

   B. Descriptive—A non-programmatic description of the phenomena.

   C. Programmatic—An ethical program that is associated with the phenomena.

5. If a programmatic definitional position is inherent in the discourses, is the program based on Ethics, Power, or Culture?
APPENDIX C

Definitions for Use in Analysis of Power*

Subject—The human being who is focusing, discussing, or acting in some way relative to an object.

1. Object—The focus of the phenomenal or intellectual action relative to the human subject.

2. Discourse—A formal way of thinking that usually manifests itself through language—a unity of signs to objects (Foucault, 1994).

3. Formal—set within a specific paradigm or structure, either phenomenological or intellectual.

4. Texts—Any of multiple media that generate an informative message through coherent symbols (Culler, 2002).

5. Declarations—Statements associated with physical or cognitive human processes.

6. Curriculum—A course of study inclusive of multiple media and venues relative to a topic.

7. Ontology—the study of being, and of the characteristics one must have to count as one.

a. This research focuses on the characteristics of a being in the act of becoming educated over time. The criteria include the following categories: “a thing or a property, a relation or an event, a state of affairs or a set” (Audi, 2006, p. 564).
b. Furthermore, “The existence or being of a thing is what makes it an entity” (Audi, 2006, p. 564).

c. An entity is distinct and has specific properties “and perhaps must enter into relations with at least some other entities . . . and “it must be logically self-consistent” (Audi, 2006, p. 565).

8. Power--The ability to use a knowledge base freely in order to attain an authenticity that liberates a subject from sectarian and in-authentic interpretations of acceptability and self discovery

9. Authority--The ability to generate an authentic and socially acceptable enforceable action. Therefore, authority is the ability to generate an action that is socially accepted and enforceable by some agency, and whose genesis is found in the individual existential act of self discovery

   a. Power & Authority are indispensible if one is to initiate an authentic ontological critical education.

10. Ontological Critical Education--An education which develops and supports a constructive criticism of accepted dictums and axioms across all disciplines in order to generate within the individual the courage to question as they journey towards an existential discovery of what it means to be an authentic self. A self whose further goal is the elimination of an econocentric results based mind and its replacement with an aesthetic perspective of existence as its goal. In other words and in a Foucault-like sense; to learn to live a beautiful life as the goal of being.

*The author has generated these definitions based on his understanding of the literature reviewed.
APPENDIX D

Questions for Use in Analysis of Power*

1. How is power defined in the text relative to the subject or object?
2. Is power within the text discursively implied or declaratively stated?
3. Are the discourses or declarations used to control cognitive and/or physical human processes?
4. In the discourses, is power associated with educational methods or a curriculum?
5. Is the subject interpreted as a being ontologically becoming or evolving educationally?
6. Is the subject being discussed or viewed as a text?
APPENDIX E

Definitions for Use in Analysis of Content and Declarative Knowledge*

1. Time-independent paradigms of analysis are politics, economics, and religion. These three disciplines are consistently seen in texts and discourses over all historical periods. Within this set of paradigms, the research includes philosophy since it can be considered, from a metaphysical perspective, as a belief system.

2. Hegemonic structures are the forms “of control exercised primarily through a society's superstructure, as opposed to its base or social relations of production [which have] a predominately economic character” (Mastroianni, 2002, para. 3). Part of the superstructure contains civil society, and included in that sector are schools, churches, and the like, usually considered as private or non-political organizations (Mastroianni, 2002). This definition is exemplified in the work of Gramsci (1971), as reported by Mastroianni (2002), who discusses and breaks down the forms of social control in the following manner:

   a. Social hegemony names the spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group [i.e., the ruling class – in Gramsci's Western Europe, the bourgeoisie]; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.

b. "Political government" names the "apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed" (Mastroianni, 2002, para 6).

3. In relation to an educational program, “hegemony, therefore, is a process by which educative pressure [is] applied to single individuals so as to obtain their consent and their collaboration, turning necessity and coercion into ‘freedom’ . . . " The "freedom" [is] produced by instruments of the ruling class [and] thus molds the "free" subject to the needs of an economic base, "the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production" (Mastroianni, 2002, para 14).

4. Question types are either (a) lower-order, focusing on declarations, asking who, what, where, and when relative to a phenomenon or nuomenal activity, or (b) higher-order, asking how or why, whose focus requires the generation of a critical perspective within the answer.

*The author has generated these definitions based on his understanding of the literature reviewed.
APPENDIX F

Questions Analyzing Content and Declarative Knowledge

1. What is the exoteric, or face-value, message of the text?

2. Which time-independent paradigm of analysis is most evident?

3. Which time-independent paradigm of analysis is least evident?

4. Is there historical support for the absence of a paradigm in the text?

5. What general assumptions are evident in the text?

6. What types of questions are evident in the text?

7. What types of questions are missing from the text?

8. What is the ratio of lower-order to higher-order questions within the text?